Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to enter into a colloquy with my Republican colleagues. Madam President, what we witnessed today is truly historic. This has never occurred. Nothing like this has ever occurred. Under article I,…
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to enter into a colloquy with my Republican colleagues.
Madam President, what we witnessed today is truly historic. This has never occurred. Nothing like this has ever occurred.
Under article I, section 3, clause 6, we have been given a duty. We have been given the sole exclusive power to try all impeachments--try all impeachments--not some of them, not just those with which we happen to agree, not just those we are happy that the House of Representatives undertook to prosecute, but all.
The word ``try'' is also significant. It refers to the word ``trial.'' It is the same word. It is a proceeding in which the law and the facts are presented to finders of fact--in front of judges--in order to reach an ultimate disposition. In a criminal proceeding, it would be an ultimate disposition culminating in a verdict of guilty or not guilty.
We were precluded from doing that job today. We were precluded from doing so in a way that is not only ahistoric and unprecedented but counterconstitutional. Nothing could be further from the plain structure, text, and history of the Constitution than that.
Let's look at the arguments that we would have heard, that we could have heard, that we should have heard today had things unfolded as they were supposed to, had things unfolded in a manner consistent with the oath that we took first when we were sworn in as U.S. Senators. We were all required to take the same oath to the Constitution when we did that.
(Ms. BUTLER assumed the Chair.)
But also the oath that we took just a few hours ago in this very Chamber in this very case to decide this case impartially.
What would we have heard? Well, first and foremost, regardless of what you think about what a trial consists of or how different people might cleverly define the term, a trial will always, at a minimum, involve lawyers, involve lawyers. Unless the person is proceeding pro se, you will always have lawyers there. At least one side will always be represented by lawyers in 99.9 percent of all cases. Both sides will. You will hear from lawyers.
We didn't hear that today. We didn't hear from the committee of individuals appointed by the House of Representatives to be the House impeachment managers or prosecutors. What else would you expect to hear? Well, you would hear evidence. Evidence would be brought in. Sometimes trials in the Senate involve bringing in evidence in a documentary form.
Other times, you might have witnesses. We didn't have any witnesses, we didn't have any documentary evidence, other than that which was charged.
So let's talk about what was charged and what evidence we could have, would have, and should have heard had we done our job today.
Well, the accusations in this impeachment trial, they fit into two categories. Category one, Senate article I of the Articles of Impeachment, article I alleges that Secretary Mayorkas repeatedly, defiantly did the exact opposite of what Federal law requires; namely, that under myriad circumstances, eight or nine different statutory provisions that he violated, he was required to detain people whom he did not detain.
But it is not just that he didn't do what the law required; he did the exact opposite of that. Instead of holding them until such time as they could be removed or alternatively adjudicated to have the status, whether in the context of immigration parole or asylum or otherwise, he just released them and, in many cases, gave them work permits.
We would have heard evidence about the fact that memoranda issued by Secretary Mayorkas within the Department of Homeland Security didn't just tolerate this result; they instructed this result. We would have heard evidence about the fact that at the outset of the Biden administration, Secretary Mayorkas, when asked what he would tell those traveling through the caravans, those paying many thousands of dollars per head--in some cases tens of thousands of dollars per head--to international drug cartels. Instead of telling them, Don't do it, he said, Maybe don't do it yet; give us a few weeks before we are ready to receive you--showing intention, aforethought to facilitate the violation of Federal law.
We would have heard evidence about how he instructed his own department to violate those rules. We would have heard evidence about how directly contrary to Federal law those things are and contrary to his own oath and his own duty.
Now, as to article I, the Senate chose to dispose of this today by doing something it has never done, in any context anywhere close to this, with a point of order that said as follows.
The majority leader stood up, defiantly refusing to have the Senate perform its obligations and called a point of order. He said: I raise a point of order that impeachment article I does not allege conduct that rises to the level of a high crime or misdemeanor as required under article II, section 4 of the United States Constitution and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
Now, let's talk about that for a minute. Now, had we been permitted to have a trial--alternatively, had we been permitted to go into executive session; alternatively, had we been permitted to go into closed session, as several of us moved today--we would have been able to hear arguments about this, about how wrong this is, because that is what you do when you have a trial: You hear evidence; you hear arguments from lawyers; and when someone makes a legal argument, as Majority Leader Schumer just did, you can consider their implications and, most importantly, consider whether or not the argument is right.
Because when we are sworn in, in a trial of impeachment, our job is to serve as both finders of fact and adjudicators of law relevant to this case. We were denied that opportunity.
So while we are exploring what we would have heard had we gone to trial, had we done our job, let's also explore what would have happened in a real trial had somebody made an actual motion and we had been permitted to do our job.
But, look, first and foremost, this is patently absurd to argue that a willful refusal to obey the law that one has a sworn solemn obligation to perform is somehow not impeachable.
We don't have to look too far in order to find support for the conclusion that this is an illegitimate, unwarranted, unsubstantiated claim--one that is directly contrary to law.
In fact, we don't have to look further than President Biden's own lawyer. The Solicitor General of the United States, who holds a special position within our Federal Government, performs functions that many people mistakenly associate with the Attorney General. But it is, in fact, the Solicitor General who is the United States Government's chief appellate advocate and chief advocate before all proceedings at the U.S. Supreme Court.
There was an exchange in a case argued last term in the Supreme Court of the United States called United States v. Texas. In that case, the Supreme Court heard arguments from the State of Texas about whether or not this administration's approach toward these same provisions of law is acceptable, whether or not they could challenge them.
Now, unfortunately, the Supreme Court reached a conclusion--a conclusion with which I strongly disagree. And the Supreme Court concluded, ultimately, that the State of Texas lacks standing to challenge Federal policy--Federal policy along the lines of what we are discussing today, notwithstanding the fact that it is conduct that inflicts substantial harm on the State of Texas and its residents.
