Floor Statements

Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Vaccines for the Future Act of 2007.

This legislation seeks to accelerate the development of vaccines for HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases that are major killers of people living in developing countries. HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis are devastating sub-Saharan Africa where, combined, they claim as many as 5 million lives a year. Yet there are no vaccines for these diseases.

Vaccines are one of the most effective public health measures of the 20th century. With U.S. leadership, the global community has eradicated smallpox, and we are close to eradicating polio. Vaccines for diseases such as measles and tetanus have dramatically reduced childhood mortality worldwide. These public health victories benefit every country.

Vaccines for diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and for other, less well-known diseases would save millions of lives. Partnerships between governments, private foundations, and businesses have made significant strides toward the development of vaccines, but much more needs to be done.

One of the biggest challenges is that drug companies do not have a strong financial incentive to invest in the development of vaccines for these diseases because there is no reliable market for them. In other words, vaccine manufacturers are reluctant to commit the hundreds of millions of dollars necessary to create a new vaccine with no obvious way to recoup their investment. What is needed is the promise of market demand to encourage industry to develop the vaccines for these diseases.

Five countries--Britain, Italy, Norway, Russia, and Canada--along with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, have developed such a market solution. On February 9, 2007, in Rome, they pledged $1.5 billion for an initiative called an Advance Market Commitment, AMC, aimed at encouraging pharmaceutical companies to develop vaccines for diseases caused by the pneumococcus bacterium, such as pneumonia and meningitis. These diseases claim the lives of an estimated 1 million children per year, most of whom live in the developing world. Through this AMC, these countries and the Gates Foundation have pledged to purchase pneumococcal vaccines that will work in poor countries.

Although a vaccine for pneumococcal disease exists in the United States and other developed countries, this version is not effective against the strains prevalent in developing countries. By committing to purchase large quantities of a successful vaccine beforehand, the Advance Market Commitment aims to bridge the gap between the vaccine makers' research costs and the future sales needed to cover the costs of their investment. Experts are hopeful that this initiative could accelerate by a decade the widespread use of a pneumococcal vaccine specific to the developing world and could prevent the deaths of an estimated 5.4 million children by 2030.

In 2005, the United States, at the G8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, agreed to encourage the development of vaccines for diseases affecting the developing world and endorsed the Advance Market Commitment concept. I believe that, with continued strong U.S. leadership, we can save many more lives in this new century. Because of the promise that vaccines hold, I am introducing the ``Vaccines for the Future Act of 2007.'' My bill would authorize the United States to contribute to the Advance Market Commitment for pneumococcal vaccines. Equally important, it would require the administration to develop a comprehensive strategy and make a commitment to speed development, testing, and distribution of life-saving vaccines for other diseases, including AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, through innovative financial incentives like the AMC.

I am hopeful that my fellow Senators will join me in supporting this legislation.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Madam President, I am pleased to join my colleague Senator Bayh in submitting a resolution congratulating the Indianapolis Colts on their historic season, culminating Sunday in a thrilling victory over the Chicago Bears in Super Bowl XLI.

Like so many of my fellow Hoosiers, I have enjoyed cheering on the Colts since the Irsay family brought them to Indianapolis almost a quarter of a century ago. Over the years Colts owner and CEO Jim Irsay and president Bill Polian have brought together a remarkable group of dedicated professionals such as Tony Dungy and players who through their hard work and dedication to community service are a credit to the Colts organization, the City of Indianapolis, and the State of Indiana.

Special recognition should be given to Tony Dungy as the first head coach of African-American descent to lead his team to victory in the Super Bowl. I have enjoyed following Coach Dungy remarkable leadership and appreciate the example he sets for all Hoosiers.

I am hopeful that each of my colleagues in the Senate will join Senator Bayh and me in congratulating the Colts on this signal achievement.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the ``NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007''. Last year this legislation passed the Senate by unanimous consent. Unfortunately, the House was unable to act prior to adjournment last year.

I was pleased that thirteen of my colleagues, including Senators Biden, Chambliss, Coleman, Dodd, Hagel, Hutchison, Martinez, McCain, Smith, and Sununu, joined me in proposing this important legislation.

The goal of this bill is to reaffirm United States support for continued enlargement of NATO to democracies that are able and willing to meet the responsibilities of membership. In particular, the legislation calls for the timely admission of Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine to NATO and authorizes security assistance for these countries in Fiscal Year 2008. Each of these countries has clearly stated its desire to join NATO and is working hard to meet the specified requirements for membership.

I believe that eventual NATO membership for these five countries would be a success for Europe, NATO, and the United States by continuing to extend the zone of peace and security. Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia have been making progress on reforms through their participation in the NATO Membership Action Plan since 2002. Unfortunately, Georgia and Ukraine have not yet been granted a Membership Action Plan but nevertheless have made remarkable progress. This legislation will provide important incentives and assistance to the countries to continue the implementation of democratic, defense, and economic reforms.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been evolving to meet the new security needs of the 21st century. In this era, the threats to NATO members are transnational and far from its geographic borders. There is strong support among members for NATO's operation in Afghanistan, and for its training mission in Iraq. NATO's viability as an effective defense and security alliance depends on flexible, creative leadership, as well as the willingness of members to improve capabilities and address common threats.

