Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 3697. Gang members and serious criminals should not be granted admission to the United States. That is not a controversial position. I think…
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 3697. Gang members and serious criminals should not be granted admission to the United States. That is not a controversial position. I think almost every Member of Congress, Democrat or Republican, agrees with that. It is our highest priority to protect the safety of the American people. That is a duty I think we all take seriously, but this bill does something other than that.
The title of the bill is the Criminal Alien Gang Member Removal Act, and, as we have seen in the past, there are times when the name of a bill is not always reflected in the actual proposed language of the statute, and that is true in this case.
First, section 2(a) of the bill defines criminal gang as ``an ongoing group, club, organization, or association of five or more persons that has as one of its primary purposes the commission of one or more'' of a wide range of offenses. This may seem reasonable until you look at the offenses listed.
These offenses could sweep in many people that no reasonable person would think of as a gang member--for example, one of the offenses relates to the harboring of undocumented immigrants. This statute includes people who give shelter to, transport, or provide other kinds of aid to undocumented immigrants. That means that,
under this bill, a religious organization that aids undocumented immigrants could be a criminal gang.
This isn't just theoretical. During the 1980s, members of the faith community were repeatedly criminally prosecuted for providing transportation to undocumented immigrants. In one case, the FBI even infiltrated a Bible study group to learn about the group's plan to support undocumented immigrants. Under this bill, DHS would have expanded authority to go after all such groups as criminal gangs. In one fell swoop, it could turn nuns into gang members.
The bill also refers to felony drug offense, which would include the repeated possession of marijuana. In California, my State, along with several other States, voters decided to decriminalize marijuana--first, for medical uses, then later for broader uses. Under this bill, a group that regularly gets together to use marijuana that is legal under State law would still be committing a felony under Federal law and would be a criminal gang. That could include groups of people who are using marijuana for medicinal purposes to treat epilepsy or cancer who are taking marijuana consistent with State law.
Second, the bill authorizes DHS to deny admission or to deport any immigrant, including one who has no criminal history or gang affiliation whatsoever, so long as DHS merely believes the person is associated with such a group.
Sections 2(b) and 2(c) of the bill expressly authorize DHS officers and immigration judges to deport an immigrant on nothing more than a reason to believe that the individual has been a member of a gang or has participated in the activities of a gang as defined under these rather broad provisions. There is no need for conviction or even an arrest. All DHS needs is a belief that the individual has assisted any group of five or more people that DHS believes has committed one of these long list of offenses.
This belief could be as minimal as the color of a person's shirt, the neighborhood they live in, or the individuals in their family. This is not just unreasonable, it is probably unconstitutional. Chairman Goodlatte had a self-actualizing amendment when the rule was adopted to change the evidentiary standard. I think it recognizes the problem with the bill.
The amendment really doesn't cure the problem with the breadth of the criminal gang definition, and it doesn't change the standard that applies to people seeking admission to the country, including those who are seeking to reunite with U.S. citizen spouses, parents, and children.
Just this week, I met with actual police officers who asked me to do what I could to defeat this unwise bill. They know, because they are out on the front lines, that gangs are a real problem, and they told me that bills like this, which could turn religious individuals, nuns, cancer victims into targets, is just going to get in their way as police officers.
If we want to keep America safe and admit immigrants who do not have a felony record, I would suggest that we consider the bipartisan Dream Act, H.R. 3440. This bill would provide a path to legal permanent residence for 800,000 young people who were raised in America, who consider this to be their home, who represent the very best of our country.
Instead of debating whether we should allow ICE officers to target religious workers, we should focus on what really makes this country great.
I would like to note that there has been much discussion about the drafting of this bill, and at the Rules Committee just last night, Republicans defended the bill by asserting that the broad provisions would not be abused by ICE officers. Even if they could target the nuns, they wouldn't do that. Even if they could target the cancer victims or the teenagers smoking marijuana after school as gang members, they wouldn't do that.
