Statements On Introduced Bills And Joint Resolutions
Mr. President, I rise today with my colleague from Indiana, Senator Bayh, to introduce the Nuclear Safeguards and Supply Act of 2007. The future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the larger nonproliferation system it supports is…
Mr. President, I rise today with my colleague from Indiana, Senator Bayh, to introduce the Nuclear Safeguards and Supply Act of 2007.
The future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the larger nonproliferation system it supports is in doubt. The existing safeguards regime used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has succeeded in forestalling nuclear weapons programs in the world's advanced industrial states, several of which were weighing the nuclear option 40 years ago. Unfortunately, this regime has failed to keep pace with the increase in the global availability of nuclear weapons technology, especially the technology and equipment for uranium enrichment and spent nuclear reactor fuel reprocessing, which can produce fissile material for weapons. Now the road to nuclear weapons can be traveled by determined countries with only a minimal industrial base. While the number of recognized nuclear weapon states has not dramatically increased over the years, the dangers of proliferation have become all too apparent as demonstrated by the A.Q. Khan network, the Iranian, North Korean, and Libyan examples.
The construction of facilities for the enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel in new states, even for ostensibly peaceful purposes, poses an unacceptable long-term risk to the national security of the United States. The enrichment technology intended to produce fuel for reactors can also be used to create highly-enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon, and the plutonium that is produced from reprocessing spent fuel is also suitable for nuclear weapons and susceptible to diversion to terrorists. The spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities will dangerously increase the chances that new nations will develop nuclear weapons and that terrorists might obtain fissile or radiological materials for crude devices. It is therefore incumbent on the United States to lead an international effort to halt the expansion of enrichment and reprocessing to new countries.
We know President Bush shares our assessment of this situation. On February 11, 2004, he stated, ``The world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing. Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.''
The threats posed by new nuclear fuel cycle facilities in new states are made worse by the fact that the use of nuclear power is likely to increase, both in developed and developing countries. As energy costs have soared in recent years, many states are reexamining nuclear power as a potential source of electricity. Importantly, however, the expansion of nuclear power does not require--either technically or economically--the construction of enrichment or reprocessing facilities in countries that do not currently have them.
Senator Bayh and I believe the United States should adopt as a basic nonproliferation principle that countries who give up their own enrichment and reprocessing programs have an assurance, either bilateral or multilateral or both, of nuclear reactor fuel at reasonable prices. Today, the market provides the basic framework for commerce in and access to nuclear fuel, and should not be interrupted by government action, but the exchange of nuclear fuel and fuel services for enrichment and reprocessing capabilities is not currently explicit. This would also require that states agreeing to accept fuel services and leasing of fuel, in return for giving up joining the group of states possessing reprocessing and enrichment capabilities, would also consent to wide access and close monitoring of their nuclear energy activities, exceeding the requirements of the IAEA Additional Protocol. Related efforts in this area should also move forward in the [Nuclear Suppliers Group, where various nations have advocated a criteria-based approach to nuclear fuel supply.
Unfortunately, as the world looks to increase the number of civilian nuclear power plants, the IAEA, charged with ensuring that energy programs do not stray into weapons efforts through the verification of safeguards agreements, operates on a shortsighted budget with old equipment. This situation threatens the institution, and to some degree the nuclear stability that the IAEA's safeguards verification mandate supports. The IAEA is responsible for verifying that states do not violate their obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The IAEA monitors states' nuclear programs through safeguards agreements and additional protocols to ensure that nuclear material, equipment, and technology are used for declared, peaceful purposes.
Last November, I visited the IAEA and its Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL), located just outside Vienna, Austria. Samples collected by IAEA inspectors during inspections are brought to the SAL to verify that safeguards obligations are being met and that there are no undeclared materials and activities. Unfortunately the laboratory's aging equipment and dangerous working conditions will hamper the important work done there, particularly as more samples arrive there and as more states expand their nuclear power infrastructure. Such a situation could, in the future, shut down a critical nonproliferation facility. The IAEA's nuclear materials analysis capability is vulnerable to a single point of failure given the situation at SAL. Laboratory staff is also severely limited in the time they can spend analyzing evidence in the ``hot'' or nuclear part of SAL because of the dilapidated air purification system in one part of the laboratory. Equally disturbing, SAL is still using equipment manufactured in the 1970's. If the IAEA is supposed to be the world's nuclear watchdog, the least we can do is to provide the people who work there with appropriate and effective tools to do their job.