If NATO is to continue to be the preeminent security Alliance and serve the defense interests of its membership, it must continue to evolve and that evolution must include enlargement. Potential NATO membership motivates emerging democracies to make important advances in areas such as the rule of law and civil society. A closer relationship with NATO will promote these values and contribute to our mutual security. Georgia is a young democracy that has made tremendous progress since the ``Rose Revolution.'' It is situated in a critical geo-strategic location and is host to a large portion of the Baku- Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that carries important energy resources to the West from Azerbaijan and, in the future, Kazakhstan. Georgia is resisting pressure from breakaway republics backed by Moscow. In the past, border disputes have been identified as reasons a country may not be invited to join NATO. But in this case, Russia's action, not Georgia's, are frustrating Tbilisi's NATO aspirations.

Three years ago, the United States Senate unanimously voted to invite seven countries to join NATO. Today, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are making significant contributions to NATO and are among our closest allies in the global war on terrorism. It is time again for the United States to take the lead in urging its allies to bring in new members, and to offer timely admission of Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine to NATO.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the ``NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007''. Last year this legislation passed the Senate by unanimous consent. Unfortunately, the House was unable to act prior to adjournment last year.

I was pleased that thirteen of my colleagues, including Senators Biden, Chambliss, Coleman, Dodd, Hagel, Hutchison, Martinez, McCain, Smith, and Sununu, joined me in proposing this important legislation.

The goal of this bill is to reaffirm United States support for continued enlargement of NATO to democracies that are able and willing to meet the responsibilities of membership. In particular, the legislation calls for the timely admission of Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine to NATO and authorizes security assistance for these countries in Fiscal Year 2008. Each of these countries has clearly stated its desire to join NATO and is working hard to meet the specified requirements for membership.

I believe that eventual NATO membership for these five countries would be a success for Europe, NATO, and the United States by continuing to extend the zone of peace and security. Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia have been making progress on reforms through their participation in the NATO Membership Action Plan since 2002. Unfortunately, Georgia and Ukraine have not yet been granted a Membership Action Plan but nevertheless have made remarkable progress. This legislation will provide important incentives and assistance to the countries to continue the implementation of democratic, defense, and economic reforms.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been evolving to meet the new security needs of the 21st century. In this era, the threats to NATO members are transnational and far from its geographic borders. There is strong support among members for NATO's operation in Afghanistan, and for its training mission in Iraq. NATO's viability as an effective defense and security alliance depends on flexible, creative leadership, as well as the willingness of members to improve capabilities and address common threats.

If NATO is to continue to be the preeminent security Alliance and serve the defense interests of its membership, it must continue to evolve and that evolution must include enlargement. Potential NATO membership motivates emerging democracies to make important advances in areas such as the rule of law and civil society. A closer relationship with NATO will promote these values and contribute to our mutual security. Georgia is a young democracy that has made tremendous progress since the ``Rose Revolution.'' It is situated in a critical geo-strategic location and is host to a large portion of the Baku- Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that carries important energy resources to the West from Azerbaijan and, in the future, Kazakhstan. Georgia is resisting pressure from breakaway republics backed by Moscow. In the past, border disputes have been identified as reasons a country may not be invited to join NATO. But in this case, Russia's action, not Georgia's, are frustrating Tbilisi's NATO aspirations.

Three years ago, the United States Senate unanimously voted to invite seven countries to join NATO. Today, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are making significant contributions to NATO and are among our closest allies in the global war on terrorism. It is time again for the United States to take the lead in urging its allies to bring in new members, and to offer timely admission of Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine to NATO.

Mr. President, I rise today to offer legislation urging the Administration to develop a United States-Poland Parliamentary Youth Exchange Program. I am pleased that my colleague from Indiana, Congressman Pete Visclosky, has agreed to again introduce this important legislation in the House of Representatives. I appreciate his strong leadership in our continued joint efforts in this and many other areas.

The purpose of this exchange program is to demonstrate to the youth of the United States and Poland the benefits of friendly cooperation between the U.S. and Poland based on common political and cultural values. I have long been an active supporter of the Congress-Bundestag Exchange program and am hopeful that this new endeavor will make similarly important lasting contributions to the U.S.-Polish relationship.

As a Rhodes Scholar, I had the opportunity to discover international education at Pembroke College--my first trip outside of the United States. The parameters of my imagination expanded enormously during this time, as I gained a sense of how large the world was, how many talented people there were, and how many opportunities one could embrace. Student exchange programs do more than benefit individual scholars and advance human knowledge. Such programs expand ties between nations, improve international commerce, encourage cooperative solutions to global problems, prevent war, and give participants a chance to develop a sense of global service and responsibility.

Funding a great foreign exchange program is a sign of both national pride and national humility. Implicit in such a program is the view that people from other nations view one's country and educational system as a beacon of knowledge--as a place where international scholars would want to study and live. But it is also an admission that a nation does not have all the answers--that our national understanding of the world is incomplete. It is an admission that we are just a part of a much larger world that has intellectual, scientific, and moral wisdom that we need to learn.

The United States and Poland have enjoyed close bilateral relations since the end of the Cold War. Most recently, Poland has been a strong supporter of efforts led by the United States to combat global terrorism, and has contributed troops to and led coalitions in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Poland also cooperates closely with the United States on such issues as democratization, human rights, regional cooperation in Eastern Europe, and reform of the United Nations. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), Poland has demonstrated its commitment to democratic values and is a role model in its region.

