Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, in response to the largest corporate scandals in U.S. history, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act strengthening the role of gatekeepers such as auditors, boards of…
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, in response to the largest corporate scandals in U.S. history, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act strengthening the role of gatekeepers such as auditors, boards of directors, audit committees, and equity analysts. We now turn our attention to another gatekeeper, the credit rating agency, and Congressman Fitzpatrick's H.R. 2990, the Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act.
Credit ratings serve a vital function in our capital market system, providing investors with an understanding of the creditworthiness of corporations and municipalities with respect to debt and other securities. As evidenced by the failures in the rating of Enron and WorldCom, who were given investment grade ratings by Moody's and Standard & Poor's just days before declaring bankruptcy, the credit rating industry is in drastic need of increased competition and improved transparency.
Currently, the SEC designates ratings agencies as nationally recognized statistical ratings organizations, or NRSROs, through an opaque process that provides applicants little guidance on the substance and procedure by which they will be evaluated. Currently, only five rating agencies are designated as NRSROs by the SEC. Understandably, many more aspire to attain that designation, as NRSRO status confers a significant competitive advantage. However, new applications often languish for years without an up or down vote on admission into this elite club. In fact, the Department of Justice commented upon the SEC designation process in 1998, calling it a ``nearly insurmountable barrier to entry.''
The SEC's opaque designation process has created an artificial government-sponsored barrier to entry that has stifled competition and helped the two top rating agencies, Moody's and Standard & Poor's, garner some 80 percent of the market share. Without true competition of this industry, fees have skyrocketed and ratings quality has deteriorated. To put it mildly, this is not a transparent and efficient mark with robust competition.
Wanting to understand an industry with such a significant impact on the markets, Congress directed the SEC to examine credit rating agencies as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Since the release of the SEC's report on rating agencies in January 2003, the Committee on Financial Services and its Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enterprises through its chairman, Richard Baker, have held five hearings on this subject, two of those hearings focused on H.R. 2990. Witnesses from the SEC, industry, academia, think tanks, and the rating agencies themselves echoed the problem areas highlighted by the SEC; namely, barriers to entry leading to a lack of competition, conflicts of interest, poor transparency of agencies' rating methodologies, and a lack of accountability. Mr. Fitzpatrick's bill is the product of this comprehensive examination.
In his testimony of this past May before the Committee on Financial Services, our former colleague, SEC Chairman Cox, expressed support for the goals of H.R. 2990, and requested enhanced authority in this area. In a June 2006 letter to Ranking Member Kanjorski, Mr. Cox stated, ``You also asked whether the quality of credit ratings concerns me. My answer is most assuredly yes. In fact, transparency, competition, and greater oversight, the principles I mentioned during my testimony before the House Financial Services Committee on May 3, 2006, are, in my view, important means to achieve the end of ensuring the high quality of credit ratings.'' The principles cited by Mr. Cox are the very principles of Mr. Fitzpatrick's legislation before us.
In addition, SEC Commissioners Paul Atkins and Cynthia Glassman have expressed their disapproval with the current designation system, and Mr. Atkins has expressed support for a registration approach like the one embodied in this bill. SEC Commissioner Roel Campos has also expressed a need for legislation that deals with conflicts, increased transparency, and provides for SEC examination.
Mr. Fitzpatrick's bill follows the regulatory regimes applied to broker-dealers and investment advisors. In doing so, it rejects regulation controlled by the SEC in favor of the market-based approach that has driven our securities laws since the 1930s.
H.R. 2990 removes the SEC's designation process, and in its place gives rating agencies who have issued ratings for 3 years the option of registering as NRSROs. A voluntary registration system will level the playing field for all rating agencies and inject much needed competition into this industry. As we have seen time and time again in other markets, true competition begets lower prices and better performance. When dealing with investor protection, it is all the more critical to ensure that healthy competition exists, yielding more accurate and reliable ratings.
In addition, H.R. 2990 promotes transparency and empowers investors by requiring registrants to disclose the methodologies by which they generate ratings. It requires rating agencies to provide short, medium, and long-term performance statistics, and to make all information and documents submitted to the SEC publicly available. This will give the market a clearer understanding of the agencies that are rating debt. The bill also requires that rating agencies maintain a chief compliance officer to oversee compliance with the securities laws and protects market stability, providing that the voluntary regime will not go into effect until January 2008.
