Floor Statements

Mr. President, I am pleased to once again introduce, along with my distinguished colleague Senator Brownback, a bill designating the Bleeding Kansas and the Enduring Struggle for Freedom National Heritage Area. This project, which we hope will receive the congressional recognition it deserves, has joined communities throughout eastern Kansas in an effort to document, preserve, and celebrate Kansas' significant role in the political struggle that led to the Civil War and in other historic struggles for equality that took place in our State.

National Heritage Areas are places where natural, cultural, historic, and recreational resources combine to form complete and distinct landscape. The State of Kansas, which has a proud heritage and compelling story, will benefit from this national designation that helps preserve and celebrate America's defining landscapes. By enhancing and developing historic sites throughout eastern Kansas, we will ensure that the traditions that evolved there are preserved.

During the Civil War, William Quantrill, the head of an infamous gang of Confederate sympathizers, led a raid on Lawrence, KS. Though far from the main campaigns, this massacre caused Bleeding Kansas to become a prominent symbol in the fight for the freedom of all people, and the territory would become a battleground over the question of slavery. After these attacks, the abolitionist Senator Charles Sumner delivered his famous speech called ``The Crime Against Kansas,'' in which he brought the escalating situation into sharper focus for the nation.

Almost 100 years later, Kansas became the battleground once again, as Oliver L. Brown fought to prove that separate among the people of this great Nation is not equal. In fact, we will soon celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Brown v. Topeka Board of Education Supreme Court decision, which was a landmark victory in the civil rights movement. These are only two of the historic chapters that will make up this heritage area, marking an important era in our Nation.

I commend the Lawrence City Commission, the Douglas County Commission, and the Lawrence Chamber of Commerce, who have worked diligently on this project for over 2 years. We have a great opportunity to pass this important piece of legislation during the 109th Congress, and I encourage the Senate's swift consideration.

Mr. President, I am pleased to once again introduce, along with my distinguished colleague Senator Brownback, a bill designating the Bleeding Kansas and the Enduring Struggle for Freedom National Heritage Area. This project, which we hope will receive the congressional recognition it deserves, has joined communities throughout eastern Kansas in an effort to document, preserve, and celebrate Kansas' significant role in the political struggle that led to the Civil War and in other historic struggles for equality that took place in our State.

National Heritage Areas are places where natural, cultural, historic, and recreational resources combine to form complete and distinct landscape. The State of Kansas, which has a proud heritage and compelling story, will benefit from this national designation that helps preserve and celebrate America's defining landscapes. By enhancing and developing historic sites throughout eastern Kansas, we will ensure that the traditions that evolved there are preserved.

During the Civil War, William Quantrill, the head of an infamous gang of Confederate sympathizers, led a raid on Lawrence, KS. Though far from the main campaigns, this massacre caused Bleeding Kansas to become a prominent symbol in the fight for the freedom of all people, and the territory would become a battleground over the question of slavery. After these attacks, the abolitionist Senator Charles Sumner delivered his famous speech called ``The Crime Against Kansas,'' in which he brought the escalating situation into sharper focus for the nation.

Almost 100 years later, Kansas became the battleground once again, as Oliver L. Brown fought to prove that separate among the people of this great Nation is not equal. In fact, we will soon celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Brown v. Topeka Board of Education Supreme Court decision, which was a landmark victory in the civil rights movement. These are only two of the historic chapters that will make up this heritage area, marking an important era in our Nation.

I commend the Lawrence City Commission, the Douglas County Commission, and the Lawrence Chamber of Commerce, who have worked diligently on this project for over 2 years. We have a great opportunity to pass this important piece of legislation during the 109th Congress, and I encourage the Senate's swift consideration.

I thank the distinguished chairman of the Agriculture Committee, and, I might add, the new chairman of the committee, for yielding this time to me. I look forward to working with him. On behalf of the man whose job it is to feed America in a troubled and hungry world, we could not have made a better choice--I am using the editorial ``we''--for a man to lead the Senate Agriculture Committee. He brings to the job extensive experience and commitment to represent not only the producers of Georgia but those all throughout the Nation. So I thank the Chairman. I look forward to working with him.

I rise today to speak on the nomination of Governor Michael Johanns of Nebraska to serve as the next Secretary of Agriculture. But first I would like to thank our outgoing Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary Ann Veneman. Ann has been a longtime and dear personal friend of mine. While she now has accepted a new challenge as head of UNICEF; that is, the United Nations Children's Fund, I want to personally thank her for the 4 years of service she has given to this Nation. Her steadfastness on behalf of agriculture was inspiring to us all. So to Ann Veneman: A job well done.

Her legacy will be her commitment to trade and food and agricultural security, which is in the best interest of all Americans. On her watch she dealt

with some of the most difficult issues any Secretary could ever face: first, a threat of foot and mouth disease almost as soon as she took office, later followed by BSE issues and the introduction of something called Asian soybean rust, which is a very severe problem. She handled all of these problems well. And she also established a plant and animal disease monitoring system. Again, that will be her legacy.

I also wish Governor Johanns all the best as he becomes our new Secretary of Agriculture. It will not be an easy job, and he knows that. Secretary Johanns will be forced to confront many of the same issues Secretary Veneman faced. He will face food safety and security surprises that will make it all the more important to continue to protect the safety and security of our food supply and the agricultural sector.

He will also face challenges with regard to budget pressures, the farm bill reauthorization, and also continued competition--I want to emphasize this--if not an outright ambush to U.S. farm programs through the World Trade Organization. That is going to be a very big challenge to all of us.

Mike Johanns is up to and qualified for this task. I had the pleasure to visit at length with the Governor prior to his confirmation hearing. I attended the entire hearing. Actually, I had the gavel when we moved the nomination. Knowing the Governor from a neighboring State, I can tell you he has a passion for this job. He has committed to do well on behalf of our farmers, ranchers, food safety, and our nutrition programs.

The Department of Agriculture is an immense agency, and he is well qualified for this task. He was raised on a farm. He understands agriculture. Most important, he is someone who will be a bully pulpit champion, if you will, for production agriculture. He is the type who will certainly be willing to sit on the wagon tongue with the farmers and ranchers, asking for their advice and their suggestions.

I have heard many stories from the Kansas producers on the northern borders of Kansas who have told me of crossing the border to Nebraska, not for a football game but simply on business, walking into the local coffee shop, and there they would run into Governor Johanns and he would be carrying on the coffee shop conversations with his farmers. This is the kind of man we want in this position.

President Bush has picked an outstanding candidate in nominating Mike Johanns, the former Governor of Nebraska. I look forward to working with him. I urge my colleagues to support the swift approval of his nomination.

I again thank the distinguished chairman and yield the floor.

I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, it is my understanding that I have allotted to me 10 minutes. I had originally understood it was 15. I ask the distinguished chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee if she could yield me 5 minutes out of her time, which I know is precious, thus making it 15?

I thank the Presiding Officer, and I thank the chairman.

Mr. President, one day after the 62nd anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and 3 years and 82 days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on our country, we will now pass the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.

I rise in strong support of this conference report which is a remarkable first step in our goal to strengthen and improve our Nation's intelligence capabilities.

My colleagues, we should start--and others have said this, and it is certainly true--by recognizing Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman and their staff for their efforts to get a bill which will have a positive impact on our intelligence community. They have put in a tremendous amount of hard slugging, sometimes very contentious and very difficult work, and overtime, since they began this effort back as of the 1st of August. I thank them. Together, we will have made a positive difference in behalf of our national security.

I would also like to thank President Bush for his instrumental efforts in getting this conference report moving. Without his leadership, this reform would still be in the midst of a turf and issue gridlock. The President knows that national security demands intelligence reform and that the status quo is not an option. So I thank the President for weighing in.

All one had to do is listen to the debate on this bill in the other body yesterday to understand that this bill by necessity is a compromise. When you compromise you do not get everything you want. In my case--and in the view of many who serve on the Senate Intelligence Committee--it does not do everything that I believe is necessary to clearly streamline the structure of our intelligence community. It is no secret that I believe we should have gone farther.

It is perplexing to me and a paradox of enormous irony that after the 9/11 investigation by both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, after our Senate committee's WMD report, after the findings of the 9/11 Commission, after the report of the President's WMD commission, and after all of the hearings we have held within the appropriate committees and the Senate Intelligence Committee--we have held over 200 hearings this session, 60 percent more than the previous session of Congress--after all of this, and the knowledge of the attacks on the Khobar Towers, the USS Cole, and the embassy bombings, 9/11, terror attacks all over the world that we know are connected, that still some believe we do not need comprehensive reform or have or will vote against this legislation because they believe it is a rush to judgment or that the legislation did not include what they deem their top national security priority.

In this regard, some have argued that this bill will interrupt the military chain of command or prevent the men and women of the armed services from receiving crucial intelligence information. Certainly these arguments should not be ignored. But in the end, this legislation does very little to modify the chains of command within the intelligence community.

The tactical intelligence elements of the U.S. Government remain clearly and explicitly under the command of the Secretary of Defense.

The leadership construct for national intelligence assets remains largely unchanged. The Director of National Intelligence remains primarily a budget and policy leader for national intelligence assets.

Undoubtedly, the Director's budget and policy authorities are strengthened. But day-to-day operational control of our national intelligence collection agencies remains dispersed. The Central Intelligence Agency will now be led by an independent Director. The Secretary of Defense retains the operational control of the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office.

Note the word of all three agencies, ``national.''

These are not only combat support agencies, but national policy assets.

I cannot see how the existing chains of command have been seriously changed.

The history of the intelligence community does not support the opponents' second argument--that the Armed Forces will somehow be deprived of intelligence by a stronger Director of National Intelligence. The former DCI has always set requirements and priorities for collection by national assets. Moreover, neither the President nor Congress--certainly not this Member of Congress, a former marine--would ever permit the crucial intelligence needs of our military to be ignored by the Director of National Intelligence.