Now, I am not suggesting that the teenagers smoking marijuana after school is a good thing. But it is not MS-13. And that is what we are trying to make a distinction here between, a gang abatement bill and garden-variety activity that we may not like.
One really very good and very thoughtful Member on the other side of the aisle suggested that, if there is a problem with the bill, we will just come back and fix it. Here is why that is a problem: We know that when we draft something in a poor manner, it often goes on to be enforced and we never get around to fixing it.
I will give an example. We passed years ago, and I objected at the time--Henry Hyde was chairman of the committee--a provision that barred people from gaining status if they provided material support to terrorists.
Well, that sounds like a good idea, but what does it mean?
It turns out that material support--which was never qualified to include support given under duress or given in the ordinary course of a commercial activity--has now been used to bar people who are not terrorists, who didn't give material support.
I will give you an example. A group of women called the Tortilla Terrorists are women who were threatened with their lives and made tortillas because they were threatened with death by guerrilla actors. Now, they were denied asylum because of the tortillas, hence the name the Tortilla Terrorists.
I think most of us would agree that is not terrorism. Yet, we drafted the bill in such a way that the Department felt that they had to enforce it in that way, and we have never gone back to it.
So to think that somehow if we write a law poorly, it is going to be fixed in the administration, that is just wrong. We should step back from this. We should work together. This was just introduced last week.
Now, I know the SAFE Act had hearings years ago, but I think we would be better off if we sat down together, if we reasoned together, if we worked through the defects in this draft, and came up with a bill that really targeted MS-13 members, something that we could all support and that well-served our country.
I will just say that Sister Simone Campbell, one of the leading nuns in America, explained her opposition to this bill. She said:
The bill's harboring provisions under INA 274 are so
sweeping that religious workers who provide shelter,
transportation, or support to undocumented immigrants could
be found liable of criminal activity. This statute has been
used against religious workers in the past, and the bill
tries to make it a weapon for the future.
Let's listen to the nuns like we did in school, and step back, redraft this bill, and oppose this poorly crafted measure today.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), my colleague on the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. Speaker, I would just note that this bill was indeed part of the Davis-Oliver Act which did go through the Judiciary Committee. But that bill was over 200 pages long. It had many problems. It was impossible to address all the problems. We would be there for a month if we had gone through line by line. It was not a good process. If it had been perfect, I would note that Chairman Goodlatte would not have had to have his amendment to remove the reason-to-believe standard that was in the bill that was part of the Davis-Oliver Act.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), who is my colleague on the Judiciary Committee.
Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I include in the Record an analysis entitled: ``Harboring: Overview of the Law,'' prepared by the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc.
[From the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc.]
Harboring: Overview of the Law
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) prohibits
individuals from concealing, shielding, or harboring
unauthorized individuals who come into and remain in the
United States. Under the law it is a criminal offense
punishable by a fine or imprisonment for any person who:
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact than an alien
has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in
violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from
detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from
detection, such alien in any place, including any building or
any means of transportation. INA Sec. 274(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8
U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) [hereinafter the ``harboring
provision'' or ``Section 1324 (a)''].
The Harboring Prohibition Applies to Everyone
The harboring prohibition is not restricted to those
individuals who are in the business of smuggling undocumented
immigrants into the United States or who employ undocumented
immigrants in sweatshop-like conditions. As interpreted by
the courts, harboring can apply to any person who knowingly
harbors an undocumented immigrant. See, e.g., United States
v. Shum, 496 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Zheng, 306 F.3d 1080, 1085 (11th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538
U.S. 925 (2003); United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 573-74
(2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d
1067, 1073 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cantu, 557 F.2d
1173, 1180 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063
(1978).
What Are the Elements of Harboring?
