Recognizing the independence of the courts of the United States.

Mr. Speaker, there are few certitudes in these complicated times. Anyone who was not conflicted in the original decision to invade Iraq or who does not see a downside to all courses of action today is not thinking. But I am hard pressed to believe anything except that the case for a steady, measured drawdown of troops in Iraq is compelling. The neocon desire to establish a semi-permanent presence in a divided Muslim country is foolhardy.

It is true that there are circumstances where it is better to fight over there than here at home. Afghanistan is a case in point. But we should not be so naive as to fail to recognize that there are also circumstances where fighting over there can increase the likelihood that conflict will spread to our shores. A decision to prolong unnecessarily our intervention in Iraq could be a case in point, as could a military confrontation with Iran.

There are tipping points in all struggles. The signs are evident that we are close today to a calamity if we do not recalibrate our policies. The irony is that our troops have lost no battles and shown great heroism, but Western occupation is intolerable for Muslims. It is also not the American way. The longer we stay, the greater the prospect that anarchistic acts will multiply and spread, perhaps to our shores.

The issue is no longer, as is so frequently asserted, the need to stay the course. It is to avoid overstaying our presence.

Sometimes it is harder to know how to end a war than to start one. Just as important to think through the ``why and how''' of committing troops to conflict, we must also think through the ``why and how'' of ending an engagement. Timing is a key element of both considerations.

For many Americans, including me, the war in Iraq has been difficult to justify. But all Americans, except perhaps a few who may be partisanly vindictive, should want as positive a result as possible, given the circumstances we now face. The decision to go to war may have been misguided and strategies involved in conducting it mistake-ridden; nonetheless there should be clarity of purpose in ending the conflict, with the goal neither to ``cut and run,'' nor simply to cut losses. At this junction of involvement we should define cogently our purposes and by so doing create a basis both for a viable future for Iraq and for a U.S. disengagement that respects the sacrifices of those who have served so valiantly in our armed forces and those of our coalition allies.

Americans understand that three rationales were given at successive stages for the war. The first involved Iraq's complicity in 9/11; the second was the imminent threat of Iraqi WMD; and the third was the desire to replace the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein with a free, democratic government. The first two arguments have proven frail. The third has some legitimacy, but to many of us it never seemed compelling, particularly in relation to the costs of the conflict.

In any regard, whether or not democracy provided a compelling rationale for starting the war, it offers the most appropriate rationale for ending it. If we do not prepare to leave Iraq on our terms, stating clearly that now that a Constitution has been adopted, elections held, and a government formed, we are prepared to proceed with a comprehensive and orderly draw-down of our troops, we will be viewed as an occupying power lacking credible motivations. When we eventually leave, the other side will claim they forced us out. That is why it is as critical to define the rationale for our disengagement as the reason for going to war. And democracy is the only rationale I know that can be used as a basis for ending our involvement in this conflict with any hope of suggesting a partial measure of success. The key is that we must control and be seen as controlling our own fate.

All Americans should be respectful of the sacrifices of our men and women in uniform. They have been placed in an untenable situation. If they had not been so heroic and in many cases so helpful in rebuilding neighborhoods and schools, the U.S. would face a far more difficult dilemma today.

But we have no choice except to assess whether Osama Bin Laden and his movement have not been given added momentum by our intervention in Iraq, and whether the ideologically advocated policy of establishing long-term bases or one of returning our troops home is likely to be the more effective strategy in prevailing in the world-wide war on terror.

Here, it should not be hard to understand that prolonged occupation of a country which encompasses an area of land where one of the world's oldest civilizations prospered is humiliating to a proud people and those elsewhere who share its great religion. It should also not be hard to understand that the neo-con strategy of establishing a long- term military presence in Iraq with semi-permanent bases raises the risk of retaliatory terrorist attacks at home and abroad.

Indeed, according to the University of Chicago scholar, Robert Pape, in his definitive book on suicide bombers, Dying to Win, the principal reason anarchists choose to wrap themselves in explosives and kill innocent civilians is to register martyred objection to the occupation of countries or territories by the armed forces of Western or other Democratic governments. Suicide bombing, by implication, will exist as long as occupations continue.

In this regard, a note about al Qaeda is in order. Just as neither Iraq with its secular leanings nor any Iraqis were responsible for 9/11, so Saddam Hussein apparently considered Osama Bin Laden as much a rival as a soul brother. It is Western military intervention that has precipitated al Qaeda's rapid growth in Iraq and elsewhere, creating a ``cause celebre'' for its singularly malevolent actions. If American withdrawal policy comes to turn on the question of anarchy--i.e., troops can't be drawn down as long as IEA attacks continue--we place ourselves in a catch-22 and, in effect, hand over decision-making discretion to those who wantonly kill. We allow the radical few to use our presence as the reason for their actions and at the same time cause our involvement to be held hostage to their villainy.