Absent refurbishment of SAL, or the construction of a new IAEA facility with modem equipment, President Ronald Reagan's charge ``trust but verify'' will be abandoned because we have not taken action.
The SAL helped to discover the inconsistencies in Iran's cover-up of its nuclear weapons program. The analysis and questioning by inspectors prompted stonewalling by Tehran. The Iranian failure to provide information and access led the IAEA Board of Governors to refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council. While I wish this might have happened more quickly, the fact is that SAL, the network of laboratories in other Member States, and the IAEA's inspectors provided the evidence necessary to build consensus on Iranian violations.
The Lugar-Bayh legislation works to create both bilateral and multilateral assurances of nuclear fuel supply by specifically authorizing the President to pursue such mechanisms. Importantly, our legislation takes note of the fact that merely ensuring fuel supply is not enough to truly deal with the potential proliferation that could arise as a result of many more nuclear reactors being built around the world. Proliferation of fuel cycle technologies may continue, regardless of the ability of our Nation and others to craft layers of assurance in fuel supply. Our bill makes an important point--that fuel supply for new nuclear power is as important as the safeguards applied to nuclear power.
The Lugar-Bayh legislation makes it the policy of the United States to discourage the development of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in additional countries, and to encourage the creation of bilateral and multilateral assurances of nuclear fuel supply,
and ensure that all supply mechanisms operate in strict accordance with the IAEA safeguards system and do not result in any additional unmet verification burdens for the system. To ensure that SAL does not cease to function, we authorize an additional $10,000,000 for the refurbishment or possible replacement of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory. We also authorize the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of the National Laboratories, and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, to pursue a program that will improve nuclear safeguards technology development.
With regard to fuel supply, our bill authorizes the President to create, consistent with existing law, bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to provide a reliable supply of nuclear fuel to those countries and groups of countries that adhere to policies designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that decide to forgo a national uranium enrichment program and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities. Such mechanisms must confront the challenges of international politics, thus the authority contained in the bill is designed to provide a flexible framework, rather than a final set of requirements, for such mechanisms. The bill embraces both bilateral and multilateral fuel supply mechanisms, and calls for a report on the establishment of an International Nuclear Fuel Authority.
The United States cannot fix the IAEA's problems alone, but we must lead. An international diplomatic effort is required to raise the funds necessary to ensure that the IAEA has the resources and leadership it needs to continue its important mission. But the IAEA, its Member States and Board of Governors must also act. The Board must review and revise SAL staffing policies as they apply to professional staff working at SAL to ensure that it attracts and retains key personnel. Current policies are self-defeating and force experts out just as they are accumulating the level of experience and expertise necessary to succeed.
Not only is the existing IAEA infrastructure in desperate need of modernization, but a global nuclear power expansion will require a commensurate increase in IAEA capability. We must strengthen the organization to ensure that multiplying nuclear power facilities are not diverted to weapons work. This can and should be accompanied by better support to our own efforts in verification activities and technologies, such as through the Key Assets Verification Fund at the Department of State and the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards or POTAS.
If the world is at the dawn of a new nuclear power age, then there will be more facilities and materials for the IAEA to inspect and verify. The IAEA is not prepared for such a future, but there is still time to put the necessary investments in place to ensure that it continues its important role. The United States and other Member States have the ability to plan and make decisions now that will ensure a safer nuclear power option in the future. It is incumbent upon the United States to assist in the construction of the best possible safeguards system to provide for international peace and security. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy are only as good as the means to verify them.
The current budget of the IAEA cannot sustain further stress, nor can the world afford to allow another state to develop nuclear weapons in secret. The IAEA is underfunded to perform its current tasks and would be required to do much more should nuclear energy become more widespread. The Bush Administration must significantly increase funding to the IAEA to improve its ability to exercise its rights and meet its obligations. We hope this legislation will begin that process.
I look forward to working with my colleagues on the Committee on Foreign Relations on these important matters. I thank Senator Bayh for his partnership in this endeavor.