But the important part that we should have been able to argue here today is the exchange that occurred at oral argument between Justice Kavanaugh and Elizabeth Prelogar, Solicitor General of the United States, in her capacity as Solicitor General as the Biden administration's chief appellate advocate and chief advocate before the United States Supreme Court.
Justice Kavanaugh asked her a number of questions at oral argument, and on page 50 of that argument transcript some of that discussion ensues. He asks the following:
[I]f a new administration comes in and says we're not going
to enforce the environmental laws, we're not going to enforce
the labor laws, your position, I believe, is no state and no
individual and no business would have standing to challenge a
decision to, as a blanket matter, just not enforce those
laws, is that correct?
Here is what Solicitor General Prelogar says:
That's correct under this Court's precedent, but the
framers intended political checks in that circumstance. You
know, if--if an administration did something that extreme and
said we're just not going to enforce the law at all, then the
President would be held to account by the voters, and
Congress has tools at its disposal as well.
So this argument continues, it continues on to the next page, in which Justice Kavanaugh says:
What are the exact tools that Congress has to make sure
that the laws are enforced . . .
And Solicitor General Prelogar answers:
Well, I think that Congress obviously has the power of the
purse.
And she goes on to explain how this is relevant. And then this goes on until we get to page 53.
And then at page 53, Justice Kavanaugh jumps back in and says:
I think your position is, instead of judicial review,
Congress has to resort to shutting down the government or
impeachment or dramatic steps--
of some sort or another.
Solicitor General Prelogar responds by saying:
Well, I think that if those dramatic steps would be
warranted, it would be in the face of a dramatic abdication
of statutory responsibility by the executive.
She just acknowledged exactly what has happened here, and she acknowledged that is exactly the moment at which the impeachment power becomes very relevant.
Lest there be any doubt on that, this stuff was settled, not just in 1789 when we adopted the Constitution and when the Framers used the language that they did, but remember, the Framers were not operating in a vacuum. They were not writing on a blank slate. They were incorporating legal terminology that had been in use for centuries.
In fact, Justice Story in his treatise on the Constitution discusses this very kind of thing and explains in section 798 of his famed treatise, written not so very long after the Constitution itself was written, that we got this stuff from England, that the British knew what impeachment meant, and they understood what would constitute a high crime or misdemeanor.
In section 798, Justice Story acknowledges that there was precedent, there was an understanding at the time of the founding that recognized that you would have an impeachable offense if, among other things, a Lord Admiral would have neglected the safeguard of the sea.
They didn't have a Homeland Security Secretary then, not in America, not in Britain. But this is really analogous. This is the exact same thing. Somebody who had a duty to do a certain thing under the law and defiantly refused to do so.
Those are arguments we could have and would have and should have heard today had we had an actual trial, had we been permitted even to go into executive session, or even go into closed session.
Why closed session? We didn't want to have to do it in closed session. But, you see, the standing rules of impeachment in this body preclude us from having this very kind of debate.
So when Majority Leader Schumer made this argument, to the great shock and surprise of all of us, we wanted to warn the body and have this debate. He wouldn't let us do that. The Democrats voted us down. So that is article I in a nutshell.
Article II of the Articles of Impeachment, what do those get to? Well, those are interesting, because those deal with false statements-- knowingly false statements repeatedly made by Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas to Congress--to Congress as it is performing its oversight responsibilities.
He lied to Congress according to the allegations of the Articles of Impeachment in article II.
To my great shock--look, he was dead wrong as to article I, but if he was dead wrong as to article I, he was deader than a doornail--whatever that means--ten times more dead as a doornail as to article II than he was to article I.
Why is that? Well, because they allege in article II that Secretary Mayorkas knowingly made false statements. Knowingly making false statements is a felony offense. It is punishable as a crime, as a felony Federal offense under, among other things, 18 USC section 1001. It is routinely charged, prosecuted, and is the basis for lots of convictions for a felony offense. You can go to prison for a very long period of time for that.
Now, for Chuck Schumer to argue--
Yes.
That is exactly what he said. That is exactly what he said when he made this motion, because he stood up and he said: I raise a point of order that impeachment article II does not allege conduct that rises to a level of high crime or misdemeanor.
That is precisely what the precedent established today stands for. That is--we have effectively--by this vote that the Democrats forced through, not even allowing us to debate this--and this is why I raised a point of order--or this is why I made a motion that we go into closed session to discuss this, because we have now set a precedent that effectively--very arguably effectively immunizes from impeachment making a false statement to Congress.
Yes, please.
Well, let's see, obviously, spreading what they deem misinformation on the internet might be a felony. I suppose at some point--
A high crime or misdemeanor.
It takes more than a high crime or misdemeanor.
I would love to respond to that point briefly, if I could, please. What we have done is to effectively immunize this against impeachability--immunize making false statements.
And going back to the original question, I don't know. Maybe aggravated, first-degree murder with heinous, atrocious, and cruel conduct as aggravators--maybe that is still a high crime or misdemeanor. That remains to be seen.
But keep in mind, particularly with the fact that they already set aside article I--and they have already said that that is out of bounds, as well, for impeachability. The Supreme Court has said pretty much nobody has standing to address that. What are we left with?
And getting back to the question from Senator Lummis, this is a phenomenally dangerous precedent to have set here, specifically with regard to false statements, because what does that do to our oversight hearings, where we rely, routinely, on testimony provided under oath by Cabinet Secretaries and other administration officials? What does that do? What incentive structure does that create? What perverse incentives does that create for them to lie?
Yes.
Yes.
Who wouldn't be offended by the use of the term ``kangaroo court.'' In fact, the entire marsupial world will be offended by this.
Yes.
