Floor Statements

Mr. President, as the people of Serbia approach a critical national election on January 21, 2007, I pay tribute to the journalists and broadcasters who have worked to provide an antidote to forces of extremism in the country. I especially congratulate the Voice of America's Serbian Service and recognize the 10-year anniversary of its first television broadcast. VOA's long-running work in Serbia has played a valuable role in the country's evolution and provided an important source of information during the darkest periods of Serb history. This contribution has been particularly evident as Serbia has undergone profound changes in the last 10 years.

Open Studio, VOA's first daily television newscast, was launched on December 11, 1996, in the wake of massive demonstrations to protest the invalidation of election victories by opponents of Slobodan Milosevic. In the face of public outcry, the Milosevic regime worked quickly to silence independent media outlets in Serbia, including a small, vibrant radio station called B92. The student-run station had distinguished itself by broadcasting hard news about the wars in the former Yugoslavia and engaging in relentless criticism of the Government. VOA's Serbian Service responded to the Milosevic regime's attacks on media freedom by expanding its broadcast and providing extensive reports on the international reaction to the protests in Serbia. On the day Serb authorities finally shut down B92, VOA requested permission to help the station reach its audience via VOA radio waves. As a result, VOA Serbian launched a media solidarity project and began broadcasting reports prepared by B92 stringers. The solidarity project received widespread international attention, including press coverage by the New York Times, Washington Post, CNN, and many other respected media outlets.

After VOA began providing assistance to B92, the Milosevic Government relented and permitted the station's radio service to resume broadcasting. B92's chief editor, Veran Matic, credited VOA's assistance and international pressure on the Milosevic Government with getting his station back on the air. B92 quickly became a symbol of freedom and resistance to ultranationalism during the balance of the Milosevic era. Today, the station is one of the most respected radio and television broadcasters in Serbia.

VOA's Open Studio program has built on its early success and is now carried by 53 television stations in the region; 45 in Serbia and Montenegro, 6 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 1 each in Kosovo and Macedonia. VOA is the leading international broadcaster in Serbia and Montenegro today, reaching 16 percent of the country's population each week through its radio and television programming.

By presenting American values to an audience that was predominantly anti-American, the Voice of America Serbian Service has been an important public diplomacy tool and helped promote United States foreign policy objectives in Southeast Europe. In keeping with the best traditions of the service's 60-year history, VOA has helped guide Serbs toward greater freedom and openness, and encouraged the country to come to terms with the difficult legacy of the Yugoslav wars. VOA's objective, comprehensive reporting and analysis has provided reliable, often indispensable information to the region's Serbian population.

Events in Serbia during the last decade provide compelling evidence of how courageous journalism can serve as a catalyst for democratic change. As the region prepares to deal with new challenges, including potential political changes in Belgrade and Kosovo, there is an ongoing need to provide Southeast Europe with reliable information. Along with the important work of B92 and other brave Serb partners, I applaud the efforts of the Voice of America to convey the facts and represent the United States to the people of Serbia. I look forward to the VOA's continued success in its next decade of service.

The Senate will shortly take a momentous step in U.S.-India relations by passing the conference report on H.R. 5682, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006. Enactment of this legislation brings us much closer to the day when India will resume peaceful nuclear commerce, despite its status as a state that has nuclear weapons and has never been a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It will help bring India into the global nuclear nonproliferation system. It also helps to remove a major irritant in the relations between our two countries.

This bill is a tremendous victory for U.S.-India relations. And it increases the prospect for stability and progress in South Asia and the rest of the world.

It has become cliche to speak of the U.S.-India relationship as a bond between the world's oldest democracy and the world's largest democracy--but this cliche is also a fact. Shared political values are the foundation for our relationship, a firm belief in the dignity of man and the consent of the governed.

Senator Lugar and I yield to no one in our commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. We have taken great care, in this legislation, to protect the role of Congress and of the international institutions that enforce nuclear nonproliferation.

This legislation was the result of hard compromises--compromises between our two countries and between Congress and the executive branch. The end result, however, was overwhelming bipartisan support, in both the House and the Senate. That level of broad, solid, bipartisan buy-in was absolutely essential when crafting legislation with such long-term impact on vital American interests.

I want to pay special tribute tonight to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar of Indiana, for his tremendous contribution to securing that broad, bipartisan consensus. The administration originally proposed legislation that would have effectively taken away the power of Congress to review an agreement for nuclear cooperation with India, and Senator Lugar was under great pressure to accept that proposal. He did not do that. Instead, he held four hearings--three open and one closed--that allowed all sides to express their views and that enabled Senators from both parties to raise their concerns with the approval procedure that the administration had proposed. Then he and I worked to craft a Senate bill that passed by a vote of 16-2 in committee and 85-12 on the floor of the Senate.

Senator Lugar performed a signal service to our country when he added title II to this legislation, the implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is fitting that this legislation has been combined with the India nuclear bill, since part of the nuclear deal is for India to negotiate its own Additional Protocol with the IAEA. It will also be a notable benefit to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy when the United States finally ratifies its Additional Protocol, giving our country greater credibility as it presses other countries to allow the IAEA to increase its inspections of their nuclear programs. Ratification of the U.S.- IAEA Additional Protocol was long delayed, and Senator Lugar's leadership on this issue was absolutely vital to this final, successful conclusion.

In conference with the House of Representatives, Senator Lugar and I once again worked for a measure that could gain broad support from the Senate. We worked with the House conferees to craft a bill that embodied the best ideas from each house of Congress. At the same time, we worked with the Administration to reach agreement on a wide range of issues, without sacrificing the principles that each house had written into its legislation. We and the other conferees chose substance over rhetoric. The result is a conference report that will command the same broad, bipartisan support today that was demonstrated in the Senate 3 weeks ago.

I would like also to acknowledge the staff members who have contributed to the success of this legislation. On the Senate side, the Foreign Relations Committee was most ably served by Ken Myers III, Thomas Moore, Edward Levine and Brian McKeon. Mr. Stephen Rademaker of the majority leader's staff was also an important contributor to our efforts. On the House side, the conferees were most ably served by Douglas Seay, David Fite and David Abramowitz, among others.

The U.S.-India agreement is much more than just a nuclear deal. I believe historians will see this as part of a dramatic and positive departure in the U.S.-India relationship that was begun by President Clinton and continued by President Bush.

In a time when relationships between states are critically important in shaping the world in which we live, no relationship is more important than the one we're building with India. There is still much to be done in India, as a stable and secure India is very much in America's national interest. We should work to help India increase its energy production, combat terrorism, and guard against epidemics of infectious diseases. We should help both India and Pakistan to ease tensions between their countries and, someday, to walk back from the nuclear precipice. And India should continue its progress toward the front rank of world leaders, and especially of leaders in combating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Enactment of this bill today helps both countries to keep moving on the path of cooperation for a better world.

In conclusion, I would like to turn to an issue raised recently by some experts, whether the legislation before us, by citing a particular IAEA document, might undermine the principle of perpetuity of safeguards in India. My view is that the IAEA document makes a real contribution to our understanding of safeguards perpetuity.

The document cited by this legislation appears in section 104(b)(2), the second determination that the President will have to make when submitting a U.S.-India agreement for nuclear cooperation to the Congress. It is an IAEA Board of Governors memo cited as GOV/1621 of 20 August 1973. We have been given permission to publish this document, so I will ask that it be printed in the Record at the end of these remarks.

The Board of Governors memo makes clear that safeguards on nuclear material will extend until that material no longer has any possible nuclear weapons use, or until it is exchanged with an equal amount of previously unsafeguarded material, or until it leaves the country--in which case safeguards may continue elsewhere. In other words, if you move some imported fuel or equipment to a new location, that location becomes subject to safeguards.

The memo also makes clear that safeguards on ``nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material'' supplied to a nuclear facility will apply as well to fissile material ``produced, processed or used in or in connection with'' a safeguarded facility. In other words, any fissile material produced by a safeguarded facility becomes subject to safeguards even after it leaves that facility. Until that output no longer has any possible nuclear weapons use, safeguards follow it; that is a real example of perpetuity of sanctions.

At the same time, perpetuity does not mean that a facility will be subject

to safeguards until the end of time. A facility can be decommissioned so that it, too, no longer has any possible nuclear weapons use. Or, if the only reason for safeguards is that the facility has imported equipment or material, removal of all such equipment or material from the facility could render it eligible for removal from safeguards. Thus, India's reprocessing plant is safeguarded when it handles spent fuel from imported uranium, but not when India is using it to reprocess spent fuel made from domestic uranium. That is the way safeguards have worked for years in India.

The Government of India has announced that eight more of its existing power reactors will be declared as civil and opened to IAEA inspection. India would gain great credibility if it were to let those reactors be inspected even if they use domestic nuclear fuel. Indian officials have suggested, however, that they may insist upon the right to remove those reactors from safeguards if foreign fuel supplies are cut off, and the safeguards agreement that India negotiates with the IAEA may allow for that. There is precedent for such an arrangement, in states that do not have full-scope safeguards, and it would be up to the IAEA Board of Governors, of which the United States is a member, to decide whether that arrangement was permissible in this case. It would be up to Congress and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, of course, to consider whether that sort of safeguards arrangement was sufficient to warrant authorizing peaceful nuclear commerce with India. And it would be up to the executive branch to determine whether to authorize a particular export to India, in light of the safeguards that would govern the facility for which the export was requested.

India has also said that many new power reactors will be put under IAEA safeguards. If those reactors are foreign-built, like the Tarapur reactor, there will be no way that they can be withdrawn from safeguards unless they are decommissioned. If they are domestic designs but use some foreign equipment, there will be no way to withdraw them from safeguards without first removing the foreign equipment. And if foreign equipment should be used in one of the eight domestically built reactors that are put under safeguards, then that equipment, too, would have to be removed before that reactor could be removed from safeguards.

As a matter of principle, then, perpetuity in safeguards applies more to material and equipment than it does to a whole facility, unless that facility is foreign-built. In practice, however, the only reactors that India might pull out of its safeguards regime would be the eight newly- safeguarded ones, and I believe that the only time that this might occur would be if India were to come under sanctions because of improper nuclear activities or weapons proliferation. In such a case, the regime for nuclear cooperation with India would likely be collapsing anyway.