To establish a violation of the harboring provision, the
government must prove the following in most jurisdictions
``(1) the alien entered or remained in the United States in
violation of the law, (2) the defendant concealed, harbored,
or sheltered the alien in the United States, (3) the
defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that the alien
entered or remained in the United States in violation of the
law, and (4) the defendant's conduct tended to substantially
facilitate the alien remaining in the United States
illegally.'' Shum, 496 F.3d at 391-392 (quoting United States
v. De Jesus-Batres, 410 F 3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 2005), cert
denied, 546 U.S. 1097 (2006)). The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit has rejected the fourth element asserting
that the phrase ``conduct tending substantially to
facilitate'' is a judicial addition to the statute that is
unnecessary for a conviction because the statute requires no
specific degree of assistance. United States v. Xiang Hui Ye,
588 F.3d 411, 415-416 (7th Cir. 2009).
What Actions Constitute Harboring?
Although Congress passed legislation to prohibit and punish
the ``harboring'' of undocumented individuals, it never
defined the term. The work of defining what constitutes
``harboring'' has been left to the courts. As shown below,
the federal courts have not settled on one uniform
definition, but rather many of the circuit courts have
adopted their own definition of ``harboring.''
Harboring is conduct that substantially facilitates an
immigrant's remaining in the U.S. illegally and that prevents
the authorities from detecting the individual's unlawful
presence (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit)
Harboring includes affirmative conduct such as providing
shelter, transportation, direction about how to obtain false
documentation, or warnings about impending investigations
that facilitates a person's continuing illegal presence in
the United States. (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit)
Harboring is conduct tending to substantially facilitate an
immigrant's remaining in the U.S. illegally (U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit)
Harboring is conduct that clandestinely shelters, succors,
and protects improperly admitted immigrants. (U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit)
Harboring is conduct that provides or offers a known
undocumented individual a secure haven, a refuge, a place to
stay in which authorities are unlikely to be seeking him.
(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit)
Harboring is conduct that affords shelter to undocumented
individuals. (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit)
Explanation of Harboring Through Case Law
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
In the influential case, United States v. Lopez, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit went through the
legislative history of the harboring provision and stated
that the term harbor ``was intended to encompass conduct
tending substantially to facilitate an alien's `remaining in
the United States illegally,' provided that the person
charged has knowledge of the immigrant's unlawful status.''
521 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995
(1975).
In this case, Mr. Lopez owned at least six homes in Nassau
County, New York, where he operated safe havens for
undocumented individuals. Mr. Lopez knew that the people
staying in his homes were undocumented. Each person paid Mr.
Lopez $15 per week to live in his houses. In many cases,
people received the address for a particular house before
they left their home countries, and, upon crossing the border
illegally, they proceeded directly to the house. Mr. Lopez
also helped these individuals obtain jobs by completing work
applications and transporting them to and from work. He
arranged sham marriages for many so that they could appear to
be in the U.S. in lawful status. With a warrant, immigration
authorities searched six of Lopez's homes and found twenty-
seven undocumented individuals. He was charged with harboring
illegal immigrants.
Mr. Lopez argued that the mere providing of shelter to
undocumented immigrants does not constitute harboring. Id. at
439. He argued that to constitute harboring the conduct must
be part of the process of smuggling immigrants into the U.S.
or facilitating the immigrants' illegal entry into the U.S.
Id. The circuit court noted that he essentially argued that
to constitute harboring the sheltering would have to be
provided either clandestinely or for the purposes of
sheltering the immigrants from the authorities. Id.
The Second Circuit rejected these arguments. It held that
the statute criminalizes conduct that tends substantially to
facilitate an alien's remaining in the United States
illegally. Id. at 441. The circuit court found that Mr.
Lopez's conduct did just that. It pointed out that Mr. Lopez
had a large number of undocumented immigrants living at his
houses; they obtained the addresses and, upon entering the
U.S., proceeded to those houses; Mr. Lopez provided
transportation for them to and from work; and, he helped
arrange sham marriages. Id. The Second Circuit did not
require that Mr. Lopez provide the shelter clandestinely nor
that he shield the illegal immigrants from detection by
immigration authorities Id.