Senator Ricketts is the former Governor of Nebraska. I would love to get your perspective on this.
Before he had his name changed legally--for purposes of this Chamber--to the junior Senator from Missouri, Attorney General Eric Schmitt was one of the Nation's leading legal minds engaged in this problem, engaged in trying to address the lawlessness at our southern border, brought on by the policies of this administration. I would like to hear his perspective on what happened today.
No. Thank you. Excellent remarks. There are some days that one wishes one could live over. This is a day that will live in infamy and is a day that future generations will wish had gone differently.
We have got a friend and colleague--our friend and colleague, the senior Senator from Wisconsin, has many titles in the Senate, titles of distinction. He is the prince of plastics, the maven of manufacturing, the connoisseur of cheese curds. He is also, among other things, someone who has identified himself as a chancellor of charts showing the profound depth of our border security crisis. He has been working on this ever since he first became the chairman of the Homeland Security Committee back in 2015. He has built on these charts, and he has built on them in a way that has resulted in their catching fire. You will now see politicians all over the country at every level of government--and I mean every level of government--utilizing his charts because they are the best in the business. Let's hear from him now.
I am grateful for those insights that we had from our friend and colleague, the distinguished senior Senator from Wisconsin.
You know, when the senior Senator from Alabama joined the United States Senate, it was a pleasure to get to know him. It has been a pleasure to work with him ever since. In fact, I visited our southern border within a few months after he arrived here.
I noticed in him a distinct concern not only for the welfare of the residents of the State of Alabama and all other Americans but also a genuine concern for those who have been human-trafficked into our country by the drug cartels, with the tacit acquiescence and even the affirmative blessing of this administration.
I, for one, am glad that Senator Tuberville was not the head coach at the University of Miami when their football team played BYU in the late summer of 1990. Had he been, that game might have turned out differently. But I would love to get his thoughts on this matter.
A very good game.
Thank you, Coach.
Another one of our colleagues who has been a longtime advocate of secure borders and is tireless in her advocacy is our friend and colleague the senior Senator from the State of Tennessee. I would love to get her thoughts on what happened today.
Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
Another great mind that we benefit from in the Senate is our friend and colleague, the junior Senator from Florida.
Before he became the Senator from Florida, Senator Scott was previously Governor Scott, a Governor of one of the most heavily populated States in America. And prior to that, he was famous in the business world, personally employing hundreds of thousands of people.
So the Department of Homeland Security is an enormous organization. Nobody understands how best to run an enormous organization and to do so with exceptional skill better than Senator Scott, and nobody understands better than him how the buck stops with the person running that organization. We would love to hear from him now.
I am grateful for the comments that have been made by so many colleagues today in this colloquy and for the insights they have shared. Each comes from a different State, bringing a different set of perspectives to the table, a different set of political and professional perspectives that help them shed light on this important issue and provide insights and warnings about the rather grave implications that we so cavalierly overlooked today--``we,'' meaning the Senate as a whole, with 49 of us trying to stand in the way and raise a word of warning about what we are doing and what implications that might have for the future.
The warning signs are everywhere. Tragically, we have seen, just in the last few days, with news breaking in recent hours, that the consequences of our open-borders policy can touch all of us, with one of our dear respected colleagues having lost a beloved staff member within the last few days, having lost that staff member as a consequence of the actions taken by an immigrant in this country who was here unlawfully, who shouldn't have been here.
That is a troubling thing, but the human level has so many ramifications. There are so many thousands of families, so many hundreds of thousands, and, in fact, so many millions and, in fact, tens--depending on how you slice it, hundreds--of millions of Americans who have been impacted in real, meaningful ways by the open-borders policy that has been so prominently featured by these Articles of Impeachment.
Over three decades ago, I spent 2 years along the U.S.-Mexico border, down in the McAllen, TX, region. I was there as a missionary. And, as a missionary, one lives and works among people of all backgrounds. I spent a lot of time with people of modest means. And, in my case, I spent most of my time with people of such humble means that I never quite witnessed in the United States--conditions that I didn't know existed on any widespread basis in the United States, including some people with dirt floors and no indoor plumbing.
But in countless cases--those were a little bit more rare, but they exist or, at least, they existed in the early 1990s. Even though those were more rare--those extreme cases--almost all the people I interacted with on a day-to-day basis were people of very humble means. They were living paycheck to paycheck, just trying to get by. And many of these people were themselves recent immigrants. Some, I suspect, were here legally. Others, I suspect, were here illegally. It wasn't standard practice at the time for missionaries talking to people to find out their immigration status. We were there for different reasons. You get to know people. You get to know their backgrounds. You get to know their concerns.
One of the things that stands out from my memories of those 2 years is that, as I interacted with these people and learned their customs and learned their language--most of them didn't speak English. Some who didn't speak English had themselves lived in the United States most or all of their lives. In fact, there were some people, especially in the older generations, where these families had been in Texas for a very long time--for generations. And some of those older generations of people were raised speaking largely, if not exclusively, Spanish.
But regardless of their immigration background or whether their family had been in Texas for generations or for only days or weeks, and whether they came legally or illegally, something I learned about them was that there is no one who fears uncontrolled waves of illegal immigration in quite the same way, to quite the same degree, as recent immigrants, especially recent immigrants of humble means living on or near the U.S.-Mexico border. You see, because it is their schools, it is their jobs, it is their neighborhoods, their homes, their children, their families who are most directly affected by these uncontrolled waves of illegal immigration, because it is those things that are at their doorstep.
They know that every one of those things are placed in grave jeopardy every time the floodgates open and people pour across our border into the United States without legal authority to be here. Every single time that happens, that has adverse consequences.
We have talked a lot about the more obvious and more newsworthy, more news-covered, implications of open borders, with situations like Laken Riley hitting the news. But we don't always talk about how it affects other people in more mundane, more pedestrian ways.