On the other hand, if we proceed with a turn-over of responsibilities to the new, freely elected Iraqi government, Sunni dissidents will confront a critical choice: to pursue the insurgency or join the political process. Pursuing the insurgency would be a risky gamble; if it fails, Sunnis may fall under Shiite domination

for years to come, and the demise of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi makes prospects of expanding influence through terrorist tactics less likely. Joining the political process, on the other hand, would guarantee Sunnis a role in governing the country.

Though the prudential and civilized choice may seem obvious to us, a continued American military presence in Iraq gives Sunni radicals a popular cause--ridding the country of the occupier--for rallying popular sentiment in Iraq and elsewhere and justifying continued violence. Announcing the commencement of an orderly drawdown of our troops, and trumpeting it widely, would rob radicals of this powerful cause, allowing moderate Sunnis to join the government and pursue sectarian interests through the constitutional process.

In the realm of policy timing can often be as important as substance. Just as Senator Dirksen once noted that a billion dollars here and a billion dollars there and pretty soon you're talking about real money, in foreign affairs a week here and a week there can soon add up to a policy dilemma.

It is possible, of course that civil strife will ensue when we withdraw, but this is just as likely to be the case in 2026 as 2006. In any regard, civil union is for the Iraqi people to manage. It's not for American troops to sustain. The authorization this Congress gave to the Executive to use force contemplated the clear prospect of military intervention in Iraq. It did not, however, contemplate prolonged occupation. If this is not understood by the Executive branch, the current overwhelming Iraqi polling sentiment favoring American troop withdrawal will be more than matched by shared American sentiment. And in a democracy no one can be a leader without followers.

The older I get, the more central I consider the human factor to be in international relations. Logic is never totally dominant. No one knows the exact origins of the seven deadly sins, but to the degree human nature is the least changed aspect of the human condition, it is relevant to today's debate to contrast two human foibles: avarice and pride. Let me suggest that avarice, the weakness of business classes, is fundamentally more pragmatic than pride, the weakness of politicians, and pride is fundamentally more dangerous than avarice.

For example, if a bookstore owner were to read two books and strongly prefer one to the other, he might inventory half a dozen of the one he prefers and one of the other. But if his customers buy the one he likes least, he will not reorder the one he likes. He will put it on the discount shelf and re-order the public's choice. His pride isn't hurt. In politics, on the other hand, the tendency is to avoid embarrassment, never acknowledge error. Mistakes are often repeated to avoid political inconsistency.

An anecdote comes to mind. In one of my early terms in Congress I was invited to the Library of Congress to a seminar Henry Kissinger was asked to give on the 1973 Paris Peace Accords. Before going, I perused one of his autobiographical tomes and was struck by a singular paragraph. In December 1968, Kissinger as the National Security Council Advisor-designate met with Richard Nixon, then the President-elect. They agreed, he wrote, that their policy would be to disengage from Vietnam. After Kissinger had delivered his lecture, I asked him about his pre-Presidency strategy talk with Nixon. Why, I inquired, didn't the Nixon administration immediately do what he said they had decided in December 1968, to do? Kissinger looked at me and responded: ``We meant with honor.'' I asked him if honor required escalation. ``Absolutely,'' he replied.

``Honor'' and ``pride'' do not have the same meaning. But in some circumstances they are clearly first cousins.

I mention this incident as a reflection of human nature and the psychology of decision-making. LBJ was too much of a Texan to reverse gear on his own policies; Nixon was too much a product of the Cold War to risk being perceived as less tough than his Democratic predecessor.

All wars evoke analogies to prior conflicts; Vietnam is on everyone's mind. My sense is that references to our Southeast Asian experience are somewhat oblique, but important to ponder. Of particular relevance is the advice of a former Vermont Senator, George Aiken, who suggested we just declare victory and get out of Vietnam. Aiken's advice was rooted in frustration, but wise as it was, represented more spin than reality. Given the strategies then in play, victory wasn't close at hand. Today, on the other hand, despite the escalation of world-wide violence and the precipitation of widespread mistrust of the United States, particularly in Muslim societies, the Administration can point to positive political change in Iraq. An Aiken approach might not be historically compelling, but it would have more currency now than when originally suggested.

In governance, judgment to be good must be timely. If we maintain a heavy presence much longer our president could find himself in a dilemma of the kind Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon came to know too well. Despite the overwhelming nature of our military capacities and the courageous commitment and sacrifice of our armed forces, well- intentioned policies can fail if they are inadequately justified, poorly executed, or pursued too long. The timing and explication of disengagement can be as consequential as the decision to intervene.

This is why clarity of purpose and flexibility of response are so crucial. Hasty withdrawal is problemsome; orderly, philosophically cogent decisions to wind down the military dimension of our presence in Iraq should, however, be our highest national interest priority.

It would be a mistake of historical proportions if respectful relations not only between America and the Moslem world but between America and its traditional allies were to rupture. We are obligated to see that they don't.

In a broader historical and philosophical context, the American intervention in Iraq underscores the need to probe the question of the limits of power of a superpower and the possible anomaly that there are liabilities of power, particularly for a superpower.

