Agriculture, Rural Development, Food And Drug Administration, And
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to temporarily set aside the pending amendment, and I call up my amendment No. 753. Mr. President, I ask…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to temporarily set aside the pending amendment, and I call up my amendment No. 753.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Mr. President, I filed amendment No. 753 to H.R. 2012, the appropriations minibus. My amendment would prohibit the use of funds for fiscal year 2012 for the prosecution of enemy combatants in our article III courts. This prohibition would apply to individuals who are members of al-Qaida or affiliated terrorist groups and who have participated in the course of planning or carrying out attacks against our country, the United States of America, or our coalition partners.
In no other conflict have we treated our enemies as criminals and tried them in our civilian court system. I believe we need to stop criminalizing this war, and that is why I have brought forward this amendment. These individuals should be treated with military custody and tried in military commissions, and that is why I have brought forward this amendment at this time.
Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, I rise in response to the comments by my esteemed colleague from Colorado about my amendment No. 753. And I would say this first. My amendment does not provide immunity to terrorists. What my amendment does is treat terrorists as they should be treated.
We are at war, and under the laws of war, traditionally we have tried enemy combatants in military commissions. And those individuals my colleague from Colorado cited, including Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, could be held accountable in a military commission because our priority has to be, when we are at war, to gather intelligence, to protect our country, and not whether we should prosecute in our article III courts, in which I have great confidence. I served as attorney general of our State and believe very much in our article III court system. But our article III court system is not where terrorists with whom we are at war should be tried.
In light of the recent comments here on the floor, I feel compelled to point out some of the facts that I think are important for the American people to know about some of the cases that have been cited in support of saying terrorists should be tried in article III courts.
On October 12, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab pleaded guilty in the U.S. district court in Detroit. That case has been cited not only by the Senator from Colorado but by the Senator from Maryland and the Senator from Illinois, and our Attorney General has cited it as well as the ultimate and final vindication of the use of our civilian courts for the trial of enemy combatants. The senior Senator from Illinois and the Obama administration were so confident that the so-called Underwear Bomber, as he has been named, guilty plea would settle the dispute once and for all, that on October 13, the Senator from Illinois came to the floor and essentially declared the controversy over. We have heard those same arguments today.
I think we need to review who exactly Abdulmutallab is. He is no common criminal. We are not talking about people who have robbed liquor stores or who are Americans who have committed criminal acts in this country. He is the Nigerian man who tried to detonate plastic explosives hidden in his underwear while onboard Northwest Airline's flight 253 to Detroit on December 25, 2009. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula claimed to have organized the attack with the Underwear Bomber claiming that AQAP supplied him with the bomb and trained him.
He was subsequently charged in Federal court with eight counts, including the attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and attempted murder of 290 Americans. The Underwear Bomber pleaded guilty at trial, telling a surprised courtroom on the second day of his trial that the failed attack was in retaliation for the killing of Muslims worldwide.
This case has been cited as the final vindication for civilian trials, and I
think it is important to mention three points about this case.
First of all, the presumption seems to be that the civilian court system should have the primary responsibility for questioning, trying, and ultimately detaining foreign enemy combatants with whom the United States is in a declared war. That has not been the rule in prior conflicts. We are treating this conflict differently than we have treated other conflicts, where enemy combatants have been tried in military commissions.
Secondly, in my view, the administration's eagerness to appease the ACLU by trying enemy combatants in civilian courts misses the whole point about detention in a time of war. When we are at war, we detain and interrogate enemy combatants according to the laws of war to glean valuable intelligence that will help prevent future attacks, save American lives, and help us capture other enemy combatants.
Al-Qaida was at war with the United States long before our country recognized or strongly reacted to this threat. We remain at war with al-Qaida. When we put enemy combatants in our civilian court system, we are focusing on prosecution, and we potentially miss important opportunities to gather information to prevent future attacks by doing so.
In Abdulmutallab's case, the administration read him his Miranda rights after 50 minutes of questioning. In my view, this jeopardized valuable intelligence. And I know my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have said: Well, eventually he spoke, and he gave us lots of information. But why would we put information in jeopardy? Why would we read terrorists Miranda rights? I, as a prosecutor, have never heard a law enforcement official tell me that Miranda rights are a helpful information-gathering tool, but that seems to be the position I am hearing today.
Jeopardizing this intelligence was clearly unnecessary. And in this case, the fact that we didn't have to rely on a confession--this was a case where we caught the Underwear Bomber redhanded. So even if we were to have tried him in a military commission and had not given him Miranda rights, had gathered intelligence for as long as we could have, we still would have had him redhanded because the passengers on that flight saw him. He was caught with the explosives on his body. This was never a case about a guilty plea and whether we got some information about him. The essential question is whether we got the most information possible from a terrorist who was trying to attack Americans and our allies, to prevent future attacks, not whether we gave him Miranda rights.
With a case that was as open and shut as Abdulmutallab's, without any need to use confessional evidence or classified information, it doesn't prove the civilian court system is superior to military commissions. His conviction was never realistically in doubt.
Defenders of bringing our enemy combatants to the U.S. civilian trial often cite a number of cases and convictions related to military commissions. Again, I want to reiterate, I am a strong believer in our civilian court system, but I want to point out some of the downsides to using our civilian court system for enemy combatants: the costs of security; the cause of civic disruption in the area; the risk of compromising classified information; and the risk of eventual release of these combatants not to some other country but into American society, regardless of whether they are convicted in civilian court. And these concerns aren't academic.