I think we have to be mindful of and, really, watch out for the tendency of those of us who are privileged enough to serve in this body to otherize immigrants, to otherize anyone with a Hispanic surname, to otherize anyone by, among other things, assuming that those groups of people speak monolithically or that we speak for them, insofar as we are seen as advocating a position that is tolerant of or even eager to embrace open borders. It is not the full picture, and it is one of the more blatantly awful otherizations that we bring about in our society. It is assuming that someone with a Hispanic surname, someone who may be a recent immigrant themselves would necessarily want open borders. It is simply not true, and it speaks profound ignorance to the plight of these individuals when we claim that they speak monolithically, especially insofar as we are suggesting, even indirectly, that they are for open borders just because of their last name or their first language or how recently they arrived in the United States or where they live in the United States relative to the border.
Getting back to the bigger picture here into what specifically happened today, when I think about the 13--
going on 13\1/2\--years that I have spent in the U.S. Senate, I don't think I can remember another day when something of such profoundly disastrous consequences was done in this body to shatter norms, rules, precedents, legal traditions and, in this case, constitutional principles quite like this decision here today did.
I remember, just before Thanksgiving in 2013, I had been in the Senate not yet 3 years, just days before Thanksgiving, just before we broke for the Thanksgiving recess, when a group of my colleagues, all of one particular party, decided to nuke the executive filibuster-- decided to break the rules of the Senate in order to change the rules of the Senate, not by changing the rules themselves, because changing the rules themselves takes 67 votes, but, instead, by a simple majority vote. They created new precedent to undercut and flip the meaning of one of the Senate rules: getting rid of the cloture rule with regard to the Executive Calendar.
I spoke to a lot of people after that happened, people of both political parties, including some of both political parties even within this body, who serve in this body, who expressed regret over that day and concerns for where it could lead. But particularly I heard from people not serving in this body, people from all walks of life, including people of all political persuasions, who acknowledged the profound consequences that could have and would eventually have on the United States Senate because, again, it involves a rather shameless, cynical maneuver whereby the Senate broke the rules of the Senate in order to change the rules of the Senate without actually changing the rules, pretending that the rules said A, not B, when, in fact, they said B, not A.
I think it may have been Abraham Lincoln who once said that--he asked rhetorically, if you count a dog's tail as a leg, how many legs does the dog have? Whenever he asked this to any individual, they would tend to say, understandably, accepting the framework of his hypothetical, that that would be five legs. He would respond by saying: No, it is not five legs. Even if you call the tail of a dog a leg, it is still not a leg.
That is what we did when we nuked the executive filibuster on that fateful day in November 2013.
In countless ways, what happened today was far worse than that because what was at stake today were not just the rules, traditions, precedents, and norms of this body--rules, precedents, traditions, and norms that, I would add here, have at no moment in our nearly 2\1/2\ century existence countenanced a result like what we achieved today. That is to say, we never had something like this, where we had Articles of Impeachment passed by the House of Representatives and transmitted to the United States Senate at a moment when the person impeached was neither dead, nor a person who had left the office that person held, nor a person ineligible for impeachment, meaning a Member of the House or Senate. Members of the House or Senate can be expelled by their respective body by a two-thirds supermajority vote, but they are not subject to impeachment per se.
If we carve out those narrow, rare exceptions where Articles of Impeachment have been cast in a way that was patently wrong, where subject matter jurisdiction in this body was lacking either at the time the articles were passed or between the time they were passed at the House and the time they arrived in the Senate, we have what I think can fairly be characterized as essentially a perfect record--at least a consistent record--that we at least held a trial.
We at least held the bare bones of a trial in which we had arguments presented by lawyers--at a minimum, by lawyers representing the House of Representatives. They are known as impeachment managers and sometimes described colloquially as House prosecutors. We at least heard arguments by them. Normally, that involves a presentation of evidence by them, by the House impeachment managers. Normally, it involves both sides having lawyers--not just the House impeachment managers but also defense counsel representing the impeached individual. Normally, there has been evidence presented and arguments made about why the Articles of Impeachment either were or were not meritorious.
In every one of those circumstances, with the narrow exceptions that I described as the sole exceptions, there has been at least some finding on at least some of those articles in every single case culminating in a verdict--a verdict of guilty or not guilty. That by itself is a precedent and a norm and a custom and a tradition and a set of rules that we overlooked today and that we have run roughshod right over.
But there is something much more at stake, something much more concerning about this that I find so troubling, and that is that under article I, section 3, clause 6, the Senate is given the sole power and with it the sacred responsibility and duty to try all impeachments.
As I just described, in every circumstance where there wasn't some jurisdictional defect--and by that, I mean a bona fide subject matter jurisdictional defect such that we lacked jurisdiction to move forward--we have proceeded and reached some kind of a verdict in every one of those cases. But not today.
Mr. President, I had been concerned for weeks and I heard rumors for weeks that what was going to happen today was that the majority leader was going to approach these articles with a certain degree of cavalier indifference and offer up a motion to table.
I immediately became convinced after looking at the rules and studying the precedent on this that a motion to table would be inappropriate here. It would be inappropriate because, for the same reasons I just explained, we have never done that, never done anything close to that.
The closest precedent for something like that was so far off course that it couldn't even be relied on. I recall the only precedent that even sounded like the same thing was, in fact, very different. During the trial over the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, one Senator had made a particular motion to do a particular thing during that trial, and another Senator later moved to table that motion. There was no motion to table any Articles of Impeachment.
In any event, I became convinced after studying this that a motion to table would be without precedent and contrary to everything I thought I knew about our role constitutionally and otherwise to conduct impeachment trials.