Does, for instance, overwhelming military might alone protect us from terrorism, or if wielded unwisely, does it escalate our vulnerability to terrorism?

Likewise, does overwhelming economic power ensure loyalty and buy friendship even from countries most indebted to the United States, or does it inspire resentment?

With each lED explosion and suicide bomb attack it becomes clearer that America and the world community are in a strategic pickle. In an era of anger, of divisions in the world based on economics, on color of skin, on ethnicity, on religious upbringing, on happenstance of family and place of birth, those who have causes--good and bad--have new globalized techniques of being heard and felt. Great leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King appealed to the higher angels of our nature and achieved revolutionary change with non-violence. More mendacious leaders like Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden have sought to impose their wills on others through appeals of hate and reliance on increasingly wanton instruments of oppression.

The policy question Americans must think through is whether great powers may be more effective with policies of restraint rather than intervention. Just as Gandhi and King led non-violent revolutions which have proved more lasting than the barbarism of Stalin and Pol Pot, maintenance and embellishment of the American model of governance may itself be more intrusively revolutionary in oppressed societies than interventionist policies.

Caution and restraint are better models for 21st Century statecraft than naive adventurism.

With this admonition in mind, it is critical that Members of the Executive Branch must understand that how and what they say to justify various policies determines how others respond.

Anyone who ever studied physics may recall that Sir Isaac Newton set forth three fundamental laws, the second of which was that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. A decade ago when the Congress was led by an extraordinary upstart whose first name was Newt, I suggested, at first as a pun, the existence of a fourth ``Newt- onian'' law, this one of social physics: reaction is greater than action. My thoughts at the time related to the partisan bickering within Congress. But with the passage of time I have come to the conclusion that international slights have graver consequences than domestic.

When, for instance, we use words like ``evil,'' reference events like the Crusades, and employ tactics designed expressly to ``shock and awe,'' should we not expect others to think and respond in like or escalated terms, although the methods employed might in the current vogue be described as asymmetric?

This brings me to several broad precepts, one of which is seemingly trite, and others of which are intended to form a theoretical and practical framework for a recalibrated foreign policy.

First, the trite. Every society has a sage who cautions that wise leaders should put themselves in the shoes of their adversaries before reaching self-centered judgments. The profoundest illustration of this comes from literature rather than Clausewitz or Tsun Tsu.

When speaking to constituents of the rationale for and against the Iraq War, I have over the past couple of years referenced a set of books that provides more geo-political wisdom than balance of power strategists: the Alexandria Quartet by Lawrence Durrell.

Set in inter-war Egypt, each of Durrell's four books chronicles the same series of events through the eyes of a different participant. While the events repeat, the stories are profoundly different. The implicit moral is that one set of eyes, one set of interactions, is insufficient to gain a full grasp of what is happening around us. Likewise, in world politics one

country's perspective is not enough. The views of others matter. If we are to manage prudently the affairs of state, we have to use more than just our own eyes, rely on more than just our own experience, and reference more than our own historical circumstance.

The Muslim experience, for instance, gives substantially less weight than the Western experience to the two cataclysmic wars of the 20th century. Despite Lawrence's involvement in Arabia and the battles between Allied forces and Rommel's tanks, the engagements in the Middle East and North Africa were skirmishes compared with the struggles in Europe and the Far East. Not only do Muslims see the 20th century differently from Westerners, but Europeans and Americans have drawn different strategic parallels in the application of common experience to current challenges in the Middle East.

In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, historians and political strategists in Europe rightly concluded that the European alliance system had been too rigid and the assassination of a relatively minor figure, an archduke, should not have precipitated a war of such devastating consequences. Hence European leaders in the 1930's falsely concluded that historical wisdom necessitated initial accommodation with Hitler's adventurism. Too little flexibility caused one war; too little spine led to Munich. In the current context, President Bush sees himself as Churchill rather than Chamberlain, but Europeans see 9/11 as more analogous to the shots fired at Archduke Ferdinand than as a cause for a doctrine of preemption or war with Iraq, a war that could too easily spring into a clash of civilizations.

If we're ever going to have a chance to shape or deter the actions of others, we must understand their reasoning. Failing to understand or respect Muslim culture, for instance, resulted in the greatest intelligence failure of our era. It is, however, not the sole intelligence failure. In one of the greatest judgmental errors of our time, we appear to have attempted to combat the ideological posturing of others by ideologizing our own intelligence. Based on what is known today, policymakers wrongly implied Iraq played a role in the 9/11 attack and not only erred in assessing Saddam Hussein's WMD capacities but put too much faith in a narrow cadre of policymakers who suggested the United States would be welcomed as a liberating rather than conquering or, worse yet, colonizing force in Iraq. Estimates of the costs of war, of the ramifications of our involvement, of the expected reaction of the population and of the likelihood of foreign respect and support were dead wrong.

Now, given the anarchy that has mushroomed in the country, