Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, I rise to comment on the controversy surrounding the intelligence community's assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I rise to comment on the controversy surrounding the intelligence community's assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities in the months leading up to the military action in Iraq.
It has been suggested that the intelligence community failed policymakers by presenting a picture of Iraq's WMD capacities that appears to have been far more advanced than the reality on the ground. It has been suggested that, as we have all heard, certain pieces of information were presented as certainties when, in reality, the accuracy of the information was very much in dispute among experts within the intelligence community.
I made a concerted effort to go to every briefing that was offered, and I think I largely succeeded, or maybe had entirely succeeded. I went to briefings for all Members, and I also went, of course, to the special briefings that were held for members of the Foreign Relations Committee. I am not a member of the Intelligence Committee and perhaps that committee had access to information dramatically different from what was put before the rest of us.
What I recall is that the CIA representatives who briefed us were careful and their statements were qualified. As CIA Director George Tenet recently indicated, it was made clear disagreements existed about how to interpret some pieces of information.
What I remember about the CIA is that they played it straight. I wish I could say the same about the political rhetoric that some in the administration used to characterize the content of those briefings.
Of course, I am certainly not saying the CIA is perfect or that the U.S. intelligence community is perfect. No one who reviewed the joint Intelligence Committee's report on 9/11 would make such a claim. And I am not asserting that all of the CIA's information and analysis presented in the lead-up to the Iraq war was correct. But what I am saying is, in the many briefings I attended I simply saw no evidence-- no evidence--to support the accusations that the CIA was trying to spin the facts or that they were trying to lead us in one direction or another.
My sense was that they were professionals, and I remember being very grateful for their thorough and candid presentations. In fact, in those briefings, they didn't give us easy answers, and that made our decisions tougher. But the people expect us to make tough decisions.
Time and again, I came away from the briefing room concerned about the unanswered questions related to Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capacities. But I also came away each time with the conclusion that we had no evidence of any imminent threat. Indeed, Director Tenet acknowledged that the CIA never characterized Iraq's WMD programs as an imminent threat when Mr. Tenet made his remarks last week.
When the President of the United States called Iraq ``a threat of unique urgency,'' that sure sounded a lot like imminent to many ears. When senior officials, speaking about Iraq, told us they did not want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud, that sure sounded like an imminent threat of nuclear attack to most Americans.
Yet just last week, CIA Director Tenet reminded the country the agency made two judgments that are too often overlooked today. They said:
Saddam did not have a nuclear weapon and probably would
have been unable to make one until 2007 to 2009.
Of course, that is a serious issue certainly but not an imminent threat.
The fact that the briefings we received did not present a picture of an imminent threat certainly did not mean there was no cause for concern or that the right course of action would have been to do nothing. Those who claim the only choices before us were rushing to war or being utterly complacent are quite simply misleading the American people.
I had long supported regime change in Iraq, and I am pleased that Saddam Hussein's regime has fallen. But the facts did not suggest that we had to invade Iraq in March of 2003. That means we could have had more time to build a solid international coalition, to combat some of the most damaging misperceptions of American motives and intentions, and more time to put in place a plan of action that would address our security interests without leaving American troops and American taxpayers holding the bag at the end of the day, bogged down in a risky occupation and mortgaging our children's future to pay for it.
Director Tenet said last week: To understand a difficult topic like Iraq takes patience and care. He is right. The same is true of understanding this debate and this controversy. That is why it is so important to discuss these issues carefully and responsibly. It is important because the stakes are so very high and because the public, especially our men and women in uniform and their families, who take tremendous risks and make tremendous sacrifices to serve this country, has every right to know what happened, what the facts were, what we got right and what we got wrong.
One of the difficulties for those of us who attend classified briefings, of course, is that we have an obligation to protect the content of those briefings. So we are limited in what we can say publicly. We are left to generalize and we run the risk of characterizing the same briefings in very different ways, leading us to debates about one person's interpretation versus another's. For this reason, an independent commission is desperately needed.
I am glad the President has agreed to establish a commission to examine our prewar intelligence. But I am concerned about the specifics of the commission's mandate. It is charged with examining the intelligence community's capacity to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers relating to the design, development, manufacture and acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use or use of WMD, related means of delivery, and other related threats of the 21st century. All of this, of course, is useful.
In the wake of the horror of September 11, 2001, we must make every effort to ensure that America's intelligence services are as reliable and effective and accountable as they possibly can be. As I have indicated, I believe a large part of our problem in the runup to the war in Iraq was a problem of how intelligence was used, how it was invoked, sometimes out of context, and how in some cases it was used in powerful and often frightening rhetoric aimed at painting a much more conclusive picture than the actual intelligence revealed.