I also became convinced that this would be bad precedent in that it would set a certain precedent suggesting that it is OK, that if the party occupying the majority position at the United States Senate didn't want to conduct a trial, that it didn't have to; it could just sweep them aside.
As I say, channeling the immortal words of Rush and the song ``Freewill,'' if you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice. You made a bad one if you choose to just set aside the impeachment articles without rendering a verdict of guilty or not guilty, whether pursuant to a motion to table or otherwise. A motion to table would be an especially bad basis--an especially bad strategy and bad mode for disposing of or otherwise addressing Articles of Impeachment.
It is important in this context to remember that the United States Senate has exactly three states of being. We exist at any given moment in our capacity as legislators in legislative session; secondly, in executive session, where we consider Presidential nominations and also on occasion treaties for ratification--both executive functions carried out under our Executive Calendar. Our third state of being exists in this context where we are to operate as a Court of Impeachment.
It is solely in our capacity as Senators sitting in a Court of Impeachment that we are administered a second separate oath, different from the oath that we all take each time we are elected or reelected to the Senate--different capacity. It is a capacity that requires us to decide the case and to do so on the merits of the case.
It is also unique in that it is the only mode in which there is a solid expectation, unblemished until today, that if we do, in fact, have Articles of Impeachment over which we have subject matter jurisdiction, that the case hasn't been rendered moot--there is an expectation, backed up by history, tradition, precedent, and the text of the
Constitution, that we will do the job; that, in fact, according to these precedents, up until today, we will reach a verdict of guilty or not guilty by the time we are done.
You see, those things don't exist in the other two states of being. In our legislative calendar, there is no expectation or tradition or precedent or implication from the text of the Constitution that we will affirmatively act upon and ultimately dispose of every piece of legislation presented to the United States Senate. We don't do that. We have never taken that approach. If we did, it would grind the place to a halt. I don't think it would physically be possible.
Nor has that ever been the expectation on the Executive Calendar. Sure, we tend eventually to get to most of them, but there is an understanding that unless or until such time as we confirm a particular nominee, that nominee is not confirmed, such that if we get to the end of the road, the end of that Congress, the end, even, of a session, if that person is to be confirmed, that person is to be renominated first and then considered by the Senate. But even then, there is no guarantee as to any final vote disposing of that nomination.
This is different in the context of an impeachment where we sit as a Court of Impeachment. In so doing, we become two things. In any trial-- in an ordinary court, there are two functions that a trial involves. You have to have finders of fact--that is a role typically played by a jury in our system, both in civil cases and in criminal cases--and you have to have judges of legal issues. Typically, those are performed by a judge. In some cases--most commonly, if the parties agree to have the issues of fact decided by a judge rather than a jury, then you can have the whole thing, the issues of fact and the issues of law, decided by a judge.
We serve both functions. We are finders of fact and judges of the law relevant to the impeachment case before us. I think that is the whole reason why we are given a separate oath for that. We don't take a separate oath every time we bring up a bill or get a Presidential nomination or every time we are asked to consider a treaty for ratification, but we do take a separate oath every time we receive Articles of Impeachment. It is not just because these things are more rare than bills as they are introduced or nominations as they are received or treaties presented to us for potential ratification; it is because it is a sacred responsibility in which there is an expectation, backed up by centuries of tradition, custom, precedent, and understanding of our constitutional text, that we will dispose of the case.
We will dispose of it in a way that culminates in a finding of guilty or not guilty except in these rare instances where we lack subject matter jurisdiction most commonly because the case has been rendered moot, which it is not in this instance.
The particular way in which we went about this today really was crazy and impossible to defend--absolutely impossible to defend on its merits.
Remember, there were two articles in these impeachment charges. Article I alleged that in eight or nine different instances in which Secretary Mayorkas had an affirmative legal duty to detain illegal immigrants pending adjudication of either their asylum claims or of their argument that they might be entitled to some other form of relief, including immigration parole, the Secretary of Homeland Security had an affirmative duty to detain them while those decisions were pending.
Eight or nine different statutes required that, eight or nine different statutes he deliberately violated. He did the opposite of what the statute required, and by doing that, he invited and facilitated an invasion at our southern border that is unprecedented in American history. That has been dangerous. That has resulted in all kinds of heinous crimes being committed--loss of life, loss of innocence, loss of property--many, many harms occurring as a result of this, occurring as a result of his deliberate decision not only not to do the job he was hired to do and that he swore an oath to perform well but to do the exact opposite of what the law required.
I mentioned a little while ago the writings of Justice Story, Justice Joseph Story, one of our early Supreme Court Justices a couple of centuries ago. He was familiar with the Constitution at a time closer to the Founding and also very familiar with the English legal antecedents on which the Constitution was predicated, with the legal terminology incorporated from English law into the American constitutional system.
And in his great treatise on the Constitution, in section 798, he explained a few things about impeachable offenses. And he said in section 798:
In examining the parliamentary history of impeachments, it
will be found, that many offences, not easily definable by
law, and many of a purely political character, have been
deemed high crimes and misdemeanors worthy of this
extraordinary remedy.
This extraordinary remedy, of course, referring to impeachment. It then recites a litany of things that would qualify for this. And, again, he just noted, they don't necessarily have to be easily definable by law when they are of a political nature, but he identified some of those things that had been established through English legal precedent--English parliamentary precedent--as worthy of impeachment qualifying as high crimes and misdemeanors.
Among other things, he identified what he referred to as ``attempts to subvert the fundamental laws''--attempts to subvert the fundamental laws. Those could have broad application in all sorts of areas, but I can think of few laws more fundamental to our Republic, to our Federal legal system than our fundamental laws governing who may enter this country and under what circumstances.
He went on to identify a number of other things that fit this definition, adding to it, among other things, by saying the one thing in particular that would meet the definition of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' and would thus be impeachable would be an instance in which a lord admiral may have neglected the safeguard of the sea.