Certainly, the requirements of our men and women in the military must be met. That has been said over and over again, especially in the House. But we must also recognize that the principal user of national intelligence that is produced by our national intelligence agencies are our national policymakers, primarily the President of the United States, the National Security Council, and the Congress of the United States. The DNI must have authority to ensure that the intelligence requirements of the President and other national policymakers are met.

Thus, while the Department of Defense is by volume--everybody understands that, by volume--the largest user of national intelligence, we must not forget that our national collection assets at the CIA and at the NSA, the NRO and the NGA--what the critics call combat support agencies--serve our policymaking needs as well.

However, while this is not the best bill possible, it is the best possible bill. It is also a big step in the right direction.

As has been said it will create a Director of National Intelligence, or a DNI, who is separate from the Director of the CIA. It will give this Director, the DNI, marginally improved budget authorities over our intelligence community agencies. It will provide authority to conduct quality control

checks of the analytic products of our intelligence community. It will also create a National counterterrorism Center which will, I hope, eventually serve as the Nation's true clearinghouse for terrorist- related intelligence. These are, in my view, very positive steps forward in our intelligence community.

I would also like my colleagues to take note of several other important and long overdue provisions in this bill. For example, this bill will consolidate what is now a needlessly complicated and expensive background investigation and security clearance process under one agency. Today, it takes too long to get good people in very crucial positions. Noting the debate in the other body, it is important to stress this bill will also bring important improvements to our Nation's border security.

I am not, however, under any illusions. This bill is not perfect. No bill is. Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman were forced to put the Senate bill through the filter of the demands of the House and still manage to get a bill that is a step in the right direction--a big step.

In conjunction with the administration, we in the Congress--more especially those of us who had the privilege of serving on the House and Senate Intelligence Committees--will need to nurture this new intelligence structure over the years and clarify as necessary the various authorities in order to make it effective.

For those who are uneasy with the unprecedented speed with which this bill was brought to this point, I would like to offer the reassurance that what we will pass today is certainly not the final chapter on the reform of our intelligence. After this bill becomes law, we will monitor its implementation and make any needed adjustments in subsequent years. If one looks at history, the process of amending and improving the National Security Act of 1947 began almost immediately following its passage. I expect that this bill will be no different. This bill is only the beginning of the intelligence reform process. Since July, several other Senators and I have made it clear that while we believe this bill has many good provisions, what it fails to do is create a leader of the intelligence community who is clearly in charge and as a result is fully accountable.

That does not make this a bad bill. It just means that Congress must continue to monitor and guide the intelligence reform process. We must continue the logical reform of our intelligence community. If we are not diligent, our newly created Director of National Intelligence could end up a director in name only. Our national security certainly demands better.

I am determined to work with my colleagues in this Congress and the administration to continue the process that has been started by this reform effort. This process will be difficult, but it is essential and we must persevere. President Eisenhower, a five-star general, a national hero, was unable to achieve the reforms he sought to unify the Department of Defense in the 1950s. Instead, President Eisenhower's reforms would have to wait another 30 years for the Goldwater-Nichols Act which made the U.S. military the very remarkable and unified force it is today.

The forces of the status quo beat back President Truman's efforts in 1947 to put military operations under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands that had shown their utility during World War II. Instead, in 1947, President Truman was forced to accept a National Security Act that codified a system in which the military services were loosely joined under a very weak Joint Chiefs of Staff organization that had no significant authority independent of the military services.

The compromise President Truman was forced to accept mirrors in many ways the compromise bill we are voting for today. But there is reason for optimism. That shell of a Joint Chiefs of Staff which was codified in 1947 did provide the foundation upon which the Goldwater-Nichols Act would build the remarkable unified command and control structure we have today.

In addition to serving as that important foundation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also became a voice. That voice was independent of the military services turf interests in the debate over how to continue the process of the reform of our defense. That was the first step in the struggle that resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Act and a major overhaul of the military command structure.

This bill does not give the Director of National Intelligence all of the authorities I would like to provide. It is my sincere hope, however, that it will at least create the same kind of voice, independent of the institutional interests that currently divide our intelligence community, a voice that can lead us toward the ultimate goal: a more rationally organized intelligence community with a clear chain of command and the real accountability that comes with it.

Since 1949, 24 attempts have been made to pass comprehensive intelligence reform legislation. I thank all concerned that we have been successful on the 25th attempt. It has been 3 years and 82 days since September 11. On behalf of the families of the victims of September 11 and on behalf of national security and every American, I am thankful we will not wait another day.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I rise today to offer my support for the President's nomination of Dr. Fran Harvey to the post of Secretary of the Army.

Our forces are deployed around the world as they have never been before. They are fighting hard and they are fighting well to defend Americans in the war on terror, and the Army is at the front line of that fight.

Gone are the days when massive and overwhelming force was all this country needed to ensure victory. The threats we face and the stresses they cause on our force require visionary solutions. Fran Harvey is the visionary we need at the head of our largest force.

Fran Harvey knows how to look at a large organization where the bureaucracy is an overwhelming force in its own right, and mold it to meet future threats. Dr. Harvey is a successful executive who has extensive experience in leading and managing large organizations, particularly program based organizations involved in the development and deployment of technology and systems.

He will bring a results oriented management approach to an organization where results matter more than anywhere else. As part of this approach, Dr. Harvey places major emphasis on business transformation through process improvement in combination with the application of information technology.

Fran Harvey's broad base of experience has been multi-dimensional in

terms of industries, functions, and markets. His industrial experience is very diverse and includes aerospace and defense, environmental and infrastructure, energy, government facilities management, communications and information systems and electronics.

Fran Harvey has the requisite experience to be Secretary of the Army, but what is more important, he is a visionary where long-term vision is badly needed. It is my great pleasure to support what I am sure will be a successful tenure leading our Army.

Mr. President, I wish all of my colleagues could have been on the floor to hear the remarks from the distinguished Senator from Indiana, who is a very valued member of the Intelligence Committee. We have some very good members on both sides of the aisle.

Senator Bayh always asks incisive questions. He gets to the bottom of the very comprehensive and complex issues we discuss. I thank him for being a valued member of the Intelligence Committee. I want to thank him for offering this amendment, which, outside the beltway and I suppose on the floor of the Senate and for anybody listening or watching, is pretty mundane, or arcane: What on Earth is he talking about, ``on-demand sequential referral of legislation, reporting from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence''? Were it not for the fact that Senator Bayh is an excellent speaker and a highly appreciated Member of this body, probably nobody would be even understanding this, or paying any attention.

I know this Senate wants to get this bill done. I know we want to go to conference on intelligence reform. I know we have the tax bill. I know we have the omnibus bill. I know people want to leave for the weekend. People are tired, and Lord knows we have been wrestling with this issue on how we reorganize the Intelligence Committee to make it more effective, in line with what the 9/11 Commission has recommended, what every commission has recommended down the years--the Bremer Commission, the Gilmore Commission, the Hart-Rudman Commission, the CIS Study, all these commissions, not to mention the 24 times we have tried reform of the Intelligence Committee since Dwight David Eisenhower and failed in each and every case. I know the fatigue factor, the high- glaze factor has set in in this body, as evidenced by the membership, as evidenced by my dear colleagues and friends across the aisle now talking about something else, even though I could probably talk as loud as the Senator from Massachusetts. But, having said that, let me try to tell Members what this is about.

His amendment would eliminate the current practice, again, of on- demand

sequential referral of legislation reported from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This very common sense measure--Mr. President, may I have order?

I know in normal times this amount of noise is about the best you can get, but I hope people will pay attention to what Senator Bayh is trying to accomplish and, as chairman of the Intelligence Committee, which I support very strongly. It is a commonsense measure.

Speaking of the Intelligence Committee, the very committee that the 9/11 Commission said should be enabled to do a better job instead of the way it is now when we are so fractionalized, it says we should be on the same level playing field as other standing committees in the Senate--just fair play, same level playing field in terms of sequential referral. A committee brings up a subject, they pass a bill, they make an inquiry, they publish it, and another committee says: You know, we are interested in that as well. We would like to have sequential referral.

How do you do that? You do it by unanimous consent or you go to the leaders and you say: You know, we have a dog in this fight. We are interested in it. We have expertise, we have background, and we would like to take a look at it as well.

Not on the Intelligence Committee. Virtually every other committee in the Congress now has on-demand--that means you finish a product, you finish your authorizing bill, and we will grab it by the throat and we will do whatever we want to with it.

That is not right. That is not right with regard to what we are trying to do to empower--and by empower I don't mean to empower over and above other important committees--or enable us to do our job.

Let me give you the classic example. We don't have, despite all of the rhetoric, all of the activity, all of the effort by Senator Collins and by Senator Lieberman and the intelligence reform bill, all of the effort by the Joint Inquiry Task Force on 9/11, all of the effort by the Intelligence Committee in regard to the WMD report--now the report by Mr. Duelfer and the Iraq Survey Group, and the group of intelligence not only of the United States globally and the importance that that has for the daily lives and pocketbooks not only of people in America but around the world, and all of this discussion about 9/11, we do not have the intelligence authorization bill passed.

We had a vote yesterday 90 to 7 on my amendment--probably the first time I will ever do that--saying regardless of what happens in intelligence we ought to authorize first and then appropriate. There is a novel thought. But even at this late date, we don't have the intelligence authorization act passed. Why? It is because of this on- demand referral that no other committee has as a millstone around its neck.

Senator Bayh is one of the committee's most serious, capable members, and he and I agree. We worried about this, along with other members on the Intelligence Committee, mostly made up of senior Members who know their job and who have attended. Their attendance record is outstanding. I can't get into that because it takes a decision by the chairman and vice chairman, and also perhaps a vote in committee to get into attendance records. I am not going to do that, simply to say these people have many other duties. They come there and work hard. We have had over 125 hearings in the Intelligence Committee, 60 percent more than at any other time in history, with regard to the WMD report, 521 pages long, which I think is the most thorough study any committee has ever done on the intelligence community.

Senator Bayh's presence on this floor on the issue underlines its importance. It is bipartisan in nature and impacts on the committee's ability to do its work.