I believe that it is important to invest in the youth of the United States and Poland in order to strengthen long-lasting ties between both societies. After receiving for many years international and U.S. financial assistance, Poland is now determined to invest its own resources toward funding a U.S.-Poland exchange program. To this end the Polish Foreign Minister unambiguously stated that Poland welcomed the opportunity to be an equal partner in funding important efforts.

Last year the Senate approved a similar version of this legislation by unanimous consent. I ask my colleagues to again support this resolution.

Mr. President, I rise today to offer legislation urging the Administration to develop a United States-Poland Parliamentary Youth Exchange Program. I am pleased that my colleague from Indiana, Congressman Pete Visclosky, has agreed to again introduce this important legislation in the House of Representatives. I appreciate his strong leadership in our continued joint efforts in this and many other areas.

The purpose of this exchange program is to demonstrate to the youth of the United States and Poland the benefits of friendly cooperation between the U.S. and Poland based on common political and cultural values. I have long been an active supporter of the Congress-Bundestag Exchange program and am hopeful that this new endeavor will make similarly important lasting contributions to the U.S.-Polish relationship.

As a Rhodes Scholar, I had the opportunity to discover international education at Pembroke College--my first trip outside of the United States. The parameters of my imagination expanded enormously during this time, as I gained a sense of how large the world was, how many talented people there were, and how many opportunities one could embrace. Student exchange programs do more than benefit individual scholars and advance human knowledge. Such programs expand ties between nations, improve international commerce, encourage cooperative solutions to global problems, prevent war, and give participants a chance to develop a sense of global service and responsibility.

Funding a great foreign exchange program is a sign of both national pride and national humility. Implicit in such a program is the view that people from other nations view one's country and educational system as a beacon of knowledge--as a place where international scholars would want to study and live. But it is also an admission that a nation does not have all the answers--that our national understanding of the world is incomplete. It is an admission that we are just a part of a much larger world that has intellectual, scientific, and moral wisdom that we need to learn.

The United States and Poland have enjoyed close bilateral relations since the end of the Cold War. Most recently, Poland has been a strong supporter of efforts led by the United States to combat global terrorism, and has contributed troops to and led coalitions in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Poland also cooperates closely with the United States on such issues as democratization, human rights, regional cooperation in Eastern Europe, and reform of the United Nations. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), Poland has demonstrated its commitment to democratic values and is a role model in its region.

I believe that it is important to invest in the youth of the United States and Poland in order to strengthen long-lasting ties between both societies. After receiving for many years international and U.S. financial assistance, Poland is now determined to invest its own resources toward funding a U.S.-Poland exchange program. To this end the Polish Foreign Minister unambiguously stated that Poland welcomed the opportunity to be an equal partner in funding important efforts.

Last year the Senate approved a similar version of this legislation by unanimous consent. I ask my colleagues to again support this resolution.

Mr. President, today I am introducing the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2007. This legislation is based on a bill I first offered in 2005. It is focused on facilitating implementation of the Nunn-Lugar program and removing some of the self- imposed restrictions that complicate or delay the destruction of weapons of mass destruction.

In 2005, the Senate approved this legislation in the form of an amendment I offered to the National Defense Authorization Act by an overwhelming vote of 78 to 19. Last year, the Senate adopted a similar amendment by unanimous consent. Unfortunately, these provisions were not included in either conference agreement.

While well-intentioned, the congressionally-imposed conditions on Nunn-Lugar have inhibited the amount of work that can be done to eliminate and safeguard weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. Each year, a six month, thirteen step certification and waiver process must be completed before appropriated funds can be obligated to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. This annual process wastes money and valuable time--time lost in the fight against proliferation. In the field, it can prevent the availability of funds already authorized and appropriated by Congress for the Nunn-Lugar Program, thus delaying critical dismantlement work.

To date, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated for destroyed: 6, 934 nuclear warheads; 637 ICBMs; 485 ICBM silos; 81 ICBM mobile missile lauchers; 155 bombers; 906 nuclear air-to-surface missiles; 436 submarine missile launchers; 601 submarine launched missiles; 30 nuclear submarines; and 194 nuclear test tunnels.

Perhaps most importantly, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan emerged from the Soviet Union as the 3rd, 4th, and 8th largest nuclear weapons powers in the world. Today, all three are nuclear weapons free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program.

The Nunn-Lugar Program currently has a permanent waiver authority, to be used on an annual basis, for the congressionally-imposed certifications on the Nunn-Lugar program. While the waiver permits the program to continue its important work, the waiver does not solve the underlying problem.

In 1991, concerns surrounding Russian commitments to nonproliferation led the original Nunn-Lugar legislation to require President to certify annually that each recipient is ``committed to'' meeting six conditions: 1. Making a substantial investment in dismantling or destroying such weapons; 2. forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction; 3. forgoing any use of fissionable and other components of destroyed nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons; 4. facilitating United States verification of weapons destruction carried out under the program; 5. complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and 6. observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of minorities.

At the time, these conditions were important to defining the U.S. strategic relationship with each Nunn-Lugar recipient. The question we must answer today is, what national security benefit do the certification requirements provide the American people? Do the conditions make it easier or harder to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Russia or elsewhere? Do the conditions make it more likely or less likely that weapons are eliminated?

Congress imposed an additional six conditions on construction of the chemical weapons destruction program at Shchuchye. These conditions include: 1. Full and accurate Russian declaration on the size of its chemical weapons stockpile; 2. allocation by Russia of at least $25,000,000 to chemical weapons elimination; 3. development by Russia of a practical plan for destroying its stockpile of nerve agents; 4. enactment of a law by Russia that provides for the elimination of all nerve agents at a single site; 5. an agreement by Russia to destroy or convert its chemical weapons production facilities at Volgograd and Novocheboksark; and 6. a demonstrated commitment from the international community to fund and build infrastructure needed to support and operate the facility.

Some will suggest that the certification process is, at most, an annoyance, but not a serious programmatic threat. I disagree. While well intentioned, these conditions delay and complicate efforts to destroy weapons of mass destruction. If the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the number one national security threat facing our country, we cannot permit any delays in our response.

The Bush Administration withheld Russia's certification in 2002 because of concerns in the chemical and biological weapon arenas. President Bush recognized the predicament and requested waiver authority for the Congressionally-imposed conditions. While awaiting temporary waiver to be authorized in law, new Nunn-Lugar projects were stalled and no new contracts were finalized between April 16 to August 9, 2002. This delay caused numerous disarmament projects in Russia to be put on hold, including: 1. Installation of security enhancements at ten nuclear weapons storage sites; 2. initiation of the dismantlement of two strategic missile submarines and thirty submarine-launched ballistic missiles; and 3. initiation of the dismantlement of SS-24 rail-mobile and SS-25 road-mobile ICBMs and launchers. Clearly,

these projects were in the national security interest of the United States, but they were delayed because of self-imposed conditions and bureaucratic red tape. A second period of delay began on October 1, 2002, with the expiration of a temporary waiver. Again, U.S. national security suffered with the postponement of critical dismantlement and security activities for some six weeks until Congress acted.

The events of 2002 are not the exceptions: They are the rule. In some years, Nunn-Lugar funds are not available for expenditure until more than half of the fiscal year has passed, and weapons of mass destruction slated for dismantlement await the U.S. bureaucratic process. This means that the program is denied access to these funds for large portions of the fiscal year in which they were intended to be spent while critical nonproliferation projects are put on hold. The bureaucracy generates reams of paper and yet ultimately produces an outcome that was never in doubt; namely, that it is in the national security interests of the United States to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Russia and elsewhere.

The certification and waiver processes consume hundreds of man-hours of work by the State Department, the Intelligence Community, the Pentagon, as well as other departments and agencies. This time could be better spent tackling the proliferation threats facing our country. Instead of interdicting WMD shipments, identifying the next AQ Khan, or locating hidden stocks of chemical and biological weapons, our nonproliferation experts spend their time compiling reports and assembling certification or waiver determinations. Even more frustrating is the fact that the majority of these reports are repetitive, in that the Department of State already reports on most of these issues in other formats.

Some will argue that the certification process provides the Administration with leverage on Russian behavior. I disagree. I do not believe any of the certification subjects are a good reason to stop the destruction and safeguarding of weapons of mass destruction. I would argue just the opposite; these are reasons for us to accelerate our efforts and become more vigilant in our approach.

These programmatic delays have given Russia, and others, cover to hide behind, pointing the finger of blame on the United States for slow program implementation and taking the spotlight off their failure to provide access and transparency. While we call on President Putin to speed up dismantlement and open more sites for security upgrades, congressionally-imposed conditions and funding delays are used as arguments against accelerating Nunn-Lugar projects.

I have concluded that despite the best intentions of Congress, the certification requirements on the Nunn-Lugar program have outlasted their utility. While the goals of the conditions are pure, they simply do not belong on nonproliferation programs. I would point out that the equally important nonproliferation programs at the Departments of Energy and State do not have these conditions. They do not suffer from the annual certification and waiver process. Why should the Nunn-Lugar program, focused on the dismantlement of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, be singled out for this treatment or need for leverage.

I am pleased that a number of administration officials and groups have endorsed the elimination of the certification and waiver process. The 9/11 Commission Report weighed in with an important endorsement of the Nunn-Lugar program, saying that ``Preventing the proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction] warrants a maximum effort--by strengthening counter-proliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.'' The Report went on to say that ``Nunn-Lugar . . . is now in need of expansion, improvement and resources.'' More recently, the follow-on 9/11 Public Discourse Project wrote that the elimination of the certification requirements ``is an important step forward in protecting the United States against catastrophic attack.''

Secretary Rice has testified that the Administration strongly supports my efforts pointing out that ``flexibility in being able to administer the program would be most welcome.'' Bob Joseph, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, also expressed his support saying pointedly to me that ``the fact that there are 13 steps that can take . . . six months or longer to get through certainly . . . underlines the rationale for [this legislation] . . . Whatever we can do, Senator, to improve the efficiency of the process, to reduce the time lines involved, and to provide greater flexibility for action, I would be in favor of.''

Charles Boyd, USAF (Ret.) and Stanley Weiss, the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, respectively, of the Business Executives for National Security, wrote to the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate expressing support for the elimination of the certification requirements on the Nunn-Lugar program. They wrote in part: ``Even though conditions can be waived, doing so diverts time and effort that could otherwise be used to meet proliferation challenges. Relying on waivers also preserves the risk that funding delays could threaten existing projects and investments.''