The material follows.

Mr. President, at the end of this year, Anthony ``Tony'' Zagami will retire after 40 years of public service, including the last 16 years at the Government Printing Office, which publishes the Congressional Record for all of us every day.

I first met Tony when I served in my first term in the Senate. He was working as a legislative assistant in the Democratic cloakroom. He spent 25 years working in the Congress, including general counsel to the Joint Committee on Printing.

In 1990, Tony left to become the general counsel at the Government Printing Office. When he retires it will be with the distinction of having been the agency's longest-serving general counsel.

As he moves on, I know all my colleagues join me in thanking him for his dedicated service, and wish him the best for the future.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Madam President, today the Senate is engaged in a truly historic process. When we pass this bill--and I expect we will do that--America will take a giant step closer to approving a major shift in United States-India relations. If we are right, this shift will increase the prospects for stability and progress in South Asia and, I would argue, the world at large. The Committee on Foreign Relations has worked to move this project forward, while safeguarding the role of Congress and minimizing any harm to nuclear nonproliferation policies and institutions. There is no one who has been stronger in dealing with the issue of nonproliferation than my colleague, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I have supported him in those efforts for years.

I urge my colleagues to take a real close look at the argument that is being made by some that this is going to promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The fact is, I believe it will not.

I am going to urge my colleagues at the appropriate time to support this bill. It has been a cliche to speak of the United States-India relationship as a bond between the world's two oldest democracies and the world's two largest democracies, but this cliche is also a fact. Shared political values are the foundation of our relationship and, I would argue, the raison d'etre for taking a chance for those who are doubtful on this treaty. Both the United States and India believe in the dignity of man and the consent of the governed. Both countries are multiethnic and multireligious. Both countries seek economic and social betterment for their people and believe that it is best achieved through peaceful change, both domestically and externally. If that were the whole story, however, it would not have taken us six decades to get to the moment we are now.

For much of the last 60 years, the political structures were trumped by geopolitical ones. Democracy in democratic India was often closer to the Soviet Union, while the United States often favored India's rival Pakistan, particularly during the most undemocratic phase of Pakistan's national history. That alignment was an anomaly of the cold war. Today the United States and Pakistan are important allies in the war on terror and, at the same time, today the national interests of the United States and India are in concert, perhaps more than any time in the past. India and the United States are both status quo powers, at least regarding territory. Neither of us has any claim on any neighboring piece of real estate. We face similar challenges from extremists and terrorists; in some cases, from the same terrorist groups and same individuals. We share a common desire for stability and the spread of liberal democracy throughout Asia and, indeed, throughout the world. And we share a concern about the world's need for energy, especially energy that does not increase the speed and risk of global warming.

The need for new energy supplies is an important underpinning of the issues before us today, legislation opening the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. In time, I hope India's burgeoning energy needs will prove a spur to a wide variety of alternatives to fossil fuels, including solar, wind, and biofuel. On many of these, India has already begun to move, but at present, nuclear power is a vital part of India's energy equation. It is likely to grow in significance in the years to come. Experts note correctly that nuclear power will still provide only a small portion of India's energy consumption even when this passes. But at the margin, the contribution of nuclear power will be greater, and India's leaders across the political spectrum see nuclear power as an important and necessary contributor to their country's economic progress.

The Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation negotiated by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in July of 2005 cannot be implemented unless Congress approves changes in U.S. law. So we in the Senate must now address both the opportunities and the nonproliferation issues raised by that agreement. The administration proposed that we treat the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as if it met all the requirements of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. In fact, it does not. There is no way, of course, that India, with a nuclear weapons program that is outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, could meet these requirements. I compliment my chairman for making it clear to the administration that was a nonstarter.

Were Congress to accept the administration's proposal, it would lose any real ability to influence a nuclear agreement with India. The agreement would be sent to Congress, but we would have to enact a motion to disapprove over a likely Presidential veto within 90 days in order to stop any agreement from entering into effect. That would be a gigantic usurpation of our responsibility. The Foreign Relations Committee, under the leadership of the chairman, rejected this approach, as did the House of Representatives.

The bill before us today would require, instead, an affirmative vote of Congress before a United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement can enter into effect. Section 3709 provides expedited procedures for the resolution to approve such a United States-India agreement. That resolution would not contain any conditions, and it could not be amended. But if Congress found the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement wanting in some respect, it could either reject the expedited resolution or approval or pass a different resolution that did contain conditions. That is what Congress did with the United States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in 1985. So this bill protects congressional powers not for the sake of protecting congressional powers, as if we were interested in turf; it protects the balance of power, the separation of power, which is essential in the formulation of a policy, including foreign policy. At the same time, it offers procedures that will expedite approval of a good agreement.

Section 3907 also allows the President to waive section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act, which provides for annual submission of one export license to Congress. That provision has never been used and would be of little benefit to Congress, as a sale could be blocked only if a resolution of disapproval were enacted, again, over the likelihood of a Presidential veto.

The administration argued that section 128, while giving Congress little real power, would harm U.S. industry

by creating an annual event that would frighten both the customer and the investor from proceeding. We agreed, and this bill includes a section 128 waiver provision that the administration requested. Chairman Lugar and I yield to nobody in our commitment to nonproliferation, and no one has a stronger record on this than Senator Lugar. We believe we have presented to this body a bill that allows civil nuclear cooperation with India to proceed and ends India's nuclear isolation, but it does so without seriously jeopardizing the hard-won nonproliferation gains of nearly the last four decades.

Specifically, our aims have been as follows:

To preserve the right of Congress to conduct a meaningful review of the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement that India and the United States are negotiating; secondly, to ensure that such nuclear cooperation is used exclusively in India's civil nuclear program and that India continues to be a ``good citizen'' when it comes to nonproliferation, as it has been; to preserve the role and procedures of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and of the International Atomic Energy Agency; and to do all this without requiring any renegotiation of the United States-India treaty deal.

Look, every time we have a treaty presented to us in the Senate, there are those of us, including my friend from North Dakota who is on the Senate floor, who believe we can probably do it better. We believe we could have gotten a better deal. We believe we could have gotten a treaty that was even better than the one that exists. But the old expression is that we cannot let the perfect be the enemy of the good.

It wasn't really very easy to do what we set out to do, but I truly believe we have succeeded in the points I have just made. There is a reason this bill was reported out of committee with a 16-to-2 margin; we did really try to address the major nonproliferation concerns legitimately raised by colleagues in the committee.

The Foreign Relations Committee did not endorse, for example, the administration's request for broad waiver authority regarding section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act. That section terminates nuclear exports to a country under certain circumstances. The administration did not want that in place.

The committee agreed that the President needs the right to waive those portions of section 129 which would end exports because India has a nuclear weapons program or because it has tested nuclear devices in the past. But section 3709 doesn't grant a waiver authority regarding those portions of section 129 which would end nuclear exports if India were to, 1, test a nuclear device in the future; 2, terminate or materially violate the IAEA safeguard; 3, materially violate its agreement with the United States, or engage in nuclear proliferation.

Look, if India does any of those things, then the premise upon which we have dealt with a good friend and neighbor was falsely relied upon. I believe India understands the consequence of this bilateral relationship as profoundly as we do. If I am wrong about that and India were to do any or all of the four things I just named, it would clearly violate the spirit of this agreement, part of which, as all agreements ultimately are, is based on some sense of comity and trust.

This bill requires that India sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and negotiate an additional protocol as well. It requires the President to certify, moreover, that the safeguards agreement is ``in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices.'' The President must certify to that effect.

We understand that India, having nuclear weapons, will not accept full-scope safeguards. But the language in this bill makes clear our expectation that the safeguards agreement India works out with the IAEA will guard effectively against diversion of foreign nuclear material and technology to India's military program.

Section 3709 also requires the President to certify that the Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided to permit civil nuclear commerce with India and that the NSG, Nuclear Suppliers Group, decision was made by consensus. We do not want to damage the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which has been a vital institution in our fight against nuclear proliferation. So this bill protects the Nuclear Suppliers Group's role in governing peaceful nuclear commerce.

The administration has said repeatedly that this is an India nuclear deal, not intended to permit nuclear commerce with Pakistan or Israel-- the only other states that never signed the NPT. The committee's bill incorporates that distinction by requiring the President to certify that the NSG--Nuclear Suppliers Group--decision does not permit nuclear commerce with any other state that does not accept full-scope safeguards.

The NSG is not likely to single out India as an exception to its guidelines. Rather, it will create tests that a non-NPT state must meet before nuclear commerce with the country may take place. The committee believes that such a test should be substantial, so that the countries outside the NPT are not all given the same benefits as the nonnuclear weapon states inside the treaty. Thus, the bill before us today is designed to maintain important nonproliferation policies that have served our country well.

With regard to sections 106 and 107, two sections of this bill, they have been cited by some Indian officials as causing concern. I will address these sections, as I do not believe such concern is merited.

Section 106 in the agreement bars the executive branch from exporting to India ``any equipment, materials, or technology related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy water.'' That is because these technologies are all used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. In fact, the administration already has a worldwide policy of not exporting these technologies. Section 106 merely makes that a legal requirement in this case.

Because section 106 makes this a legal requirement, we also added two exemptions. One would be for a program such as the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, which is to develop a new generation of proliferation-resistant nuclear facilities. In other words, the second exemption would be for a facility in an IAEA-approved program to provide alternatives to national fuel cycle capability. For example, there might some day be a South Asian regional uranium enrichment facility under IAEA auspices.

Some Indian officials are reportedly upset because section 106 singles out India. But they have long known that it is U.S. policy not to sell them these technologies, so this is a matter more of pride than of substance, which I hope they deal with. I would not object to making section 106 apply worldwide, but we believed this was too large a step to take in this bill. I would think it should apply worldwide.

Section 107 requires a program to maintain accountability with respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology that we sell, lease, export, or reexport to India. This program would include end-use monitoring conditions, as appropriate. A similar program exists for U.S. nuclear exports to China. Such a monitoring program would enhance confidence in India's separation of its civilian and military nuclear programs. It would also further ensure U.S. compliance with article I of the nonproliferation treaty.