What will the amendment of Senator Bayh do if it passes? It will mean that for the first time in history the legislative priorities of the Senate Intelligence Committee will reach the Senate floor without being automatically filtered through the lens of other Senate committees. I must admit that under resolution 400 we have the ability in the Intelligence Committee--if anybody mentions intelligence, there might be another committee which can ask for referral. We don't normally do that. I don't think we have to do that. As a matter of fact, I am trying to think of when we did that in the history of the committee. But certainly that is a lot different than on-demand sequential referral by every other committee.

Interested committees under the Bayh amendment will still be able to request sequential referral to the Intelligence Committee legislation. But just as other authorizing legislation, those committees would have to do so through a unanimous consent agreement instead of a demand letter.

All we want is to be treated as any other committee. My goodness. If we are the ones who are supposed to be empowered and stand up according to the 9/11 Commission and do a better job--and I think we have in the last few years--why on Earth would you force the Intelligence Committee to go through this on-demand sequential referral?

An example of the problems associated with on-demand sequential referral of intelligence--I don't know what to call this. On-demand special referral sounds like a lot of gobbledygook outside the beltway, an arcane thing. It is sort of like cattle rustling; you sort of take that bill and rustle it away from that pasture on demand and the poor owner of that cowherd can't do a doggone thing about it. It is time to end it.

At any rate, an example of problems associated with on-demand sequential referral, or the cattle rustling of Intelligence Committee legislation to the Armed Services Committee, is the fate of intelligence reforms proposed by former Intelligence Committee Chairman Senator Specter, who was on the floor a while back, and Vice Chairman Bob Kerrey, who did a splendid job as vice chairman--that was back in 1997 during the Intelligence authorization bill, the Intelligence Committee proposal, what we have debated here for the last 2 weeks-- this was back in 1997--direct appropriations of intelligence community funding by the Director of Central Intelligence is something which George Tenet and every other DCI has wanted for a long time. That appropriations would have funded the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office--what was then called the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. The Armed Services Committee obtained sequential referral of the 1997 intelligence authorization bill. After 30 days of the Armed Services Committee being innovative and forward looking, the Specter-Kerrey reform measure became a computer system to track intelligence expenditures. It didn't have any authority. It became a computer center to track intelligence expenditures.

On-demand sequential referral has had a chilling effect on the introduction of legislative initiatives by the Intelligence Committee.

I see the distinguished former chairman, the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, who had a reform measure back in 1997 which would have gone a long way toward intelligence reform that we have been considering on this floor for the last 3 days. I thank him for that effort. But he got sidetracked. His cattle got--well, they were sort of branded, sort of got into another pasture. I think that is unfortunate.

A degree of self-policing occurs about what legislative provisions realistically can survive automatic referral through other committees. As a result, many provisions are dropped or diluted to make the bill as unobjectionable as possible.

Senator Collins of Maine said we had a delicate balance. We had a discussion yesterday of the national intelligence director. The thought was that director should be able to move positions, but then we had a compromise. We could move positions and we couldn't move people. What the heck is that? I know that in compromise when you refer to other committees, you make it less objectionable, but sometimes you leave the cutting edge of reform with a very dull knife. This deterrent effect, I will tell you as chairman of the committee, begins prior to the committee markup. I know whatever we do in terms of authorization must go over to the distinguished chairman

of the Armed Services Committee. I serve on that committee. I have the utmost respect for the chairman of that committee. It is a privilege to serve on that committee. I am chairman of something called Emerging Threat and Capabilities. I have enjoyed my service on the Armed Services Committee.

But we know even before markup that we are going to have to go to the Armed Services Committee, and we could on demand referral have the same thing happen on Foreign Relations, on Appropriations, on Armed Services, and Judiciary because those are the members who now serve on the committee to make sure there are two people on that committee so it is widely represented.

But I know, and everybody on the committee knows, that before we even do the authorization, we have to go through this Byzantine kind of machination before we get our product on the floor even to pass it.

Again, where is the intelligence authorization bill for this year? I don't know. We have tried to hotline it. We have had objections.

After all this year of reform we cannot even pass an intelligence authorization bill? Do we want to continue that? This deterrent effect, as I said, begins right at the start. We have 22 professional staffers who have backgrounds, analysts with the DIA, CIA throughout the intelligence community. They are the people who put together the 521- page report on the WMD. We let the chips fall where they may.

Senator Rockefeller and I worked together, both sides, and we had a bipartisan vote, 17 to 0. It was tough. Can we do the job? You darn bet you, and we have 22 staffers who can do that job.

I daresay none of the other committees that have on-demand sequential referral have this kind of staff. Yet we end up on the cutting-room floor. Sometimes we do not even get in the room where we end up on the cutting-room floor. I don't think that is right.

I would be delighted. Maybe my blood pressure would come down. I would be delighted to suspend on behalf of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, as a fan of the Louisville Cardinals.

I haven't quite figured it out yet. I got wound up pretty good.

I have one more page, and the Senator from Pennsylvania asked how long will that take? How about 2 minutes, 3 minutes.

May I inquire of the distinguished Senator, are we getting time limits now? I wanted to have a good colloquy with my dear friend and esteemed chairman of the Armed Services Committee who has a willing offer to make because I am not quite sure in regard to this issue what it will be, and if we put in an artificial time limit--I don't know.

No.

Will the Senator yield?

Mr. President, could I ask the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee whether his 12 minutes will defer to the Bayh amendment or the Chambliss-Kennedy amendment?

It is probable that the chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, from time to time recognized by the Armed Services Committee, would like to at least have something to say about what the distinguished chairman will say about the Bayh amendment.

I am not trying to set the record straight because that is not in the realm of possibility of the distinguished chairman, but I don't know how to accomplish that now if we go to the other--I guess we will have time.

Mr. President, I guess we started up a fuss by talking about this, which I can understand.

Let me go back to sort of remind anyone that is listening that on- demand sequential referral, as referred to in the Bayh amendment, has had a chilling effect on the introduction of legislative initiatives by the Intelligence Committee.

Why is that important? It is because the joint inquiry task force investigating September 11, it is because the 511-page report on WMD, intelligence on whether there were WMD in Iraq, and the 9/11 Commission's report had this unique idea, and the unique idea was that the Select Committee on Intelligence should be granted at least enabling power, be empowered to be the oversight committee that has independence and leadership and clout and that we do not today.

One of the obstacles is this on-demand sequential referral. Every other committee in the Congress can ask for sequential referral, but they do it by unanimous consent or they ask the leadership. There is nothing wrong with that. But on-demand sequential referral from the very committees that we have two members on the Intelligence Committee representing--Judiciary, Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations? They are represented. And as I have indicated, legislative initiatives that we have end up on the cutting-room floor. It is a very fractionalized process, both from the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee.

I have nothing but admiration for the distinguished Senator from Virginia and the distinguished Senator from Michigan and the work they do on behalf of our military, and for the appropriators and the work they do on behalf of our military. It is just that it is a fractionalized process. Sometimes we are in the room, sometimes we are not. Sometimes we don't know what ends up on the cutting-room floor, sometimes we do. That does not speak well for the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the Intelligence Committee.

This process, which the members of the Intelligence Committee believe is unique to the Intelligence Committee, does not permit the committee priorities to reach the Senate floor for full debate. We cannot fully debate it because it is classified. Everybody else who wants sequential referral changes a bill. They come to the floor, argue the points, and then win or lose. We cannot because it is classified.

This provision is a significant obstacle to the full realization of the Intelligence Committee oversight and should be repealed. I support the amendment. I encourage my colleagues to do likewise. I hope we are able to reach some accommodation.

I thank the Presiding Officer and my colleagues and yield the floor.

Amendment No. 3994

Will the Senator yield?

I ask unanimous consent that I be recognized after the distinguished Senator from Florida.

Mr. President, I rise to support Senator McCain and his amendment to the McConnell-Reid measure amending S. Res. 445.

First, I pay tribute to the former chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Mr. Graham. I thank him for his service to our country. He is retiring, although that certainly does not describe the Senator, but I thank him for his leadership and his suggestions as we go through this very difficult task of reforming how we do our oversight responsibilities in reference to our intelligence obligations.

Back to Senator McCain and his amendment, if we approve the McCain amendment, Senators will implement what is the most important recommendation of the 9/11 Commission for improvement of congressional oversight of intelligence activities--most important by the 9/11 Commission.

Now, why is John McCain getting in the middle of what would have to be termed a sheep and cattle war, if one goes back to the history of Arizona, and taking on the challenge of suggesting that the Intelligence Committee, or any authorizing committee, have appropriations power? That is tough. I mean, that really is tough.

I think everybody knows there is more than one way to skin a cat that is sticking his head in a bootjack than simply pulling on his tail. That is hard work. That is where nobody wants to reach their hand into, but there again that is John McCain.

John is from Arizona. I used to reside in Arizona. There is a lot of cactus in Arizona. One does not have to sit on each and every one of them. Sometimes people think that Senator McCain does that. Why is he doing this? Why is he fighting this sometimes lonely battle? Well, on page 420 of the 9/11 report, the Commissioners wrote this:

Under the terms of existing rules and resolutions the House

and Senate intelligence committees lack the power, influence

and sustained capability to meet this challenge.

He is right. He is dead on. He is pulling that cat by the tail in the bootjack. And in terms of being right, there are times that one can take on tough measures and sort of let them go and slide or one can do the right thing. The truth of it is that I can tell my colleagues, as chairman of the Intelligence Committee and an 8-year veteran of that committee--and it has been a privilege--we are fractionalized when we talk to Lee Hamilton, Governor Kean, Bob Kerrey, the former Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, and others. They came to visit before the Intelligence Committee with Senator Rockefeller and myself, Senator Rockefeller being the distinguished vice chairman and my bipartisan partner in trying to do what is right on behalf of our national security--and we think we have done a good job, by the way, backed up by 22 professional staffers, the most of any committee. So, consequently, what happens to us is that when we do our work as quoted by the 9/11 Commission--and after the visit by the 9/11 Commission to the Committee, they agreed with us that we are fractionalized, that our job is pretty tough, that in terms of being an authorizing committee we probably are expected to have the most obligation, independence, leadership, clout in regards to oversight in reference to intelligence and national security of any committee in the Congress, but we have the least.