In sum, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the number one national security threat facing the United States today. The Nunn-Lugar program is making tremendous contributions to the elimination of potentially vulnerable stockpiles. While the Congress' intentions in imposing annual certification requirements were pure, the process has evolved into a bureaucratic quagmire in to which months of work by numerous departments, agencies and bureaus are sunk. The Administration toils to produce a forgone conclusion; namely, that it is in U.S. interests to eliminate and secure weapons and materials of mass destruction. The funds for these operations are delayed while threats remain unaddressed. This is red-tape that we can do without. The only practical effect is unnecessary delays to our response to the number one national security threat facing the United States.

Mr. President, today I am introducing the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2007. This legislation is based on a bill I first offered in 2005. It is focused on facilitating implementation of the Nunn-Lugar program and removing some of the self- imposed restrictions that complicate or delay the destruction of weapons of mass destruction.

In 2005, the Senate approved this legislation in the form of an amendment I offered to the National Defense Authorization Act by an overwhelming vote of 78 to 19. Last year, the Senate adopted a similar amendment by unanimous consent. Unfortunately, these provisions were not included in either conference agreement.

While well-intentioned, the congressionally-imposed conditions on Nunn-Lugar have inhibited the amount of work that can be done to eliminate and safeguard weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. Each year, a six month, thirteen step certification and waiver process must be completed before appropriated funds can be obligated to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. This annual process wastes money and valuable time--time lost in the fight against proliferation. In the field, it can prevent the availability of funds already authorized and appropriated by Congress for the Nunn-Lugar Program, thus delaying critical dismantlement work.

To date, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated for destroyed: 6, 934 nuclear warheads; 637 ICBMs; 485 ICBM silos; 81 ICBM mobile missile lauchers; 155 bombers; 906 nuclear air-to-surface missiles; 436 submarine missile launchers; 601 submarine launched missiles; 30 nuclear submarines; and 194 nuclear test tunnels.

Perhaps most importantly, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan emerged from the Soviet Union as the 3rd, 4th, and 8th largest nuclear weapons powers in the world. Today, all three are nuclear weapons free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program.

The Nunn-Lugar Program currently has a permanent waiver authority, to be used on an annual basis, for the congressionally-imposed certifications on the Nunn-Lugar program. While the waiver permits the program to continue its important work, the waiver does not solve the underlying problem.

In 1991, concerns surrounding Russian commitments to nonproliferation led the original Nunn-Lugar legislation to require President to certify annually that each recipient is ``committed to'' meeting six conditions: 1. Making a substantial investment in dismantling or destroying such weapons; 2. forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction; 3. forgoing any use of fissionable and other components of destroyed nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons; 4. facilitating United States verification of weapons destruction carried out under the program; 5. complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and 6. observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of minorities.

At the time, these conditions were important to defining the U.S. strategic relationship with each Nunn-Lugar recipient. The question we must answer today is, what national security benefit do the certification requirements provide the American people? Do the conditions make it easier or harder to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Russia or elsewhere? Do the conditions make it more likely or less likely that weapons are eliminated?

Congress imposed an additional six conditions on construction of the chemical weapons destruction program at Shchuchye. These conditions include: 1. Full and accurate Russian declaration on the size of its chemical weapons stockpile; 2. allocation by Russia of at least $25,000,000 to chemical weapons elimination; 3. development by Russia of a practical plan for destroying its stockpile of nerve agents; 4. enactment of a law by Russia that provides for the elimination of all nerve agents at a single site; 5. an agreement by Russia to destroy or convert its chemical weapons production facilities at Volgograd and Novocheboksark; and 6. a demonstrated commitment from the international community to fund and build infrastructure needed to support and operate the facility.

Some will suggest that the certification process is, at most, an annoyance, but not a serious programmatic threat. I disagree. While well intentioned, these conditions delay and complicate efforts to destroy weapons of mass destruction. If the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the number one national security threat facing our country, we cannot permit any delays in our response.

The Bush Administration withheld Russia's certification in 2002 because of concerns in the chemical and biological weapon arenas. President Bush recognized the predicament and requested waiver authority for the Congressionally-imposed conditions. While awaiting temporary waiver to be authorized in law, new Nunn-Lugar projects were stalled and no new contracts were finalized between April 16 to August 9, 2002. This delay caused numerous disarmament projects in Russia to be put on hold, including: 1. Installation of security enhancements at ten nuclear weapons storage sites; 2. initiation of the dismantlement of two strategic missile submarines and thirty submarine-launched ballistic missiles; and 3. initiation of the dismantlement of SS-24 rail-mobile and SS-25 road-mobile ICBMs and launchers. Clearly,

these projects were in the national security interest of the United States, but they were delayed because of self-imposed conditions and bureaucratic red tape. A second period of delay began on October 1, 2002, with the expiration of a temporary waiver. Again, U.S. national security suffered with the postponement of critical dismantlement and security activities for some six weeks until Congress acted.

The events of 2002 are not the exceptions: They are the rule. In some years, Nunn-Lugar funds are not available for expenditure until more than half of the fiscal year has passed, and weapons of mass destruction slated for dismantlement await the U.S. bureaucratic process. This means that the program is denied access to these funds for large portions of the fiscal year in which they were intended to be spent while critical nonproliferation projects are put on hold. The bureaucracy generates reams of paper and yet ultimately produces an outcome that was never in doubt; namely, that it is in the national security interests of the United States to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Russia and elsewhere.

The certification and waiver processes consume hundreds of man-hours of work by the State Department, the Intelligence Community, the Pentagon, as well as other departments and agencies. This time could be better spent tackling the proliferation threats facing our country. Instead of interdicting WMD shipments, identifying the next AQ Khan, or locating hidden stocks of chemical and biological weapons, our nonproliferation experts spend their time compiling reports and assembling certification or waiver determinations. Even more frustrating is the fact that the majority of these reports are repetitive, in that the Department of State already reports on most of these issues in other formats.

Some will argue that the certification process provides the Administration with leverage on Russian behavior. I disagree. I do not believe any of the certification subjects are a good reason to stop the destruction and safeguarding of weapons of mass destruction. I would argue just the opposite; these are reasons for us to accelerate our efforts and become more vigilant in our approach.

These programmatic delays have given Russia, and others, cover to hide behind, pointing the finger of blame on the United States for slow program implementation and taking the spotlight off their failure to provide access and transparency. While we call on President Putin to speed up dismantlement and open more sites for security upgrades, congressionally-imposed conditions and funding delays are used as arguments against accelerating Nunn-Lugar projects.

I have concluded that despite the best intentions of Congress, the certification requirements on the Nunn-Lugar program have outlasted their utility. While the goals of the conditions are pure, they simply do not belong on nonproliferation programs. I would point out that the equally important nonproliferation programs at the Departments of Energy and State do not have these conditions. They do not suffer from the annual certification and waiver process. Why should the Nunn-Lugar program, focused on the dismantlement of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, be singled out for this treatment or need for leverage.

I am pleased that a number of administration officials and groups have endorsed the elimination of the certification and waiver process. The 9/11 Commission Report weighed in with an important endorsement of the Nunn-Lugar program, saying that ``Preventing the proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction] warrants a maximum effort--by strengthening counter-proliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.'' The Report went on to say that ``Nunn-Lugar . . . is now in need of expansion, improvement and resources.'' More recently, the follow-on 9/11 Public Discourse Project wrote that the elimination of the certification requirements ``is an important step forward in protecting the United States against catastrophic attack.''

Secretary Rice has testified that the Administration strongly supports my efforts pointing out that ``flexibility in being able to administer the program would be most welcome.'' Bob Joseph, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, also expressed his support saying pointedly to me that ``the fact that there are 13 steps that can take . . . six months or longer to get through certainly . . . underlines the rationale for [this legislation] . . . Whatever we can do, Senator, to improve the efficiency of the process, to reduce the time lines involved, and to provide greater flexibility for action, I would be in favor of.''

Charles Boyd, USAF (Ret.) and Stanley Weiss, the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, respectively, of the Business Executives for National Security, wrote to the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate expressing support for the elimination of the certification requirements on the Nunn-Lugar program. They wrote in part: ``Even though conditions can be waived, doing so diverts time and effort that could otherwise be used to meet proliferation challenges. Relying on waivers also preserves the risk that funding delays could threaten existing projects and investments.''

In sum, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the number one national security threat facing the United States today. The Nunn-Lugar program is making tremendous contributions to the elimination of potentially vulnerable stockpiles. While the Congress' intentions in imposing annual certification requirements were pure, the process has evolved into a bureaucratic quagmire in to which months of work by numerous departments, agencies and bureaus are sunk. The Administration toils to produce a forgone conclusion; namely, that it is in U.S. interests to eliminate and secure weapons and materials of mass destruction. The funds for these operations are delayed while threats remain unaddressed. This is red-tape that we can do without. The only practical effect is unnecessary delays to our response to the number one national security threat facing the United States.

Mr. President, I wish to make an important note regarding a provision in the conference agreement on H.R. 5682, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006.

The conferees on this legislation believe that one of the most important aspects of renewed nuclear cooperation with India will be the new safeguards agreement it enters into with the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, that would apply to its expanded list of declared civilian nuclear sites, facilities, and locations.

The administration's original legislation concerning India, which I introduced as S. 2429 on March 16, 2006, stated with regard to this matter that the President had to determine that ``an agreement has entered into force between India and the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices to India's civil nuclear facilities.''

As a part of the committee's consideration of the administration's proposal, I asked a number of questions for the record regarding this new safeguards agreement. Secretary Rice stated in response to a question asked in April of this year regarding India's new safeguards agreement that:

This Initiative will only allow for nuclear cooperation to

proceed with civil facilities and programs that are

safeguarded by the IAEA. The Government of India has agreed

that these safeguards will be in place in perpetuity. Under

the Initiative, India has committed to place all its current

and future civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards,

including monitoring and inspections. These procedures are

designed to detect--and thereby prevent--the diversion to

military use of any nuclear materials, technologies, or

equipment provided to India's civil nuclear facilities. India

has also committed to sign and adhere to an Additional

Protocol, which provides for even broader IAEA access to

facilities and information regarding nuclear related

activities.

In March of this year, Senator Biden asked Under Secretaries Robert Joseph and Nicholas Burns how they interpreted certain Indian statements regarding their new safeguards agreement, specifically India's contention that it will be ``India-specific.'' They stated:

``It will be incumbent on India to clarify what it means by

`India-specific' safeguards in the context of its

negotiations with the IAEA. In our view, the safeguards

agreement for India will be unique to India because India

presents a unique set of circumstances. India has agreed to

place all its civil nuclear facilities under safeguards in a

phased manner, along with future civil facilities, but India

is not an NPT party and will have non-civil facilities and

material outside of safeguards. However, there is an accepted

IAEA framework for safeguards (INFCIRC/66) that pre-dates the

NPT and is suited to safeguarding material in a non-NPT party

without full-scope safeguards. In its separation plan, India

has committed to safeguards in perpetuity.''