So some on the other side of the aisle have argued that, well, really what Secretary Mayorkas did was to just not do as good of a job as he should have and could have in enforcing the law, and that can't be a basis for impeachment, they argue.
Some of them will invoke the line of reasoning that says maladministration--in other words, not doing your job well--isn't a valid basis for an impeachable offense. I am not at all sure that that argument, even stated in the abstract, is accurate. In fact, I tend to think that it is not because the Constitution itself assigns that job to this branch of government--to the House as it assesses whether to charge something as impeachable and to the Senate as it assesses whether an impeachment passed and presented by the House warrants conviction, removal from office.
That really is our job, and as Justice Story noted, it includes offenses of a political character, regardless of whether they would amount to independently prosecutable criminal offenses in a criminal court of law sense of that word.
But in any event, even if you buy into that reason, there are those scholars who believe that. I seem to recall Professor Alan Dershowitz, a respected Harvard law professor from whom we have heard in past impeachment proceedings. I believe that he believes in this approach. Even under Professor Dershowitz's approach, he is someone for whom I have great respect, even where I disagree with him.
Even if you were to accept that premise, this isn't just that. This goes far beyond just maladministration. It is not just that Secretary Mayorkas didn't do as good of a job as he could have and should have and we wish he would have, it is that he willfully subverted what the law required and did the exact opposite of what the law required. That is impeachable.
It has got to be impeachable, and yet the majority leader stood up today, and he said: I raise a point of order that impeachment article I--again, impeachment article I is the part that deals with Secretary Mayorkas's decision to do the exact opposite of what the law requires.
The majority leader continued: Impeachment article I does not allege conduct that rises to the level of a high crime or misdemeanor as required in article II, section 4, of the United States Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional.
Really, I don't know how he gets there. He can't get there except by sheer force, and the way you do something by sheer force here is you produce a simple majority of votes from Senators declaring the impeachment equivalent of defining the tail of a dog to be a leg.
What I found even more stunning, was when--as stunning as that first move was and as disappointing as it was that a simple majority of United States Senators, all from the same political party, I would add, not my own--he somehow managed to outdo that one by later making the same point of order with respect to article II.
Arguing that, you know, he said: I raise a point of order that impeachment article II does not allege conduct that rises to the level of a high crime or misdemeanor as required under article II, section 4, of the United States Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional.
Let's remember what article II was about. Article II charged Secretary Mayorkas with knowingly making false statements to Congress as Congress was carrying out its oversight responsibilities with him testifying, often under oath, to Congress.
Now, unfortunately, we never got to hear any evidence on this. Therefore, we weren't presented with the opportunity to make a final determination on this, but we instead had the majority simply roll right over all of us by just declaring, ipse dixit, it is because it is. It is because we say it is; that it is not an impeachable offense, even if, as has been alleged and as the House impeachment managers--the House prosecutors we sometimes call them--were denied the opportunity to try to prove that he knowingly made false statements to Congress. To say that that is not impeachable is breathtakingly frightening.
We have now established a precedent in the United States Senate that if you occupy a high position of trust within the United States Government, a Cabinet member in this instance, and you knowingly, willfully make false statements to Congress as Congress has tried to get to the truth about what you are doing in your job and whether or not you are faithfully executing, implementing, and enforcing the law, that lying to Congress in that sense, even under oath, isn't an impeachable offense.
That precedent could suggest that we now are effectively immunized from impeachment, doing that very thing. How are we to conduct adequate oversight, if even the theoretical threat, the theoretical, hypothetical, potential threat of impeachment isn't on the table?
That severely weakens the fabric of our Republic. It certainly weakens the ability of the United States Senate to push back on abuses by and within a coordinate branch of government. You know, when James Madison expressed in the Federalist Papers, among other places in Federalist 51, the government was sort of an experiment; it is an exhibit; it is a display of human nature--there and in other Federalist Papers, he explains things like the fact that as he continued in Federalist 51, that if we as human beings were angels, we wouldn't need government; if we had access to angels to run our government, we wouldn't need all these rules to govern those responsible for government, but, alas, we are not angels. We don't have access to angels to run our government, so we need rules.
Madison was also a big believer in the fact that because we are not angels, we don't have access to angels to run our government, we do need these rules. You have got to set up a system in which power can be made to check power, and you set up each branch with its own set of incentives to guard against abuses in power.
I have wondered over time, as I have seen the United States Senate gradually but very steadily over many decades voluntarily relinquishing its power--much of it started with our work on the legislative calendar starting in earnest really in the 1930s, continuing to the present day.
We have gradually, steadily been outsourcing a lot of our lawmaking power to unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats--pass all sorts of laws saying, essentially, we shall have good law with respect to issue x and we hereby delegate to Department or Commission or Agency or functionary y the power to promulgate rules carrying the force of generally applicable Federal law as to issue x.
Little by little, the American people lose control over their own government as this happens. Little by little, you start to see that this diminishes the overall accountability of the U.S. Government. And when Agency or Department y promulgates a particular rule carrying the force of generally applicable Federal law, people understandably, predictably, very consistently come to us to complain, saying: This is killing us. This rule made by unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats is now going to shut down my business. I am going to be deprived of life, liberty, or property, or some combination of the three. Whether I choose to comply or not, it is going to harm me in material ways.
And, yet, you know, Article I, Section 1, Clause 1, says that all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in the Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.
Article I, Section 7, makes abundantly clear what Article I, section 1 sets up, which is to say: You cannot make a Federal law without the assent of both the House of Representatives and the Senate on the same bill. They have got to the pass the same bill text and then present it to the Chief Executive--the President of the United States--for signature, veto, or acquiescence.