Intelligence, as all data, can be manipulated. I am concerned about the appearance of a concerted effort to interpret information to justify a seemingly predetermined course of action and to too easily disregard information that could not be used for this purpose. I think such an approach serves no one. I think it actually diminishes American power. I think it risks making this country far less secure.
So we must investigate matters such as the activities of the Office of Special Plans at the Pentagon, which seems to have been charged with sifting through information to assemble only those pieces that bolstered the case for going to war.
We must also address the way that intelligence was alluded to in public settings, in ways that painted a much more decisive picture than actually existed. Obviously, not all Americans could be in the briefing room, but all Americans hear the public debate.
Those of us who receive and act on classified briefings have a vitally important responsibility to ensure that we never abuse their trust. I believe we need to make sure that in our efforts to review intelligence-gathering capacities and analysis capacities we do not fail to take a hard look at how policymakers employ intelligence in public remarks. Our words and our characterizations matter. The context that it is or is not provided matters. Even now some would insist that Iraq was a threat to America because even if Saddam Hussein did not have WMD, he had the capacity to make a weapon. But chemical or biological weapons could be produced in dual-use facilities in almost every country that has any significant domestic, pharmaceutical, or chemical manufacturing capacity.
This is a serious issue to be sure, but it does not make the case for the threat of unique urgency a good case. It does not make for a threat of unique urgency directed at the American people.
Finally, I propose that we need to take a look at how people responded and prepared for things we were warned about in briefings about Iraq, some of which then became public knowledge. Given what we all heard in the briefing room about the possibility that Iraq continued to possess biological and chemical weapons stockpiles and given the administration's clear belief that such stockpiles existed, why was there no better policy planning and execution when it came to rounding up these things?
Former chief weapons inspector David Kay has suggested that we may just all have to live with, as he called it, an unresolved ambiguity about what happened, that he traces to the failure on April 9 to establish immediate physical security in Iraq.
The looting that ensued has introduced a host of alarming unknowns into our consideration of what might have happened to the materiel that may or may not have existed in the first place and, quite frankly, any assertion that the United States would not have anticipated this looting has no credibility whatsoever. From think tanks to military planners to nongovernmental organizations, there were multiple, consistent, and high-level warnings about the risks of chaos and looting in the wake of the regime's fall.
There were plenty of questions about this issue which were never satisfactorily answered in the lead-up to war. In fact, I spent over 6 months, primarily in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, repeatedly asking whatever administration witness I could the same important questions. For example, I remember asking Secretary Powell in 2002: Are you aware of any significant planning for securing weapons of mass destruction sites in Iraq in the event of a military invasion if the Government would be toppled and some degree of chaos were to rein for some period? Is there not a very real risk that WMD and the means to make them will be taken out of the country or sold off to exactly the kind of nonstate actors that the United States is worried about? Do we know enough about where WMD sites are to be confident in our ability to secure them, I asked the Secretary of State?
Secretary Powell could provide no details. He simply assured me that our military planners were making this issue their highest priority. Those military planners never provided any details, either.
In the end, we are left with video footage of the unchecked looting of the country, with unanswered questions, with David Kay's unresolved ambiguity. So we have a case of inadequate follow-up on a vitally important issue presented to us by the intelligence community and that, too, is something we need to review and address in the interest of national security.
We have a lot of work to do. Some of that certainly does involve reforms of the intelligence community. I believe our biggest problems did not come in the briefing room. In the interest of our national security, in the interest of protecting the public's trust in Government, in the interest of this country's global prestige and power to persuade, we have to avoid scapegoating tactics. We have to face some hard truths about the process and the rhetoric that led this country into Iraq in March 2003.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Missouri for his remarks. Perhaps they were intended as response to my remarks or perhaps they were general remarks, but my remarks have to do with the fact there is a perception in this country that somehow the briefings the CIA gave us with regard to Iraq were distorted or inappropriate or oversold the case for the war.
My purpose here was to indicate that is not the way I saw it. I was in those briefings. As I have indicated, I felt the CIA was very measured and careful in its presentation.
The Senator from Missouri can talk as much as he wants about whether Iraq worked or not, and what the consequences are. But there are real consequences when Members of both parties decide to tell the public the misinformation or the problems were the fault of the CIA.
I think that is dangerous for the CIA. I think it is dangerous for our country.
I think it is dangerous for how we are perceived in the world.
Some of the members of the other party--including the administration, frankly--and some of the members of my own party are pointing their fingers at what we heard in the briefings. I want everyone to know that I went to the briefings. I did not hear a compelling case for the war to be conducted at that time.
Regardless of what has happened since, I would be happy to debate at any point whether it was the right thing to do and whether how we did it was the right thing to do. Regardless of all that, the point is, as one Senator who went to those briefings and did not hear the case made, I give the CIA credit for being measured and careful. And we should thank Mr. Tenet for his leadership.
I yield the floor.