Why is that? It is because we are fractionalized in terms of sequential referral on demand. I am not going to get into that speech again because I think we are trying to work it out. I think we have a compromise, or I hope we have a compromise, and I thank Senator Rockefeller for being a leader in this instance.

Whatever we do, we know that we have to then first go to the Armed Services Committee and then, of course, we have to go to the Appropriations Committee.

Now, that is not a bad thing because we have many fine people serving on the Appropriations Committee. I do not mean to perjure the Appropriations Committee. Far from it. They have many obligations. They have their constitutional authority to do this. But what happens? The intelligence community comes before us during the long session of 6 months, 8 months, 9 months when we do our authorization and make priority changes and make recommended changes and make reform changes, some of which have been very dramatic. And I think they understand that, obviously, then we are going to have to go to the Armed Services Committee and then, obviously, we are going to have to go to the Subcommittee on Defense of the Appropriations Committee where they have done, I might add, a splendid job of doing their very best in terms of their obligations to meet our national security obligations vis-a-vis the intelligence community.

Now, what would someone do if they were a member of the intelligence community? They would appear before the authorizing committee, the Senate Intelligence Committee--and I am not saying it was wink them, blink them, and nod to a committee that has no authority, but one can sort of make that case--and I do not perjure anybody who has come before the committee because they are great people. They are laying their lives on the line. They are dedicated people. That is not my point.

What they do, however, is go to the Senate Armed Services Committee and then they also go to two primary members of this Senate whom I personally call friends and admire and respect, and there have been no two people in the Congress of the United States, perhaps in the history of the United States, who have done more for the military and done more during those times where we were stretched thin and hollow and addressing the tremendous problems we have today. I am talking about the distinguished Senator from Alaska, who is chairman of the committee, Ted Stevens and his counterpart, the Senator from Hawaii, Dan Inouye. I do not know who has been the stagecoach driver and who has ridden shotgun. During these particular years, they both worked equally well.

But what happens to them is that time demands come in and the intelligence community comes in and says: Wow, we have a problem. We have just had an ``Oh, my God'' hearing before the Intelligence Committee. Oh, my God, how did this happen? Khobar Towers, embassy bombings, USS Cole, the lack of really trying to figure out what happened when we missed the India nuclear explosion, 9/11, Somalia--do you know what. It was all tied together.

So the Appropriations Committee is faced with this urgent need, and they

respond. And the intelligence community pretty well gets what they want. That is not all bad, especially when we are facing some kind of emergency, but it basically cuts out the Intelligence Committee's authorization process to some degree. It cuts out what the Armed Services Committee does as well. It is time based.

The 9/11 Commission took a look at this and said: Congressional oversight for intelligence and counterterrorism is now dysfunctional. Congress should address this problem. We have considered various alternatives. The primary suggestion: a single committee in each House of Congress combining authorizing and appropriating authorities. The McCain amendment will accomplish this alternative. The McCain amendment will accomplish this by giving appropriations authority to the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, a man whom I admire, a man who has been a great friend, basically cited the example between 1865 and 1885 that when they took away powers from the Appropriations Committee, storm clouds arrived, lightning struck, and it was doom and gloom time until they restored that authority.

Let me suggest another number. It is called 9/11. Let me suggest all the hearings we have held in the Intelligence Committee--I call them ``Oh, my God'' hearings: Oh, my God, how did this happen?--indicated the systemic failure of the global intelligence community in regard to WMD and the situation in Iraq--not just the United States, everyone, including the United Nations.

The chairman of the Appropriations Committee and his counterpart, the ranking member--when he says there is no turf battle, I believe him. I don't know of any two Members who would put turf over conscience and turf over performance and the obligations of what they have already done. I know the chairman has mentioned that he and the members and the qualified staff of the Appropriations Committee have gone the world over, and they have. I know. I have been with them on many occasions, looking at intelligence and looking to see how the money is spent on the ground, taking a hard look. I understand that.

But we have 22 staffers, 22 professional staffers who have background and experience in regard to being an analyst at the DIA, being an analyst at the CIA with at least 10 years' experience. We have the staffers who put together the 521-page WMD report, where the chips fell where they may. Guess what happened. The intelligence was wrong. Some people try to put that at the foot of the President. He made very declarative and aggressive comments. Others in this Congress received the same intelligence and made the same statements. Now, of course, a lot of that has changed because it is an even-numbered year, and you know what kind of situation we are in.

But I am trying to say your Intelligence Committee stands ready to do a professional job in regard to budget authority, should we be granted that privilege, with 22 professional staffers. We have done that. There have been occasions where we have been granted access. I don't mean that in a cynical way because the Appropriations Committee usually is in a big hurry with what they have to do, meeting obligations that are emergencies--where we have made our suggestions. Some of them, not all of them--as a matter of fact, not very many of them--were accepted by the Appropriations Committee or, for that matter, the Armed Services Committee. Some of them, a lot of them, ended up on the cutting-room floor.

In some cases we were not granted access because of the time equation, and wouldn't you know that many of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and many of the problems we have experienced that nobody wants to see that we have had hearings on are the same kinds of things we have tried to fix in the Intelligence Committee and maybe could have had we not had this fractionalized process that the 9/11 Commission has talked about.

I have talked about what a hard job this is. I talked about the courage Senator McCain has had to approach this topic. It is a tough topic. Really, this is not hard. Members have a choice. They have a choice to make. A vote for the McCain amendment enhances the congressional oversight by addressing the findings of the 9/11 Commission, period. The amendment will enhance the power, influence, and sustained capability of the Senate Intelligence Committee; that is, to conduct oversight of this Nation's intelligence activities. It couldn't be any more simple.

Members, you should vote for the measure if you want to enhance the Senate Intelligence Committee's ability to conduct congressional oversight as recommended by the 9/11 Commission and, by the way, virtually every other commission that has studied this. So the McCain amendment is in harmony with the 9/11 Commission's major recommendation for improving congressional oversight and intelligence activities.

I am not saying the appropriators or the Armed Services Committee has done anything wrong, egregious, dysfunctional, whatever. They have done a great job under the circumstances with the setup of the Congress as it has been. But we stand ready with 22 professional staffers to do the job. I believe we can do the job.

I am voting for the McCain amendment. In behalf of our national security, I urge my colleagues to do the same.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I have two amendments to offer. I wish to offer them in sequence, taking 2 minutes at most for each one. I propose to only give a very brief description of each amendment.

Amendment No. 4019 To Amendment No. 3981

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside, and I call up amendment No. 4019.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, this amendment simply clarifies language in the McConnell-Reid amendment regarding the staffing of the Intelligence Committee.

The amendment ensures that the professional staff of the Intelligence Committee and the personal staff now designated by Members to serve on the committee will be provided similar access to committee resources and information as determined by the chairman and vice chairman.

I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I thank Senator Kyl for his assistance. It provides modest but important clarity to the proposals of Senator McConnell and Senator Reid.

I yield the floor.

I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 4018 To Amendment No. 3981

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside, and I call up amendment No. 4018.

Mr. President, I thank the clerk and ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, this amendment makes explicit what is already implicit in the McConnell-Reid substitute amendment; namely, that the Intelligence Committee will have explicit jurisdiction for the consideration and reporting of nominees for civilian intelligence community positions.

I urge my colleagues to support the amendment and hope the managers will agree to incorporate the modification.

I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, Senator Biden, in his usual flare, has offered an amendment to add the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as ex officio members of the Intelligence Committee. Under S. Res. 400, the organizing resolution for the Senate Intelligence Committee, eight members are already crossovers from other committees: two from the Judiciary Committee, two from Armed Services, two from Appropriations, and two from foreign Relations. This is on purpose, because we believe these four committees should have crossover representation on the committee as it now stands. That is under S. Res. 400.

With all due respect, I think the members of the Foreign Relations Committee--Senator Hagel, Senator Rockefeller--do an excellent job in representing the Foreign Relations Committee on the Intelligence Committee. These crossover members do perform an invaluable service for the Intelligence Committee.

First, they ensure that the insights and perspectives of the other Senate committees are considered in the oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States. And second, they do already provide the Armed Services Committee and the Judiciary Committee and the Appropriations Committee and, yes, the esteemed members of the Foreign Relations Committee, with a view of the Intelligence Committee on issues that cross jurisdictional boundaries.

Now, under the McConnell-Reid reform proposal, the Intelligence Committee would grow by two ex-officio members already. The chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, the majority and minority leaders, already serve as ex-officio members of the committee. So following reform, the Intelligence Committee will be composed of eight crossover members. If Senator Biden's amendment is successful, there will be six nonvoting ex-officio members.

Now, any chairman or any ranking member who has crossover jurisdiction with any other committee, under this logic, should be an ex-officio member of the committee. After all, we need to keep an eye on one another. I have every trust in thee and me, but I wonder about thee. This is like Bob Barker: Come on down, be an ex-officio member of the Intelligence Committee. This is empowerment? This is further dissolution in terms of the responsibilities and cohesion and pertinence in regard to the Intelligence Committee.

Well, does the Intelligence Committee need that much oversight? Do the guaranteed crossover memberships not really protect sufficiently the equities of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees?

As chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I said on the Senate floor earlier today that I often have concerns with the actions of the Armed Services Committee, Foreign Relations Committee, Appropriations Committee, and the Judiciary Committee--not necessarily in that order.

Given this logic, as such, given the proliferation of ex-officio memberships, perhaps the chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee should have ex-officio membership on other committees with jurisdiction that overlap the intelligence issues. What is good for the goose is good for the gander. I will leave Members to decide who is the goose and who is the gander. I focus on four primary committees: Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Judiciary. I was going to have a second-degree amendment to say, why can't Senator Rockefeller and I be ex-officio on these committees if they want to be ex-officio on our committee? I am not sure exactly what they would do other than monitor. We can certainly find something for them to do as they follow the work of the Intelligence Committee. I could go on. We could have ex-officio status for Senator Rockefeller and myself for the new Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Banking, Finance, and Agriculture Committees. They all have cross-jurisdictional interests that touch on intelligence issues.