In November 2005, I asked Under Secretary Joseph what kinds of safeguards will be applied to India's declared civil sites, facilities, and locations. He responded that:

``Safeguards agreements are modeled after INFCIRC/153 (the

NPT safeguards agreement) or INFCIRC/66 (the Agency's

safeguards system predating the NPT). India will not likely

sign a safeguards agreement based strictly on INFCIRC/153, as

this would require safeguards on India's nuclear weapons

program. NPT-acknowledged nuclear weapon states have so-

called `voluntary' safeguards agreements that draw on

INFCIRC/153 language, but do not obligate the IAEA to

actually apply safeguards and do allow for the removal of

facilities or material from safeguards. We heard from other

states at the recent NSG meeting that they would not support

a ``voluntary offer'' arrangement as, in their view, it would

be tantamount to granting de facto nuclear weapon state

status to India. We have similarly indicated to India that we

would not view such an arrangement as defensible from a

nonproliferation standpoint. We therefore believe that the

logical approach to formulating a safeguards agreement for

India is to use INFCIRC/66, which is currently used at

India's four safeguarded reactors. For the most part,

INFCIRC/66 and INFCIRC/153 agreements result in very similar

technical measures actually applied at nuclear facilities.''

In view of these responses, and since S. 2429 contained similar language, the Senate's India bill, S. 3709, specified with regard to India's safeguards agreement, and the determination the President had to make regarding it, that ``an agreement between India and the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices to civil nuclear facilities, programs, and materials . . . has entered into force and the text of such agreement has been made available to the appropriate congressional committees.''

The conference agreement before us today does not include the language from the S. 3709 regarding this element of the Presidential determination required to use the waiver authority we grant. Rather, the conference agreement provides in section 104(b)(2) that ``India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps required prior to signature by the parties of an agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices, (including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs . . . including materials used in or produced through the use of India's civil nuclear facilities.''

The conferees were assured by administration officials that the language referring to ``all legal steps'' includes approval by the IAEA Board of Governors. The conferees understand that safeguards agreements are signed after Board of Governors' approval, but that entry into force can take additional time. Since Board of Governors' approval would mean that the text of the safeguards agreement would be final, and it is unlikely that either the IAEA or India would sign an agreement that is not final, conferees agreed to this language. The conferees' intent was to secure as final a text as possible for congressional review since the text of the new Indian safeguards agreement would be submitted to Congress as a part of the Presidential determination and waiver authority contained in section 104 of this conference agreement. It is the view of the conferees that this language means that Congress will receive the final text of such an agreement as a part of the President's determination.

(At the request of Mr. Reid, the following statement was ordered to be printed in the Record.)

Mr. President, today the Senate passes H.R. 5682, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act.

This agreement is the most important strategic diplomatic initiative undertaken by President Bush. By concluding this pact and the far- reaching set of cooperative agreements that accompany it, the President has embraced a long-term outlook that seeks to enhance the core strength of our foreign policy in a way that will give us new diplomatic options and improve global stability.

The Committee on Foreign Relations undertook an extensive review of this agreement. We held 4 public hearings with testimony from 17 witnesses, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. We received a classified briefing from Under Secretaries of State Nick Burns and Bob Joseph. Numerous briefings were held for staff with experts from the Congressional Research Service, the State Department, and the National Security Council. I submitted more than 170 written questions for the record to the Department of State on details of the agreement and posted the answers on my web site.

The agreement allows India to receive nuclear fuel, technology, and reactors from the United States--benefits that were previously denied to India because of its status outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, (NPT). This pact can be a lasting incentive for India to abstain from further nuclear weapons tests and to cooperate closely with the United States in stopping proliferation, and our legislation further strengthens this situation.

The conference agreement before us is an important step toward implementing the nuclear agreement with India, but we should understand that it is not the final step. This legislation sets the rules for subsequent Congressional consideration of a so-called 123 agreement between the United States and India. A 123 agreement is the term for an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant to the conditions outlined in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

I am pleased to note that the conference agreement does not restrict nor does it predetermine congressional action on the forthcoming 123 agreement. Unlike the administration's original legislative proposal, this bill preserves congressional prerogatives with regard to consideration of a future 123 agreement. Under the administration's original proposal, the 123 agreement would have entered into force 90 days after submission unless both Houses of Congress voted against it and with majorities that could overcome a likely Presidential veto. I am pleased the administration changed course on this matter and agreed to submit the 123 agreement with India to Congress under existing procedures in the Atomic Energy Act. This means that both the House and the Senate must cast a positive vote of support before the 123 agreement can enter into force. In my view, this better protects Congress's role in the process and ensures congressional views will be taken into consideration. In addition, it does not limit our actions to a single ``no'' vote, which could have severe consequences for United States-India relations. It would be particularly risky if that were the only course available to Congress, no matter what its concerns may be.