I have heard some of my colleagues cite the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was a member of al-Qaida who was involved in the 9/11 attacks. The civilian proceedings spanned nearly a decade, and his case was finally resolved only last year. These proceedings cost millions of dollars and caused substantial civic disruption. For example, the Federal courthouse in Alexandria, VA, was described as ``an armed camp, with the courthouse complex and surrounding neighborhood becoming a virtual encampment, with heavily armed guards, rooftop snipers, bomb- sniffing dogs, blocked streets and identification checks.'' If we had tried him at Guantanamo Bay, in the military commission there, these security concerns would have been accounted for, and we wouldn't have had to disrupt Virginia to do that. It is not a problem we would confront in our military commission system.
In addition, in the civilian trial of 9/11 terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui, sensitive material was inadvertently leaked because our civilian court system, as wonderful as it is, is not set up as well to deal with cases involving sensitive information during a time of war.
Moussaoui also mocked 9/11 victims and used the civilian trial as a platform to spew terrorist propaganda.
All of these negative side effects of trying a terrorist in a civilian court would have been eliminated or significantly mitigated if he had been detained in military custody and tried before a military commission.
In the case of Omar Abdel Rahman, commonly known as the Blind Sheik, which has also been cited here today, the civilian trial provided intelligence to Osama bin Laden. So when I hear that case cited as a success, the first thing that comes to my mind is, if intelligence was provided to Osama bin Laden, how is that a success when our No. 1 focus should be on protecting the American people? And that has to be the distinction between trying enemy combatants in a time of war and the very important purpose of our civilian court system.
In the case of the Blind Sheik, according to Michael Mukasey, the former Attorney General, ``in the course of prosecuting Omar Abdel Rahman, the government was compelled--as it is in all cases that charge a coconspiracy charge--to turn over a list of unindicted coconspirators to the defendants. Within 10 days, a copy of that list of unindicted coconspirators reached bin Laden in Khartoum.''
The notion that a list--because you had to do it, according to our civilian court system where notice requirements are very important, where generally our court systems are open--would be provided to Osama bin Laden, in my view, is unacceptable, a risk we could have avoided if we treated the Blind Sheik as he should have been treated, which is as an enemy combatant and tried in a military commission.
Civilian trials of enemy combatants have provided a treasure trove of information to terrorists, and I think those risks have been very discounted by my esteemed colleagues who have come to the floor to oppose my amendment.
According to open source reporting, the cost of disclosing information unwisely became clear after the New York trials of bin Laden associates for the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Africa. Some of the evidence indicated that the National Security Agency, the U.S. foreign eavesdrop organization, had intercepted cell phone conversations. Shortly thereafter, bin Laden's organization stopped using cell phones to discuss sensitive operational details.
It is also important to note that the record of trying enemy combatants in civilian courts is not as good as it has been made out to be. Opponents of my amendment don't often speak about Ahmed Ghailani.
Ghailani is a Tanzanian who was charged with a total of 284 counts, including 200-plus counts of murder and 1 count of conspiracy in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. The bombings killed 224 people, including 12 Americans. He also spent time as Osama bin Laden's bodyguard.
He was tried in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Department of Justice directed the U.S. attorney not to seek the death penalty. At trial, the presiding justice excluded from evidence the testimony of a key witness--a Tanzanian, who may have issued statements implicating him in the bombings. And on November 17, 2010, a jury, after this evidence was excluded, found Ghailani only guilty of 1 count of a conspiracy and acquitted him of all 284 other charges, including the murder charges. He murdered 284 people--12 Americans--and he was acquitted of murder charges. I think that is a case that shows our civilian court system is not always the best way to deal with enemy combatants and is very contrary to what I have heard on the cases cited from my opponents of this amendment.
Proponents of civilian trial, such as Attorney General Holder, want to criminalize the war, but they fail to cite these cases where the civilian
court system leaked classified information to terrorists or, because of excluded evidence, where terrorists are not held fully accountable.
Military detention for enemy combatants has always been the rule, not the exception. Why are we treating this war any differently? Civilian courts rightly focus on prosecution, but in detaining enemy combatants when at war, they miss the most important goal we have to have; that is, gathering intelligence and protecting the American people against future attacks.
Civilian trials for enemy combatants incur tremendous costs and cause civic disruption. That is why the administration itself has reversed its position on trying Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in New York City. They wanted to try the mastermind behind 9/11 in the middle of New York City, but the American people were so outraged by trying someone who is the mastermind of 9/11 in the middle of New York City and the millions of dollars it would have cost to protect the citizens of New York from this horrible individual, giving him a forum in the middle of New York City.
Again, the costs associated with protecting the American people in these civilian trials alone is enough to treat them as they should be-- in military commissions.
We risk compromising classified information, and we risk the eventual release of these combatants into American society.
For these reasons, consistent with a longstanding precedent, we should not be bringing enemy combatants to the United States for civilian trials. If the Obama administration is willing to kill enemy combatants without due process, and I applaud them for doing so, why is the administration so against placing these same enemy combatants in military custody and detaining them under the law of war, and when appropriate trying them in military commissions?
I think the answer is clear. Unfortunately, I am concerned that it is a political decision rather than putting intelligence gathering first in order to protect the American people and treat these enemy combatants as what they are--enemies of our country. I urge my colleagues to support my amendment. In my view, beyond the policy reasons for not trying enemy combatants in civilian courts, we should ask ourselves why should we bring foreign terrorists to the United States and give them the legal protections reserved for U.S. citizens and secured by those Americans who have fought and died for those rights? Why do these people deserve access to our American court system? They are our enemies. In the civilian court systems there are rights guaranteed, such as Miranda rights and speedy presentment, that should not be extended to enemy combatants. We need to prioritize protecting our country. I think the American people will agree with me when I say that no terrorist should ever hear the words ``you have the right to remain silent.''
I urge my colleagues to support my amendment No. 753.