The case of United States v. Kim also is instructive on the
meaning of harboring. 193 F.3d 567 (2d Cu 1999). It states
that harboring within the meaning of Section 1324(a)
``encompasses conduct tending substantially to facilitate an
alien's remaining in the U.S. illegally and to prevent
government authorities from detecting [the immigrant's]
unlawful presence.'' Id. at 574. In this case, Mr. Myung Ho
Kim owned and operated a garment-manufacturing business
called ``Sewing Masters'' in New York City. He employed a
number of undocumented workers, including Nancy Fanfar.
During the course of her employment, Mr. Kim instructed Ms.
Fanfar to bring in new papers with a different name that
would indicate that she had work authorization. He instructed
Ms. Fanfar to change her name and remain in his employ a
second time, even while he was being investigated by
immigration authorities.
According to the circuit court, Mr. Kim's actions
constituted harboring, for they were designed to help Ms.
Fanfar remain in his employ and to prevent her continued
presence from being detected by the authorities. Thus, his
conduct substantially facilitated her ability to remain in
the U.S. illegally in prohibition of the harboring provision.
Id. at 574-575.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
The Third Circuit also has considered what conduct
constitutes ``shielding,'' ``harboring,'' and ``concealing''
within the meaning of Section 1324(a). Like the Second
Circuit, it determined that these terms encompass conduct
``tending to substantially facilitate an alien's remaining in
the U.S. illegally'' and [that] prevent[s] government
authorities from detecting the alien's unlawful presence.
``U.S. v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 100 (3d Cir. 2008); see also
Delno-Mocci v. Connolly Props, 672 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir.
2012), U.S. v. Cuevas-Reyes, 572 F.3d 119, 122 (3d Cir.
2009); U.S. v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1003 (3d Cir. 2008).
In United States v. Ozcelik, the defendant knew that the
individual remained in the U.S. illegally and advised him to
``lay low'' and ``stay away'' from the address he had on file
with the government. 527 F.3d at 100. However, Mr. Ozcelik
did not actively attempt to intervene or delay an impending
immigration investigation and the Third Circuit held that
advising an individual without legal status to stay out of
trouble and to keep a low profile does not tend substantially
to facilitate their remaining in the country. Id. at 100-01.
The circuit court reasserted that shielding or harboring a
person without status ordinarily includes affirmative conduct
such as providing shelter, transportation, direction about
how to obtain false documentation, or warnings about
impending investigations that facilitates a person's
continuing illegal presence in the United States. See Id. at
99.
In United States v. Silveus, the Third Circuit held that
cohabitation, along with reasonable control of premises
during an immigration agent's inquiry regarding the
whereabouts of the suspected undocumented individual, does
not constitute harboring without sufficient evidence that a
defendant's conduct substantially facilitated the
individual's remaining in the U.S. illegally and prevented
authorities from detecting his/her unlawful presence. 542
F.3d at 1002-04. In this case, the agent never saw the
suspected undocumented individual, but only heard the
apartment door slam, heard some bushes break, and as he
approached, saw the defendant shut her front door. Id. at
1002. The defendant spoke to the agent through her window and
when asked if anybody had run out of her apartment, she said
``I don't know.'' Id. at 1003. The circuit court determined
that the act of shutting a door as an agent rounded the
corner and her subsequent reply to the agent's question did
not establish ``harboring'' under Section 1324(a) because it
only led to speculation as to the suspect's presence. Id. at
1004.
In United States v. Cuevas-Reyes, the Third Circuit
reaffirmed that shielding an undocumented person includes
affirmative conduct (such as providing shelter,
transportation, direction about how to obtain false
documents, or warnings about impending investigations) that
facilitates the person's continuing illegal presence in the
U.S. 572 F.3d at 122. The circuit court held that the
defendant's actions (taking undocumented people from the U.S.
to the Dominican Republic in his private plane) were
undertaken for the purpose of removing them from the U.S.,
not helping them remain in the U.S. Id. It noted that the
goal of Section 1324 is to prevent undocumented individuals
from entering or remaining illegally in the U.S. by punishing
those that shield or harbor. Id. It asserted that punishing a
defendant for helping individuals without legal status leave
the U.S. would be contrary to that goal. Id.
