Floor Statements

Madam President, I am overwhelmed by the thoughtfulness and graciousness of both leaders, my friends Bill Frist and Tom Daschle. I thank both of them for those very wonderful comments.

I will take a moment, if I may, to thank some other people, people of Indiana, who made it possible for me to be in the Senate to cast the 10,000 votes, those who gave me their confidence, their support, and their prayers throughout the years.

I especially thank the Lord above for giving me good health throughout that period of time and who made it possible to do this.

I must pay tribute, as we all are doing today, to Lloyd Ogilvie whose personal counsel and support to me and my family during the past 8 years has meant so much.

Of course, behind all of this is the confidence and love of my wife Charlene, our boys, and their wives, who have really sustained me, who said this is something we ought to be doing, a commitment of our time and our lives in a way that has been exciting for me and I hope for them.

My staff has made it possible for me to get to the Chamber for all of these votes. Wherever we are in the country, in Washington or at the airport, each one of us is indebted to staff who tell us when the votes are going to occur and give us some reasonable idea about what is being voted on. I pay tribute to each one of those persons.

I pay tribute to colleagues who have sustained me each day with their loyal friendship, likewise the sheer vigor of the experience. I feel each day it is an adventure, and I am sure that is shared by each of the colleagues who are present today.

I want to mention specifically Senator Robert Byrd, who was the majority leader when I first came. One of the reasons my vote total escalated so rapidly was that in 1977 I think Senator Byrd created an all-time record of rollcall votes. I am certain he will remember exactly how many, but I recall there were at least 650, which was a substantial amount for a freshman Senator to start out with. So we have had some money in the bank ever since, thanks to Senator Byrd.

Finally, I want to thank the pages. They have played a very special role in these votes because, as some of my colleagues know, occasionally I go running out on The Mall. On several occasions I have been caught as far away as 14th Street or the Washington Monument when the beeper went off. I had to run swiftly. Fortunately, my pace is sufficient to get the mile and a half back to the Capitol during the time of the vote to scramble up the back stairs, but in a disheveled condition I have prevailed upon the pages to crack open the door, and the reading clerk has been kind enough to read my name so that I can peak through and keep this voting record alive.

So I thank all of you. I appreciate very much this moment today.

Mr. President, for the Committee on Foreign Relations I report favorably the following nomination list which was printed in the Record on the date indicated, and ask unanimous consent, to save the expense of reprinting on the Executive Calendar that this nomination lie at the Secretary's desk for the information of Senators.

Mr. President, I rise today to offer legislation to repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment to Title IV of the 1974 Trade Act as it relates to Russia and to authorize the President to grant permanent normal trade relations to Russia.

Congress passed the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment to deny permanent normal trade relations to communist countries that restricted emigration rights. Over the years, it has been an effective tool to promote free emigration, but its continuing applicability to Russia no longer makes sense in the context of the many changes that have occurred since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Since 1994, successive Administrations have found Russia in full compliance with the requirements of freedom of emigration. Because Russia continues to be subject to Jackson-Vanik, the Administration must submit a semi-annual report to the Congress on Russia's continued compliance with freedom of emigration requirements. Since 1991, Congress has authorized the removal of Jackson-Vanik restrictions from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Kyrgyzstan, Albania, and Georgia. The conditions that have warranted these countries' removal from Title IV reporting apply equally to Russia.

For more than 8 years, Russia has satisfied the requirements of the Jackson-Vanik legislation. It has supported free emigration and it has signed a bilateral trade agreement with the United States allowing the application of normal trade relations status. Last year, the United States declared that Russia would no longer be considered a nonmarket economy for the purposes of trade remedies laws. Russia has made tremendous strides in the last decade. While Russia currently receives normal trade relations treatment with respect to its exports to the U.S., repealing Jackson-Vanik will remove the requirement of semi- annual reports that have been an irritant in U.S.-Russia relations. Granting permanent normal trade relations also will provide certainty that will improve the investment climate and promote enhanced economic relations between the U.S. and Russia. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. President, I rise today to offer legislation to repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment to Title IV of the 1974 Trade Act as it relates to Russia and to authorize the President to grant permanent normal trade relations to Russia.

Congress passed the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment to deny permanent normal trade relations to communist countries that restricted emigration rights. Over the years, it has been an effective tool to promote free emigration, but its continuing applicability to Russia no longer makes sense in the context of the many changes that have occurred since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Since 1994, successive Administrations have found Russia in full compliance with the requirements of freedom of emigration. Because Russia continues to be subject to Jackson-Vanik, the Administration must submit a semi-annual report to the Congress on Russia's continued compliance with freedom of emigration requirements. Since 1991, Congress has authorized the removal of Jackson-Vanik restrictions from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Kyrgyzstan, Albania, and Georgia. The conditions that have warranted these countries' removal from Title IV reporting apply equally to Russia.

For more than 8 years, Russia has satisfied the requirements of the Jackson-Vanik legislation. It has supported free emigration and it has signed a bilateral trade agreement with the United States allowing the application of normal trade relations status. Last year, the United States declared that Russia would no longer be considered a nonmarket economy for the purposes of trade remedies laws. Russia has made tremendous strides in the last decade. While Russia currently receives normal trade relations treatment with respect to its exports to the U.S., repealing Jackson-Vanik will remove the requirement of semi- annual reports that have been an irritant in U.S.-Russia relations. Granting permanent normal trade relations also will provide certainty that will improve the investment climate and promote enhanced economic relations between the U.S. and Russia. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. President, with the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee still in the Chamber and likewise my colleague, Senator Warner, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I wish to say what a privilege it is to work with these two great Senators.

Senator Warner, mentioned, as did Senator Stevens, the great team the President has assembled with Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and Condoleezza Rice. We are very pleased in the Senate with the leadership of Bill Frist as our majority leader, and committee chairmen are working together vigorously.

I congratulate the Senator from Virginia for his construction this morning of a very important opportunity for us to think together about the events of the present and likewise our possibilities for the future.

My hope is that the United States of America will continue to lead in forming a global coalition that will combat terrorism in a very effective way.

Terrorists, when armed with weapons of mass destruction, are in a position to create what philosophers would call existential events for countries. By that I mean that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of relatively few people--a rogue state, a sub-national group, or maybe even a small terrorist cell--are capable of obliterating large cities, killing hundreds of thousands of people, and creating panic in entire countries. One terrorist attack with a weapon of mass destruction has the potential to create such dislocations in the economy of a country that recovery could take decades. This existential threat from terrorism is a new condition for the world that requires changes in our policy priorities. All nations do not understand this with the same precision that the United States and our leadership does. All nations have not been attacked in the same manner we have been.

For some members of our body politic, the September 11 attacks were a wake-up call, but it was a call that has been heard. When President Bush and his strategists put forward a response, it was supported by the vast majority of the American people. We knew that the hijackers were from the al-Qaida group. We knew there were al-Qaida terrorists in Afghanistan who had been in training camps. We knew that the Afghanistan Government, under the Taliban regime, had been hospitable to terrorists.

We asked the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to turn over the terrorists. They were unwilling to do so. As a result, our country led an international effort in Afghanistan to root out the terrorists. As President Bush has pointed out, we pursued this mission in the most careful and humane way with regard to innocent civilians in that country. We sought to find one by one the individuals who were perpetrating not only deeds in the United States of America, but a long string of terrorist atrocities over the previous decade.

The military action that occurred there had the support of our NATO allies.

It had the support of many countries that understood immediately the problems terrorism in the world presents. For example, President Putin of Russia and President Bush were on the phone both voicing mutual support. I mention that particular call because in the past 2 days the Senate has had extensive debate on the Moscow Treaty. This debate had significance for our global position and for an important relationship that has been changing for the better, and which must continue to improve.

One reason for discussing the Moscow Treaty at this particular point in the life of the Senate was because the Senate is deeply engaged in world affairs, in foreign policy, in defense policy, and deeply concerned about our relationship with Russia. The participation of Russia in the war against terrorism is vital. Even at this moment, President Bush and Secretary of State Powell are working with the Russians to come to a somber understanding of what our mutual obligations are with regard to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and in North Korea and, for that matter, everywhere.

These are important conversations. The President of the United States in his news conference last night, talked about this vigorous diplomacy. Our President has been reaching out to world leaders on the phone. He has been active in attempting to make certain that all nations understand the gravity of danger to each one of us and how much the community of nations depend upon the actions of the Security Council and those who take leadership in the United Nations. These are extremely important days for diplomacy. They are critical days for the success of the Security Council and the United Nations.

In the Senate, we have understood this in our committees. Chairman Warner pointed out already the extraordinary number of hearings in the Armed Services Committee and the specific ways in which the problems of Iraq have been addressed by his committee. I congratulate the chairman and his committee.

Likewise, Senator Stevens has mentioned this morning the extraordinary amount of work that occurs in all of the subcommittees on appropriations, but especially those that are dealing with our national security. In the Foreign Relations Committee we have had hearings almost daily on Iraq, on North Korea, on Afghanistan.

Last week, the President of Afghanistan, President Karzai, was before our committee making a personal appeal for the kind of support that he hopes will be forthcoming from not only the United States, but also from the European countries and from nations in his neighborhood. Democracy must succeed in Afghanistan, as we hope that it will in Iraq, and as we hope that it will in all countries of the Middle East. Aspirations for freedom can be fulfilled if democratic institutions are built.

This is what the coalition against terrorism is about. Clearly, we are concerned with the threats from Iraq, but we also want the coalition to understand the role of expanding freedom. The future is a great one for people who have freedom, but at this particular moment terrorists would deny all of us the opportunity to have freedom.