With only limited exceptions, all Senators have access to the information and activity of the Intelligence Committee. As chairman, I and the distinguished vice chairman, Senator Rockefeller, have invited all Senators to come down and take a look at the classified portions of the Iraq review or any other Intelligence Committee product or holding. You are welcome. Just ask. Come on in.

The committee assists in the arrangement of classified briefings for all Senators by our intelligence agencies. Ex-officio membership is an unnecessary requirement and maintains the status of the Intelligence Committee as a weak child of the Senate.

Let's not have any further diminution of the Intelligence Committee.

Mr. President, I believe I have approximately 9 minutes remaining.

Mr. President, let me say to the Senator from Delaware, whom I admire for his expertise on foreign policy, I think all of us have an obligation to learn from, to ask, to seek guidance, to seek expertise from other Members, and I hope it is in that spirit that we are able to do this.

As Chairman of the Emerging Threats Capabilities Subcommittee on Armed Services, I work very closely with Senator Lugar on the Counterthreat Reduction Program. I do not think I can do the job without talking to Senator Lugar. Senator

Nunn and Senator Lugar put that together, the Nunn-Lugar program. I talk with Senator Lugar a lot in regard to his perspectives on foreign policy.

I have not taken the opportunity that I probably should have to talk with the Senator from Delaware at great length--we talk about some things but certainly not enough. I welcome the Senator to come to the Intelligence Committee in regard to any desire he might have to go over or to review any of the intelligence material that pertains to foreign policy. All of that does, as a matter of fact. It was the State Department that pretty much got it right in the WMD review in regard to possible WMD in Iraq, and we know that and we respect that. We made a special effort to invite the State Department in, and we will be happy to visit with the Senator from Delaware about that.

I yield the remaining time I have to a member of the Foreign Relations Committee who is always telling me about the need to tie in the relationship with regard to foreign relations and intelligence. He is the distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee. We work together in a bipartisan way. We have gone through pretty tough times. We achieved a 17-to-0 vote in regard to the WMD inquiry.

We are not trying to deny information to anybody. We want to share it. We want to learn, especially from people such as Senator Biden.

I yield my remaining time to Senator Rockefeller.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside.

I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 3742, with a modification.

Mr. President, I thank Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman for working with me to include this provision in the act. It preserves an important requirement from section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947. It is very simple: That funds appropriated for an intelligence activity must be specifically authorized.

I appreciate your cooperation on this matter. It is a very simple amendment.

I yield to the distinguished chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment, and I call up amendment No. 3740 with a modification which I send to the desk.

Mr. President, I thank the chairman and ranking member for crafting an amendment with me that embodies several technical and clarifying modifications to their bill. If, in fact, the distinguished Senator and the distinguished ranking member at this time would accept the amendment, it would be highly desirable on the part of this Senator.

I thank the Senators for their assistance.

I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw from consideration amendment Nos. 3741, 3744, and 3751.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment, and call up amendment No. 3748, as modified, which I send to the desk.

Mr. President, this amendment ensures that the analytic review unit will be able to perform an important quality control and accountability mechanism for the analytic product of the intelligence community. This is an important function that has not been performed by the intelligence community as well as it should have. I thank the chairman and ranking member for working with me to ensure that this important amendment is adopted.

I yield to the distinguished chairman.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 3748 entitled ``The Analytic

Review Unit,'' which probably should be entitled ``The Accountability Amendment.''

I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

This amendment clarifies the role of the analytical review unit that the Collins and Lieberman bill creates within the Office of the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority. The amendment specifies that the unit will evaluate the quality of the analysis of our national intelligence agency and, where appropriate, issue nonbinding--and I underline ``nonbinding''--recommendations for present personnel actions to include additional training, commendations, and also any action that would be disciplinary.

This quality control mechanism will help instill accountability--we have heard that word over and over again in regard to intelligence reform, independence, leadership, and accountability--in the intelligence community's analytical effort in an effort to guard against analytical failures such as prewar intelligence assessment concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs by providing regular quality control audits of the intelligence community's analysis.

I am extremely hopeful the managers can find a way to include this important amendment in the bill.

I ask unanimous consent to set aside the amendment at this time.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up en bloc amendments 3739 and 3750 and ask that they be considered separately.

I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendments be dispensed with.

This amendment clarifies that a primary mission of National Intelligence Authority is the elimination of barriers that impede any coordination of all intelligence activities, not merely counterterrorism activities.

Three years after 9/11, information sharing still remains, unfortunately, a serious problem. As recently as last week--as recently as last week--the Senate Intelligence Committee received a disturbing briefing in closed session that clearly demonstrated that even on matters related to the current terrorist threat to our homeland, the intelligence agencies still stubbornly refuse to adequately share information.

The National Security Act of 1947 clearly stipulates that a primary mission of the head of the intelligence community is to protect sources and methods. The current language of the Collins-Lieberman bill wisely balances this with the need to also ensure that intelligence concerning terrorism is certainly shared with those who need it.

This amendment seeks to broaden that responsibility to include all intelligence threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, North Korea, and other intelligence threats, not just terrorism. Terrorism is a serious threat, but it is not the last threat that we will face.

This amendment, which would build on the Collins-Lieberman bill and their already strong provisions for a ``trusted information network,'' also stipulates that the national intelligence director is responsible for ensuring that the information-sharing process be automated to allow intelligence analysts to ``pull'' information from databases rather than waiting for somebody to push it to them. Currently, much of the information sharing that does occur in the intelligence community happens only through phones and fax machines, which is very inefficient, and also it is unreliable.

I am hopeful the managers can find a way to include this important amendment in the bill. I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be set aside.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 3747.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, this amendment would provide the national intelligence director with certain specified authorities already provided to the Central Intelligence Agency. These provisions include flexible acquisition, spending, personnel, and management authorities. As I have indicated, the national intelligence director already has these authorities. In addition, the amendment permits the national intelligence director to delegate any of the specified authorities to the head of an element of the intelligence community for use by that element.

Under the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA has a range of authorities in matters such as acquisition, spending, personnel, and management that do not exist anywhere else in Government. These sorts of authorities are often required to effectively conduct intelligence operations in a very timely way. This amendment seeks to empower the national intelligence director by allowing him to exercise these authorities anywhere in the intelligence community that he sees fit, not just at the CIA.

I am extremely hopeful that the managers can find a way to include this very important amendment in the bill.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the amendment.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 3742.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, this amendment would preserve the requirement in section 504 of the National Security Act that funds appropriated for an intelligence activity must also be specifically authorized.

I am hopeful I can work with the managers of the bill and that we will be able to include this important amendment in the bill. It is absolutely essential.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be set aside.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up en bloc amendments Nos. 3740, 3741, 3744, and 3751, and I ask they be considered separately.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendments be dispensed with.

Mr. President, these amendments contain clarifications to the authorities of the national intelligence director. I am told that our staffs have been working very diligently on these matters. I believe that they strengthen the bill, and I am hopeful they will be accepted by the managers of the bill.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these amendments now be set aside.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, will the distinguished chairman yield?

I say to the Senator, I would like to thank you for your very kind remarks. As the chairman knows, we have 22 professional staffers who were former analysts throughout the intelligence community. We would like to think we have expertise on this issue. As the chairman knows and the distinguished ranking member knows, we did produce a 511-page inquiry on WMD in regard to the inquiry on the prewar intelligence. I think it is the most thorough look at the intelligence community that has been conducted in the last 20 years. I am very proud of our staff. I think we have an outstanding staff.

I would just like to say this: This is not going to be the best possible bill. This is going to be the best bill possible to achieve that delicate balance that the distinguished chairman has talked about. And that is not being untoward. That is not bad. This is a very comprehensive bill. This touches our entire intelligence community. So we are bound to have to take a good look at this, and we are also going to be bound in terms of our responsibilities in terms of oversight.

I would imagine that with any bill you have what is called technical corrections. In this particular bill, we are going to have to take a hard look at not only technical corrections but monitor this bill as it evolves. But the important thing is that both Senators have been the primary movers of this bill in moving it forward in a comprehensive way. I credit them for their work. I can speak for all members of the Intelligence Committee: We are here, and we are here to help.

I thank the Senator for her kind comments.

I thought the agreement was 30.

If the distinguished chairman will yield, I am not sure of the timeframe. I think my remarks will be approximately 30 minutes. I hope they will not go over 30 minutes. But that would be my goal.

Mr. President, I rise in support of the Specter amendment. Before I begin, I would like to commend the managers of the bill, Senators Collins and Lieberman, for their extraordinary patience and their hard work as we continue working through this process. Senators Collins and Lieberman are very prominent and hard-working Senators. They have been given a very tough assignment and a limited timeframe in which to complete it. Nevertheless, they have produced a bill which is a step in the right direction.

As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I look forward to working with the Senators who serve on the committee of assignment by the leadership as the Senate attempts to make intelligence reform a reality.

Simply put, the Specter amendment would give the national intelligence director, or what we call now the NID, the authority to direct and supervise and control our national intelligence collection agencies. In doing so, it will create a clear chain of command that will leave no doubt in anybody's mind that the national intelligence director is in charge and is accountable.

There is no rush to judgment on this issue. The debate in which we are currently engaged is the same debate that has been going on for decades, centered on how to grant increased authority to the Director of Central Intelligence, or a new national intelligence director, while leaving undisturbed the intelligence community's structural status quo. Time and time again, those who have struggled with this conundrum have found we simply can't get there from here under that context. In other words, I believe it takes significant organizational change to overcome the inherent conflicts in the current structure of our national intelligence community.