Indian officials are reportedly upset that American personnel might need to visit India's nuclear sites. It should come as no surprise, however, that we need to ensure that U.S. nuclear materials, equipment, and technology are not diverted to military uses.

The purpose of section 107 is not to impose new conditions upon India but, rather, to make sure the executive branch doesn't forget its obligation to guard against diversion. That obligation is already U.S. policy. It also flows from article I of the nonproliferation treaty, which requires nuclear weapon states not to assist nonnuclear weapon states ``in any way'' to manufacture nuclear weapons. And India remains a nonnuclear weapons state under both the NPT and U.S. law, despite the fact that now it does have nuclear weapons.

I hope that in conference we can adjust the wording of section 107 to correct any potential misunderstanding of its effect, which is not intended to be onerous. I also hope that Indian officials will understand the U.S. need to embark upon nuclear commerce with India in a manner that maintains our

nonproliferation policies and fulfills our international obligation. I believe the bill reported out by the Foreign Relations Committee does that in a most reasonable manner and that it will provide a strong foundation for a new beginning in United States-Indian relations.

The United States-Indian agreement is much more than just a nuclear deal, though, Mr. President. I believe historians will see this as a historic step, part of the dramatic and positive departure in United States-Indian relationship that was begun by President Clinton.

President Bush is to be commended for continuing and accelerating the journey President Clinton started in our relations with India.

If I were asked to name the pillars for security in the 21st century, India and the United States would be two of them. India and the United States, working in cooperation toward the same goal, can provide the beginning of a strong foundation for a stable world. And for the United States, no relationship, in my view, is more important than the United States-India relationship maturing along the lines that have begun.

The ultimate success of this agreement will rest on India's willingness and ability to reduce tensions with its nuclear neighbors and achieve nuclear stability. We all hope to see the day when India and Pakistan voluntarily reduce or end their fissile material production, as the recognized NPT nuclear weapons states already have done.

I hope especially that India will not use its peaceful nuclear commerce to free up domestic uranium for increased production of nuclear weapons. The United States-India deal doesn't bar India from doing that. But such a nuclear buildup--unless carried out in response to a direct threat from its nuclear-armed neighbors--would be a gross abuse of the world's trust, in my view. It would sour relations between India and the United States, just at a time when both countries hope to build upon a new foundation that has been laid in the past decade and which I respectfully suggest is in the overwhelming self-interest of both countries.

India and the world will also benefit if India embraces these critical nonproliferation standards. These include the Proliferation Security Initiative; the guidelines and policies of the Australia Group, which, I add, controls exports that could help countries build chemical or biological weapons; and the guidelines and policies of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which combats the spread of advanced conventional weapons.

India is a major world power. India needs to--and will, I believe-- step up to this awesome responsibility. As an important world power, it is important that support for the complete nonproliferation regime would make a gigantic difference in the world. Currently, however, India doesn't stop its companies from exporting dual-use chemicals and equipment to countries such as Iran because those exports are not banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Other leading countries have concluded that unrestrained exports of items that could be used to produce chemical or biological weapons and advanced conventional weapons are a real danger to world stability. It is my fervent hope and prayer that India reaches that conclusion as well. It is time for them to adopt, in my opinion, the same approach to the dangers posed by such proliferation.

India will not attain the respect and status it seeks and deserves in the world unless it takes a willing and active role in preventing proliferation of all kinds. The nuclear deal we are considering today is a sign, however, of the world's desire to bring India into the fold. I hope India will use this deal as a departure point from which it will branch out to embrace all international nonproliferation activities. It will surely be welcomed if it does.

In my view, the bill before us is a victory for United States-India relationships. It is a victory for the quest to move beyond fossil fuels. And it is a victory we have achieved while doing our best to maintain the global effort to end proliferation.

I believe, not guaranteed by this agreement, it will be also a point of departure for India to rethink its role in the world with regard to proliferation of all kinds. I sincerely hope it does.

I end where I began. I think United States-India relations is two of the pillars upon which we have a chance--we have a chance, a real chance--to build a 21st century that is much more stable than the 20th century and to avoid the carnage of the 20th century. It cannot be done without India's cooperation, and it can be done with India's leadership.

I thank my colleagues for listening. I understand my friend from North Dakota may have an amendment or may wish to seek the floor.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I rise to speak to the Dorgan amendment. I appreciate, respect, and share the sentiment and concern of the Senator from North Dakota who has been doggedly supportive of pushing nonproliferation and a nonproliferation regime. And if this were 1998 or 1999, I would support the Senator's amendment. But this is 2006, and a great deal has changed since India and Pakistan both exploded nuclear devices in 1998.

The Security Council resolution passed after those tests called for several things: one including for India and Pakistan to immediately stop their nuclear weapons programs and their ballistic missile programs. We wish they would have ceased their nuclear programs. They did not. We wish they had ceased their programs with regard to missiles. Well, they did not.

So the fact is, it is not realistic. We wish they would join the nuclear test ban treaty. But do we really think that is possible under this administration that is not supportive of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty?

In this legislation, and in the United States-India nuclear agreement, we are making clear that continued cooperation under this nuclear agreement and nuclear exports to India will cease if India, one, tests a nuclear device, terminates or materially violates its IAEA safeguards, materially violates its agreement with the United States, or engages in nuclear proliferation.

Further, the bill requires that India sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and negotiate an additional protocol. It also requires the President to certify that the safeguards agreement is in accordance with the IAEA standards, principles, and practices.

In sum, that is U.S. policy toward India and its nuclear program, and I do not see the purpose of revisiting the old history of 1998. We need to look forward, and that is what we are doing in this legislation. We are using this legislation and the agreement to build a new relationship with India on this issue, and also using it as a means to strengthen the bilateral relationship across the board. And in doing so, we have enshrined important nonproliferation principles into this legislation because we cannot turn back the history of 1998.

So at the appropriate time--and I think we are working now on a consent agreement--I would urge the defeat of the Dorgan amendment.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I will be very brief.

As I said, I really admire, respect, and observe the passion of my friend from North Dakota on this issue. But I think the comparisons are not particularly apt. The wing strut the Senator has was able to be held in his hand because two countries--the United States and the Soviet Union--concluded that it was in their mutual interest to cease and desist and/or significantly reduce the threat each posed to the other. And they were the only threats that existed. The only threat to the United States from a nuclear capability of an ICBM or a Backfire bomber resided in the Soviet Union.

Now, we tried. I was the author of--and, as a matter of fact, there was a South Dakota Senator named Pressler, along with John Glenn, who early on put in legislation relating to sanctions for India.

India obviously violated those sanctions and did not comply with the U.N. resolution. But there is a reason for that--not a justification, a reason. They looked across their borders north and west and saw two nuclear powers--one emerging nuclear power, one existing nuclear power--and they concluded, rightly or wrongly, from their perspective that they had to be a nuclear power.

It is clear nonproliferation does not work in a vacuum. Nonproliferation entreatments, requests, proddings to a nation that finds itself in a situation where it believes it is threatened by a nuclear neighbor have not worked particularly well, offering those two examples, for example.

It seems to me what we are attempting to do is the only route to get to the point where both India and Pakistan are part of a nonproliferation treaty; that is, we are trying to change the regional situation on the ground. It is not going to happen through a nonproliferation treaty. It is going to happen through a rapprochement between India and Pakistan. The idea that we would be able to, through any legislation, prevent India from moving forward to add additional nuclear weapons, if they so choose to do that--there is no legislation we can pass to do that.

What this legislation does is recognize the reality of the geopolitical situation in the region, set up safeguards to deal with the ability for India to use anything we are doing with them to be able to further advance their nuclear capability, give them a new buy-in to an international regime that will have the effect of putting pressure on them to move in the direction we and the Soviets moved on back when that Backfire bomber strut was sawed off a wing, and that is the route we choose. It is not pretty. It is not clear. It is no guarantee. It is not certain to succeed. But I do know one thing: Absent this agreement, there is a likelihood things get worse instead of better, beyond what may already occur.

I appreciate the Senator's comparisons, but I think they are not as apt as they might appear to be because, again, India's motivation, in terms of its viewing its need for a nuclear arsenal, is not unlike the motivation that existed with regard to the United States and the Soviet Union. It is going to take a geopolitical settlement of that, not a nuclear arms control agreement imposing a settlement on India and Pakistan at this moment, now that the genie is out of the bottle.

I appreciate my friend's point and respect his point of view, but I disagree that it is the best way to move forward.

Mr. President, I want to associate myself with the remarks made by the Senator from Indiana.

The amendment requires India to declare as civil reactors all reactors that supply electricity to the civil sector.

There is no way that India will accept this.

I might wish they would, but they will not.

That's because for decades, they have built reactors that can be either civil or military.

So India has reserved as military enough reactors to produce more plutonium for nuclear weapons--in case they decide they need to do that.

But India will also use those reactors for electric power.

If this amendment is enacted, India will have to choose to either make all its power reactors civil, and build new ones to produce plutonium; or waste the electric power capability of its current military reactors.

India will not do that.

So this is a killer amendment.

It's also a killer amendment because it requires India to commit to

verifiably reduce its nuclear weapons stockpile.

I wish India would do that--but it will not.

India fears both Pakistan and China, which also have nuclear weapons.

The Dorgan amendment does not require Pakistan and China to reduce their stockpiles, only India.

This is a non-starter for India.

Finally, the amendment requires India to commit to ``joining a legally-binding, nuclear test moratorium.'' I wish India would do that. I hope the administration will push for that.

But for now, there is only one ``legally-binding, nuclear test moratorium.'' It is called the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.

And I do not think this administration will press India to join that treaty.

So, I sympathize with all of the concerns raised by this amendment. But I know that it would kill the nuclear deal.

That is the bottom line: if we support the deal, we have to reject this amendment.

Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I think there is a need for a mild correction.

Mr. President, if I understand the parliamentary situation properly, and I am not sure I do, I ask unanimous consent that following the offering of the Ensign amendment, the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair so that it may reconvene pursuant to the previous order.

I further ask that the following Senate staff be permitted to attend the closed session, and I send the list to the desk.