Last evening President Bush indicated that Saddam Hussein has the ability and opportunity to surrender the weapons of mass destruction that were cataloged by the United Nations in 1998 and 1999 and are still in Iraq. Resolution 1441, adopted unanimously by the Security Council of the United Nations, said to Saddam Hussein: This is your last chance. Disarm or show evidence you have disarmed.

Each of the succeeding reports from the inspectors have indicated that Iraq has minimally cooperated in allowing inspectors to go to various sites, but the Iraqi regime obviously has been very reluctant to show evidence of disarmament or, in fact, to disarm. Even the Iraqi missiles possessing an illegal range, which are an undisputed and tangible violation, are being surrendered only gradually in the most resistant manner possible.

There are reports in the American press of destruction of a few of these, but in the Iraqi press, or at least among people in that country, there is no word of this. In part, it is supposed that Saddam would be embarrassed by the disclosure that he has been found out and is disarming at all.

I mention all of this because these are fateful days in bringing together a coalition, hopefully of the Security Council--absent that, a coalition of the willing--that knows the war against terrorism can only be won if weapons of mass destruction in the hands of aggressive dictators are destroyed. Our President has said as the bottom line, Saddam will be disarmed. In the aftermath of that event, we will have a great deal of work to do in this body.

There are expenses involved in disarming Saddam. I think every one of us, as committee chairmen, as Senators, have been up front with our people. We know this is costly and we

know our Armed Forces are at risk. We know a lot of things are at risk. One thing that must not be at risk, however, is the movement to build a greater coalition in the war against terrorism.

I will now speak specifically about the fact that in the Foreign Relations Committee, starting March 25, we will be having hearings on ratification of the NATO treaty of enlargement. The occupant of the chair will recall that a fairly short time ago, seven nations were invited into NATO membership. They have been busy fulfilling the requirements that came with that invitation. They include the Baltic States, as well as Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Slovakia. I will suggest that the hearings on NATO enlargement will, in fact, fulfill an even a greater purpose. We will have an opportunity to discuss the importance of each of the countries in NATO and the historical importance of America and Canada reaching across the Atlantic for over 50 years and working with European friends to guarantee peace on a continent which has known no peace in any 50-year period in the last millennium.

This is the reason that European countries have sought NATO membership. They have wanted to be in a Europe whole and free. They have talked freely about obligations out of area. They are eager to participate in the war against terrorism. They want to be strong friends of the United States of America and manifest that every day. That is something to celebrate. We will do so as we discuss NATO.

But as we discuss NATO, we will also discuss its future, which must be a very strong future. My prayer is that all of our NATO allies will be with us in the event Saddam Hussein does not disarm. I hope that in the event NATO allies are not with us on that particular day, they will get their soon. All of our friends are going to be needed as we think about the future of Iraq and work with the people of that country for the building of democratic institutions.

I hope we are all prepared for vigorous activity in Afghanistan to ensure the success of that state. I hope that we will sustain a partnership with Afghanistan that will inspire confidence throughout the world in our commitment to freedom.

I conclude simply by saying that the President is offering strong leadership and I support him. I am prepared to work with the President in pursuit of all the objectives he has in the days and months ahead. I know from the words of the President that he foresees a future that is filled with complexity, but one that also is filled with promise for our country and for others that share our vision.

Therefore, we should face this day with optimism because we have a plan for a future that looks brighter than the future did on September 11, 2001. On that date we discovered that the oceans did not guarantee our safety, that we were vulnerable, that Americans were dying, that our most cherished landmarks--including this Capitol--were at risk. And I suspect each of us prudently understands that this is still the case. But rather than going into a situation of panic, as resolute Americans, we found leadership with President Bush and new reservoirs of strength within ourselves. This is a place of resolute activity in each of our committees and on the floor of the Senate in discussing the most basic foreign policy and defense issues of our time, doing so with intelligence, with optimism, and likewise, with an ability to listen to each other.

I yield the floor.

I respond to the distinguished Senator from Virginia, who, likewise, distinguished himself as Secretary of the Navy at another time in his career. The Senator clearly has seen parallels at various times.

Historically the path for the United States, France, and Germany was not always easy during the Cold War period. The potential for hostilities with the old Soviet Union tested us many times. I can recall, as can the Senator, when Helmut Schmidt went to London in 1979, and came forward with a very bold statement. He said that if the Soviet Union did not withdraw medium-range missiles that were aimed at Europe, then NATO must put missiles on European soil to counteract them. The Russians perhaps predictably, moved their missiles forward and indicated in an intimidating way that they might be prepared to take action sooner, rather than later, against Europe.

There were rallies throughout Europe, with people saying, ``better red than dead.'' All the major capitals had frequent marches with people claiming peace is what they wanted, but also with some admitting that they would be prepared to live under communism as opposed to having the proper military preparation to combat and deter communism.

In those days the stepping forward of Prime Minister Kohl was critical. Germany came forward and said you can put Pershing missiles on our soil, and so did the Italians.

I cite that event because it was an important and courageous step in a time of great uncertainty and fear. It led, ultimately, to President Bush, the father of our current President, committing America to German unification well before Great Britain, well before France. And Germans understand that. That was the basis upon which the unification of the country came.

Now, from time to time, the French have been extraordinarily helpful, and I think we need to remember that they have participated in many critical NATO policies and operations. They have asked us to step forward specifically in Bosnia where they believed they had a history, as did Germany, that they simply could not overcome.

I mention all these things off the top of the head because they are important, as ways in which we have worked together when there were urgent mutual problems. NATO has not been a hollow alliance. It has been central to the security of Europe and our nation.

On this floor we debated the INF Treaty which provided that all intermediate-range missiles come down, every one of them, on both sides. This happened only because of the strength of the alliance and our mutual action. That is what we ask of our friends now, that they remember that fairly recent history of our solidarity against tyranny. And they understand that terrorism could hit them. The war against terrorism is not just the United States versus al-Qaida. Terrorists could just as well level the Brandenburg Gate or the Eiffel Tower or symbols that are important quite apart from the human losses of those who got in harm's way.

I thank the Senator for his inquiry. The Senator is correct, times have changed with regard to inspection. Let me offer as an anecdote the Russian facility at Pokrov. This situation is not well known, but it is an agricultural chemical station. Pokrov is an example of the problems which confront Hans Blix and the inspectors.

As I and others went there at the invitation of Russians, we looked around at a rather desolate-looking place with run-down buildings. We were led to a room in which people were making shampoo. They were using stainless steel equipment. I would say, without two Russians at my side, I would have had no idea about the history of that room, quite apart from the facility. But they pointed out that just months before, anthrax was produced in the same machinery. This is dual use in a dramatic way. Equipment used for biological weapons had been easily converted to producing a commercial product. Likewise on this premise, but clearly not within view, were stores of anthrax. In fact, on the third floor of another building they had been making anthrax. In another building, they had been making dual-use materials for agricultural livestock. One was to produce antidotes so they could protect, they thought, the Russian livestock. The other use was to produce toxins, deadly toxins, out of 14 serums that were in vials in a room, in an icebox, that could kill all the livestock in the United States.

My point is that we would have been clueless without those who could give us a 25-year history of the activities at Pokrov. All of it could have been completely hidden. There was not a ghost of a chance an inspector would find anything there in years, quite apart from months.

These are old facilities. Saddam Hussein, and others, have gone to school on dual use. Therefore I simply say, as the chairman already knows, the production of chemical weapons is clearly enveloped in dual use. There is not a ghost of a chance you will find a scintilla of it unless Iraq wants you to find it.

Regarding the biological situation, as Secretary Powell already pointed out in his public address at the U.N., the Iraqis are able to break down all the equipment, put it in vans and cart it down the road 200 miles. Unless the inspector is clued in that this particular van out of all the vans in Iraq has a biological laboratory in it, there is not a chance, zero, of finding anything there.

This is the reason why the inspection business is at best a holding action. Those who argue in favor say: After all, with all those inspectors there, with all of the press following them out every day, surely Saddam Hussein cannot now be producing a whole lot.

But that doesn't solve the problem of what is there, detailed by the U.N., after all these years. Nor does it solve the problem of the intellectual inquiry of scientists who even as we speak are working on new formulations. They don't need huge factories and installations visible from the air. They need only the necessary scientific knowledge and, ultimately, fissile material from somewhere else to get the bomb. And each intelligence report that we have all seen--those now made public--say Iraq may be a year, 2 years, 3 years from making a nuclear weapon. But there is always the footnote: If they get the fissile material from somewhere else--it will take far less time.

That is the basis on which our President has to say the security of the American people is at stake. This is not a speculative business for we all know fissile material exists in the world, a lot of it in Russia. A lot of it is still not pinned down by the cooperative threat reduction program or anything else. That is a tremendous danger, and we all ought to recognize that. It is not going to go away with inspectors.

We must continue to assist them in reaching those conclusions.

Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Democratic leader for his thoughtful comments. I encourage amendments to be offered as soon as possible and that we be prepared to debate those amendments and work with both leaders to finalize actions on the Moscow Treaty today. I appreciate very much the specific amendments that are out there. I hope we can identify those amendments and work with the offerers of the amendments.

Mr. President, while I have the floor, I would simply indicate that the Moscow Treaty before the Senate today is very important for several reasons. Some of these were outlined by Senator Biden, myself, and others yesterday.

But let me reiterate the fact that this treaty arose from a very important meeting that President Bush had with President Putin of Russia last May. During the course of that time, both leaders identified the fact that both countries were in the process of thinking through how to reduce the number of nuclear warheads that are still on missiles aimed at each other. These leaders identified thousands of such warheads and the dangers of leaving things where they were. Our President has indicated that he had already reached a determination with his advisers. It would be in our best interests, if necessary, to unilaterally change our situation; that is, to think through carefully how many warheads the United States needs to defend itself against all potential adversaries and to move to that number. That would save a great deal of expense for the taxpayers in perpetuity--every year that these warheads were no longer required. Furthermore, and more obviously, it would relieve the anxiety of people all over the world who see the cold war still manifested in a very large number of nuclear weapons on missiles that could convey them.

The Russians have had the same idea. They have budget stringencies that are much more severe than our own. Therefore, the two leaders came to a conclusion that an agreement was useful, and, furthermore, it would illustrate what both characterized as a new relationship between Russia and the United States in a very visible and tangible way.

Some advisers of both President Bush and President Putin may have believed all of this might be done without a treaty; that is, both countries simply taking action would seem to be in the self-interest of the two countries. Others clearly believed it would be best to codify this in as simple an agreement as possible. The Moscow Treaty was the product of that effort. It is a short treaty, as many have pointed out.

As I mentioned yesterday, many of the critics believe it is far too short;

that it should have covered a great number of areas in much greater detail, including verification procedures and a number of aspects that have been part and parcel of previous arms control agreements between Russia and the United States, and/or the United States and other parties. Nevertheless, the treaty that was adopted does speak clearly to the aim by the year 2012. Both of our countries will, in fact, have reduced the number of warheads that are viable vehicles of destruction from a level of roughly 6,000 apiece now to somewhere in the 1,700-to- 2,200 range.

We will do this on our own schedules, and we will have the protocols of START before us through 2009 and the cooperative threat reduction activity--at least the very visible form of cooperative activity and verification--through that means.

I mention all of that because some Senators have asked both on the floor and off the floor, Is this important to President Bush now? Why is the Moscow Treaty coming up at this particular moment?

I would respond to those questions by saying from the very first meeting the President had with Senator Biden, then-chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and me, he encouraged us to move as rapidly as prudent. And we have done so. We pledged to the President that day that hearings would be held. In fact, they were held last year. They were extensive. We have mentioned that hearings were held also in the Armed Services Committee and there were behind-closed-door hearings in the Intelligence Committee, and that both of the other committees shared with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the product of those hearings.

Senators have been on the floor of the Senate as members of those committees and have already testified to the efficacy and the importance of the treaty.

This is the first period of time available on the calendar of the Senate. The majority leader has given this time to our committee with the full cooperation of Senator Daschle and Democratic leaders of the Senate. I treasure that fact because I think it is important and it is keeping the faith not only with our President but with the relationship that our President and President Putin have been attempting to forge.

I would simply point out that we have just concluded in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee another extensive hearing on North Korea. There we talked about the importance of a relationship between Russia and the United States. That is a very important relationship. The United States is counting upon Russian friends to be forthcoming with regard to their understanding of the risks that are involved in the Korean peninsula, the risk to Russia, the risk to the United States, and the risk with regard to nuclear weapons throughout the world in which Russia and the United States have perhaps the greatest responsibility and the greatest stake.

The Moscow Treaty is timely with regard to dialog and diplomacy with the United States and Russia with regard to North Korea. Many hope it may be relevant still with regard to our dialog on the question of Iraq and Resolution 1441 at the United Nations or its successor.

I mention those aspects not with prediction but simply with the relevancy and the timeliness of this debate. I think it is important for us to proceed, if we can, to have a successful conclusion of the debate and a vote on the Moscow Treaty today.

The distinguished Democratic leader has indicated that he perceives this as in the best interests of the Senate. I know our leader feels the same. I simply invite Senators to come to the floor to come forward with their amendments, and we will try to proceed.

I finally add, both Senator Biden and I indicated yesterday it would be our hope that amendments would not be adopted to the text of the treaty or its annexes at this point. We believe passage by the Duma, as well as passage by the Senate, in a timely manner is very important.

We understand there are many Senators who wish the treaty had been longer, more extensive, more intrusive with regard to Russian procedures as well as our own, but we have attempted to achieve a great deal. We have much further to go as we negotiate with our Russian friends. Therefore, I hope Senators will not call for bridges that are too far on this treaty and thus jeopardize both its passage here and its implementation by both countries.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I am advised there will not be speakers offering amendments for some time, therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until 2 p.m.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Michigan. I do so reluctantly because of my high regard for the Senator and his work on arms control, which has been indefatigable. His wisdom I respect.

As a rule, we are on the same side. I, however, wish to oppose the amendment for the reasons I will relate in this testimony. I read, in my opening statement yesterday, words that the Foreign Relations Committee addressed to this issue in the Resolution of Ratification. The Senator has referenced that fact.

It was drafted by us in an attempt to address concerns put forward by the Senator from Michigan, the Senator from Wisconsin, and others regarding the treaty's withdrawal clause contained in article 4.

Our text is based on Secretary Powell's commitment to consult with the Senate should the President consider the utilization of the withdrawal provision.

It is worth repeating, especially in light of the amendment offered today, the answer Secretary Powell submitted for the record on the issue of treaty withdrawal. The Foreign Relations Committee asked the Secretary:

What role will the Congress have in any decision to

withdraw from this treaty?

Will the administration agree to at least consult closely

with this committee--

That is the Foreign Relations Committee--

before making any such decision?

The Secretary responded:

While it is the President who withdraws from treaties, the

administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from

the treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee prior to announcing any such action.

This was a carefully considered answer of Secretary Powell for the record.

Past Senate consideration of this issue has resulted in the view that one of the bases on which a President may terminate a treaty without congressional participation is when a decision to withdraw is taken in conformity with the provisions of the treaty. The Moscow Treaty, as it stands, provides for this.

I am aware of Senators' concerns and arguments about the need to insert the Senate into the process. Many of the arguments we have heard about withdrawal stem from President Bush's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. That decision was taken in full compliance with the terms of the ABM Treaty. The President made no secret about his desire to do so, and Congress held innumerable hearings and public statements about the need to take the action.

I am sympathetic to arguments from Senators regarding the need to maintain Senate prerogatives. The process governing termination and withdrawal is a point of constitutional debate. Although the Constitution assigns a specific role for the Senate in the treaty ratification process, it is silent on the issue of treaty termination. Furthermore, nothing in the Constitution restricts the President from terminating or withdrawing from a treaty on his own authority.

Presidents have consistently terminated advice and consent treaties on their own authority since 1980. Twenty-three of the thirty treaties terminated during this period were bilateral; seven of these treaties were multilateral, all of them terminated by the President.

Prior to 1980, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona challenged President Carter's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. Senator Goldwater's challenge failed and the treaty was terminated.

The White House legal adviser has long argued that the President is the principal spokesman of the Nation in foreign affairs, and restrictions on that power have been strictly construed. Given the absence of a textual basis conferring the termination power on another branch or an established practice derogating from the President's termination power, it is difficult to envision such a role for the Senate.

Proponents of a senatorial role in this process will often respond by suggesting that the President cannot, on his own authority, terminate a treaty because it is the law of the land. Again, the White House suggests this is a fallacy. A terminated treaty no longer has effect in much the same way that a provision of a law or treaty found by the courts to be unconstitutional no longer has effect. However, in neither case is the law repealed.

Historically, there is evidence of only one instance in which the Senate sought by a resolution of advice and consent to limit the President's constitutional power to terminate a treaty. The first condition to the 1919 proposed resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Versailles Treaty would have provided:

Notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a

concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.

On that occasion, the Vice President of the United States, Thomas Marshall, addressing the Senate before the vote, called the condition an unconstitutional limitation on the President's powers, a view with which a number of leading scholars of the day concurred. The resolution failed to receive the required two-thirds vote and the question has remained moot for the better part of a century--I might say, until today.

Beyond the legal issues that underlie this debate, some have expressed concern that article 4 differs from previous arms control agreements in that it only requires 3 months' notice and permits withdrawal based upon issues related to national sovereignty. Critics point out the START treaty allows the parties to withdraw after giving 6 months' notice, and only ``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interest.''

The withdrawal clause is reflective of the changed nature of our relationship with Russia, not a desire to rob the Senate of its role in the treaty-making process. As the administration's article-by-article analysis sent to the Senate with the treaty states--this is the analysis by the administration as it submits the treaty:

Unlike some other arms control agreements, the withdrawal

clause is not tied to a Party's determination that

extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing its supreme national

interests exist. Rather, the Moscow Treaty includes a more

general formulation that allows greater flexibility for each

Party to respond to unforeseen circumstances.

Indeed, as we have related in this debate, the Moscow Treaty arose from a desire on the part of the United States unilaterally to destroy its nuclear weapons and likewise a similar desire by the Russians. Finding these coincident interests, they have joined in this treaty; nevertheless, there is no timetable. Some critics have pointed out that the nature of this treaty is substantially different. It is one that comes from the volition of the two without specific verification procedures.

I do not view the withdrawal provisions as a weakness in the treaty. Instead, I believe it is another manifestation of the improved U.S.- Russian relationship. It should also be pointed out that our bilateral relationship provides us with some confidence that the time and reasons for withdrawal would not necessarily relate to the agreement. As the Secretary of State told the Committee: ``The Moscow Treaty's formulation for withdrawal reflects the likelihood that a decision to withdraw would be prompted by causes unrelated either to the Treaty or to our bilateral relationship. We believe this formulation more appropriately reflects our much-improved strategic relationship with Russia.''

In sum Mr. President, I was hopeful that our resolution of ratification would have resolved this issue. For the benefit of the Senate let me again read the text of our resolution of ratification.

Given the Senate's continuing interest in the Treaty and in

continuing strategic offensive reductions to the lowest

possible levels consistent with national security

requirements and alliance obligations of the United States,

the Senate urges the President to consult with the Senate

prior to taking actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 or

Article IV of the Treaty.

This text was negotiated closely with Administration officials with the goal of striking a compromise that would preserve Senate prerogatives while not infringing upon the power provided to the President by the Constitution. I believe we succeeded in doing so.

For these reasons, I oppose the amendment, and I urge my colleagues to do so as well.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, again, I will simply say that in our Resolution of Ratification--and this is what we have before the Senate now:

Given the Senate's continuing interest in the treaty and in

continuing strategic offensive reductions to the lowest

possible levels consistent with national security

requirements and the alliance obligation of the United

States, the Senate urges the President to consult with the

Senate prior to taking action relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3

of article 4 of the treaty.

It seems to me the language is clear. We have spelled it out. In addition, we have had testimony and have queried Secretary Powell regarding his interpretation of the role of the Congress, and he has assured us that there would be consultation.

Yes.

Yes, that would be very satisfactory. In fact, I even will propose a time sooner than that if that is in the realm of the possible.

Let me make a proposal and, in fact, offer a unanimous consent at this time to that effect.

I ask unanimous consent that the vote in relation to the Levin amendment No. 252 occur at 4:05 today, and that the time until then be equally divided in the usual form; further, that no second-degree amendments be in order prior to the vote.

I thank the Senator from Michigan for that suggestion.

I will conclude by indicating that the Senator from Michigan and the Senator from Wisconsin proposed a serious constitutional issue. At the initiation of this debate, I indicated that this is not a settled law. I also argue that this is not the treaty on which to attempt to settle. There has been precedent--at least in terms of activity that both the distinguished Senator from Delaware and I have decided. I pointed out 30 treaties terminated by the President since 1980. This is a lot of treaties. That has been the regular practice.

I referred to a debate on this issue indicated in 1919 on the Versailles Treaty on which the Vice President of the United States addressed the Senate. The Senate did not come up with a two-thirds vote to change the fact that the Constitution is silent.

I accept the fact that the Senator from Michigan pointed out at some point in our history--and I think the Senator from Delaware made the same point--we may want to have this debate, but I hope not on this treaty at this time, given the assurance by the Secretary of State, and likewise by the committee, in our article 4 to this treaty.

For the benefit of Senators, there are about 26 minutes left and, essentially, we will leave it to the Chair how that should be divided.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum equally divided.

Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote and move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 254

Madam President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Hawaii for his very important thoughts about threat reduction and about our mutual quest and support.

I agree with my friend. The CTR and other non- proliferation programs are making progress but face a new set of responsibilities in light of the Moscow Treaty. The Russian Federation intends to reduce, destroy, and account for various weapons systems, materials, and expertise with U.S. assistance under the CTR and other non-proliferation programs. For this reason, the Foreign Relations Committee included Condition One to the Treaty to require the President to submit to Congress an annual report and recommendations on how Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance can best help the Russian Federation implement the Treaty efficiently and maintain the security and accurate accounting of its nuclear weapons and weapons-usable components and material.

Yes, this report is intended to establish the rationale for all U.S. non-proliferation programs insofar as they can be used to help Russia dismantle weapons or assure the security of those weapons and of the fissile material in them. The report also will include the amount of CTR assistance that the Russian Federation will need to meet its obligations under the Treaty.

Yes, I agree that such information is useful. However I believe that this information already is provided as part of the overall CTR annual report to Congress by the Department of Defense and annual reports by other non-proliferation programs. Specifically, the CTR annual report contains funding levels for individual projects as well as five-year cost estimates.

I understand my colleague's concern that this report does not address Treaty-specific programs. The report required in the resolution of ratification could lay the groundwork for future cost and program requirements for non-proliferation that perhaps can be addressed in the Defense authorization bill.

Mr. President, let me respond to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts by reviewing, once again, the origins of the Moscow Treaty. At the time that President Putin and President Bush met in May of last year, Russia had made the decision that the distinguished Minister of Defense of Russia, Sergei Ivanov, announced that the Russians would be destroying warheads in a matter of course, dismantling them from missiles. President Bush had indicated that as a matter of fact, unilaterally, the United States was prepared to do the same. For a variety of reasons--some economic, some safety--both countries had decided upon a course of action. When the two Presidents came together to formulate their joint announcement, the Moscow Treaty was formed.

As has been pointed out, first it was not clear that a treaty would be formulated, but ultimately both leaders decided that was the best course. That is why the treaty is simple. It, clearly, does not cover all of the objectives of arms control that can be covered in further negotiations, and many of us hope there will be further negotiations, not only in the nuclear area but in the biological area where in the course of this we have pointed out there is still a lack of transparency on the part of the Russians, as we perceive it at certain military facilities.

In the case of the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts as a way of shoring up a treaty that he has criticized, let me say that the major verification procedure now in place is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, very specifically. At Surovatika, Senators and Members of the House have witnessed four missiles coming into that plant each month. They are destroyed. Clearly, the warheads have been separated from the missiles prior to that destruction. That four-a-month situation is going to continue unless for reasons of our own parliamentary procedure we stop the funding.

Clearly, you can verify the missiles. In my last visit to the site, I was accompanied by the governor of the territory, the mayors of various towns and radio stations in Russia. Why? Because this is a jobs issue. Russians employ people destroying missiles. Nothing very secret about it; they are swarming around. A television station from Indianapolis, channel 13, accompanied me on that occasion, took pictures of the entire process and put it on a remarkable documentary on Indianapolis television.

We need to catch up with where verification is in the world. It is on the ground, with Americans working in cooperative threat reduction with Russians.

The missiles that come in are interchangeable SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS- 19s. We visited with plant officials about their further planning on SS-24s and 25s. This is the comprehensive scope of what we are talking about. These are, in fact, the missiles on which the warheads were located and from which they have been separated.

In a future treaty the United States and Russia may decide they wish to go much further with regard to the destruction of the warheads themselves. That point has been made by many Senators that the treaty does not call for the destruction of warheads. But, in fact, warheads are being destroyed by Russia and by the United States.

In terms of both of our countries, we have decided not to have transparency to the point that both nations are inspecting that process, but we are able to verify the results. I point out that the intelligence report that perhaps the Senator is calling for may be covered in large part by the cooperative threat reduction annual report to Congress. This one is for fiscal year 2002, a detailed summary not only of nuclear dismantlement and demolition but, likewise, anything we are doing in chemical and biological, too.

I admit there are areas, as I have said earlier, that we are not into yet, and we wish we were. My hope is we will be successful as two nations in seeing eye to eye on movement in that direction.

When it comes, however, to the verification of this Moscow Treaty, it flows from the fact that both nations of their own will want to destroy the missiles and separate the warheads and thus reduce the viability of these situations. We have indicated at our own time, at our own speed, we will do that. And the linchpin from the beginning, it seems to me, is the fact not only of the START requirements that do expire in 2009 but the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program on the ground which has no expiration unless Congress decides to terminate it. That is a different debate and a different set of decisions.

I am hopeful Senators will understand that. I appreciate the fervent plea for verifiability for all of us. As I say, I admit, I wish we had a better insight into the disposition of all of the warheads, but even here both Russians and Americans indicate in the fullness of time that these warheads have to be destroyed. In large part that is because sometimes the fuel components in them are unstable. They become a danger for the nation that is simply holding them.

This is not a sporting goods situation of inert matter on shelves. These, unfortunately, are far too living, viable, dynamic instruments. This is why we have worked with Russia on the fissile material that comes from the destruction of these warheads; to provide storage for that. It is a whole new set of problems.

Some arms control people have suggested that while the warhead is on the missile, you do not have the problem of fissile material that might get loose and be bought or sold. It is contained. That is still true while it is in the warhead. As it comes out of the warhead, a whole new set of problems is created--

of storage and of accountability. We are working with the Russians through our Department of Energy on these accountability projects, which are intense and vigorous.

For these reasons, I oppose the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. I hope other Senators will oppose it. It appears to me to be unnecessary. I would say, simply, other criticisms of the treaty are certainly a matter of the opinion of the Senator, but it was a modest treaty. It came from the volition and the will of both countries coming together at their own time, at their own speed, and with procedures that seem to me to offer an adequate amount of verifiability, much of it on the site and through the eyes of the Russian press, as well as our own.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote in relation to the Kerry amendment, No. 255, occur at 5:40 today, and the time until then be equally divided in the usual form, provided that no further second-degree amendment be in order to the amendment prior to the vote.

Mr. President, I add one final argument, and that is the actual text of the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts requires these intelligence reports on the capability of the United States to monitor the compliance of the Russian Federation to the requirements of the treaty.

The treaty does not require insight into the warhead destruction. That is a desirable aim, and I have indicated in due course we may be able to negotiate that, but that is not a part of this treaty. Therefore, the report that is being asked for really asks for information that is not covered by the treaty.

I repeat, the information that is covered by the treaty, it seems to me, is really adequately monitored by the cooperative threat reduction personnel.

I yield the floor.

I yield to the distinguished Senator from Delaware.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, I am pleased to respond to the distinguished Senator from Michigan. Our report does not require information on those warheads that are not operationally deployed. We would urge the administration to provide this information.

During our hearings on the treaty, a number of witnesses expressed concern about the alert status of U.S. strategic nuclear warheads. As the United States and Russia enter a new era of friendship and cooperation, we must take a close look at what we can do, in a safe and effective manner, to take nuclear weapons off alert status and prevent an accidental nuclear launch due to a false alarm or a miscalculation. I know our friend and former colleague Senator Sam Nunn expressed hope in our hearings that we might address the cold war-era nuclear postures of the United States and Russia as a critical next step following ratification of the Moscow Treaty.

The Senator from Delaware is correct, and while we have not determined precisely how to proceed, I expect that we will want to encourage action by the President before we move on our own. Such a measure could be offered as an amendment to major legislation such as the Department of State authorization bill.

I can say with confidence that Senator Biden and I are agreed that we should continue to pursue this initiative in ways that will provide productive results.

I share the concern voiced by the senior Senator from North Dakota on the potential proliferation threats posed by non- strategic nuclear weapons in Russia. As the Senator knows, the United States has voiced serious concerns about the safety and security of these dangerous weapons stored at multiple locations around Russia. I believe the Russian tactical nuclear weapons arsenal represents an area of concern and needs attention.

I thank the Senator from North Dakota for his work on this important issue and his thoughtful invitation. I would ask that the Senator from North Dakota withhold his amendment with the understanding that the Foreign Relations Committee will make a serious effort to elevate the matter of Russian tactical nuclear weapons to a top priority on our Nation's arms control and threat reduction agenda.

The ranking member and I have plans to hold hearings on the continued proliferation challenges in Russia. Clearly the threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons would be an important topic to be discussed and investigated in that forum. I believe that tactical nuclear warhead reductions should be a top United States priority in our new relationship with Russia.

I thank the Senator for his thoughts. This issue was raised repeatedly during our hearings on the Treaty. I am confident of the administration's efforts to engage Russia on this issue. I would be happy to reinforce the committee's views on these issues with the appropriate Administration officials.

My understanding is the distinguished majority leader has a statement.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the Resolution of Ratification.

I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. President, I express my appreciation to Senator Biden for his leadership and management of this treaty and to all Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, including the distinguished occupant of the Chair, and also Senators who contributed constructively to, I believe, a very important achievement.

I specifically mention staff Members who were most supportive and helpful: Tom Moore, Ed Levine, Jofi Joseph, Brian McKenan, Jason Hamm, Ken Myers, Sr., and Kenny Myers, Jr. We are appreciative of staff on both sides of the aisle for a remarkable piece of work.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, by request, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to establish the Millennium Challenge Account and the Millennium Challenge Corporation in order to reduce global poverty through increased economic growth by supporting a new compact for global development.

This proposed legislation has been requested by the President of the United States, George W. Bush, and I am introducing it in order that there may be a specific bill to which Members of the Senate and the public may direct their attention and comments.

I reserve my right to support or oppose this bill, as well as to make any suggested amendments to it, as this important initiative of the President continues to be considered by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record together with a section-by-section analysis of the bill and the letter from the President of the United States to the Congress of the United States dated February 5, 2003.

Mr. President, by request, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to establish the Millennium Challenge Account and the Millennium Challenge Corporation in order to reduce global poverty through increased economic growth by supporting a new compact for global development.

This proposed legislation has been requested by the President of the United States, George W. Bush, and I am introducing it in order that there may be a specific bill to which Members of the Senate and the public may direct their attention and comments.

I reserve my right to support or oppose this bill, as well as to make any suggested amendments to it, as this important initiative of the President continues to be considered by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record together with a section-by-section analysis of the bill and the letter from the President of the United States to the Congress of the United States dated February 5, 2003.

Madam President, I thank the distinguished majority leader for his thoughtful commendation of the work of our committee. I appreciate especially the strong endorsement he has given to the treaty and to the procedures that have brought us to this day.

On behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am honored to bring the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, better known as the Moscow Treaty, to the floor for Senate consideration and ratification. The treaty was signed on May 24, 2002, and was transmitted by President Bush to the Senate on June 20, 2002. It reduces operational deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level of between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012.

This is truly a tremendous accomplishment and deserves the full support of the Senate and the Russian Duma. I believe this treaty is an important step toward a safer world.

The Foreign Relations Committee held four hearings and numerous briefings on the treaty, starting in July of last year, under the chairmanship of Senator Joe Biden. I thank Senator Biden and his staff for the timely consideration the treaty received and for the many opportunities provided to members of the committee to hear testimony and to engage in conversation with experts from the administration and from the private sector.

Moreover, during the last 2 months, Senator Biden has been an indispensable partner in constructing this resolution of ratification. Its provisions reflect our mutual efforts to construct a bipartisan resolution that could be broadly supported by the Senate.

The resolution, in fact, was approved unanimously by the Foreign Relations Committee. We are hopeful of a very strong vote on the Senate floor.

During the course of the committee's consideration of the Moscow Treaty, we received testimony from Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers. Each expressed a strong desire for an overwhelming vote of approval. In addition to administration witnesses, we heard from the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ken Adelman; from the former commander in chief of U.S. Strategic Command, GEN Gene Habiger; and our former colleague, Sam Nunn; as well as numerous representatives of think tanks and interest groups.

In addition to efforts undertaken in the Foreign Relations Committee, Senators Levin and Warner and the Committee on Armed Services conducted two hearings examining the military implications of the treaty and shared analysis of their findings with us. These letters have been made a part of the record and our committee report.

Furthermore, the Intelligence Committee conducted a thorough review of the treaty's verification procedures through numerous members only and staff briefings. The Committee on Foreign Relations appreciates the expertise of our colleagues on the Intelligence Committee and what they have lent to this process.

President Bush and President Putin have assigned a high priority to the timely ratification of the Moscow Treaty. Both point to the treaty as evidence that the U.S.-Russian relationship has turned the corner. Areas of disagreement clearly remain, but we are attempting to develop a partnership in the war against terrorism, and both Russians and Americans believe that political and economic cooperation can increase dramatically in the coming decade.

On May 1, 2001, in a speech at the National Defense University, President Bush called for a new strategic framework to transform our relationship with Russia ``from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests.''

Less than 8 months later, President Bush announced his intention to reduce our nuclear levels unilaterally and invited President Putin to implement similar reductions. This was the beginning of a process that led to a treaty signing during the summit in Moscow last year.

The Moscow Treaty is unlike arms control agreements we have considered in the past. I remember vividly, as do many of our colleagues, visiting the START I and START II treaty negotiations. The United States and the Soviet Union faced off against each other, against conference tables. They met for years. These negotiations produced extensive treaties and verification annexes that described in detail the requirements mandated by the treaties.

To be sure, the treaty before us today could have been more expansive, rigid, and demanding. The negotiators could have followed the cold war template for arms control negotiations and entered into a multiyear discussion process. That procedure did not serve the best interest of either side. Both sides, Americans and Russians, wanted to move quickly to capitalize on the opportunity to sharply reduce strategic weaponry.

The agreement benefits not only the cause of arms control, but also the broader United States-Russia relationship. In my opinion, President Bush was wise to conclude the treaty quickly in this form rather than enter into a more lengthy and uncertain negotiation process.

Russian strategic and nuclear forces are declining. Russian leaders have indicated they would prefer warhead levels to be less than 2,200 by 2012. In fact, Moscow pushed for a limit of 1,500 nuclear warheads and settled for a range of 1,700 to 2,200. It would appear that Moscow is reluctant to accept the resource tradeoffs necessary to maintain a larger force. President Putin inherited a force structure that already was moving toward the deep reductions necessary for START II implementation. Faced with continued resource constraints, he decided to limit further spending on strategic forces while seeking a new treaty to limit the United States and Russian forces in a predictable manner.

In the past, most critics of strategic arms control treaties objected to the constraints these treaties placed on U.S. forces. They often alleged the treaties would expose U.S. security to unnecessary risk. Critics of the Moscow Treaty, however, have made the opposite complaint. They have said the treaty's constraints do not go far enough. Various analysts have suggested the treaty should include a

verification system requirement to dismantle warheads, a specific reduction schedule, and provisions dealing with tactical nuclear weapons.

I share some of the concerns expressed by these critics, but the treaty is an important step forward because it maintains the momentum of an arms control process that has been successful.

The treaty provides a mutual framework for continuing the destruction of offensive nuclear weapons whose purpose was to target the United States of America. It also underscores the importance of the United States-Russia relationship at a time when we are depending on Russian support for the war on terrorism.

Nevertheless, important questions remain and will be discussed during this debate. What happens to the nuclear warheads taken from dismantled Russian delivery systems? I have confidence in the United States storage procedures and appreciate the flexibility the treaty permits in our strategic systems, but I am concerned with the parallel Russian process. We must work with Russia to make certain that these dangerous weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. However, there are readily available means to address these deficiencies.

The primary vehicle for cooperation in reducing warheads to levels set by the Moscow Treaty and addressing the threat posed by warhead security is the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program. Without Nunn-Lugar, it is unlikely that the benefits of the treaty will be realized.

During consideration of the treaty, the committee heard testimony from Secretary Powell asserting that increased Nunn-Lugar assistance would serve as a foundation for the cooperation necessary to meet Russian obligations under the treaty and as additional means of verifying that those obligations are met.

My concerns about treaty implementation are compounded by the impasse we experienced over the Nunn-Lugar certification process last year. Each year, our President is required by law to certify that Russia is ``committed to the goals of arms control.'' In 2002, the administration requested a waiver to this condition, pointing out that unresolved concerns in the chemical and biological arenas made this difficult. Meanwhile, existing Nunn-Lugar activities and projects were permitted to continue, but no new projects were initiated and no new contracts were finalized.

President Bush requested a permanent annual waiver to the Nunn-Lugar legislation so we could continue with important work. But some in Congress preferred just a 1-year waiver or no waiver at all. Without a permanent waiver, the President would be forced to suspend dismantling assistance each year pending congressional action to waive the requirement. This could lead to delays of up to 6 months or more, just as we experienced last year.

Let me assure my colleagues, this is not a hypothetical situation. It just happened to us. For more than 6 months, submarines on the Kola Peninsula awaited destruction. Regiments of SS-18 missiles loaded with 10 nuclear warheads apiece were left standing in Siberia, and almost 2 million rounds of chemical weapons in relatively transportable shells awaited elimination at Shchuch'ye. But the Nunn-Lugar program was powerless to address these threats because of congressional conditions drafted over a decade ago.

American dismantlement experts in Russia were forced to wait and watch as these dangerous weapons systems sat in their silos, docks, or warehouses while the conference committee process between the two Houses of Congress dragged on through the summer.

Without the changing of congressional conditions on the legislation or the granting of a permanent Presidential waiver, the current situation could reoccur in the years ahead. To say the least, this would delay full implementation of the Moscow Treaty far beyond the envisioned 10-year time period; namely, 2012.

Let me be clear. The Moscow Treaty alone is insufficient to meet our security needs. The treaty is part of the answer, but without cooperative threat reduction, dismantlement, and warhead security projects, the agreement will not reach its potential in a timely manner.

Critics of the Moscow Treaty suggest this lack of a new verification regime is a weakness that must be rectified. Some have gone so far as to suggest the treaty be shelved until verification is strengthened. But this point of view sees the treaty through a cold war prism when cooperative threat reduction programs did not exist and both sides were trying to maximize strategic nuclear force levels.

The Bush administration has been forthright in its recognition of the lack of a verification provision in the Moscow Treaty, including statements in the President's letter of transmittal and the testimony of Secretary Powell before the Foreign Relations Committee.

The administration's views on verification of the treaty are based upon three basic assumptions: First, the United States and Russia have moved beyond cold war tensions, and the United States would have undertaken these reductions of nuclear warheads regardless of Russia's view--unilateral disarmament. Second, the national security interests of the United States are better served through the flexibility of the Moscow Treaty. And third, Russia is unlikely to have the means or the incentives to violate or withdraw from this agreement.

I believe the level of verification of the Moscow Treaty is sufficient. American verification experts will have the START I treaty verification procedures in place throughout at least 2009. But perhaps more importantly, the Nunn-Lugar program has placed American dismantlement teams and equipment on the ground in Russia now. These teams work on a daily basis with their Russian counterparts to safely dismantle weapons systems. For example, at Surovatika, U.S.-provided equipment is routinely dismantling four ICBMs per month. It is hard to imagine a more complete means by which to verify the dismantlement of weapons than the systematic work occurring under cooperative threat reduction at Surovatika.

Senator Biden and I met with President Bush last June to discuss Senate consideration of the treaty, just after the President returned from his visit at the Moscow Summit. We committed to moving the treaty forward in a responsible, bi-partisan, and expeditious manner. The resolution before us today is a product of close cooperation and consultation. I am pleased to report that it enjoys the strong support of the administration.

The resolution of ratification contains two conditions and six declarations. I would like to describe each of these provisions for the Senate.

The first condition requires the President to submit to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees an annual report on the amount of Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction assistance that Russia will need to meet its obligations under the Treaty. As I mentioned earlier, without U.S. assistance, Russia cannot meet the timetable of its obligations under this treaty. Without the Nunn-Lugar program, it is likely the benefits of this treaty will be postponed or never realized.

The second condition requires the President to report to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on important items related to the treaty, including: 1, Strategic force levels; 2, planned offensive reductions; 3, treaty implementation plans; 4, efforts to improve verification and transparency; 5, status of START I treaty verification extension; 6, information regarding the ability of either side to fully implement the treaty; and 7, any efforts proposed to improve the effectiveness of the treaty.

The report contained in this condition must be submitted within 60 days of the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty and by April 15 of each following year. The extensive nature of this report protects our critical Senate role in oversight of implementation and ensures that this body will remain an integral part of the process throughout the treaty's life.

The first declaration has been in each resolution of ratification for arms control treaties since the INF Treaty's resolution of ratification in 1988. It is known to colleagues here as the Byrd-Biden Condition. The condition articulates the Constitutional principles on which the common understanding of the terms of a treaty will be based.

The second declaration encourages the President to continue efforts to

eliminate the threats posed by strategic offensive nuclear weapons to the lowest level possible while not jeopardizing our country's national security or alliance obligations. Secretary Powell stated in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee that ``the Moscow Treaty represents significant progress in meeting the obligations set forth in Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty.'' This treaty takes another step in meeting the U.S. and Russian commitments under the Nonproliferation Treaty.

The treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission, as a diplomatic consultative forum to discuss issues related to implementation of the Treaty. The resolution's third declaration calls on the Executive Branch to provide briefings before and after meetings of the commission concerning: 1, issues raised during meetings; 2, any issues the United States is pursuing through other channels; and 3, Presidential determinations with regard to these issues. This provision has been included to ensure that we remain fully aware of the activities of the Bilateral Implementation Commission.

During the hearings on the treaty, Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld testified that non-strategic nuclear weapons remain an important issue and expressed a strong interest in working closely with Russia to reduce associated threats. The resolution's fourth declaration is meant to underscore the threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons. It urges the President to work closely with Russia and to provide assistance on the full accounting, safety, and security of the Russian tactical nuclear weapon stockpile.

In 1991, President George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev announced the removal of their deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In Helsinki in 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to begin talks on these weapons, but negotiations have failed to materialize.

Secretary Powell has reported that the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons was not possible in the Moscow Treaty. Thus far, Russia has declined to engage in discussions on the future of non-strategic systems. This declaration is meant to communicate the Senate's concerns about the threats associated with non-strategic weapons. It is our hope that there will be further dialogue and, if possible, greater efforts to secure these systems.

The fifth declaration encourages the President to accelerate U.S. reductions where feasible and consistent with U.S. national security requirements so that reductions may be achieved prior to December 31, 2012.

The final declaration has been included in an attempt to address concerns put forward by some Senators regarding the treaty's withdrawal clause in Article IV. This text follows up on Secretary Powell's commitment to consult with the Senate should the President consider the utilization of the withdrawal provision.

The Foreign Relations Committee asked the Secretary: ``What role will the Congress have in any decision to withdraw from this treaty?''; and ``Will the administration agree to at least consult closely with this committee before making any such decision?'' The Secretary responded that: ``While it is the President who withdraws from treaties, the administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, prior to announcing any such action.''

While I am sympathetic to arguments from Senators regarding the need to maintain Senate prerogatives, the process governing termination and withdrawal is a point of Constitutional debate. Although the Constitution assigns a specific role for the Senate in the treaty ratification process, it is silent on the is due of treaty termination. Furthermore, nothing in the Constitution restricts the President from terminating or withdrawing from a treaty on his own authority.

Presidents have consistently terminated advice and consent treaties on their own authority since 1980. Twenty-three of the thirty treaties terminated during this period were bilateral; seven were multilateral. Prior to 1980, Senator Barry Goldwater challenged Presidents Carter's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. Senator Goldwater's challenge failed and the treaty was terminated. Since that time, objections have been raised only with respect to Presidents Bush's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

The White House Legal Advisor has long argued that the President is the principle spokesman of the nation in foreign affairs and restrictions on the power have been strictly construed.

Given the absence of a textual basis conferring the termination power on another branch or an established practice derogating from the President's termination power, it is difficult to envisage such a role for the Senate.

Proponents of a Senatorial role in this process will often respond by suggesting that the President cannot on his own authority terminate a treaty because it is the ``law of the land.'' Again, the White House suggests this is a fallacy. A terminated treaty no longer has effect in much the same way that a provision of a law or treaty found by the courts to be unconstitutional no longer has effect. However, in neither case is the law repealed.

Historically there is evidence of only one instance in which the Senate sought by a resolution of advice and consent to limit the President's constitutional power to terminate a treaty. The first condition to the 1919 proposed resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Versailles Treaty would have provided: ``notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.'' Vice President Thomas Marshall, addressing the Senate before the vote, called the condition an unconstitutional limitation on the President's powers--a view with which a number of leading scholars of the day concurred. However, the resolution failed to receive the required two-thirds vote and the question has remained moot for the better part of a century.

Beyond the legal issues which underlie this debate, some have expressed concern that Article IV differs from previous arms control agreements in that it only requires three months notice and permits withdrawal based upon issues related to national sovereignty. Critics point out that the START Treaty allows a Party to withdraw, after giving 6 months' notice and only ``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.''

I do not view the withdrawal provisions as a weakness in the treaty. Instead, I believe it is another manifestation of the improved U.S.- Russian relationship. It should also be pointed out that our bilateral relationship provides us with some confidence that the time and reasons for withdrawal would not necessarily relate to the agreement. As the Secretary of State told the Committee: ``The Moscow Treaty's formulation for withdrawal reflects the likelihood that a decision to withdraw would be prompted by causes unrelated either to the Treaty or to our bilateral relationship. We believe this formulation more appropriately reflects our much-improved strategic relationship with Russia.''

Mr. President, in performing its constitutional responsibilities with respect to treaties and international agreements, the Senate has to reach a judgment as to whether, on balance, U.S. acceptance of the obligations contained in the treaty serves the national interests of the United States.

The Moscow Treaty is not without blemishes. The Senate should not be surprised that the treaty is not perfect or that it does not cover every desired area of bilateral arms control. But that is not the point. The proper question is whether on balance, the Moscow Treaty serves the national security of our nation.

For some, no arms control treaty is good enough. Indeed, the very high stakes of the cold war and the fact that arms control cheating by the Soviet Union represented a potential threat to the survival of the United States led to a legitimate focus on treaties with high standards, especially for verification and the ability to detect even minor violations.

The cold war is over, and treaty requirements must suit U.S. national interests as they exist today. The Moscow Treaty charts a course towards greater security for both the United States and Russia. I urge my colleagues to ratify this treaty and approve the resolution of ratification without amendment.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, I thank the Senator for his very thoughtful and generous remarks about cooperative threat reduction and

the conversations we have enjoyed about that.

The Senator from Illinois has been a very strong supporter of nonproliferation in this country as we have worked with the Russians or we have tried to direct our own programs. It is always difficult to oppose an amendment of someone who has been so generous in mentioning cooperation we have had together.

I will oppose the amendment because I believe that, in fact, the Senator's objectives are being realized in many ways. Some are known to the Senator; some I would like to discuss presently.

But, first of all, I would say that in arguing in favor of the Moscow Treaty, Senator Biden and I have pointed out that the President had already made a determination that we were going to unilaterally destroy a good number of weapons. And the Russians, for their own reasons, had decided they wanted to do so.

This is why it is a very short and simple treaty without extensive verification protocols that have characterized other treaties. But it comes with the START I verification procedures that last through 2009. In our hearings, we have pointed out 2009 is short of 2012, which is the timetable for the total treaty to be consummated. But, at the same time, there is all of the strictness the Senator from Illinois has mentioned in previous treaties incorporated in this one.

The second point of verification is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Nunn-Lugar program. This has people from our country working with Russians on the ground in Russia. They are verifying precisely what they are doing.

I want to mention the extent of this reporting and verification by pointing to the CTR report which was just published for the year 2002. It has, on the front, so that all Senators will be able to see, the CTR logo, and says: ``Cooperative Threat Reduction annual report, Fiscal Year 2002.''

Now, page by page, the report goes through a description of cooperative threat reduction activities carried out in fiscal year 2000 in the nuclear, chemical, and biological areas, project by project and objective by objective. It discusses the 5-year plan for destruction or containment, security of each of these materials or weapons systems.

I mention this simply because that has been the objective of those of us who have tried to foster this Cooperative Threat Reduction Program; that in fact there be very close congressional scrutiny, dollar for dollar, area by area, all the way through.

Now, Senator Biden was prescient in his amendment that the Senator from Illinois has cited. But this clearly influenced the subsequent work under cooperative threat reduction, and does to this day.

The objectives that the Senator from Illinois has suggested that are especially important--and those were also mentioned by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota, Mr. Dorgan, early on--we are concerned about the tactical nuclear weapons. We have raised the question to Secretary Powell as to why this was not included. In essence, this is not a quote from the Secretary, but he said: It is a bridge too far. We raised this with the Russians. They are not prepared to come to agreement.

Now, other countries are deeply interested in the Russians coming to agreement, the G-8 countries that have come together in the so-called 10 plus 10 over 10 program, which means $10 billion for each of 10 years from the countries in the G-8 other than the United States, thus matching essentially what we are doing under cooperative threat reduction.

One of the objectives of the early meetings was clearly: What about the tactical weapons? These are very close to the Europeans. They are not long-range ballistic missiles. They are missiles on the continent in proximity to countries worried about their security.

So we have friends, in a multilateral way, who are helping to pursue this situation. I have some confidence--because Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld, in their testimony, indicated this is a high priority for them, they will continue to raise it with the Russians--we will make some headway. But we have not thus far.

I would just say to the distinguished Senator from Illinois, whether spurred by the Biden amendment years ago or various other activities, our activities as Members of the Senate and the House and on the ground in Russia have been vigorous.

I think the Senator cited perhaps some of my trips. But one recently, last August, was an attempt to go to the biomilitary plant at so-called Kirov 200. I sought to go there because it was identified as one of four bioweapons facilities of which we believe the Russians are simply still in denial. They are not prepared to work with us, even though at 14 other sites we do now have active programs.

Under the ISTC Program, the International Science and Technology Program, we are giving stipends to Russian scientists who now have left the weapons field and are working on HIV/AIDS or other ways to combat chemical weapons poisoning.

I would simply say that the Kirov 200 situation, for me, was almost a bridge too far, even though I thought arrangements were available for our U.S. Air Force plane to convey me and the party out there. At the airport that morning, we were informed we would not be able to land. We could fly, but we were not going to land. So we began to work our way through the bureaucracy of the foreign office of Russia, unwilling to take no for an answer. In due course, we did fly the aircraft, and we did land in Kirov.

Having gotten there, I would say that I did not see everything that I wished to see. But what I did find were retired Russians, retired at 55, who had come, from the plant that was denied to me, down to our activities and who, in essence, told me everything they were doing at either.

So I think we have a pretty good insight. I just mention this because even as we legislatively will some things to happen, they do not happen without persistence and sort of doggedly pursuing those objectives. I am just testifying that is occurring, sometimes to the discomfort of our relationship with the Russians. But in this particular case, I reported all my activities to the defense minister, Mr. Ivanov, and at least mildly admonished him we ought to be beyond this. The whole idea of the Moscow Treaty should be a new relationship, a new trust between President Putin and our President Bush. And all of us on both sides need to be fostering that.

So my response to the Senator from Illinois is to say that I think we are on the same side in pursuing congressional oversight, more vigor with regard to everything we are now doing, although I think it is fully reported annually by the Department of Energy, quite apart from CTR, and with goals to go where we have not been; namely, tactical weapons and future destruction.

Yes, I yield for a question.

The Senator is correct. The treaty does not call for the destruction of warheads.

I would not disagree, in response to the distinguished Senator, that it would be ideal for this verification to occur, but I would simply respond that although we have been negotiating such verification for some time, the Russians have not agreed to do this. In other words, one reason that is not in this treaty is the negotiators have found resistance. I have found resistance. Other people have found resistance.

These things open up tediously, sort of one by one. For example, after great pressure, I was taken on a small Russian aircraft to a plant where in fact

there are warheads taken off of missiles, and they are stored almost like bodies in coffins side by side, lined there. Each one had a history of when the warhead was built, when it was taken off of the missile that would have conveyed it, when it was put there in storage, and some estimate as to its efficacy; that is, how long you can anticipate this warhead would actually be explosive. Much more ominous down the trail and something that I am pursuing is some sort of prediction as to when it might become dangerous.

The difficulty--and the Senator knows this--is these warheads are unstable sometimes in terms of their chemical composition. They may not lie there in peace forever, like a sporting goods store situation of inert matter. That is the problem for the Russians. At some point they will have to move the warheads. So they already have a railway station secured. They have procedures because they know that at some stage they will have to take the warhead out and disassemble it, a very dangerous predicament and one that then leads to problems of storage of the fissile material. So in another Nunn-Lugar program we are trying to work on the storage facilities for thousands of these warheads because, for the moment, there is not adequate storage for the fissile material itself after it is taken as plutonium or highly enriched uranium from the warhead. The Russians would like to pursue that.

So we asked the logical question the Senator has asked: Why can't we work together to verify where all these warheads are, what status they are in. We are interested in that. We don't want an accidental nuclear event in Russia. And the Russians have been resistant, in the fullness of time perhaps less resistant, but I would just say, once again, that was probably a bridge too far for this treaty. Our negotiators found the Russians not to be prepared.

Of course.

I think it is a reasonable interpretation, I respond to the Senator, but I would also say that in fact the President, at least through the Department of Defense, in the CDR report I have in front of me, is doing that each year. These are annual reports. Likewise the Secretary of Energy is making his own reports on the nuclear accountability issues. So it appears to me that generally the objective of the Senator is being fulfilled in current reports.

What is not being fulfilled and what the Senator and I both wish was being fulfilled is more progress toward the destruction of the warheads themselves and more openness on the part of the Russians to what their problem clearly is and one in which we could help if we had more access. Before I got into this particular vault I am talking about, General Habiger, who has been mentioned in this debate, was the last American ever to get there. This is not openness or transparency. So even though property threat reduction brings a lot of Russians and Americans together, there are areas in which we have not come together, these bioweapons plants, the four of them, for example, and some of these vaults that we have not seen.

Every year we are reporting, however, our deficiencies or our inability to reach agreement. It is a checkoff list with the Russians.

I say, on behalf of those who are in the field with the CDR, they work at it all the time, working with their compatriots out in the hinterland of Russia to see what might open up this year.

In response to the Senator, of course, I see it in that light. My only argument with the Senator today is that I do not believe it ought to be part of the treaty. I believe clearly the fulfillment is already occurring in terms of the reporting, with considerable vigor, but at the same time, as I have admitted to the Senator, the objectives we both seek by getting the President to indicate energy and so forth also requires the Russians to reciprocate. This particular treaty still has to be ratified by the Duma. We have our own debate here, but they will have theirs, too.

Senator Biden and I in our opening comments indicated we would resist amendments simply because we believe we have at least in a very general way covered territory of what we ought to be doing in terms of oversight but in ways that would not in any way be objectionable to the Russians who have to ratify the treaty and thus at least preserve the spirit in which Presidents Putin and Bush negotiated, admittedly, a limited treaty. I would ask the Senator at least for his thoughts as to whether he would be sufficiently assured by the vigor of my response to withdraw the amendment, understanding that we will continue to pursue these reports.

I will try to make available to Senators the CDR message if they do not have it which really reviews in detail the gist of what the Senator is requesting. But beyond that, it is a pledge of vigor in proceeding where we have not been, these bridges too far that I have described that are very important.

I respond to the Senator that I would be pleased to work with the Senator on a letter which affirms, once again, the importance of the debate we are having, the interest of Members who are signing the letter, but others literally in the subject matter of what we are talking about who would acknowledge perhaps that some reports are being made and maybe ask for more vigor in being more complete. I would like to work with the Senator in that project.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

I ask unanimous consent that Jason Hamm, a presidential

management intern for the Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, be given floor privileges during the debate on the Moscow Treaty.

Mr. President, I rise today to congratulate a group of young Indiana students who have shown great educative achievement. I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues the winners of the 2002-2003 Eighth Grade Youth Essay Contest, which I sponsored in association with the Indiana Farm Bureau and Farm Bureau Insurance Companies. These students have displayed strong writing abilities and are outstanding young Hoosier scholars. I will submit their names for the Congressional Record because they demonstrate the capabilities of today's students and are fine representatives of our Nation.

This year, Hoosier students wrote on the theme, ``Growing Nutrition Right Here In Indiana.'' I would like to submit for the Record the winning essays of Caitlin Dunn and Ryan Nigh. As State winners of the Youth Essay Contest, these two outstanding students are being recognized on Friday, February 28, 2003, during a visit to the United States Capitol.

The essays are as follows:

Growing Nutrition Right Here In Indiana

(By Caitlin Dunn--Jay County)

Don't leave the table.

Stay in your seat.

An event of magic

Is yours to meet.

With the wave of my wand

And a magical spell,

The nutrition grown in Indiana

Will help you stay well!

Our magical journey begins with an ordinary deck of cards.

``Pick a card--any card--just don't tell me what it is. You

have chosen the ace of spades.'' This card is remarkable

because it holds the most powerful magic of all. It

represents the farmer's spade used to tend the bountiful and

nutritious crops grown in Indiana.

Indiana farmers create a powerful potion for keeping our

bodies healthy:

M--Maintaining a healthy diet from the basic food groups

including Indiana beef, pork, poultry, vegetables, fruits,

grains, and dairy will increase the body's level of energy

and make it easier to live an active lifestyle.

A--Agriculture from Indiana such as corn, tomatoes,

cucumbers, snap beans, potatoes, apples, watermelons,

cantaloupes, peaches, and blueberries as well as soybeans,

wheat, and oats will help the body resist infection and

disease.

G--Good eating habits will improve ``brain power,''

creating a better aptitude for learning.

I--An increase in life expectancy can result from

decreasing cholesterol with Indiana whole grains and soy

protein.

C--Caring for bones and teeth with dairy products from

Indiana farms will help prevent osteoporosis and promote a

healthy digestive system.

Combine all ingredients and simmer for a lifetime.

Eat properly and unlock the MAGIC. maintain a healthy diet,

consume nutritious Indiana agricultural products, practice

good eating habits, increase life expectancy with Indiana

whole grains, and care for bones and teeth with Indiana dairy

products. Conjure up a little magic in yourself and--

ABRACADABRA--live a healthy life with nutrition grown right

here in Indiana.

Madam President, I am pleased to join with my colleague, Senator Daschle, in reintroducing the Renewable Fuels Act. I am thankful for this opportunity to remind my colleagues about the importance of this legislation, and the benefits it brings to the American people.

In the 107th Congress, the Senate voted in favor of a comprehensive energy bill establishing a renewable fuels standard. This provision would triple the amount of renewable fuel America consumes, displacing nearly 600,000 barrels of oil per day. The bipartisan renewable fuels agreement is a culmination of years of effort and enjoys strong support from a broad spectrum. Regrettably, disagreements on other provisions in the comprehensive energy legislation stranded the renewable fuels provision in a House-Senate conference committee last year.

Senator Daschle and I first introduced a bill creating a renewable fuels standard three years ago. Like that earlier bill, this bill represents an important first step toward reducing our dependence on foreign oil and improving our nation's energy security. At the same time, this proposal goes far toward protecting the environment, stimulating rural economic development, and increasing the flexibility of the national fuel supply to reduce the impact of future price spikes.

This bill will also forms the basis for a solution to the MTBE problem that will be acceptable to all regions of the nation. MTBE, a carcinogen that contaminates drinking water, is on its way out. This proposal addresses public concerns regarding water pollution while considering all of the environmental and energy security issues involved. It requires the EPA Administrator to end the use of MTBE within four years in order to protect public health and the environment. And it establishes strict ``anti-backsliding'' provisions to capture all of the air quality benefits of MTBE and ethanol as MTBE is phased down and then phased out.

Those of us who recall the energy crises of the 1970s--and recognize the current political instability in oil-rich regions around the world--remain committed to the development of cheap, plentiful renewable sources of energy. For years, tax incentives supporting ethanol production have helped foster the creation of a strong domestic ethanol industry. But more needs to be done to reduce the cost of ethanol and make this plant-based commodity more competitive with fossil fuels.

Energy and agriculture are closely tied topics that have been of interest to me for several years. Since 1996, I have chaired five hearings in the Agriculture Committee regarding energy security and renewable fuels. These hearings were designed to inform the public that our reliance on imported oil is growing, making the U.S. and the world increasingly dependent on the unstable nations of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. At the same time, the hearings convinced many in Washington that a greater reliance on renewable fuels like ethanol could have major energy security, air quality and rural development benefits.

As we look to the future, major new scientific and technical breakthroughs are making ethanol more economical. As a result of the Biomass Research and Development Act, federal agencies are now coordinating research activities focused on making ethanol out of virtually any plant in the world. New biocatalysts--genetically engineered enzymes, yeasts, and bacteria--are reducing the cost of so- called cellulosic ethanol to the point where petroleum products may one day face vigorous competition.

The legislation we are introducing today will build on these efforts by offering an incentive to producers of cellulosic ethanol. Like our previous proposals, this bill gives a special credit to users of cellulosic ethanol for the purpose of fulfilling requirements of the renewable fuels standard.

This legislation will go far toward strengthening our national security, improving our rural communities, protecting our natural environment and, ultimately, substituting carbohydrates for hydrocarbons.

Thank you for joining me in supporting ethanol, a domestic form of clean, renewable energy.

Madam President, I am pleased to join with my colleague, Senator Daschle, in reintroducing the Renewable Fuels Act. I am thankful for this opportunity to remind my colleagues about the importance of this legislation, and the benefits it brings to the American people.

In the 107th Congress, the Senate voted in favor of a comprehensive energy bill establishing a renewable fuels standard. This provision would triple the amount of renewable fuel America consumes, displacing nearly 600,000 barrels of oil per day. The bipartisan renewable fuels agreement is a culmination of years of effort and enjoys strong support from a broad spectrum. Regrettably, disagreements on other provisions in the comprehensive energy legislation stranded the renewable fuels provision in a House-Senate conference committee last year.

Senator Daschle and I first introduced a bill creating a renewable fuels standard three years ago. Like that earlier bill, this bill represents an important first step toward reducing our dependence on foreign oil and improving our nation's energy security. At the same time, this proposal goes far toward protecting the environment, stimulating rural economic development, and increasing the flexibility of the national fuel supply to reduce the impact of future price spikes.

This bill will also forms the basis for a solution to the MTBE problem that will be acceptable to all regions of the nation. MTBE, a carcinogen that contaminates drinking water, is on its way out. This proposal addresses public concerns regarding water pollution while considering all of the environmental and energy security issues involved. It requires the EPA Administrator to end the use of MTBE within four years in order to protect public health and the environment. And it establishes strict ``anti-backsliding'' provisions to capture all of the air quality benefits of MTBE and ethanol as MTBE is phased down and then phased out.

Those of us who recall the energy crises of the 1970s--and recognize the current political instability in oil-rich regions around the world--remain committed to the development of cheap, plentiful renewable sources of energy. For years, tax incentives supporting ethanol production have helped foster the creation of a strong domestic ethanol industry. But more needs to be done to reduce the cost of ethanol and make this plant-based commodity more competitive with fossil fuels.

Energy and agriculture are closely tied topics that have been of interest to me for several years. Since 1996, I have chaired five hearings in the Agriculture Committee regarding energy security and renewable fuels. These hearings were designed to inform the public that our reliance on imported oil is growing, making the U.S. and the world increasingly dependent on the unstable nations of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. At the same time, the hearings convinced many in Washington that a greater reliance on renewable fuels like ethanol could have major energy security, air quality and rural development benefits.

As we look to the future, major new scientific and technical breakthroughs are making ethanol more economical. As a result of the Biomass Research and Development Act, federal agencies are now coordinating research activities focused on making ethanol out of virtually any plant in the world. New biocatalysts--genetically engineered enzymes, yeasts, and bacteria--are reducing the cost of so- called cellulosic ethanol to the point where petroleum products may one day face vigorous competition.

The legislation we are introducing today will build on these efforts by offering an incentive to producers of cellulosic ethanol. Like our previous proposals, this bill gives a special credit to users of cellulosic ethanol for the purpose of fulfilling requirements of the renewable fuels standard.

This legislation will go far toward strengthening our national security, improving our rural communities, protecting our natural environment and, ultimately, substituting carbohydrates for hydrocarbons.

Thank you for joining me in supporting ethanol, a domestic form of clean, renewable energy.