Unless you follow that formula of Article I, Section 7, you are not supposed to be able to make a Federal law.
One of the more influential political philosophers on the founding generation was Charles de Montesquieu, who observed that the lawmaking power is itself nondelegable; that the task of lawmaking involves the power to make law, not other lawmakers, because as we see to this very day, when these things happen, when people come back to complain to us that the administrative regulation carrying the force of generally applicable Federal law, when it causes problems, people come and complain to us. And then Members of Congress, predictably and foreseeably, beat their chest. And they say: Oh, yes, those barbarians over at Agency, Commission, Department y. We didn't mean to authorize this. We just said make good law as to issue x; we didn't say to make bad law.
And then, predictably, Senators, the Representatives, say something like the following: You know what I am going to do for you, Constituent? I am going to write them a harshly worded letter. That is what I am going to do--as if that were our job we were sworn in to do were to write harshly worded letters.
It is not that, of course. It is to make laws, not other lawmakers.
You know, I keep these two stacks of documents behind my desk. One stack is small. It is usually a few inches, no more than a foot or so, consists of the laws passed by Congress in the preceding year. It is just, you know, a few thousand pages long.
The other stack is 13 feet tall. During a typical year, it will reach about 100,000 pages stacked up--even on very thin paper, double-sided, small print--about 13 feet tall, consists of last year's Federal registry, the annual cumulative index of these Federal regulations as they are promulgated, as they are initially released for notice and comment and, later, as they are finalized.
Those rules carry the force of generally applicable Federal law. Failure to abide by those can shut down your business, can result in enormous fines. In many cases can result in your imprisonment if you don't follow them. And yet they are not enacted themselves through the formula prescribed by Article I, Section 7. No.
Because in that instance, we have authorized the making, not of laws but of other lawmakers, not ourselves. And those other lawmakers to whom we have given this assignment, while, perhaps, however well- educated and well-intentioned, wise, specialized, well-trained they might be, they don't stand accountable to the American people, ever. Their name will never appear on a ballot. In fact, their name will stand, essentially, as a secret to nearly every American, including those who will stand accountable to those laws, who may lose life, liberty, and property as a result of those things.
(Ms. HASSAN assumes the Chair.)
That is not right. We all know deep down that is not right. We know that every time we are presented with one of these complaints by our constituents--and we all have them. In my office, it is in nearly constant refrain. And yet they often precipitate the predictable harshly worded letter and not a lot else.
In other instances, they might culminate in the filing of a resolution of disapproval under the Congressional Review Act. As fun as those can be--as they do give us, at least, an opportunity to debate them--those are privileged resolutions. If you follow the rules of a Congressional Review Act, you can pretty much always get one of those voted on. You can, at least, have an opportunity to present those here in the U.S. Senate and to vote up or down as to whether or not you want to disapprove of the regulation in question.
Ultimately, however, those prove dissatisfying from a constitutional standpoint in the sense that, with very narrow exceptions, they don't really do any good because nearly any administration whose bureaucratic structures will promulgate the administrative rule in question will like, for policy reasons and political reasons, the policy choice embodied in those regulations. And, consequently, the President whose administration promulgated that regulation being challenged under the CRA resolution of disapproval will almost always veto any resolution of disapproval passed by both Houses of Congress. It is very rare that that doesn't happen.
With only one exception I can think of from a few decades ago, the only time that works--other than that one exception that I am thinking of--occurs when you have a holdover, when you have a new administration and you have regulations that have been promulgated toward the tail end of the previous administration. We had a number of those when President Trump took office following President Obama's time in office where regulations from the Obama era were becoming ripe for CRA resolutions of disapproval, and we were able to get them passed by both Houses of Congress and then signed by President Trump.
Those circumstances are pretty rare. In every other circumstance, the voters of this great country, those subject to these administrative regulations that are, in fact, laws, those things leave us without redress. It is one of the reasons why I have long advocated for us to pass a measure called the REINS Act.
If a genie appeared to me and said: You can pass any one bill now pending in front of the U.S. Congress, it would be the REINS Act. Why? Well, because the REINS Act would require us, by statute, to do what I believe the Constitution already requires, what it, in fact, does contemplate, which is: It is fine for administrative regulations to be promulgated, to be proposed. But unless or until they are affirmatively enacted into law by both Houses of Congress and then signed into law or acquiesced to by the sitting President, or in the event of a veto, that veto is overridden by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, then it can take effect. Short of that, no dice. You don't get a law.
These do have far-reaching effects, including the fact that, as a Member of the Judiciary Committee, I and a few of my colleagues tried to figure out a few years ago how many criminal offenses are on the books. How many different provisions of Federal law prescribe criminal penalties that can result in a criminal conviction?
We asked this question of the Congressional Research Service, the entity to which we turn regularly in order to get answers to questions like those. The answer came back to us in a way that I found absolutely stunning. The answer that came back to us from the Congressional Research Service--very talented people at the Congressional Service who were very good at answering these questions. They did a good job doing it, and in the end, they gave us the answer that it was possible to achieve. They said: The answer is unknown and unknowable, but we know that it stands at at least 300,000 separately defined criminal offenses on the books.
Now, this does not mean that on 300,000-plus occasions both Houses of Congress passed into law separate statute defining a criminal offense with criminal penalties. No. In many, many of these instances--one of the reasons why the number is so difficult to tie down is because a lot of these are defined administratively.
So that is one area in which the U.S. Senate has been deliberately shirking its responsibilities and handing them off to somebody else, refusing to do the job that we have been given to do. So that is on the legislative calendar.
We have done that time and time again. Also on the executive calendar where we have changed the law so as to limit--changed the law or, in some cases, adopted standing orders that have been embraced in subsequent iterations of the Senate limiting the number of Presidential nominees requiring confirmation.