The list is as follows:

Mike Disilvestro; Joel Breitner; Mary Jane McCarthy; Paul

Nelson; Richard Verma; Stephen Rademaker; Marcel Lettre;

Nancy Erickson; Lynne Halbrooks; Scott O'Malia; Pam Thiessen;

Thomas Moore; Lynn Rusten; Ed Corrigan; Rexon Ryu; Ken Myers

III; Ken Myers, Jr; Brian McKeon; Ed Levine; Madelyn Creedon;

Nancy Stetson; Diane Ohlbaum; Anthony Blinken; Janice

O'Connell.

Mr. President, before the Chair rules, I will remind Senators that those who attend the closed session are not permitted to bring any electronic devices into the Old Senate Chamber. Mr. President, I send to the desk the list of the names of the staff members that could be present.

Mr. President, how much time remains?

I wonder if the Chair would give me 3 minutes.

Mr. President, I will be very brief.

The Senator stated it well. And I don't like to argue with my friend from California; I seldom ever win, and I am very uncomfortable because I consider her one of my best friends in this body. So it is an uncomfortable position to be in.

I want to make three points. The first is that right now, if India were to engage in transferring any lethal weaponry to Iran, it would be in violation of our law. It would damage the relationship and fundamentally alter our relationship. It is existing U.S. law.

No country can transfer lethal weaponry to Iran and maintain our support. That is No. 1.

The second point I would like to make is with the underlying concern--I know it is much broader than this--of my friend from California. I think if I read her correctly--and I may not be--somehow this agreement is going to yield the prospect that India will be in a better position to transfer some kind of technology in this military- to-military relationship to Iran that will help Iran get the nuclear capability.

The truth is, as the chairman has pointed out, they have entered into an agreement with us not to do that. But, secondly, they have voted in the IAEA with the Board of Governors to sanction Iran, to take issue with Iran, to report it to the U.N., and they voted with us in the U.N. So they are openly taking on Iran in terms of the thing of greatest concern to us all.

I know my friend spoke eloquently about the support of terrorism by Iran. The implication is that any military-to-military assistance goes directly to helping the capability of the Iranians to help support Hezbollah and other organizations that are terrorist organizations around the world.

I will make the following observation: She also stated accurately that Indian entities have been sanctioned for transferring materials to Iran. I must point out, so has Germany, so has the Spanish, so have European allies of ours. They also had entities sanctioned. It is not unique to India that an organization would, in fact, provide assistance to Iran in a way that would generate United States sanctions. Spain is the most recent offender.

I conclude by saying this is the hardest piece to swallow--not what the Senator said, but what I am about to say is the hardest piece to swallow. Palmerston had the famous expression that countries don't have permanent friends, they have permanent interests.

Look where India resides and look where Iran resides. One of the countries they are most concerned about is Pakistan. Now, it is not reasonable to assume that India and Iran would not want to have a military relationship where they shared information and/or concerns relative to Pakistan. So for them to forswear any kind of relationship at all with India that has a military or quasi-military relationship is to essentially suggest to them that they should not deal with a common enemy.

Look what we are doing. We are dealing with a country that we sanctioned

before, that we have clearly decided is not a democratic country, that clearly has probably the largest percentage of jihadists residing in it, with, arguably, the least significant effort to deal with these jihadists--the country of Pakistan. What are we doing? Because we have permanent interests, and our interests are that we have support in the war against jihadists and al-Qaida and terrorist organizations, we are cooperating with a country we otherwise probably would not cooperate with.

How would we feel if a European country or any other country around the world said--or India said--we will not trade with you, the United States of America, as long as you continue to have a military-to- military relationship with Pakistan, a country that is, in fact, exporting--or if they are not exporting, at least cooperating with or turning a blind eye to the terrorist organizations that reside within their country? We would say, Wait a minute. You want to trade with us, trade with us. You want to tell us whether out of our self-interest we can cooperate with Pakistan--which is not what you call a model democracy--then we would say no.

The only generic point I want to make, I know of no evidence--it may exist, but I am unaware of it--where India is materially cooperating with Iran in order for Iran to be able to better supply, support, and/ or encourage terrorism. I know of no such interest and no such circumstance. Maybe my friend may know what I do not. She may have gotten a recent briefing with the Intelligence Committee where somebody said that, but I am unaware of any such cooperation that has the net effect of promoting terror.

What I do know is we have built into the law now the ability to sanction India if, in fact, India does supply lethal weapons or was in any way cooperating with promoting Iran's nuclear program. Beyond that, it would break the spirit of the entire agreement we have with India. If it came to light that somehow there was evidence that India was in any way cooperating with Iran's nuclear program, this deal is done. This is over. It is finished. It is gone.

At the root of this overall agreement, which my colleague, understandably, does not like, the underlying issue here is this agreement between India and the United States. The underlying premise is based upon a notion of a maturing relationship based on trust that they will not only not violate the letter but will not violate the spirit of this agreement.

Let me conclude by saying what the spirit of the agreement is. The spirit of the agreement is we are not going to do anything, United States of America, that we would not otherwise be able to do; we will not do anything with what you provide for us that will increase our capacity, our ability, our desire, or our intent to deal with our nuclear program.

They have said straightforwardly at the same time, We are keeping our nuclear program. We ain't giving it up.

It is a little bit like us saying now--and this will be my last statement--you know, Pakistan violated the law, Pakistan violated our law. It went out and it broke the deal and it did what India did. On top of that, Pakistan was the largest proliferator in the history of the world of nuclear capability through A.Q. Khan. And guess what. We are going to bite our nose off to spite our face. Now that we need Pakistan in dealing with this war on terror, we are going to sanction Pakistan, we are not going to cooperate with Pakistan, we are going to do nothing with Pakistan even though we acknowledge that might give greater sustenance to al-Qaida, bin Laden, the Taliban, et cetera.

Countries make hard choices. They are not neat and clean. I suggest if we are going to impose upon India a requirement to cease and desist with any military-to-military relationships notwithstanding they have common enemies and common concerns with Iran, as bad as Iran is, notwithstanding the fact that there is no evidence that they are promoting and/or giving the ability to support terrorism's greater thrust, notwithstanding the fact they have agreed to do everything they can to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, if we are going to sanction them this way, I ask the rhetorical question: Why wouldn't the rest of the world sanction us for our relationship with Pakistan. And why are we cooperating with Pakistan? If anybody in the deal is not the ideal partner right now, it is Pakistan.

But what do we do? To steal a phrase from a former President that I often hear, comments we hear on CNN all the time, his comment always is ``you got to accept life in the world as you find it.'' I am paraphrasing a former President. I think it is close to a quote. We have to accept the world as we find it, make the best out of it, and promote our interest to the greatest extent. Sometimes it means we make less than perfect deals.

Had Chairman Lugar been President Lugar, had Senator Boxer been Senator Boxer, had I been their Secretary of State, I believe I could have gotten a better deal than we got. But the fact is, we are where we are, as the old trade expression goes, and I believe the downside of rejecting this treaty is so much further down than any downside that flows from supporting this changed law allowing this to go forward. In that sense, it is not a close call.

I suggest to my friend, I think everything she says has merit in the abstract. But we are living in the world we live in now based on the parameters we are looking at. I think this amendment, which would kill the agreement, is not worth the candle because it would do that--not because it doesn't have underlying merit.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, let me, in brief response, say I understand the intent of the amendment. But the amendment uses the words, for example, ``India cannot use United States-origin equipment . . . ,'' ``India cannot replicate and subsequently use. . . .'' No one can certify they cannot. It is possible they could. The question is whether we are insisting that they not use it. We are insisting they are not using it, and we have built into this agreement a requirement on the part of the administration to look at whether they are, in fact, doing it.

So the question is not whether they can or cannot. Anything can happen. A President cannot certify it is not possible. That is what ``cannot'' says. But he can certify to the best of his knowledge it is not occurring. That is what we require. ``Cannot'' makes this a deal- breaker. No President could certify it. ``Cannot'' translates into ``it is not possible to replicate, it is not possible to . . . ,'' and no one can certify to that.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I rise today to pay special tribute to the General Federation of Women's Clubs and their recent work to fight domestic violence. The organization is a gem among our midst. Founded in April 1890, it is one of the world's oldest and largest women's volunteer organizations. More than 150,000 women members in 5,000 local and 20 international clubs volunteer over 13 million hours and contribute approximately $35 million through more than 160,000 club projects. I can't underestimate how powerful and influential this corps of volunteers is to the health of our Nation.

I am particularly proud that this year the international president, Jacqueline Pierce, has adopted ``Domestic Violence Awareness and Prevention'' as her President's Special Project for 2006-2008. Nannette White, a member from Louisiana, serves as the national chairperson of the President's Special Project, and with the support of a national committee of women, promotes participation in this project. All across the Nation, local women's clubs are adopting battered women's shelters and donating needed goods such as food, linens, health care items, and more. In Nevada, members sponsored a public service campaign on radio stations to promote important messages about violence prevention. In Mississippi, members distributed 2,000 fliers with information on the National Domestic Violence Hotline and helped raise funds for the Mississippi State Coalition Against Domestic Violence. This is just a small sampling of the good works being done.

As part of this special project, the General Federation of Women's Clubs forged a historic collaboration with the Family Violence Prevention Fund, the National Domestic Violence Hotline, the National Network to End Domestic Violence and domestic violence organizations in communities throughout the United States. Innovative partnerships between the public and private sector, new relationships between organizations--these are the pathways to solutions to our Nation's most pressing problems.

I have spent almost 34 years of my life in Congress and witnessed the transformative impact of powerful Federal legislation. For instance, the Violence Against Women Act improved Federal and State criminal laws and enacted programs that encourage prosecution of abusers, create battered women's shelters and sponsor educational campaigns. Over the past decade, the act's programs have distributed over $4 billion to States, local governments, and nonprofit organizations. Yet despite this extraordinary success, I am convinced that Federal Government action alone cannot end domestic violence. We desperately need the individual attention and dedication of volunteers. Change happens one woman at a time and one volunteer at a time. The volunteer work done by club members fills an invaluable role. As my mother would say, these are the people who do God's work.