True empowerment requires a national intelligence director with both budget authority and the authority to direct and control the activities of the intelligence collection agencies. One without the other will once again leave us with an intelligence head who can neither succeed nor be held fully accountable.

Let me state that the bill reported by the Governmental Affairs Committee does address the question of budget authority very effectively. It is significant and well contained. The bill leaves unaddressed, however, the issue of the national intelligence director's authority to direct, to supervise, and control the activities of our national intelligence collection agencies.

In short, the bill, in my opinion, preserves divided loyalties inherent in the current structure. Why is it so difficult to give this new NID direct control over all of the intelligence community agencies? It is no secret. The issue centers on the fact that the National Reconnaissance Office, which designs and acquires our spy satellites, the National Security Agency, which collects our signal intelligence, and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, which processes and disseminates our satellite imagery, all fall under the direct control of the Secretary of Defense.

These agencies, while essential to the collection of national intelligence, have also been deemed essential to the Pentagon's ability to fight and to win wars. In essence, these agencies serve two masters: The head of the intelligence community and the Secretary of Defense. This tension has existed for decades, and it continues today. As long as the Secretary of Defense directs the day-to-day activities of these agencies, the new national intelligence director will continue to struggle with a structure that undermines his ability to succeed as the head of the intelligence community.

It appears to me that under today's bill the national intelligence director's authority concerning collection will be about the same as the DCI's has been for over 50 years. I do not mean to be a pessimist, but history has shown in practice that these authorities to ``establish requirements,'' ``manage the collection task,'' and ``resolve the conflicts'' have limited ability when an agency works with the Secretary of Defense and not for the head of the intelligence community.

Why has it been so difficult to streamline the chain of command in the intelligence community? Because when the Defense Department comes up on the radar screen and announces to Congress and the media that its ability to defend America will be undermined if it loses direct control over its intelligence agencies, Members of Congress rightfully pause and they certainly take note. This is especially true today when American forces are engaged in combat. This, however, should not lead to what we call paralysis.

During this debate, we have heard a great deal about support to our dedicated, brave men and women in uniform, i.e., the warfighters. Many of my colleagues have argued and will continue to argue that the national intelligence director must not be allowed to direct and supervise the control of activities of our national intelligence collection agencies. In their view, granting such an authority would undermine the Secretary of Defense's ability to fight and win wars. For this to be true, the national intelligence director would have to deny our military commanders the information they need to wage war. I cannot conceive of any circumstance where that would be the case.

I am a member of the Armed Services Committee. I am a former Marine officer. I would not sanction any legislation that I thought would limit the ability of our troops to fight and to win wars. I recognize the special requirements of the Department of Defense. As chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I also know that the Department of Defense is only one of the major consumers of intelligence. Important, yes; major, yes; but one.

I often hear people referring to the Department of Defense as the principal consumer of intelligence. While the Department is a significant and important consumer of intelligence, we need

to remember one thing: The principal consumers of intelligence are the President of the United States, the Congress, and the National Security Council. They are the principal consumers. The Department of Defense is a major consumer.

In time, the Department of Homeland Security is likely to become a voracious consumer of intelligence, perhaps on a par with the Department of Defense.

I do not believe the defense of the homeland is any less important than prosecuting the war. Consequently it does not make sense to have 80 percent of our intelligence collection apparatus controlled by one consumer, and that is the Department of Defense.

If we give the national intelligence director the authority to manage all of the national collection agencies, that will ensure one office is responsible and accountable for meeting the intelligence requirements of all consumers including, of course, that of the Department of Defense. If any Cabinet member believes their intelligence requirements are not being met, he or she can address the issues to the national intelligence director. If a Cabinet member does not agree with NID's decision, they can take it up with the President of the United States.

I also note that in testimony before Congress, the directors of two of the Pentagon's intelligence collection agencies--the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency--stated that having their agencies transferred to the control of a national intelligence director would not degrade their level of support to the military.

Let me repeat that. The directors of two of the Pentagon's intelligence collection agencies--the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency--stated that having their agencies transferred to the control of a national intelligence director would not degrade their level of support to the military.

Additionally, some have argued that giving the national intelligence director line control of agencies with uniformed military personnel would be complicated. There will certainly be some issues to be resolved, to be sure. But the Department of Defense regularly details military personnel to agencies and offices outside of the Department of Defense. We would not be breaking new ground here. We have had civilian control of the military since the founding of this Nation, and I don't see how civilian control by a national intelligence director is qualitatively different than civilian control by the Secretary of Defense. They both work for the President.

There has been a lot of talk about that fact in regard to meetings we have had with people in uniform and the Secretary of Defense and a certain Senator asking, How would you feel if your budget was controlled by somebody who didn't wear a uniform? Well, the Secretary of Defense doesn't wear a uniform. When the military appears before the Congress, they don't wear a uniform. Neither does the Secretary of Army, Navy, or Air Force wear a uniform.

Let me detail a few examples to illustrate why direct control is so important to the success of the national intelligence director.

As recently as last week--I would like for Members to pay attention to this--as recently as last week, the Senate Intelligence Committee received a very troubling briefing in closed session that clearly demonstrated that even on matters relating to the terrorist threat to our homeland, today, now, the terrorist threat that we face, the intelligence agencies still stubbornly refuse to adequately share information. Why are these agencies still not sharing? Some progress has been made. But why are they still not sharing? Is it because the DCI doesn't have adequate budget authority? No. They don't share it because they work for 15 different bosses and no one holds them accountable for information sharing. The national intelligence director can cajole, he can plead, he can consult all he wants; he can promulgate policies and guidelines all day long. He can create grand, trusted information networks. But without a national intelligence director with direct control, there will be no one to force adequate information sharing within the intelligence community.

Let us take another example.

We have all heard former DCI Tenet's now famous declaration of war against al-Qaida in 1998. Mr. Tenet ordered that no resource was to be spared in this critical effort. He declared war as a result of Osama bin Laden issuing fatwas to kill Americans.

What happened as a result of this bold order? Not much. The National Security Agency went its own way, saying: Thank you, Mr. DCI, for your interest in national security, but we are going to retool for a threat that has nothing to do with terrorism.

What would have happened if Mr. Tenet had the authorities granted to the national intelligence director under the Collins-Lieberman bill when he made his 1998 declaration? He might have said: We are at war, and the NSA will see that reflected in the budget you will receive in the next year or so, assuming Congress does not make any changes to it. That is budget authority. That is the crowbar he would use in terms of influence. However, with the authorities to direct, supervise, and control, which are provided in the Specter amendment, Mr. Tenet would have been able to order the NSA to stop retooling for the other threat, get to work that day, focus their efforts on al-Qaida. In the 21st century, threats evolve too quickly to wait a year or so for the national intelligence director's budget change to have any effect. The NID must have direct control in order to make immediate changes.

The bill before the Senate today is a significant step in the right direction. Credit goes to Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman. There are many good provisions in the bill which should improve the intelligence community, but it is missing something very important--a clear chain of command and accountability.

As the examples I have cited demonstrate, a clear chain of command and accountability that comes with it are essential to real and lasting reform. If we do not make the hard choices now, I fear after yet another series of intelligence failures--and Lord knows I do not want to sit as chairman of the Intelligence Committee and have any more ``Oh my God'' hearings in regard to past tragedies from Khobar Towers to embassy bombings to the Khartoum chemical plant to the failure to even try to come as close as possible to predicting the India nuclear blast, Somalia, the USS Cole, and obviously September 11. We do not want to go back down that road.

I fear the Senate Intelligence Committee will be right back in its hearing room listening to the newly minted national intelligence director testify while he enjoys a great deal of budget authority he still lacks the real authority to perform the day-to-day operations of our intelligence agencies and therefore lacks ability to lead as we expect and as he must. I urge my colleagues to support the Specter amendment so there is no doubt in anyone's mind that the national intelligence director is in charge and is accountable.

I will take a few more moments to comment on some of the debate I have heard concerning this amendment. This is not a new debate. What I heard in the Senate yesterday and today represents an age-old tension that has existed since the intelligence community was created.

Certainly, I would be more than happy, in the middle of shining the light of truth into darkness, to yield for a unanimous consent request.

If the Senator will yield, may I ask if the 21 amendments I have drafted, amendments that would improve the nature of the bill, are they included in that list?

What I heard in the Senate yesterday in regard to comments on this debate represents an age-old tension that has existed since the intelligence community was created.

Members heard numerous quotes from statutes such as title 10, title 50. The heart of this debate, however, is whether we will give an individual unambiguous control of intelligence activities in the United States. We can quote from the United States Code all day. The point is the laws could be changed. That is what we do in the Congress. The debate today is about what the law should be, not what the law is. Arguing the status quo is convenient, but it is not always correct.

This bill gives the new national intelligence director one very good tool. It is called budget authority. It does not give him control. The Specter amendment gives the national intelligence director control, which means accountability and real reform.

As we have debated this issue, I have heard many Members cite the words and reported opinions of the 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission has done a great service to this country, but the Commissioners themselves have made it clear they do not have all the answers.

The 9/11 Commission did produce an excellent study of the failures leading

up to the attacks of September 11. The Governmental Affairs Committee bill is faithful to the lessons the Commission drew from its work. It is an excellent report. But I remind my colleagues that the Commission's report was based on a single case study--the period leading up to the attacks of September 11. However, a broader historical examination of our intelligence community leads many-- including this Senator--to the important conclusion that over the last 50 years, the intelligence community has drifted due to the lack of or absence of a clear chain of command and the lack of accountability that a clear chain of command can bring. That clear chain of command requires giving the national intelligence director the authority to direct, to control, and to supervise our national collection agencies.

Our job is not to take the work of the 9/11 Commission as a sacred text which is not to be questioned or altered; our job is to take their work and integrate it with the lessons learned over the 50-plus years of history of our intelligence community and nearly 30 years of congressional oversight by the Intelligence Committee. As the Senator from Pennsylvania has pointed out, his amendment incorporates many of those lessons.

Yesterday, I also heard Members argue that the Specter amendment would create confusing chains of command for the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence collection elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency. I respectfully disagree.

