Mr. Speaker, it's been more than 2 years now since the world saw the infamous photographs showing prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib. To date, mostly junior enlisted personnel have been tried and prosecuted for various offenses related to…
Mr. Speaker, it's been more than 2 years now since the world saw the infamous photographs showing prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib. To date, mostly junior enlisted personnel have been tried and prosecuted for various offenses related to detainee abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan. These individuals did not commit these acts in a vacuum; senior leaders allowed this abuse--and in several cases, deaths--to occur on their watch. That's not simply my opinion. It's the judgment of men like retired Rear Admiral John D. Hutson, a former senior Navy Judge Advocate General officer who has said ``One such incident would be an isolated transgression; two would be a serious problem; a dozen of them is policy.''
Admiral Hutson and other senior former officers offered those kinds of comments, and their endorsement, for a report issued earlier this year by Human Rights First entitled Command's Responsibility: Detainee Deaths in U.S. Custody in Iraq and Afghanistan. I strongly encourage my colleagues to take the time to read at least the executive summary of this meticulously documented 82-page report. You can find this report on the web at: http://www.humanrightsfirstinfo/pdf/06221-etn-hrf-dic- rep-web.pdf
I would also recommend that my colleagues familiarize themselves with Human Rights First 2004 report, Getting to Ground Truth, which formed the foundation of their work on the detainee abuse issue. That report can be found on the Human Rights First website at: http:// www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/PDF/detainees/ Getting_to_Ground_Truth_0908.04.pdf
Let me take a moment to share with you some of the key findings from Command's Responsibility, which I am also including for the Record. The report documents 98 detainee deaths in U.S. custody. Of those 98 deaths, 45 are suspected or confirmed homicides. Thirty-four deaths were classified as homicides under the U.S. military's own definition. Human Rights First found 11 additional cases where the facts suggest that deaths were the result of physical abuse or the harsh conditions of detention. In 48 cases--close to half of all the cases--the cause of death remains officially undetermined or unannounced. At least 8 detainees, and possibly as many as 12, were tortured to death. To date, only 12 deaths have resulted in any kind of punishment, and the highest punishment for a torture-related death has been 5 months confinement.
Most tellingly, no civilian official or officer above the rank of colonel responsible for interrogation and detention policies or practices has been charged in connection with any death of a detainee in U.S. custody, including the deaths of detainees by torture or abuse.
As retired Army Brigadier General David Irvine noted in the Human Rights First report, ``What is unquestionably broken is the fundamental principle of command accountability, and that starts at the very top. The Army exists not just to win America's wars, but to defend America's values. The policy and practice of torture without accountability has jeopardized both.''
I whole-heartedly agree, which is why last June I joined over 170 of my colleagues in cosponsoring HR 3003, which would establish an independent Commission on the Investigation of Detainee Abuses to conduct a full, complete, independent, and impartial investigation of the abuses of detainees in connection with Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, or any operation within the wider war against Al Qaeda. The Commission would be charged with determining: (1) the extent of the abuses; (2) why the abuses occurred; and (3) who is responsible, and to provide recommendations for corrective action.
This Commission is necessary because the work of uncovering all of the facts in these cases has yet to be done. This Commission must also help Congress determine why no flag-rank officers have been held accountable for the deaths and abuse that occurred on their watch. If we are to avoid future cases of abuse and rebuild our reputation as a nation that lives by the rule of law, we must air the full facts about how aggressive interrogation techniques resulted in serious injury or death for dozens of detainees in our custody.
Mr. Speaker, the detainee abuse scandal has done grievous harm to our moral standing in the world, and given our terrorist enemies a powerful recruiting tool. We cannot allow it to happen again. I urge the House leadership to bring H.R. 3003 to floor for an immediate vote. Congress has allowed too much time to pass already; we need answers, and we need to hold senior civilian and military leaders accountable for this sorry episode.
Finally, I commend Human Rights First for their unflagging commitment to preserving and protecting human rights, for the high quality of their work on these issues, and for holding our Government and its representatives accountable in the court of public opinion on this critically important issue.
[From Command's Responsibility]
I. Introduction
``Do I believe that [abuse] may have hurt us in winning the
hearts and minds of Muslims around the world? Yes, and I do
regret that. But one of the ways we address that is to show
the world that we don't just talk about Geneva, we enforce
Geneva. . . . [T]hat's why you have these military court-
martials; that's why you have these administrative penalties
imposed upon those responsible because we want to find out
what happened so it doesn't happen again. And if someone has
done something wrong, they're going to be held
accountable.''--U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales,
Confirmation Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
January 6, 2005.
``Basically [an August 30, 2003 memo] said that as far as
they [senior commanders] knew there were no ROE [Rules of
Engagement] for interrogations. They were still struggling
with the definition for a detainee. It also said that
commanders were tired of us taking casualties and they [told
interrogators they] wanted the gloves to come
off. . . . Other than a memo saying that they were to be
considered `unprivileged combatants' we received no guidance
from them [on the status of detainees].''-- Chief Warrant
Officer Lewis Welshofer, Testifying during his Court Martial
for Death of Iraqi General Abed Hamed Mowhoush, January 19,
2006.