I commend Madam President Pierce for her leadership and commitment to airing our Nation's ``dirty little secret,'' domestic violence. She has brought a whole new legion of women warriors to help battered women and their children. On behalf of the entire Senate, I thank them for their tireless volunteerism to end domestic violence and giving women what they haven't had before--hope.

Mr. President, the country of Cyprus has occupied a special place in my heart for many years. My admiration for the island and its people grew in recent months as Cypriots opened their arms to assist the thousands of American citizens who fled from Lebanon during this summer's fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. This exceptional display of Hellenic hospitality has reaffirmed Cyprus's importance as a safe harbor amid the unsettled waters of the eastern Mediterranean and a key partner for the United States.

For far too long, however, Cyprus has existed as an island divided. An invasion by Turkey in 1974 needlessly separated the island's ethnically Greek and Turkish citizens--two communities that had successfully coexisted for centuries. A generation has now grown to adulthood on either side of a Green Line that segregates Cypriots from both their peaceful shared history and their promising shared destiny. Mr. President, I believe we must correct this wrong before another generation endures a similar fate.

In 2004, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan presented a plan to reunite the island's two communities. The Annan plan certainly wasn't perfect, but it brought the island closer to reunification than any peace initiative in the past three decades. After the plan failed to gain the support of the Greek Cypriot community in an April 2004 referendum, the drive to unify the island largely stagnated, and the U.N. closed its ``good offices'' mission in Nicosia that had worked to facilitate peace negotiations.

Over the summer, I have been encouraged by the first real signs of movement toward a settlement since the Annan plan was rejected. Ibrahim Gambari, the United Nations Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, visited Cyprus in July and presided over a joint meeting between the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, and the head of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mehmet Ali Talat. The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to seek a political settlement in an agreement signed on July 8. They are now poised to begin a new round of technical talks that I hope will move the peace process forward.

Mr. President, others have rightly stated that Cypriot problems need Cypriot solutions, but I am convinced that those solutions won't be forthcoming without the forceful support of the international community. For years, the United Nations has played a critical role in Cyprus, maintaining a ceasefire and facilitating a political settlement. Under Secretary Gambari will report to the U.N. Security Council in the beginning of December, and the Security Council and Secretary General will subsequently decide whether to renew the mandate of UNFICYP, the U.N. Peacekeeping mission in Cyprus, and reopen the Secretary General's good offices mission in Nicosia.

Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders should take advantage of this window of opportunity and launch the technical talks they committed to as part of the July 8 agreement. Once they do, the international community should be ready to support them. I am convinced that given the right conditions and adequate international backing, a solution in Cyprus is both possible and attainable. I hope that members of the Security Council will reach the same conclusion and act accordingly when the issue is before them, and that the new U.N. Secretary General will build on Secretary General Annan's leadership to facilitate a peaceful resolution of this long-running conflict.

When it finally happens, the reunification of Cyprus will have significance far beyond the shores of the Mediterranean. A united Cyprus will stand as an example to the world of how different ethnic groups can overcome past wrongs, bridge differences, and live together as neighbors. At a time when too many countries are beset by demons of ethnic and sectarian hatred, it is more important than ever to find an answer to the Cyprus question. If the United States and other members of the international community are willing to act as catalysts for a political settlement, I am confident that future generations of Cypriots can enjoy the peace they rightly deserve.

Mr. President, earlier this year, Dr. David Roselle, a personal friend and longtime president of my alma mater, the University of Delaware, announced that he will retire in May. I have the greatest respect for Dr. Roselle and the tremendous job he has done at the institution I love.

The average tenure of a university president, I am told, is a little over 6 years, about the term of a U.S. Senator. When Dr. Roselle leaves, he will have served 17 years, equivalent to almost a three-term Senator. That is staying power that has let him turn the University of Delaware from a very good regional school into a university, known nationally for its academic excellence.

When constituents ask me: ``My child has gotten into this university or that university. Where should she go?'' I say go to that university they can get into now and are quite certain 10 years from now they would never be admitted. That certainly would have been my story at the University of Delaware.

Back when I was a student in the early 1960s, we had 4,000 undergraduates, maybe 400 graduate students. Today, there are 15,000 undergraduates and 3,000 graduate students. They come from all over the country and world.

But what is really different between then, and now, is not the quantity, but that even the highest caliber students must now worry about their ability to get in. During Dr. Roselle's tenure, the SAT scores of entering freshman has risen significantly.

All of us in public service have the goal to leave the place better than how we found it, and Dr. Roselle has clearly done that, on many fronts.

Physically, under his leadership, he oversaw the building and rebuilding of about two dozen structures, including a new sports/ convocation center, a new center for the arts that opened recently, new laboratories, new residences, and new academic buildings. He brought technology into the infrastructure, so all campus buildings are 21st century ready.

Financially, he has nearly quadrupled the university's endowment, to $1.2 billion, far exceeding anyone's expectations. The number of endowed faculty positions has increased from 20 some 10 years ago to more than 100 today, allowing the university to attract excellent faculty members.

Since he arrived, he increased student aid from $19 million to $56 million and started scholarship support so more students can study abroad. The University of Delaware started the first Study Abroad Program in the world 80 years ago, and today, 40 percent of undergraduates spend some time learning abroad, increasingly important preparation for a job in today's global economy.

All of us in this Chamber should feel good about helping expand the university's scientific programs. During Dr. Roselle's tenure, Congress appropriated almost $90 million for defense work, primarily at the University's Center for Advanced Composite Materials. It has been put to good use. They have developed critical basic composite materials and production techniques to produce the lighter, more capable vehicles, guns, armor, and ships our military needs.

We also should feel good about the millions of dollars Congress has directed to the university to help fight avian influenza, develop clean energy technologies, and for biotechnology research, among other activities.

I also note that Dr. Roselle presided over Blue Hen football teams that combined had a 135-54-1 record and brought to Newark a national championship, a proud day for all of our alumni.

The list of his accomplishments is long, and I could go on. But it is not so much what he has built, as what the 70,000 students who graduated during his tenure will accomplish with the quality education he had such a strong hand in giving them.

Our alma mater has a wonderful line, ``We give thee thanks for glorious days beneath thy guiding hand,'' and it is certainly his hand as well as his head and heart that has guided the university into the wonderful institution it is today.

I know I speak for all of my colleagues in extending Dr. Roselle our heartfelt congratulations.

Mr. President, I want to start by complimenting Senators Warner, McCain and Graham and the work that they did to improve this bill, particularly in two areas.

First, our colleagues did the right thing by rejecting the attempt by the administration to reinterpret, by statute, Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions. That would have been an enormous mistake--and an invitation for other countries to define for themselves what the Geneva Conventions require.

Second, our colleagues were right to reject the use of secret evidence in military commissions. Such a proposal is not consistent with American jurisprudence, and would not have satisfied the requirements of the Supreme Court decision in Hamdan.

Overall, the bill provides a much better framework for trying unlawful enemy combatants than under the flawed order issued by the President. All this is positive, and our three colleagues deserve credit for their good work.

But the bill contains a significant flaw. It limits the right of habeas corpus in a manner that is probably unconstitutional. Don't take my word for it. Listen to the words of a conservative Republican, Kenneth Starr, who used to sit on this nation's second highest court, and is now one of the country's leading appellate advocates, in a letter written to Senator Specter earlier this week:

Article 1, section 9, clause 2 of the United States

Constitution provides that ``[t]he privilege of the Writ of

Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of

Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.'' The

United States is neither in a state of rebellion nor

invasion. Consequently, it would be problematic for Congress

to modify the constitutionally protected writ of habeas

corpus under current events.

Accordingly, I believe this bill is likely unconstitutional. I hope that I am wrong. But I fear that I am right, and that we will be back here in a few years debating this issue again.

We had one chance to get this right--to ensure that we don't end up back here again after a new round of litigation. There was no reason to rush. No one challenges our right to detain the high-value prisoners the President just transferred to Guantanamo. We are not about to release them--nor should we.

But rush we did. In the last week, there have been two different versions of the legislation that emerged from closed-door negotiations with the administration. My colleagues may be willing to trust the legal judgment and competence of this administration. But I am not.

Since 9/11, several major cases have gone to the Supreme Court that relate to the laws governing the war on al-Qaida and the President's powers. And the administration has been wrong too many times--wrong about whether habeas corpus rights applied to detainees in Guantanamo Bay, wrong about whether U.S. citizens detained as enemy combatants had a right to meaningful due process, and wrong about whether the military commissions the President established by order were legal. Simply put, I am not willing to trust the administration's legal judgment again. And it is clear that the administration has put its imprint on this legislation in several troubling respects, including in the stripping of habeas rights.

In the struggle in which we are engaged against radical fundamentalists, we must be both tough and smart. This bill is not smart because it risks continued litigation about how we detain and try unlawful enemy combatants.

It is also not smart because it risks continued harm to the image of the United States. The 9/11 Commission concluded that ``[a]llegations that the United States abused prisoners in its custody make it harder to build the diplomatic, political, and military alliances the government will need.'' The recently released National Intelligence Estimate made plain that there are several factors fueling the spread of the jihadist movement, including ``entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness.'' The mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib, and concerns about our policies governing detainees at Guantanamo Bay, undoubtedly fuel these grievances and anger against the United States. Our detainee policies have also made it harder for our allies to support our anti-terrorism policies. We have to get this right.

Therefore, even though our colleagues achieved significant improvements, I cannot support this legislation.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Homeland Security Trust Fund Act of 2006. And, I do so because it is my sincere belief, that in order to better prevent attacks here at home, we must dramatically reorder the priorities of the Federal Government.

This legislation, which I unsuccessfully attempted to attach to the port security legislation 2 weeks ago, will reorder our priorities by creating a homeland security trust fund that will set aside $53.3 billion to invest in our homeland security over the next 5 years. Through this trust fund we will allocate an additional $10 billion per year over the next 5 years to enhance the safety of our communities.