To insulate the rating agencies from overreaching legislation, H.R. 2990 affirms that the Federal Government may not intrude into rating agencies' methodologies or the ratings process.
Finally, I have concerns about the conflicts of interest which plague this industry. Ratings firms have expanded into new areas which, many commentators have suggested, further compromise their objectivity.
In addition, it has been alleged that leading rating agencies engage in certain abusive practices to the detriment of smaller market players. H.R. 2990 requires disclosure of conflicts of interest and prohibits such anti-competitive practices.
The many hours that the Committee on Financial Services and Mr. Fitzpatrick have spent on this issue have shown the problems cited by the SEC report are best rectified through a system of voluntary registration open to all eligible rating agencies. This will eliminate barriers to entry, promote competition, and do so using the least restrictive means of regulation.
I urge all Members to support this important bill.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I am now pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Price), a valuable member of the committee.
(Mr. PRICE of Georgia asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Pennsylvania (Ms. Hart).
Mr. Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the author of the legislation, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Fitzpatrick).
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Baker), the chairman of the Capital Markets Subcommittee.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, let me first of all recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Fitzpatrick. He has been a real bulldog on this issue. The committee has worked its will passing this bill on a voice vote in the committee. His leadership has been extraordinary. The committee has had numerous hearings. We have had input from all of the usual sources, and then some, to craft this legislation.
If somebody were to tell you or anybody in this body that there was an industry out there where 80 percent of that business was controlled by two companies, whether it was in the steel industry or the auto industry, the health care field, I would suggest that particularly my friends on the other side of the aisle would be particularly upset and call it restraint of trade and ask for all kinds of investigations and to try to induce more competition and new entries into that marketplace. And that is exactly what we have got here. We have got credit rating agencies that for the last 35 years have basically had a duopoly on this very lucrative business. And as in the case with any other kind of business, when you have a duopoly or an oligopoly, you have lack of competition. You have a situation where you have conflicts of interest almost guaranteed, and you have a lack of transparency at the same time. That is what we attack in the Fitzpatrick legislation.
Now, I have been chairman of this committee for 6 years. Even before I was chairman of this committee this was an issue. The SEC would always come up before the committee, testify, well, we are working on it. We are trying to open this up. And yet, a frustrated member of the committee said, when are you ever going to get around to it?
This legislation is a wakeup call to the SEC, to the industry that, at least from our perspective, we are tired of waiting for this to happen. Everybody likes competition, but nobody likes competitors. Everybody wants to go to heaven, but nobody wants to die.
It is time that we provide the kind of competitive structure in this critical area that is long due coming.
There is a reason why, Mr. Chairman, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that we requested this study, because we knew that part of the problem going forward with Enron and WorldCom and the like was lack of competition and the abysmal ratings effect that two members of the duopoly created right before Enron and WorldCom collapsed. Just think about the credit rating that they gave to Enron and WorldCom just weeks before they collapsed, and it tells you a lot about the lack of competition, the lack of transparency and a potential conflict of interest in the existing status quo.
This bill is anti-status quo. It is far reaching. It is visionary, and Mike Fitzpatrick's leadership on this cannot be overestimated. And so I think that every Member should take a look at this. This is part of the ongoing process to make our markets more competitive, more transparent, and this bill is a natural follow-up on what this Congress and what this committee has done over the years to create better confidence in the markets by investors to provide more competition therein. This legislation gets the job done, and all Members should support it.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer an amendment to H.R. 2990, the Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act. This amendment makes certain clarifying and technical changes to Mr. Fitzpatrick's rating agency reform legislation.
Specifically, the amendment clarifies that there is no private right of action for rating agencies registered as nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, or NRSROs, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Neither is there an express or an implied private right of action with respect to rating agencies registered as NRSROs under the Securities Exchange Act. The Securities and Exchange Commission will retain its enforcement authority over registered rating agencies.
In addition, the amendment allots to the Securities and Exchange Commission an additional 6 months, for a total of 1 year, to review and, if necessary, revise its regulations that use the term ``NRSRO.'' The additional time will allow the SEC and industry participants more time to properly assess regulations using the NRSRO technology.
This amendment also makes a number of technical amendments, clarifying definitions, findings and disclosure requirements.
I urge all Members to support this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.