More recently, the Third Circuit reiterated that
``harboring'' requires some act that obstructs the
government's ability to discover the undocumented person and
that it is highly unlikely that landlords renting apartments
to people lacking lawful status could, without more, satisfy
the court's definition of harboring. Delrio-Mocci, 672 F.3d
at 246 (citing Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 223
(3d Cir 2010)). The circuit court reiterated that ``[r]enting
an apartment in the normal course of business is not in and
of itself conduct that prevents the government from detecting
an alien's presence.'' Id.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit's definition of harboring is broader than
the Second and Third Circuits. It rejects the notion that to
be convicted of harboring a defendant's conduct must be part
of a smuggling operation or involve actions that hide
immigrants from law enforcement authorities. See De Jesus-
Batres, 410 F.3d at 162 (specific intent is not an element of
the offense of harboring). An early Fifth Circuit decision,
U.S. v. Cantu, 557 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1977), remains
informative.
In Cantu, immigration agents visited the restaurant owned
by Mr. Cantu because they received information that he was
employing undocumented workers. The agents wanted to question
the employees. Mr. Cantu refused admission to his restaurant
until they could provide a warrant.
While the immigration authorities waited outside for the
warrant, Mr. Cantu made arrangements with at least two of his
patrons to drive some of his undocumented employees into
town. Mr. Cantu also arranged for his employees to sit in the
restaurant and then leave the restaurant like customers. As
the employees left the restaurant, the immigration agents
approached them and questioned them about their immigration
status. The agents determined their illegal status and
arrested them.
Mr. Cantu argued that, because he did not instruct his
employees to ``hide,'' and because the employees left the
restaurant in full view of the officers, he could not be
charged with shielding immigrants from detection. He also
argued that his actions were not connected to any smuggling
activity. The Fifth Circuit, relying on the Second Circuit's
Lopez decision, rejected these arguments, and determined that
Mr. Cantu's actions--instructing the employees to act like
customers so they could evade arrest--tended to facilitate
the immigrants remaining in the U.S. illegally. Id. at 1180.
In another Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Varkonyi,
645 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1981), the court cited to Lopez to
assert that the harboring statute prohibits ``any conduct
which tends to substantially facilitate an alien's remaining
in the U.S. illegally.'' Id. at 459. Mr. Varkonyi provided a
group of undocumented immigrants with steady employment at
his scrap metal yard six days a week as well as lodging at
his warehouse. On previous occasions, he had instructed and
aided the men in avoiding detection and apprehension. On the
day of their detention, Mr. Varkonyi interfered with Customs
and Border Protection agents' actions by forcibly denying
them entry to his property through physical force.
Here, the circuit court found that Mr. Varkonyi's conduct
went well beyond mere employment and thus constituted
harboring. Id. at 459. In this case, the court pointed out
that Mr. Varkonyi knew of the immigrants' undocumented
status, he had instructed the immigrants on avoiding
detection on a prior occasion; he was providing the
immigrants with employment and lodging, he interfered with
immigration agents to protect the immigrants from
apprehension; and he was partly responsible for the escape of
one of the immigrants from custody. Id. Given these facts,
the circuit court found that Mr. Varkonyi's conduct, both
before and after the detention of the immigrants, was
calculated to facilitate the immigrants remaining in the U.S.
unlawfully. Id. at 460.
In 2007, the Fifth Circuit ruled in another employment
harboring case that ``substantially facilitate'' means to
make an individual's illegal presence in the United States
substantially ``easier or less difficult.'' United States v.
Shum, 496 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). The court noted that Section
1324(a) was enacted to deter employers from hiring
unauthorized individuals and it refused to adopt a narrow
definition of ``substantially facilitate'' that undermines
Congress's purpose. Id.