Everyone in this body knows that we are not yet safe enough. Independent experts, law enforcement personnel, and first responders have warned us that we have not done enough to prevent an attack and we are ill-equipped to respond to one. Hurricane Katrina, which happened just over a year ago, demonstrated this unfortunate truth and showed us the devastating consequences of our failure to act responsibly here in Washington. And, last December, the 9/11 Commission issued their report card on the administration's and Congresses' progress in implementing their recommendations. The result was a report card riddled with D's and F's.

And, to add to this, the FBI reported earlier this summer that violent crime and murders are on the rise for the first time in a decade. Given all of this, it is hard to argue that we are as safe as we should be.

To turn this around, we have to get serious about our security. If we establish the right priorities, we can do the job. We can fund local law enforcement, which the President has attempted to slash by over $2 billion for fiscal year 2007. We can give the FBI an additional 1,000 agents to allow them to implement reforms without abandoning local crime. We can secure the soft targets in our critical infrastructure, to ensure that our chemical plants and electricity grids are protected from attacks. We can immediately re-allocate spectrum from the television networks and give it to our first responders so they can talk during an emergency.

I know what many of my colleagues here will argue. They will argue that it is simply too expensive to do everything. This argument is complete malarkey. This is all about priorities. And, quite frankly this Congress and this administration have had the wrong priorities for the past 5 years.

For example, this year the tax cut for Americans that make over $1 million is nearly $60 billion. Let me repeat that, just one year of the Bush tax cut for Americans making over $1 million is nearly $60 billion. In contrast, we dedicate roughly one-half of that-- approximately $32 billion--to fund the operations of the Department of Homeland Security. We have invested twice as much for a tax cut for millionaires--less than 1 percent of the population--than we do for the Department intended to help secure the entire nation.

For a Nation that is repeatedly warned about the grave threats we face, how can this be the right priority? The Homeland Security Trust Fund Act of 2006 would change this by taking less than 1 year of the tax cut for millionaires--$53.3 billion--and investing it in homeland security over the next 5 years. By investing this over the next 5 years at just over $10 billion per year, we could implement all the 9/11 Commission recommendations and do those commonsense things that we know will make us safer.

For example, under this amendment, we could hire 50,000 additional police officers and help local agencies create locally based counter- terrorism units. We could hire an additional 1,000 FBI agents to help ensure that FBI is able to implement critical reforms without abandoning its traditional crime fighting functions. We could also invest in security upgrades within our critical infrastructure and nearly double the funding for state homeland security grants. And, the list goes on.

We continually authorize funding for critical homeland security programs, but a look back at our recent appropriations bills tells us that the funding rarely matches the authorization. Just this July we passed the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Budget. In that legislation, the Senate allocated only $210 million for port security grants--which is just over one-half of the amounts authorized in the

bipartisan port security legislation that passed the Senate 2 weeks ago.

Yet, another example of this problem is our shameful record on providing funding for rail security. For the last two Congresses, the Senate has passed bipartisan rail security legislation sponsored by myself, Senator McCain and others. This legislation authorizes $1.2 billion to secure the soft targets in our rail system, such as the tunnels and stations. Notwithstanding, we have only allocated $150 million per year for rail and transit security with less than $15 million allocated for intercity passenger rail security.

So, while it is critical that we have acknowledged the need for increased rail security funding by passing authorizations, unless we invest the money, it doesn't really mean much. Unfortunately, this is an example that is repeated over and over.

We know that the murder rate is up and that there is an officer shortage in communities throughout the Nation. Yet, we provide $0 funding for the COPS hiring program and we've slashed funding for the Justice Assistance Grant.

We know that our first responders can't talk because they don't have enough interoperable equipment. Yet, we have not forced the networks to turn over critical spectrum, and we vote down funding to help local agencies purchase equipment every year.

We know that only 5 percent of cargo containers are screened, yet we do not invest in the personnel and equipment to upgrade our systems.

We know that our critical infrastructure is vulnerable. Yet, we allow industry to decide what is best and provide scant resources to harden soft targets.

The 9/11 Commission's report card issued last December stated bluntly that ``it is time we stop talking about setting priorities and actually set some.''

This legislation will set some priorities. First, we provide the funding necessary to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Next, we take the commonsense steps to make our Nation safer. We make sure that law enforcement and first responders have the personnel, equipment, training they need, and are sufficiently coordinated to do the job by providing $1.15 billion per year for COPS grants; $160 million per year to hire 1,000 FBI agents; $200 million to hire and equip 1,000 rail police. $900 million for the Justice Assistance Grants; $1 billion per year for interoperable communications; $1 billion for Fire Act and SAFER grants.

In addition, we could invest in new screening technologies to protect the American people by providing $100 million to improve airline screening checkpoints and $100 million for research and development on improving screening technologies. We also set aside funding to soften hard targets by setting aside $500 million per year for general infrastructure grants; $500 million per year for port security grants, and $200 million per year to harden our rail infrastructure. And the list goes on.

I will conclude where I started. This is all about setting the right priorities for America. Instead of giving a tax cut to the richest Americans who don't need it, we should take some of it and dedicate it towards the security of all Americans. Our Nation's most fortunate are just as patriotic as the middle class. They are just as willing to sacrifice for the good of our Nation. The problem is that no one has asked them to sacrifice.

The Homeland Security Trust Fund Act of 2006 will ask them to sacrifice for the good of the Nation, and I'm convinced that they will gladly help us out. And to those who say this won't work, I would remind them that the 1994 Crime Bill established the Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund, specifically designated for public safety, that put more than 100,000 cops on the street, funded prevention programs and more prison beds to lock up violent offenders. It worked; violent crime went down every year for 8 years from the historic highs to the lowest levels in a generation.

Our Nation is at its best when we all pull together and sacrifice. Our Nation's most fortunate citizens are just as patriotic as those in the middle class, and I am confident that they will be willing to forgo 1 year of their tax cut for the greater good of securing the homeland. The bottom line is that with this legislation, we make clear what our national priorities should be, we set out how we will pay for them, and we ensure those who are asked to sacrifice, that money the government raises for security actually gets spent on security.

This legislation is about re-ordering our homeland security priorities. I realize that it will not be enacted this year, but I will introduce this legislation again in the next Congress and I will push for its prompt passage and I hope to gain the support of my colleagues in this effort.

Mr. President, earlier this month, the Wilmington community lost Julianne Hammond--one of our most prominent lawyers and a good friend to my wife Jill.

She was the 28th woman ever admitted to practice law in Delaware and worked for 30 years in real estate finance and land use law, changing the landscape of our city with many redevelopment efforts.

Juli was a very outgoing, optimistic, happy person, who never let her illness get her down even as she battled breast cancer for 18 years. She literally worked until a week or so before she passed away, never talking about how sick she was.

She also was a very caring person and wanted to help others in their battles with cancer. That is how we got to know Juli. In 1994, she became a founding board member of the Biden Breast Health Initiative to help educate young women on the importance of breast self-exam and early detection. She would assist Jill with special events and raising funds, doing everything and anything to help others.

I don't know how she had the time and energy, but Juli also served as vice president of the board of the Wilmington Economic Development Corporation, a board member of the Land Use Committee for the Committee of 100, and secretary of the board of the Wellness Community of Delaware.

Wilmington and New Castle County will not be the same without Juli. I know my colleagues join Jill and me in extending our deepest sympathies to her family.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding time to me.

Mr. President, last Thursday I introduced a bipartisan resolution urging the President to take immediate action to avert a looming tragedy in Darfur, Sudan. I urge the Senate to pass it today. The Government of Sudan has launched an all but military offensive in Darfur that could result in hundreds of thousands of deaths. The United States must lead the international community to save those lives. It is urgent that we act.

Over the past 2 years the situation in Sudan has remained dire. As many as 400,000 people have died. Two million people have been displaced from their homes, over 200,000 are refugees in Chad, and 3 million rely on international aid. Those numbers haven't diminished over time, they have gotten worse. And now, they may be on the brink of becoming even more catastrophic.

In May of this year, the Government of Sudan and rebels in Darfur-- specifically the Minni Minawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Army-- signed a peace agreement. Tragically, instead of improving the security situation, the Darfur Peace Agreement has made things worse.

The agreement never had the support of the entire SLA, or the other major rebel movement in Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement. Nor did it have the support of people living in displaced persons camps in Darfur. In the days and weeks after news of the agreement spread, violence in camps increased either because people misunderstood what was in the agreement, or they felt the agreement was flawed. And violence on the ground became worse, as the rebel factions split and fighting erupted between those who had signed the Darfur Peace Agreement and those who had not.

Tens of thousands of people have been displaced in fighting since May--50,000 in the last 2 months alone. Many of them have taken refuge in camps for the internally displaced. Attacks on humanitarian aid convoys have increased by a factor of more than 10 compared to this time last year. Twelve humanitarian workers have been killed in the past 4 months--more than during the entire previous year. Two hundred internally displaced women have been raped and another 200 violently assaulted over the course of the past 5 weeks.

The United Nations, after months of delay, finally extended the mandate of the U.N. Mission in Sudan--UNMIS--to Darfur at the end of August. And, through U.N. Security Council Resolution 1706, it authorized the deployment of over 17,000 peacekeepers and 3,000 civilian police to Darfur.

However, the Government of Sudan has categorically rejected the deployment of the U.N. force. In fact, the Sudanese Government has launched a military offensive in the region. Khartoum has sent over 10,000 troops to Darfur and has resumed aerial bombardments. Seven villages--villages, not military targets--were bombed just this weekend. African Union officials have stated that they will not extend the mission in Sudan past the end of this month. I understand that the African Union Peace and Security Council will meet in New York on September 18, just before the U.N. General Assembly meeting takes place. But it is unclear if the AU will reverse its decision to terminate its mission in Sudan. If it does terminate it, ``Katey, bar the door,'' all the carnage going on now will be increased multifold.

Even if the impediments I just mentioned did not exist, it would be months--we are talking January--before a U.N. mission could fully deploy, so we need the AU to stay in place a while longer.

In the mean time, Khartoum is doing its level best to be sure that no U.N. force comes to Darfur. The Government of Sudan's tactic seems to be to scorch enough earth--and people--such that there will be no need for the peacekeeping force because there will be no one left to protect and no peace to keep.

At this point in time, right here today, we are at a pivotal moment. Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese are in camps, vulnerable to aerial and ground attacks from government forces. We cannot stand by and do nothing.

This resolution is very straightforward. It calls on the President to undertake three key actions, some of which the Senate has asked him to do before:

First, it once again calls on him to pursue the imposition of a no- fly zone through the U.N. NATO or NATO allies. The Senate asked the President to propose that NATO consider how to implement and enforce such a no-fly zone in March of this year. If anything the need to enforce a no-fly zone has increased.

Second, it asks that the President secure the necessary support from United Nations member states to schedule a special session on Sudan in the United Nations Human Rights Council. The international community must speak out on the atrocities which continue to unfold in Sudan--and it must act.

Third, it asks the President to appoint a Special Envoy to Sudan to head the office that Senator DeWine and I established at the State Department through the supplemental appropriations bill signed into law in June. The administration has avoided naming a Special Envoy to Sudan for years, and our diplomatic efforts have suffered as a result.

I am under no illusion that these actions alone will stop the Sudanese Government's murderous actions in Darfur. The international community must put a credible international force on the ground as soon as possible. NATO should be prepared to help the AMIS hand-off to the United Nations. The U.S. should impose targeted financial, travel, and diplomatic sanctions against the Sudanese leadership, rebel forces, and others determined to be responsible for the atrocities and pursue the immediate imposition of similar sanctions by the U.N. Security Council and the European Union as called for by U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1564. It is long past time for the Security Council to take such action. If the Council cannot act because of threats of a Russian or Chinese veto, then the United States and Europe should do so together.

I visited the camps across the border in Chad. It is an absolute tragedy. There are tens of thousands of people in that one camp alone, with no real protection. When the appropriate time comes I will introduce this resolution. I hope it meets the approval of my colleagues. I hope the President will listen.

I thank the managers of the bill for yielding me this time.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside.

Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, since I only have 2 minutes--and I am not going to ask for a vote on it now--my amendment talks about the dirty little word no one wants to talk about: How are we going to pay for all this? The fact is, we are arguing over peanuts. The fact is, we should set up a trust fund as we did with the violent crime trust fund. We should fund everything everyone knows we need to fund here, all those elements the 9/11 Commission called for, plus reinstating local law enforcement.

The whole cost of that would be less than 1 year--1 year--of the tax cut for people making over $1 million. My amendment sets up a trust fund, has $53 billion put into that trust fund, displaced over 5 years--$10 billion a year--to pay for all we are doing here.

Rich folks are just as patriotic as poor folks. It instructs the Finance Committees to go out and find the means by which they would deal with that, take it 1 year or take a piece of it over 5 years.

The bottom line is, this is crazy. We are talking about all that we do not have. We are passing amendments like the Biden-McCain amendment or the McCain-Biden amendment on rail. We know it is never going to be funded. We know the cost is about $50 billion to fund what we all need. Yet, at the same time, we are spending three times as much on a tax cut as we are spending on how we are going to do it.

This is only for people making over $1 million. Again, I floated this with millionaires. I have been with groups who are millionaires. I have asked them: Would you object to giving up 1 year of your tax cut?

The response is: No, if you guarantee me it is going to go to provide for security.

This amendment would guarantee that, set up a trust fund. For those who are skeptical about trust funds, let me remind you, we did it with the violent crime trust fund. It worked, and it reduced crime. We should step to the plate and say how we are going to pay for it.

Everyone in this body knows that we are not yet safe enough. Independent experts, law enforcement personnel, and first responders have warned us that we have not done enough to prevent an attack and we are ill-equipped to respond to one.

Hurricane Katrina, which happened just over a year ago, demonstrated this unfortunate truth and showed us the devastating consequences of our failure to act responsibly here in Washington.

And, last December, the 9/11 Commission issued their report card on the administration's and Congress's progress in implementing their recommendations. The result was a report card riddled with D's and F's. And, to add to this, the FBI reported earlier this summer that violent crime and murders are on the rise for the first time in a decade.

Given all of this, it is hard to argue that we are as safe as we should be. To turn this around, we have to get serious about our security.

If we establish the right priorities, we can do the job. We can fund local law enforcement, which the President has attempted to slash by over $2 billion. We can give the FBI an additional 1,000 agents to allow them to implement reforms without abandoning local crime. We can secure the soft targets in our critical infrastructure, to ensure that our chemical plants and electricity grids are protected from attacks. We can immediately re-allocate

spectrum from the television networks and give it to our first responders so they can talk during an emergency.

I know what many of my colleagues here will argue. They will argue that it is simply too expensive to do everything. That is malarkey. This is all about priorities. And, quite frankly, this Congress and this administration has had the wrong priorities over the past 5 years.

For example, this year the tax cut for Americans who make over $1 million is nearly $60 billion. Let me repeat that, just 1 year of the Bush tax cut for Americans making over $1 million is nearly $60 billion.

In contrast, we dedicate roughly one-half of that--approximately $32 billion--for the entire operations of the Department of Homeland Security.

We have invested twice as much for a tax cut for millionaires--less than 1 percent of the population--than we do for the Department intended to help secure the entire Nation.

For a nation that is repeatedly warned about the grave threats we face, how can this be the right priority?

The amendment that I am offering would change this by taking less than 1 year of the tax cut for millionaires--$53.3 billion--and invest it in homeland security over the next 5 years.

By investing this over the next 5 years at just over $10 billion per year, we could implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations and do those commonsense things that we know will make us safer.

For example, under this amendment, we could hire 50,000 additional police officers and help local agencies create locally based counterterrorism units.

We could hire an additional 1,000 FBI agents to help ensure that the FBI is able to implement critical reforms without abandoning its traditional crime-fighting functions.

We could also invest in security upgrades within our critical infrastructure and nearly double the funding for State homeland security grants.

And, the list goes on.

The bill that we are debating today is a good bill, and I am sure it will pass, but does anyone really believe that the $400 million in port security grants authorized in it will really be funded? A look back at our recent appropriations bills tells us that this is not likely.

Just this July we passed the Department of Homeland Security appropriations budget. In that legislation, the Senate allocated only $210 million for port security grants--just over one-half of what we are advocating be authorized in this bill.

Another example of this problem is our shameful record on providing funding for rail security. For the last two Congresses. the Senate has passed bipartisan rail security legislation sponsored by myself and Senator McCain, and others.

This legislation authorizes $1.2 billion to secure the soft targets in our rail system, such as the tunnels and stations. In fact, this legislation was added as an amendment to this bill 2 days ago. I thank my colleagues for including it, but we all understand that there is no chance of fully funding it unless we change our priorities.

Indeed, this body has voted against funding rail security when I have offered it as an amendment to the Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill the past 2 years. During that time, only $150 million per year has been allocated for rail and transit security with less than $15 million allocated for Amtrak security.

So while I thank my colleagues for recognizing the need for increased rail security by adopting the McCain-Biden amendment, it is clear that it won't mean much. Unfortunately, this is an example that is repeated over and over.

We know that the murder rate is up and that there is an officer shortage in communities throughout the Nation. Yet, we provide zero funding for the COPS hiring program and we have slashed funding for the Justice Assistance Grant.

We know that our first responders can't talk because they don't have enough interoperable equipment. Yet, we have not forced the networks to turn over critical spectrum, and we vote down funding to help local agencies purchase equipment every year.

We know that only 5 percent of cargo containers are screened, yet we do not invest in the personnel and equipment to upgrade our systems.

We know that our critical infrastructure is vulnerable. Yet, we allow industry to decide what is best and provide scant resources to harden soft targets.

The 9/11 Commission's Report Card issued last December stated bluntly that ``it is time we stop talking about setting priorities and actually set some.''

With this amendment, we set some priorities.

I won't go through the entire amendment on the floor, but I would like to touch on the highlights.

First, we provide the funding necessary to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

Next, we take the commonsense steps to make our Nation safer.

We make sure that law enforcement and first responders have the personnel, equipment, training, and are sufficiently coordinated to do the job.

With this trust fund we could provide: $1.15 billion per year for COPS grants; $160 million per year to hire 1,000 FBI agents; $200 million to hire and equip 1,000 rail police; $900 million for the Justice Assistance Grants; $1 billion per year for interoperable communications; and $1 billion for Fire Act and SAFER grants.

We could invest in screening technologies: $100 million to improve airline screening checkpoints; $100 million for research and development on improving screening technologies.

We set aside funding for our critical infrastructure: $500 million per year for general infrastructure grants; $500 million per year for port security grants; $200 million per year to harden our rail infrastructure.

And, the list goes on.

Mr. President, I will conclude where I started. This is all about setting the right priorities for America. Instead of giving a tax cut to the richest Americans who don't need it we should take some of it and dedicate it towards the security of all Americans.

Our Nation's most fortunate are just as patriotic as the middle class. They are just as willing to sacrifice for the good of our Nation. The problem is that no one has asked them to sacrifice.

If we adopt this amendment, we will be asking them to sacrifice for the good of the Nation, and I am convinced that they would gladly help us out. We have done this before with the Violent Crime Trust Fund.

This amendment is about reordering our homeland security priorities, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. President, I thank my colleague, the Senator from Washington, for yielding me the time, and I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I rise this morning as a point of personal privilege to welcome a friend and leader in our community in Wilmington, DE. Father Christo opened the Senate in prayer this morning. It may be the only time the entire Greek community in Wilmington, DE, was tuned in to C-SPAN as we opened up the morning session. I want this Senate to know and I hope my colleagues will get a chance to meet Father Christo.

Many who were raised with a parochial education got an opportunity to meet religious teachers. The kind of guy one always looked for was Father. Father is a guy whom everyone knew was much smarter than you. You knew he was probably a better athlete than you were. You knew he had thought through whatever you were thinking of before you thought it. And you also knew you could go to him whenever you needed help.

That is the role he continues to play with an adult parish in one of the most active communities in my State. The Greek-American community is small in our State, but it is extremely vibrant. Similar to many communities, the heart and soul of it is the church. The heart and soul of it is not only the spiritual center of the community, it is the political center of the community. I mean that in a nonpartisan way. It is the social center of the community. It is the community. It is the embodiment of community.

We have very important business this morning, and I will yield to my distinguished colleague, Senator Carper.