In addition to providing the national intelligence director with the authority to direct, supervise, and control these agencies, the Specter amendment clarifies other provisions of law to specifically address this concern. It amends title 10 and title 50, adds two new provisions to the law to specifically clarify that the Directors, again, of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence collection elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency report directly to the national intelligence director.

While this amendment gives the national intelligence director direct control over these agencies, they remain ``combat support agencies''-- nobody quarrels with that--and the Secretary of Defense will still have influence over them. That is by design. No one is trying to change that. I think it is much better than the bill's current language in which the Secretary of Defense has direct control of these agencies, and the NID only has influence and persuasion. I can tell you from past history, influence and persuasion do not get you very far at the Pentagon.

Some have argued that only the Secretary of Defense can manage the combat support agencies. Some argue that only if the Secretary of Defense manages the Pentagon's national intelligence collection agencies will the warfighter receive adequate support. This is a fallacy. As I said earlier, there is no reason to believe the Defense Department will not receive the support it needs if the Pentagon's national intelligence collection agencies report to the national intelligence director.

The amendment provides the Secretary of Defense with important feedback mechanisms to make sure the Department is getting the national intelligence support it needs.

First, the Secretary of Defense is required to provide the national intelligence director with some performance appraisals for the directors of the national intelligence collection agencies. Second, the national intelligence director will receive recommendations from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff based upon a biannual review of the combat support plans for the National Security Agency; again, the National Reconnaissance Office; again, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency; and the DIA, again, the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Working with the Secretary of Defense through these feedback mechanisms, the national intelligence director will ensure that the Defense Department's intelligence needs are met. Clearly, this amendment recognizes the important support role these agencies play to the Department of Defense in its role as an intelligence consumer.

Now, I also heard the argument yesterday that giving the national intelligence director direction, supervision, and control of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is a bad idea because that agency is responsible for making maps. I point out that this agency used to be named the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, but they changed its name to signal a change in the manner in which it would perform its mission.

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or the NGA, uses intelligence data acquired by satellites and other means and melds that data into the maps that our entire Government uses. This is what is now called geospatial intelligence. The maps we use have the full benefit of the intelligence data we gather all around the world. Mapmaking is not inconsistent with the national intelligence director's mission.

Another argument heard yesterday against the Specter amendment was that the 9/11 Commission had considered granting the NID direction, supervision, and control authorities but rejected the idea on the grounds that the duties of managing these agencies would overload the national intelligence director. However, I note that the Secretary of Defense controls the military services, the Reserves, the unified commands, the defense agencies, field activities, literally millions of uniformed and civilian personnel, and those who mow the yard outside the Pentagon.

So if I understand correctly, in order not to overburden the national intelligence director, we will leave the national intelligence collection agencies under the control of an already extremely busy and, I might add, effective Secretary of Defense. This logic escapes me.

I also heard an argument that the 9/11 Commission had rejected granting the national intelligence director greater authorities because the Commissioners preferred what was described on the Senate floor as a ``lean, mean modern corporate structure.''

I ask my colleagues, What successful modern corporation would not give its chairman and CEO the authority to direct, supervise, and control every component of the organization for which he or she was held accountable by the shareholders? We should not confuse direction, supervision, and control with micromanagement.

I also heard the argument that the Specter amendment would promote group-think within the intelligence community. Well, I can tell you that the Senate Intelligence Committee wrote the book on the occurrence of group-think in its report on the prewar assessments on Iraq's WMD programs.

It is a problem that we on the committee watch very carefully every week, almost every day. I do not believe the Specter amendment will promote any kind of group-think. I would be concerned about the risk of group-think if we were proposing to grant the national intelligence director the authority to direct, supervise, and control the analytical content of our national analytical agencies. That is not what Senator Specter's amendment proposes. It proposes direction, supervision, and control over the Department of Defense's national intelligence collection agencies.

Additionally, as was seen in the committee's examination of the prewar assessments--as I say, it took us over a year, 22 professional staff members; we interviewed over 220 analysts--the creation of a strong national intelligence director will prevent group-think in the intelligence community. A strong director will ensure a level playing field in which the analysis of all agencies will be given full consideration and equal consideration based upon the quality of the analysis when intelligence community assessments are being developed. If anyone has studied the committee's Iraq report--and I encourage Senators to read it, 511 pages--they know that the lack of a level playing field was a major problem.

Mr. President, with that I am going to conclude my remarks. I urge Members to support the Specter amendment.

The Specter amendment has been described as a ``bridge too far.'' This well-known term is a product of the tragic Battle of Arnhem, Holland, in 1944.

Many historians see the tragedy of Arnhem as a combination of errors, i.e., the undertaking, for some political

reasons, of an ill-advised military campaign opposed by American commanders; i.e., and a massive intelligence gap that failed to detect a large concentration of German armor in the area.

Mr. President, the ``bridge too far'' analogy is apt, but it cuts in favor of the Specter amendment. We must not, for political reasons, fail to make the hard decisions that are necessary to ensure a strong, in-charge national intelligence director.

These decisions are difficult. They are hard. But these decisions are critically needed. The changes we make today have one overarching goal: to prevent another intelligence failure on the order of Arnhem and September 11. Because of those failures, the allies suffered 17,000 casualties and, obviously, on September 11, 3,000 died.

Failure to approve the Specter amendment may be seen by historians as a tragic half-measure that led to another Arnhem or another September 11.

I yield the floor.

Will the distinguished Senator yield?

I was going to ask a question of the distinguished floor manager. I thank the distinguished Senator from Virginia for his courtesy.

It is my understanding we are not going to vote on the Specter amendment as of this evening; is that right?

It is my understanding we are not going to vote on the Specter amendment as of this evening; is that correct?

Do we have an idea approximately what time tomorrow morning?

One Senator who is asking you some questions now would like to speak, and I would like to have 20 to 25 minutes, if that would be all right, speaking as the chairman of the Intelligence Committee. If I could have an understanding? I know you will work very hard and I know there has been a lot spoken tonight; I understand that. But I would like to speak in favor of the Specter amendment, if in fact that could be arranged, or have that understanding with the Senator.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the morning business time be reserved.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that any quorum calls that take place during the consideration of the Goss nomination be charged equally to both sides.

Mr. President, I rise today to urge my colleagues in the Senate to confirm Mr. Porter J. Goss, of Florida, to be the next Director of Intelligence.

On August 10, 2004, President Bush nominated Porter Goss to be the next Director of Central Intelligence, or the DCI. In doing so, the President stated that Mr. Goss ``is a leader with strong experience in intelligence and in the fight against terrorism. He knows the CIA inside and out. He is the right man to lead this important agency at this critical moment in our Nation's history.''

The Goss nomination was received in the Senate on September 7. On September 14 and September 20, the Select Committee on Intelligence held extraordinary open hearings on this nomination that were televised and widely covered in the press.

At the September 14 hearing, Mr. Goss was introduced to the committee by both of Florida's distinguished Senators, Bob Graham, former chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, and Bill Nelson, who is well known to the Intelligence Committee as an interested and informed supporter of our efforts.

That both Florida Senators reached across the aisle to support this nomination is a testament to the wide bipartisan support that it does enjoy.

After 2 days of thorough and wide-ranging public hearings, the Goss nomination was placed before the Intelligence Committee membership for a vote yesterday morning.

In yet another impressive display of bipartisanship, the committee approved the Goss nomination and ordered it reported in a vote of 12 to 4. At this time, I would like to congratulate the Intelligence Committee members of both parties for their sober, penetrating, and thorough consideration of this nomination. The committee's handling of this nomination is very much in keeping with the bipartisan spirit that has animated its work during a very difficult year of challenges in the global war on terrorism in Iraq and in other areas around the world.

This bipartisan spirit did produce important steps forward, such as the committee's report on Iraq WMD, in understanding intelligence problems and gaps and also making recommendations in that regard.

As such, the committee's work will certainly help Mr. Goss as he strives to make the intelligence community better and to produce the best possible intelligence product. I want to say I also appreciate Mr. Goss's efforts during his 2 days of public hearings to respond to members' concerns and questions. He took these hearings very seriously and with attention to detail demanded by consideration for a position that has in the past been part of the Cabinet.

In my opinion, during his confirmation hearings Mr. Goss showed the qualities we want to see in a good DCI. They are coolness under pressure, a willingness to look at alternative views and, very importantly, a willingness to ``take a few licks'' for past judgments.

Most important of all, he demonstrated his ability to put the lawmaker's so-called partisan hat aside and take up the strictly nonpartisan duties of this critical executive branch office.

As I noted at Mr. Goss's first public hearing on September 14, the role of the Director of Central Intelligence is of paramount importance to the security of this Nation. It is also one of the most challenging jobs in the executive branch today.

Obviously, this Nation is currently engaged in a war not only in Iraq, not only in Afghanistan, but elsewhere around the globe. In this war, for the most part there are no trenches. There is no barbed wire. There is no well-defined no man's land. On the contrary, in this war of shadows and darkness, intelligence defines the front line and indicates its weak points and gaps.

Recently, a distinguished former National Security Adviser remarked to Senators that during the last 3 years our world has changed dramatically. In the old world, the threats were posed by nation states and organized military forces. In our new world, the greatest threats may be domestic. These threats may come from nation states and their agents and terrorist groups such as al-Qaida. Organized military conflict is only one of many threats.

In our new world, we are not fighting against nation states but against a network of disparate terrorist groups that operate not only in the shadows but at times right in our own midst. Whether Afghanistan or Iraq or here at home, defeating this enemy depends primarily upon the ability of our intelligence services to locate, to penetrate and, yes, to destroy the terrorist cells. We are involved in a world war which requires timely and actionable intelligence to ensure victory and the safety of the American people.

The Director of Central Intelligence is personally responsible for producing this intelligence. As we fight Islamic terror, other global threats continue to menace our Nation, and among them are these: The development of nuclear programs by adversary regimes such as those in Iran and also North Korea; the steady transformation of the People's Republic of China into a power capable of challenging our interests broadly and exercising influence over the region; and the continuing worldwide expansion of WMD technology.