Since August 2002, nearly 100 detainees have died while in
the hands of U.S. officials in the global ``war on terror.''
According to the U.S. military's own classifications, 34 of
these cases are suspected or confirmed homicides; Human
Rights First has identified another 11 in which the facts
suggest death as a result of physical abuse or harsh
conditions of detention. In close to half the deaths Human
Rights First surveyed, the cause of death remains officially
undetermined or unannounced. Overall, eight people in U.S.
custody were tortured to death.
Despite these numbers, four years since the first known
death in U.S. custody, only 12 detainee deaths have resulted
in punishment of any kind for any U.S. official. Of the 34
homicide cases so far identified by the military,
investigators recommended criminal charges in fewer than two
thirds, and charges were actually brought (based on decisions
made by command) in less than half. While the CIA has been
implicated in several deaths, not one CIA agent has faced a
criminal charge. Crucially, among the worst cases in this
list--those of detainees tortured to death--only half have
resulted in punishment; the steepest sentence for anyone
involved in a torture-related death: five months in jail.
It is difficult to assess the systemic adequacy of
punishment when so few have been punished, and when the
deliberations of juries and commanders are largely unknown.
Nonetheless, two patterns clearly emerge: (1) because of
investigative and evidentiary failures, accountability for
wrongdoing has been limited at best, and almost non-existent
for command; and (2) commanders have played a key role in
undermining chances for full accountability. In dozens of
cases documented here, grossly inadequate reporting,
investigation, and follow-through have left no one at all
responsible for homicides and other unexplained deaths.
Commanders have failed both to provide troops clear
guidance, and to take crimes seriously by insisting on
vigorous investigations. And command responsibility
itself--the law that requires commanders to be held liable
for the unlawful acts of their subordinates about which
they knew or should have known--has been all but
forgotten.
The failure to deal adequately with these cases has opened
a serious accountability gap for the U.S. military and
intelligence community, and has produced a credibility gap
for the United States--between policies the leadership says
it respects on paper, and
behavior it actually allows in practice. As long as the
accountability gap exists, there will be little incentive for
military command to correct bad behavior, or for civilian
leadership to adopt policies that follow the law. As long as
that gap exists, the problem of torture and abuse will
remain.
This report examines how cases of deaths in custody have
been handled. It is about how and why this ``accountability
gap'' between U.S. policy and practice has come to exist. And
it is about why ensuring that officials up and down the chain
of command bear responsibility for detainee mistreatment
should be a top priority for the United States.
The Cases to Date
The cases behind these numbers have names and faces. This
report describes more than 20 cases in detail, to illustrate
both the failures in investigation and in accountability.
Among the cases is that of Manadel al-Jamadi, whose death
became public during the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal
when photographs depicting prison guards giving the thumbs-up
over his body were released; to date, no U.S. military or
intelligence official has been punished criminally in
connection with Jamadi's death.
The cases also include that of Abed Hamed Mowhoush, a
former Iraqi general beaten over days by U.S. Army, CIA and
other non-military forces, stuffed into a sleeping bag,
wrapped with electrical cord, and suffocated to death. In the
recently concluded trial of a low-level military officer
charged in Mowhoush's death, the officer received a written
reprimand, a fine, and 60 days with his movements limited to
his work, home, and church.
And they include cases like that of Nagem Sadoon Hatab, in
which investigative failures have made accountability
impossible. Hatab, a 52-year-old Iraqi, was killed while in
U.S. custody at a holding camp close to Nasiriyah. Although a
U.S. Army medical examiner found that Hatab had died of
strangulation, the evidence that would have been required to
secure accountability for his death--Hatab's body--was
rendered unusable in court. Hatab's internal organs were left
exposed on an airport tarmac for hours; in the blistering
Baghdad heat, the organs were destroyed; the throat bone that
would have supported the Army medical examiner's findings of
strangulation was never found.
Although policing crimes in wartime is always challenging,
government investigations into deaths in custody since 2002
have been unacceptable. The cases discussed in this report
include incidents where deaths went unreported, witnesses
were never interviewed, evidence was lost or mishandled, and
record-keeping was scattershot. They also include
investigations that were cut short as a result of decisions
by commanders--who are given the authority to decide whether
and to what extent to pursue an investigation--to rely on
incomplete inquiries, or to discharge a suspect before an
investigation can be completed. Given the extent of the non-
reporting, under-reporting, and lax record keeping to date,
it is likely that the statistics reported here, if anything,
under-count the number of deaths.
Among our key findings:
Commanders have failed to report deaths of detainees in the
custody of their command, reported the deaths only after a
period of days and sometimes weeks, or actively interfered in
efforts to pursue investigations;
Investigators have failed to interview key witnesses,
collect useable evidence, or maintain evidence that could be
used for any subsequent prosecution;
Record keeping has been inadequate, further undermining
chances for effective investigation or appropriate
prosecution;
Overlapping criminal and administrative investigations have
compromised chances for accountability;
Overbroad classification of information and other
investigation restrictions have left CIA and Special Forces
essentially immune from accountability;
Agencies have failed to disclose critical information,
including the cause or circumstance of death, in close to
half the cases examined;
Effective punishment has been too little and too late.