Title II of this conference agreement contains legislation on the U.S. Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency AEA. President Bush called on the Senate to ratify this important agreement on February 11, 2004, and the Senate did so on March 31, 2004. This conference agreement contains important implementing provisions for our Additional Protocol that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has been working on for more than 2 years. This legislative measure is critical because our Additional Protocol is not a self-executing agreement, and passage of implementing legislation completes Congressional action and permits the agreement to come into force. Our action today will allow the President to complete U.S. ratification and make this Nation a party to this important IAEA safeguards measure. U.S. ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol will give Secretary Rice and our representative to the IAEA in Vienna, Austria, an important diplomatic tool in the battle against proliferation as we maintain our longstanding leadership and support for the IAEA safeguards system. Our Additional Protocol is one part of that support, just like our annual voluntary contributions to the IAEA, and they involve significant congressional oversight and involvement. Approval of this legislation today is good news because it shows that Congress supports the critical nonproliferation work of the

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my remarks, delivered in a keynote address at the German Marshall Fund conference on Monday, November 27, in Riga, Latvia, in advance of the NATO Summit, be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, today I honor the life and work of a fellow Hoosier, Dr. Lynton Keith Caldwell, of Bloomigton, IN. I ask that the following tribute, attributed to Wendy Read Wertz of Bloomington, Indiana, be printed in the Record.

The tribute follows:

Dr. Lynton Keith Caldwell, 92, regarded as one of the

twentieth century's most distinguished scholars in the fields

of environmental policy, law, science and administration, and

a principal architect of the National Environmental Policy

Act of 1969, died on August 15, 2006, at his home in

Bloomington, Indiana. At the time of his death Dr. Caldwell

was Arthur F. Bentley Professor Emeritus of Political Science

and Professor of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana

University.

Today, Dr. Caldwell is frequently referred to as the

``father of NEPA'' and the ``inventor'' of the Environmental

Impact Statement. Importantly, as he frequently reminded

people later, NEPA did much more than simply mandate

paperwork. True to its title, Congress established this

nation's environmental policies in Section 101(a) of the Act,

declaring that, ``it is the continuing policy of the Federal

Government, in cooperation with State and local governments,

and other concerned public and private organizations, to use

all practicable means and measures, including financial and

technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and

promote the general welfare, to create and maintain

conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive

harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other

requirements of present and future generations of

Americans.'' And the reach of those policies goes beyond the

federal government to touch every American. Indeed, in the

law, ``The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy

a healthful environment and that each person has a

responsibility to contribute to the preservation and

enhancement of the environment'' (Section 101(c)).

Dr. Caldwell lived a full life, making contributions on

many levels. He earned his undergraduate degree in English at

the University of Chicago in 1934, his Masters degree at

Harvard in History and Government in 1938, and his doctorate

degree in Political Science at the University of Chicago in

1943 where his special focus was on public administration. In

1977 he was awarded an honorary LLD from Western Michigan

University.

From 1944 until 1962 Dr. Caldwell's career was focused on

public administration. U.N. appointments took him to

Columbia, the Philippines and Turkey where he served in

Ankara as the U.N. Co-Director of the Public Administration

Institute for Turkey and the Middle East. He became a

Professor of Government at Indiana University in 1956 where

he served as Director of the Institute of Training for Public

Service and Coordinator of the Indonesian and Thailand Public

Administration programs. Further assignments in a consulting

or lecturing capacity took him to Japan, Pakistan, India,

Europe and Australia.

In his private capacity, however, Dr. Caldwell was deeply

committed to conservation issues. A lover of nature from

childhood, he became a knowledgeable botanist and bird

watcher. He helped to found the South Bend branch of the

Audubon Society, assisted in the establishment of the Indiana

Dunes National Lakeshore, and was a founding member of both

the first local chapter of The Nature Conservancy in New York

and of the Indiana chapter. He served on the Board of

Governors of the Nature Conservancy from 1959-1965.

Dr. Caldwell will undoubtedly be missed by the many, many

former students, colleagues and professionals in this country

and around the world who benefited from his insights and

teachings. His dignity, knowledge and personal compassion for

the people and world around him served this nation

well.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce S. Res. 627 commemorating the 1-year anniversary of the November 9, 2005, terrorist attacks in Amman, Jordan and reaffirming the support of the United States for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as an important ally in combating terrorism in the region.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been a steadfast friend and ally of the United States in the war against terrorism. Sadly, on November 9, 2005, Jordan itself became a victim of terrorism. Terrorists attacked western hotels in its capital city, Amman, killing and injuring scores of people.

This bill condemns the terrorist attacks that took place on November 9 and reaffirms the support of the U.S. Government for the Jordanian people and their government.

Mr. President, today I wish to celebrate the important leadership of Carol Hagel upon her retirement from the Indiana Farm Bureau, Inc. Over the years, she has traveled tirelessly representing Indiana agriculture in her position as the second vice president and head of the Women's Division.

In 1985, the Indiana Farm Bureau and I conceived the idea of sponsoring a youth essay contest focusing on the importance of Indiana agriculture in their daily lives. Throughout the years, essay topics have focused on health and nutrition, global trade, and most recently, alternative energy consumption. The Indiana Farm Bureau Women's Division has generously given of its time to judge over 15,000 essays at the county, district, and State levels.

For the past several years, I have looked forward to visiting with Carol when she traveled to Washington, DC, with the State essay winners and their families.

Carol has been a true friend to Indiana agriculture, and I cherish our years of friendship. I hope that you will join me as we honor and celebrate her many contributions to the State of Indiana.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be dispensed with.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 3699, that it then be referred to the Energy and Natural Resources Committee and immediately discharged, and that the Senate then proceed to its immediate consideration.

Madam President, I further ask unanimous consent that the bill be read three times and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate, and that statements relating to the measure be printed in the Record.