The Director of Central Intelligence is also responsible for producing intelligence to keep the President and policymakers informed about these threats.

And if that were not daunting enough, Mr. Goss has been nominated for a position which in all probability may not exist for much longer. As Senators know, the President and many in the Congress now support the creation of a new national intelligence director. There has been a great deal of discussion among my colleagues about reform. Above all, we must ensure that a national intelligence director is something more than a weak and ineffective figurehead.

Most of the debate outside the Intelligence Committee has centered on how to grant increased authority to the new national intelligence director while leaving the structural status quo undisturbed.

Many on the Intelligence Committee believe this is simply unworkable. In other words, significant structural change is vital to real reform. I believe strongly that we must create a new structure. This new structure must accommodate the diverse activities of our intelligence agency by giving direct responsibility and control of primary intelligence disciplines and the corresponding agencies to a truly empowered national intelligence director and his assistants. And true empowerment includes both budget authority and line authority to direct and control the activities of the intelligence activities. One without the other may leave us with an intelligence head who can neither succeed nor be held accountable, and that would be a most unfortunate outcome.

We don't know how or when reform will finally be enacted. Until then, however, we need a strong Director of Central Intelligence with the necessary skills to manage a community which needs reform. Porter Goss understands these issues. As chairman of the House Intelligence Committee he helped create momentum for reform.

Porter Goss will be a good man to have in the intelligence community driver's seat as Congress, in cooperation with the executive branch, goes through the consideration of major reform. His unique background will serve him well as he meets these and other challenges while directing our intelligence community.

For over 40 years, Porter Goss has been serving his Nation, his State, and his community. As an Army intelligence officer, a clandestine CIA case officer, a newspaper man, a county commissioner, a U.S. Representative, and chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Porter Goss has done his duty with skill, with honor, and with integrity. I believe, and Members on both sides agree, that his experience makes him uniquely suited to serve as the Director of Central Intelligence.

I have known Mr. Goss personally for 16 years. I served with him in the other body, the House of Representatives. I have worked with him on a weekly

basis since I joined the Intelligence Committee. I have formed a strong opinion about his fitness to lead the intelligence community.

One of Porter Goss's most important characteristics is that he does not ride in a partisan posse. In that sense and in many others, the President has selected an outstanding public servant to be his principal adviser on intelligence.

In concluding my opening statement on the Goss nomination, I would like to underscore an important point. If, as I earnestly hope, the Senate approves this nomination today, this body will not simply have performed a routine pro forma duty. On the contrary, Porter Goss's confirmation as the DCI represents perhaps the most important changing of the guard for our intelligence community since 1947. This confirmation represents a fresh start for our Nation's intelligence community. He will be the first Director of Central Intelligence in a new and hopefully better intelligence community. It is not the same entity that George Tenet inherited when he was confirmed by this body 7 years ago.

It is not the same entity that existed on September 10, 2001. The intelligence community has undergone vitally important changes since the terrorist attacks of 2001. These changes are the result of many factors: statutory requirements, Executive orders, and other major changes in policy. That snapshot that we took of the intelligence community back on September 10, 2001, and the snapshot today is much better in terms of improvement. A key factor is the vigilance and dedication of the intelligence community rank and file, to include those men and women who, today, as I speak, are putting their lives at risk in remote and dangerous places to protect our Nation.

Still other changes are on the immediate horizon as Congress considers major intelligence reform. So let us understand clearly what we do here today. Porter Goss, as the new DCI, will lead a new intelligence community into a new chapter. Senate confirmation of Porter Goss does not mean simply painting a new name on the mailbox at Langley. It represents the opening of a new era for the intelligence community. The errors and omissions of Iraq are well known. They must be corrected.

Steps have been taken and will be taken to ensure that. The errors and the omissions of 9/11 are very clearly and thoroughly described in both the joint inquiry that was conducted by the Senate Intelligence Committee, the House Intelligence Committee, and the 9/11 Commission Report.

These errors and omissions must and will be corrected. Porter Goss's task will be to build, inspire, and open a new chapter in our intelligence activities. We must never forget the errors of the past or their human cost. Likewise, we should not dwell on them or allow them to paralyze us. We must grapple with them and overcome them. That is what is happening now, with structural intelligence community reform. Porter Goss's task will be to open the new chapter and lead the intelligence community into that fresh start.

Today, perhaps our highest legislative priority is to repair what is broken in the intelligence community. We must not let this laudable desire immobilize us.

John McLaughlin, the Acting Director, has done a professional and commendable job as the Acting DCI. He, no less than the rank and file of the intelligence community, needs long-term, permanent leadership, and we need it now.

One of the concerns voiced by the 9/11 Commission was that it takes too long to put key intelligence community officials into place. In the case of this nomination, I believe the Senate definitely got the message. The watch word for this nomination since the beginning has been goodwill and bipartisanship. As I stated at the beginning, Senators Graham and Nelson of Florida introduced and strongly endorsed this nominee at his first confirmation hearing. We had an impressive bipartisan vote on this nomination in the Senate Intelligence Committee. The ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, the Honorable Ms. Jane Harman, has pointed with pride to her committee's involvement in intelligence reform under Mr. Goss's chairmanship. Expressions of support for this nomination have come from both sides of the aisle and both sides of Capitol Hill.

This nominee is ready to go to work and he is needed. I urge the Senate to confirm him as soon as possible. I, personally, and I think I speak for the members of the Intelligence Committee, look forward to working with Porter Goss, the next and possibly last DCI.

I understand the vice chair is waiting to speak, but I ask his indulgence to permit Senator Chambliss to speak first.

How much time does the Senator request?

I yield him such time as he would consume.

Mr. President, I yield such time as he may use to the distinguished Senator from Missouri, a member of the Intelligence Committee.

I yield as much time as he may need to a valued member of the Intelligence Committee, the distinguished Senator from Ohio.

Mr. President, I will be happy to soon yield to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, a valued member of the Intelligence Committee.

On the issue of the HPSCI activity, the House intelligence activity, in regard to reform and other intelligence challenges during the last 3 Congresses, which has been brought up, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the Survey of Activities of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence During the 107th Congress. I also commend to my colleagues the Survey of Activities of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence during the 106th Congress and the 105th Congress.

Mr. President, I yield as much time as he may consume to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi.

I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished Senator from Utah and thank him for his service on the Intelligence Committee.

Also, I thank the Senator from Mississippi for his excellent commentary, more especially highlighting Mr. Goss's independence and the fact he will be a nonpartisan DCI.

Thank you, Mr. President.

I now yield as much time as the distinguished Senator from Maryland may use. I thank the distinguished Senator for her service on this committee as she always provides the committee with very candid, independent, and right-on views. I am delighted to yield time to her at this time.

Mr. President, I thank Senator Mikulski for her very forthright statement. Like the Senator, I understand the point raised by Senator Lautenberg and would only make two points about the notion of Porter Goss's alleged lack of independence from the administration.

First, Mr. Goss sent a very candid letter to DCI Tenet, along with Congresswoman Jane Harman, who is the ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, expressing deep concern about our intelligence on Iraq. That letter is not the work of a shrinking violet, I can assure you.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that letter be printed in the Record.

Second, the independence issue was thoroughly explored at Mr. Goss's confirmation hearing as of this week. Mr. Goss has assured the committee--and I do believe him, knowing him for 16 years in the Congress--that he has the integrity, as Senator Mikulski put it, to look the President in the eye and say no.

Mr. President, at present, it does not appear either side has a Member requesting time, so I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I yield such time to the distinguished Senator from Florida as he might consume and thank him for his contributions, not only with his strong interest in the Intelligence Committee and the leading intelligence issues and challenges we face today, but for his service on the Armed Services Committee as well, for working with me with regard to Captain Spiker and other issues. I look forward to his comments.

Mr. President, seeing no other Senators requesting time now, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Reserving the right to object, and I shall not object, it is my understanding, or I can ask the distinguished Senator--

He would be able to finish his remarks at 3, in time for the meeting?

No.

Mr. President, we have two speakers. I inform the distinguished leader, the minority whip, a man from Searchlight, that we have two speakers.

If I could ask Senator Snowe how much time she would like to have.

All right. So a total of what, 15 or 20 minutes?

I am assuming by about 4:45--I am not anticipating any further speakers on our side. That could change.

I am delighted to yield.

Right.

Could we agree to have a UC request in regard to a vote certain at 5 o'clock?

I have no objection. I think that is an excellent suggestion.

Mr. President, I yield whatever time she may consume to the Senator from Maine.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, a vital member of the Intelligence Committee, be recognized for 5 minutes. Senator Warner is a previous member of the Intelligence Committee, now again on the Intelligence Committee, and he is chairman of the Armed Services Committee. He has a unique perspective to offer my colleagues. Is 5 minutes appropriate?

Mr. President, with this debate and the vote certain at 5 o'clock, I think there has been an extraordinary level of examination of this nomination. Two days of open hearings were held. By way of comparison, that is one day more than Secretary of State Powell had during his confirmation in early 2001.

It is certainly understandable that an official of the DCI stature would be the subject of close Senate scrutiny. I think we have achieved that level of scrutiny, and members of the Intelligence Committee on both sides have expressed satisfaction with the way this process has unfolded. It was not by accident. It was in close conference and cooperation with the distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the Senator from West Virginia.

I think Mr. Goss has been forthcoming. I think he has been candid with the committee. He provided literally dozens of written answers to questions sent to him by the committee, both before and after his confirmation hearings. He also provided complete and exhaustive details about his background and his professional life in connection with his nomination.

In short, I believe the examination of this nomination has been thorough and informative. The nominee and Members on both sides should be complimented for the way it has unfolded.

Expressions of support for his nomination have come from both sides of the aisle and both sides of Capitol Hill. This nominee is ready to go to work, and he is needed.

I urge the Senate to vote for his confirmation, and I look forward to working with Porter Goss as the next and, by the way, possibly last