Mr. Speaker, I submit the following. Section-by-Section Summary (a) Advice of Counsel. The AIA's section 17 created a new Sec. 298 of title 35 that bars the use of evidence of an accused infringer's failure to obtain advice of counsel, or…
Mr. Speaker, I submit the following.
Section-by-Section Summary
(a) Advice of Counsel. The AIA's section 17 created a new
Sec. 298 of title 35 that bars the use of evidence of an
accused infringer's failure to obtain advice of counsel, or
his failure to waive privilege and introduce such opinion, to
prove either willfulness or intent to induce infringement.
Section 17, however, neglected to specify when this new
authority became effective. As a result, Sec. 298 is subject
to the default effective date at section 35 of the AIA, and
applies only to patents issued one year or later after
enactment of the AIA. This subsection makes Sec. 298
applicable to all civil actions commenced after the enactment
of this Act.
(b) Transitional Program for CBMs. This subsection corrects
two scrivener's errors in section 18 of the AIA. These
changes have no substantive effect.
(c) Joinder of Parties. This subsection corrects a
scrivener's error in the new Sec. 299 of title 35. This
change has no substantive effect.
(d) Dead Zones. This subsection fixes two provisions that
inadvertently make it impossible to seek either post-grant or
inter partes review of a patent during certain time periods.
Section 311(c) of title 35 bars anyone from seeking inter
partes review of a patent during the first nine months after
the patent issues, or until a post-grant review of a patent
is completed if such review is instituted. Section 311(c) was
intended to preclude challengers from using IPR during the
period when they can instead use PGR. The problem with the
provision is that, during Senate floor consideration of the
AIA in March 2011, another provision was added to the bill
via the managers' amendment that allows only first-to-file
patents to be challenged in PGR. This provision, at section
6(f)(2)(A) of the AIA, was intended to allow USPTO a longer
period to prepare to conduct PGR proceedings, and to exclude
patents that raise discovery-intensive invention-date and
loss-of-right-to-patent issues from PGR. However, Sec. 311(c)
takes effect and applies to all petitions for IPR that are
filed on or after September 16, 2012. Yet for several years
thereafter, almost all patents that are issued will still be
first-to-invent patents. And under Sec. 311(c) of title 35,
these patents cannot be challenged in IPR during the first 9
months after their issuance, while under section 6(f)(2) of
the AIA, these patents cannot be challenged in PGR. Paragraph
(1) eliminates this nine month ``dead zone'' by making
Sec. 311(c) inapplicable to patents that are first-to-invent
patents and are thus ineligible for PGR.
Paragraph (2) addresses another dead zone that is unique to
reissue patents. Under Sec. 311(c) of title 35, IPR cannot be
sought during the nine months after a patent is reissued.
This limit was imposed in order to force challengers to bring
a PGR challenge (rather than IPR) against what is, in effect,
a new patent. However, Sec. 325(f) of title 35 then bars a
challenge to any claim in a reissue patent that is
``identical'' to or ``narrower'' than the claims in the
original patent. As a result, such ``identical'' or
``narrower'' claims could not be reviewed in either a PGR or
an IPR during the nine months after a reissue. Paragraph (2)
eliminates this dead zone by repealing section 311(c)(1)'s
limit on filing a petition for inter partes review after a
patent has been reissued.
(e) Correct Inventor. This subsection amends the
authorization of settlement in derivation proceedings to
refer to ``correct inventor'' in the singular, out of
recognition of the fact that it is the entire inventive
entity that must be named in the settlement agreement. This
change has no substantive effect.
(f) Required Oath. Paragraph (1) liberalizes the time
allowed for an applicant to file the required oath or
alternative statement, allowing him to file as late as
payment of the issue fee (rather than requiring filing prior
to allowance). Paragraph (2) corrects Sec. 115(g)(1) by using
``that claims'' rather than ``who claims,'' since the
antecedent for these words is ``application'' rather than
``inventor.'' Paragraph (2)'s change has no substantive
effect. (USPTO requests.)
(g) Travel Expenses and Payment of Administrative Judges.
Section 21 of the AIA, which makes minor changes to the law
regarding the compensation of USPTO employees for travel and
the payment of APJs, was not given its own effective date.
This subsection makes these provisions effective upon
enactment of the AIA.
(h) Patent Term Adjustments. This subsection clarifies and
improves certain requirements for seeking patent-term
adjustments. These changes allow USPTO to provide notice of
its PTA determination at the same time as the grant of a
patent, and effectively require an applicant who wishes to
pursue a civil action under paragraph (4)(A) of Sec. 154(b)
to exhaust remedies provided under paragraph 3(B)(ii). These
changes are minor, and only apply prospectively to PTAs that
are determined and to Sec. 154(b)(4)(A) actions that are
commenced after the enactment of this Act. (USPTO request.)
The Committee is aware that the district court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, on November 1 of this year,
issued a decision in the case of Exelixis v. Kappos that
appears to have adopted a highly problematic interpretation
of the patent term adjustment allowed by Sec. 154(b)(1)(B).
For reasons that remain unclear, the court concluded that
continuations and other events described in the ``not
including'' clauses of that subparagraph should not be
excluded from the subparagraph's calculation of patent term
adjustment, but instead must be read only to toll the three-
year clock that determines when patent term adjustment begins
to accrue under subparagraph (B). The district court's
interpretation of subparagraph (B) thus would allow patent
term adjustment to accrue for any continued examination
sought after the three-year clock has run. Such a result, of
course, would allow applicants to postpone their patent's
expiration date through dilatory prosecution, the very
submarine-patenting tactic that Congress sought to preclude
in 1994 when it adopted a 20-year patent term that runs from
an application's effective filing date.