Closing the Accountability Gap
The military has taken some steps toward correcting the
failings identified here. Under public pressure following the
release of the Abu Ghraib photographs in 2004, the Army
reopened over a dozen investigations into deaths in custody
and conducted multiple investigation reviews; many of these
identified serious flaws. The Defense Department also
``clarified'' some existing rules, reminding commanders that
they were required to report ``immediately'' the death of a
detainee to service criminal investigators, and barring
release of a body without written authorization from the
relevant investigation agency or the Armed Forces Medical
Examiner. It also made the performance of an autopsy the
norm, with exceptions made only by the Armed Forces Medical
Examiner. And the Defense Department says that it is now
providing pre-deployment training on the Geneva Conventions
and rules of engagement to all new units to be stationed in
Iraq and responsible for guarding and processing detainees.
But these reforms are only first steps. They have not
addressed systemic flaws in the investigation of detainee
deaths, or in the prosecution and punishment of those
responsible for wrongdoing. Most important, they have not
addressed the role of those leaders who have emerged as a
pivotal part of the problem--military and civilian command.
Commanders are the only line between troops in the field who
need clear, usable rules, and policy-makers who have provided
broad instructions since 2002 that have been at worst
unlawful and at best unclear. Under today's military justice
system, commanders also have broad discretion to insist that
investigations into wrongdoing be pursued, and that charges,
when appropriate, be brought. And commanders have a historic,
legal, and ethical duty to take responsibility for the acts
of their subordinates. As the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized since World War II, commanders are responsible for
the acts of their subordinates if they knew or should have
known unlawful activity was underway, and yet did nothing to
correct or stop it. That doctrine of command responsibility
has yet to be invoked in a single prosecution arising out of
the ``war on terror.''
Closing this accountability gap will require, at a minimum,
a zero-tolerance approach to commanders who fail to take
steps to provide clear guidance, and who allow unlawful
conduct to persist on their watch. Zero tolerance includes at
least this:
First, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, should move
immediately to fully implement the ban on cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment passed overwhelmingly by the U.S.
Congress and signed into law on December 30, 2005. Full
implementation requires that the President clarify his
commitment to abide by the ban (which was called into
question by the President's statement signing the bill into
law). It also requires the President to instruct all relevant
military and intelligence agencies involved in detention and
interrogation operations to review and revise internal rules
and legal guidance to make sure they are in line with the
statutory mandate.
Second, the President, the U.S. military, and relevant
intelligence agencies should take immediate steps to make
clear that all acts of torture and abuse are taken
seriously--not from the moment a crime becomes public, but
from the moment the United States sends troops and agents
into the field. The President should issue regular reminders
to command that abuse will not be tolerated, and commanders
should regularly give troops the same, serious message.
Relevant agencies should welcome independent oversight--by
Congress and the American people--by establishing a
centralized, up-to-date, and publicly available collection of
information about the status of investigations and
prosecutions in torture and abuse cases (including trial
transcripts, documents, and evidence presented), and all
incidents of abuse. And the Defense and Justice Departments
should move forward promptly with long-pending actions
against those involved in cases of wrongful detainee death or
abuse.
Third, the U.S. military should make good on the obligation
of command responsibility by developing, in consultation with
congressional, military justice, human rights, and other
advisors, a public plan for holding all those who engage in
wrongdoing accountable. Such a plan might include the
implementation of a single, high-level convening authority
across the service branches for allegations of detainee
torture and abuse. Such a convening authority would review
and make decisions about whom to hold responsible; bring
uniformity, certainty, and more independent oversight to the
process of discipline and punishment; and make punishing
commanders themselves more likely.
Finally, Congress should at long last establish an
independent, bipartisan commission to review the scope of
U.S. detention and interrogation operations worldwide in the
``war on terror.'' Such a commission could investigate and
identify the systemic causes of failures that lead to
torture, abuse, and wrongful death, and chart a detailed and
specific path going forward to make sure those mistakes never
happen again. The proposal for a commission has been endorsed
by a wide range of distinguished Americans from Republican
and Democratic members of Congress to former presidents to
leaders in the U.S. military. We urge Congress to act without
further delay.
This report underscores what a growing number of Americans
have come to understand. As a distinguished group of retired
generals and admirals put it in a September 2004 letter to
the President: ``Understanding what has gone wrong and what
can be done to avoid systemic failure in the future is
essential not only to ensure that those who may be
responsible are held accountable for any wrongdoing, but also
to ensure that the effectiveness of the U.S. military and
intelligence operations is not compromised by an atmosphere
of permissiveness, ambiguity, or cofusion. This is
fundamentally a command responsibility.'' It is the
responsibility of American leadership.