So we have narrowed our playing field there, too, shirking our responsibility. Even as the size of the Federal Government has increased inexorably, we have narrowed our job. And now we have seen it done again today in our third state of being, in our third category where we operate as a Court of Impeachment.
Even here, where our job is really limited, we have one job in this area: to conduct impeachment trials. There are a thousand ways you can conduct an impeachment trial. You can conduct an impeachment trial with the whole Senate. You can specialize the impeachment trial so that it is heard in the first instance by a select committee with Members of both political parties who hear the evidence and then, after doing that, submit the whole matter for a final vote to the whole Senate.
You can hear evidence through individual witnesses. You can receive evidence in documentary form. There are a thousand different ways to conduct a trial, some of which allow the trial to be conducted pretty quickly, others might take more time. But there are a thousand ways we can do it.
And, here, as with the other two states of being--first on the legislative calendar and then on the Executive Calendar--now as we sit as a Court of Impeachment, we have narrowed our work again, shirking our responsibilities again, again declining to perform our constitutional duties.
This is shameful. I am embarrassed that we as a Senate seem so enamored with the idea that we can't do the things given to us.
What is especially troubling about this is that, you know, we are, in fact, a government of limited enumerated powers.
Our job is not to, as some people put it, run the country. Our job is not to make law on any matter that we think appropriate or significant. Our job is not just to enact legislation in any area where we think it might redound in one way or another to the net benefit of the American people. No. We are supposed to be a government of limited, enumerated powers, charged with a few basic things.
We are in charge of a uniform system of weights and measures, a system of immigration and nationality laws, regulating trade or commerce between the several States with foreign nations and with Indian Tribes. We are in charge of declaring war; establishing and regulating an Army and a Navy; coming up with rules governing State militias, which we now describe and refer to as the National Guard; coining money and regulating the value thereof; coming up with bankruptcy laws; postal roads; post offices; regulating in some instances Federal land to be used for some military purpose; regulating what we now call the District of Columbia; adopting rules governing the regulation and disposal of territory and of other property owned by the United States.
One of my favorite powers of Congress involves granting letters of marque and reprisal. ``Marque'' in this instance is spelled M-A-R-Q-U- E. We haven't done one of those in over a century. I hope we will sometime. I think we should. A letter of marque and reprisal is basically a hall pass issued by Congress that allows those acting pursuant to it to engage in acts of piracy on the high seas, with impunity offered by the United States if they are able to make it back with whatever loot they take into the United States and then divide the spoils and share in the spoils with the United States Government.
That is about it. There are a few other powers of Congress here and
there, but that is the lion's share of what the Federal Government can do.
Of course, we occupy the most significant, prominent, dominant, and dangerous power within that because we are the lawmaking branch. We make the laws.
The executive branch enforces the laws we make, deferring to our policies and enforcing the policies that we enact.
The judicial branch, headed by the Supreme Court, interprets them-- not just in the abstract but interprets them in a way so as to be able to resolve disputes properly brought before the jurisdiction of the courts--disputes over the meaning of Federal law.
So we have the most dangerous, prominent, dominant position. It makes sense that the Founding Fathers entrusted that role only to us because we happen to be the branch of government most accountable to the people at the most regular intervals. You can fire all 435 Members of the House every 2 years. You can fire one-third of the Members of this Body every 2 years. It is one of the reasons why you know the Founding Fathers considered the power that we wield the most dangerous, because they made us subject to the most frequent and regular and direct kinds of guarantees of accountability--that is, through elections.
So now we have somebody who has been impeached because a law that we passed that he was charged with enforcing and administering and implementing and executing--didn't do his job, although it falls on us to decide that.
We have myriad instances in which that violation of the law can't be adjudicated in court, such as this case we referred to earlier, the United States v. Texas, where a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States--I guess, by the way, a brilliant dissent by Justice Alito--concluded that the State of Texas didn't have standing to address violations of law, deviations from law by Secretary Mayorkas and the Biden administration.
So if not us, who? There are countless instances that the courts can't do it. The executive branch isn't going to check the executive branch. The buck stops with us. It is our job to do this, and today, we failed. We didn't just fail in the sense that we tried to do it and we didn't; the majority of us, unfortunately, tried not to, went out of our way to define our role as something that it is not, to define the law as saying something other than what it, in fact, says so that we can shirk our responsibilities once again. Shame on us. Shame on those Members of this body who voted to do that today.
I wonder what future generations will say about this. I wonder how many ways in which future generations will suffer from what we did today.
I hope they will take this as a lesson in what not to do and soon depart from this awful precedent because otherwise this will lead to the shedding of tears and worse.
We are told that the Senate is apparently just too busy to conduct an impeachment trial, just as we are about to be told that the Senate is too busy to require the Federal Government to get a warrant before searching the private communications of the American people incidentally collected and stored in the FISA 702 databases. Too busy to do those things, but I think we are about to be told that it is not too busy to send even more money to Ukraine, where we have already sent $113 billion--not too busy to do that; not too busy to expand FISA without adding a warrant requirement; but just way too busy, apparently, to do what the Senate and only the Senate can do and what under the Constitution we must do.
Like the ghost of Christmas future in Charles Dickens' ``A Christmas Carol,'' I hope that as we examine our future and what today's action portends about the future of the United States and of the United States Senate, I hope we can choose to depart from this course. While I fear that our past will prove to be our prologue, I sure hope we won't solidify and more deeply entrench this unwise, indefensible move that we took today.
But I am glad we have had a chance today to set the record straight, to make an adequate record of what really happened, and that while a majority--a bare, slim majority--chose to excuse the inexcusable today, some of us--nearly half of us tried to stand in front of that train and stop it. I hope this will prove to be an aberration. Let's all pray that it does.
Madam President, I yield the floor.