Despite the absurd and undesirable results that would
appear to flow from the district court's interpretation, the
Committee declines to address this matter at this time. This
case was brought to the Committee's attention only very
recently, precluding the thorough consideration and
consultation that is appropriate before legislation is
enacted. Moreover, Congress is not in the business of
immediately amending the United States Code in response to
every nonfinal legal error made by a trial court. The
Committee, of course, reserves the right to address this
matter in the future. In the meantime, the fact that the
present bill does not amend Sec. 154(b) to address the
Exelixis decision should not be construed as congressional
acquiescence in or agreement with the reasoning of that
decision.
(i) Improper Applicant. This subsection repeals an
unnecessary limitation on who may file an international
application designating the United States. (USPTO request.)
(j) Financial Management Clarifications. This subsection
makes several technical changes to Sec. 42 of title 35,
concerning USPTO funding. These changes: (1) ensure that the
rule requiring that patent fees be spent for patent purposes
also applies to RCE fees; and (2) ensure that all USPTO
administrative costs will be covered by either patent fees or
trademark fees. (USPTO request.)
(k) Derivation Proceedings. Currently, the third sentence
of Sec. 135(a) will allow a derivation proceeding to be
sought only within the year after the victim's claim that has
been the target of derivation has published. It is possible,
however, that a deriver could file first, but delay claiming
the derived material until more than a year has elapsed after
the victim's claims have published, in other words, until
after the current deadline has lapsed. The changes made by
this subsection preclude such a scenario by requiring the
proceeding to be sought during the year after the publication
of the deriver's claim to the invention. These changes also
add a definition of ``earlier application'' to Sec. 135(a),
correct inconsistencies in the AIA's version of Sec. 135(a),
and authorize the PTAB to conduct, and the courts to hear
appeals of, interferences commenced after the effective date
of the AIA's amendments to Sec. 135(a). (USPTO request.)
(I) Terms of Public Advisory Committee Members. This
subsection makes the terms of PPAC and TPAC members run for 3
years
from a fixed date (rather than from the date that they are
appointed), and requires Chairmen and Vice Chairmen to be
designated from among existing members. (Current law
designates only a Chairman and gives him a 3-year term.)
These changes will produce better coordination of members'
terms, will allow experienced Chairmen to be appointed
without requiring such individuals to serve two 3-year terms,
and will provide for automatic replacement of a Chairman who
does not complete his term of service. (AIPLA request.)
(m) Report on pre-GATT Applications. The URAA amendments
took effect on June 8, 1995 but were made inapplicable to
applications filed before that effective date. Unfortunately,
a small number of applicants may have engaged in clearly
dilatory behavior and continue to maintain pending
applications with effective-filing dates that precede the
URAA effective date.
It is highly unlikely that the 103d Congress ever conceived
that its amendments to Sec. 154(a) would remain inapplicable
to applications still pending in this Congress. The issuance
of any such patent at this late date would be grossly
prejudicial to the public. Many of these applications claim
invention dates in the 1980s, and some even claim priority
dates in the 1970s. To remove such technology from the public
domain in 2012 would work a clear injustice on the public,
and would bear no relation to the patent system's purpose of
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts.
An earlier version of this Act included a provision that
would have required these applicants to complete prosecution
of these applications promptly after the enactment of the
Act. To avoid controversy that might delay the enactment of
this Act, the present Act substitutes the earlier proposal
with a requirement that USPTO issue a report that will
provide Congress and the public with relevant information
about these applications. The Committee expects that the
report will contribute to an understanding of whether these
applications present special circumstances that require
further legislative, executive, or judicial action in order
to ensure transparency and protect the public's interests.
(n) Micro Entity Definition. This subsection corrects a
scrivener's error in the AIA's definition of the ``micro
entities'' that are entitled to a fee reduction. This change
has no substantive effect.
(o) Default Effective Date. This subsection provides that
the amendments made by this Act apply to proceedings
commenced on or after the enactment of the Act, except where
the provisions of the Act include their own effective date or
modify an existing law's effective date.
Other Issues for Future Consideration
Post-Grant Review Could-Have-Raised Estoppel. The version
of post-grant review that was enacted by the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act bars a petitioner who completes such a
review from challenging any of the claims of the patent that
were reviewed in the proceeding on any ground that the
petitioner ``could have raised'' in the post-grant review.
Although this broad estoppel first appeared in the bill that
was reported by the House Judiciary Committee in June 2011,
no amendment adopted by the committee authorized such a
change. The change appears to have been made by staff charged
with making technical corrections to the bill, who apparently
assumed that the omission of could-have-raised estoppel in
Sec. 325(e)(2) was an oversight.
The application of a civil-litigation could-have-raised
estoppel to PGR would cripple that proceeding if it is not
corrected. All validity issues can be raised in PGR, and must
be raised during the first nine months of the patent's life
and without the benefit of discovery. Thus if could-have-
raised estoppel were applied to PGR, a PGR challenger would
effectively have to waive the possibility of raising any
validity defense against the patent if he is later sued for
infringement--and all without an opportunity to adequately
investigate enablement and other discovery-intensive issues.
In order to ensure that the post-grant review system that
USPTO has recently implemented does not simply become a white
elephant, it is important that this scrivener's error be
corrected in the future. And, lest anyone suggest that the
correction of this error is properly regarded as
controversial, allow me to note that this correction would
simply conform the PGR estoppel provisions to those of the
bill that passed the Senate on March 8, 2011, by a vote of
95-5.