I can say to Father, it is an honor to have him here this morning. I hope he has an even greater impression than I know he possessed when he came, of the majesty of this place. This is the people's Chamber. They talk about the people's House, this building, this Senate, all of the Capitol. Every time people come to visit, I remind them that this belongs to them. This is theirs. We are only here as hired hands for a while. I hope Father takes back to his parish the notion that there is an awful lot of good that can be done here.

I am delighted he took the time this morning to remind us of the relationship between temple, Government, and the spiritual leadership that comes directly and immediately from God. I thank him for that. I thank him for his generosity and leadership back home in our community beyond Holy Trinity. Thank you very much.

I yield the floor.

(for himself, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Kerry, Mrs. Clinton, Ms. Cantwell, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Nelson of Florida, Mr. Levin, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Durbin, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Voinovich, Mr. Specter, Mr. Chafee,

Mr. Sununu, Mr. McCain, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Coleman, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Salazar, Mr. Schumer, Mr. Leahy, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Hagel, Mr. Frist, and Mr. Smith) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Whereas the Darfur Peace Agreement, signed on May 5, 2006,

between the Government of Sudan and rebels in Darfur has not

resulted in a cessation of hostilities in Darfur;

Whereas, although the United Nations Security Council

approved Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006), which

provides for a United Nations peacekeeping presence in Darfur

to replace the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the

Government of Sudan has rejected the deployment of United

Nations peacekeepers;

Whereas the Government of Sudan is engaged in a major

offensive in Darfur, in direct violation of the Darfur Peace

Agreement;

Whereas violence in the Darfur region has increased since

the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement;

Whereas Jan Egeland, the United Nations Under-Secretary

General for Humanitarian Affairs, has stated that the coming

weeks may result in a ``man-made catastrophe of an

unprecedented scale'' in Darfur;

Whereas the African Union has decided to terminate the

African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) at the end of September

2006;

Whereas it is unlikely that the United Nations will have

the logistical means or capability to deploy peacekeepers to

Sudan until the end of 2006;

Whereas the people of Darfur cannot wait that long for

security to be re-established; and

Whereas the international community must renew its efforts

to stop genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in

Darfur:

Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate--

(1) strongly condemns--

(A) the current military offensive of the Government of

Sudan in Darfur in violation of the terms of the May 5, 2006,

Darfur Peace Agreement and the April 8, 2004, N'Djamena

cease-fire accord; and

(B) the rejection by the Government of Sudan of United

Nations Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006);

(2) commends the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) for

its actions to date in monitoring the April 8, 2004,

N'Djamena cease-fire agreement in Darfur and encourages the

African Union to leave the AMIS force in place until a United

Nations peacekeeping mission is deployed to Darfur;

(3) calls upon the Government of Sudan to immediately--

(A) cease its military offensive in Darfur; and

(B) comply with the deployment of United Nations

peacekeepers to Darfurt called for by the United Nations

Security Council;

(4) calls upon the United Nations--

(A) to deploy as quickly as practicable peacekeeping troops

as authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution

1706 (2006) that are well trained and equipped; and

(B) to begin considerations of sanctions as called for by

paragraphs 6 and 7 of United Nations Security Council

Resolution 1556 (2004) and paragraph 14 of United Nations

Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004);

(5) urges the President to take urgent steps to help

improve the security situation in Darfur, including by--

(A) pursuing the imposition of a ``no-fly zone'' in Darfur

in cooperation with the United Nations, NATO, or NATO allies;

(B) garnering support for NATO assistance with the handover

by the African Union of the AMIS mission to the United

Nations;

(C) working through diplomatic channels to obtain the

support of China, Russia, and United States allies in the

Arab League in securing the compliance of the Government of

Sudan with the deployment of United Nations peacekeepers as

provided by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706

(2006);

(D) supporting full funding for the United Nations

Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan;

(E) securing the necessary support from United Nations

member states to schedule a special session on Sudan in the

United Nations Human Rights Council; and

(F) appointing a Special Envoy to Sudan to head the Office

of the Presidential Special Envoy established pursuant to

chapter 6 of title I of the Emergency Supplemental

Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and

Hurricane Recovery, 2006 (Public Law 109-234; 120 Stat. 439);

and

(6) urges the international community--

(A) to support the deployment of United Nations

peacekeepers to Darfur financially, with logistical and

equipment support, or through troop contributions;

(B) to fulfill financial obligations to United Nations and

international humanitarian aid agencies for responding to

thepiis in Darfur or addressing humanitarian needs throughout

Sudan;

(C) to impose targeted sanctions against members of the

National Congress Party determined to be responsible for

human rights violations, war crimes, and crimes against

humanity; and

(D) to impose sanctions consistent with paragraphs 6 and 7

of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004) and

paragraph 14 of United Nations Security Council Resolution

1564 (2004)

Mr. President, today I am introducing a resolution along with my colleague Senator DeWine urging the President to take immediate action to avert a looming tragedy in Darfur, Sudan. The government of Sudan has launched an all-out military offensive in Darfur that could result in hundreds of thousands of additional deaths. The United States must lead the international community to save those lives. It is urgent that we act.

How did we arrive at such a situation? And what must we do to stop it?

Over the past two years the situation in Sudan has remained dire. As many as 400,000 people may be dead. Two million people have been displaced from their homes, over 200,000 are refugees in Chad, and three million rely on international aid. Those numbers haven't diminished over time, they have gotten worse. And now, they may be on the brink of becoming even more catastrophic.

In May of this year, the government of Sudan and rebels in Darfur-- specifically the Minni Minnawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Army, SLA,--signed a peace agreement. Rather than improving the security situation, the Darfur Peace Agreement has made things worse. The agreement never had the support of the entire SLA, or the other major rebel movement in Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement. Nor did it have the support of people living in displaced camps in Darfur. In the days and weeks after news of the agreement spread, violence in camps increased either because people misunderstood what was in the agreement, or they felt the agreement was flawed. And violence on the ground became worse, as the rebel factions split and fighting erupted between those who had signed the Darfur Peace Agreement and those who had not.

Tens of thousands of people have been displaced in fighting since May--fifty thousand in the last two months alone. Many of them have taken refuge in camps for the internally displaced. Attacks on humanitarian aid convoys have increased by a factor of more than ten compared to this time last year. Twelve humanitarian workers have been killed in the past four months--more than during the previous year. Two hundred internally displaced women have been raped and another two hundred violently assaulted in over the course of the past five weeks.

The United Nations, after months of delay, finally extended the mandate of the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to Darfur at the end of August. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1706 authorizes the deployment of over 17,000 peace keepers and 3000 civilian police to Darfur. Regrettably, however, the government of Sudan has rejected the deployment of the U.N. force, instead launching a military offensive in Darfur. African Union officials have stated that they will not extend the mission in Sudan past the end of this month. And even if the aforementioned impediments did not exist, it would be months before a U.N. mission could fully deploy.

Just to make absolutely sure a peacekeeping force is never deployed, the government of Khartoum has gone on the offensive. If it scorches enough earth--and people--there will be no need for the peacekeeping force because there will be no one left to protect and no peace to keep.

We are at a pivotal moment. Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese are in camps, vulnerable to aerial and ground attacks from government forces. We cannot stand by and do nothing.

This resolution is straightforward. It calls on the President to undertake three key actions, some of which the Senate has asked him to do before: First, it once again calls on him to pursue the imposition of a no-fly zone through the U.N., NATO or NATO allies. The Senate asked the President to propose that NATO consider how to implement and enforce such a no-fly zone in March of this year. If anything, the need to enforce a no-fly zone has increased.

Second, it asks that the President secure the necessary support from United Nations member states to schedule a special session on Sudan in the United Nations Human Rights Council. The international community must speak out on the atrocities which continue to unfold in Sudan--and it must act.

Third, it asks the President to appoint a Special Envoy to Sudan to head the office that Senator DeWine and I

established at the State Department through a provision in the supplemental appropriations bill that was signed into law in June. The administration has avoided doing so for years, and our diplomatic efforts have suffered as a result.

I'm under no illusion that these actions alone will stop the Sudanese government. The international community must put a credible force on the ground as soon as possible. NATO should be prepared to help the AMIS hand-off to the United Nations. It is imperative that the President pick up the phone and talk to our NATO allies about how to do that. He should also call the president of the African Union and the U.N. Secretary General about going to Khartoum to talk to President Bashir about his government's rejection of the U.N. Security Council resolution. And the Secretary of State must get involved in diplomatic efforts to convince the Sudanese to cooperate with the implementation of Security Council resolution. I understand that Assistant Secretary of State Frazer was sent to Khartoum over the Labor Day weekend. She met with President Bashir, but according to all reports, the meeting did not result in any change in Khartoum's posture towards the deployment of U.N. troops. I applaud the administration for sending Dr. Frazer. But with all due respect I think we need to be engaged at higher levels.

It has been 12 years since the international community watched nearly a million people get killed in Rwanda, and 11 years since the world stood by as the massacres in Srebrenica occurred. Since then, President Clinton took decisive action to stop ethnic cleansing act in Bosnia, and then in Kosovo. Both missions were controversial--even unpopular. But the cost of inaction was too high. The cost of inaction in Darfur is too high as well.

Mr. President, I share the concerns that prompted the introduction of this amendment, but I am not prepared to approve such a far-reaching measure without a clear legislative record regarding the need for it and its likely impact on U.S. and allied forces.

Cluster bombs have always posed problems for responsible military forces like those of the United States. The weapons are very useful militarily, but they also carry a real risk of causing civilian casualties if they are used where civilians are present or if too many submunitions fail to explode when they hit the ground. This is a legitimate issue to consider and, perhaps, to legislate. But it should be done in a careful manner, after holding hearings and with proper preparation.

I urge the Senate Armed Services Committee to hold hearings on the issue of cluster munitions so that we can all gain a better understanding of how to maintain their usefulness while minimizing their risks. The committee should also make sure the Defense Department lives up to its claim that it ``is working towards minimizing `dud' cluster munitions by phasing cluster munitions systems with more reliable or self-destructing fuzes.'' Success in that effort would go far to reduce the risks of postwar casualties.