In this case, Mr. Shum was vice-president of an office-
cleaning company and he employed janitors without legal
status. According to witnesses, he provided false
identifications to the workers to facilitate background
checks so that the workers could clean government office
buildings.
In this legal analysis by the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc., it does point out that religious persons have been prosecuted and convicted for providing sanctuary. Opinions may differ on whether that is a good idea or bad idea, but to say that that is an MS-13 activity, I think we would all agree that is just crazy. That is what this bill would do.
Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Demings), a freshman Member of the House whom we are so fortunate to have. Just last year, as the chief of police, she was on the front line in the fight against gangs.
Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I just want to make a couple of closing comments on this bill.
I think it is a given that every Member of this body wants to do something about gangs. I have gangs in my district. I think I heard Mr. King speak so passionately about the problem in his district. It is a pervasive problem.
The concern is that this bill goes far beyond targeting those gangs. That is why we, with great reluctance, have to say we can't do this. We can't do this.
If we wanted to target just the gangs, we wouldn't have included language that would allow charging people who are not gang members as gang members. We wouldn't have included provisions that the victims of gangs would be denied asylum. Section 2(f) of the bill denies individuals who are suspected of alleged gang membership the opportunity to apply for asylum.
Here is the problem. In certain parts of Central America, you have rampant gang activity. Women and girls are terribly abused. They are beaten, turned into sex slaves, tattooed, and they escape. If that young girl who has been the victim of that violence from gangs comes with the tattoos, the brand that that gang put on her, and if she, as a consequence, is reasonably suspected of being a member of the gang, she can't get asylum. That is not what we want in the fight against MS-13.
The bill is not drafted adequately.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, may I inquire how much time remains on each side?
Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
It has been mentioned that there are terrible activities being undertaken by gang members. I don't think there is any dispute in this body about that. Our obligation is to craft bills that will allow for remedies for that problem in a specific, targeted, and effective way. I think this bill falls far short in that regard.
We had mentioned earlier the great concern that has been expressed to us by religious people across the United States about the provisions relative to harboring. Five nuns on a religious worker visa who help provide sanctuary for an undocumented person is a gang under this bill. They are not MS-13.
We could craft a measure that avoids that outcome while still going after MS-13. We didn't do that. For one thing, we didn't actually sit down, both sides of the aisle, to work together, to reason together, to make that happen.
I would like to note that the smuggling issue is a big problem. We have unanimous agreement on the smuggling issue. We have worked together, actually, with the Wilberforce Act and other acts in a bipartisan way to deal with that. But we didn't bifurcate smuggling from harboring in this bill. That is why the nuns and the Catholic bishops have contacted us asking us not to support this bill.
I would like to note, just finally, that the first obligation that we have is to keep America safe. We fail to do that if we craft language that really is just part of a broad deportation agenda under the guise of an antigang bill. There is great concern that is what has happened here.
One of the elements that is referenced as a predicate for gang activity--the five people who are working together--is that documents are false. A lot of people are highly agitated when undocumented people have false documents. Opinions differ. Almost every undocumented person in the United States who works has a fake ID; otherwise, they can't get a job.
You can agree with that, you can think it is terrible, you can think it is maybe not so terrible. I think most of us would agree it is not MS-13. Why would we craft this in such a way to treat that activity as an MS-13 activity and to blow up all the procedures we have in place to make sure that justice is done?
I hope that Members will vote against this bill. Despite the name, it goes far beyond attacking gangs. It would drift into allowing for the deportation of religious people and others who have done nothing related to gang activity.
I hope that, if this bill is defeated, we can sit down, as we often have on various items and worked collaboratively on patent reform and other issues, and do the same on this. I hope, if this bill is defeated, we will take the opportunity to do that.
I, for one, pledge my best efforts to come up with a measure that is targeted and effective. This bill, unfortunately, is not.
Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
Parliamentary Inquiry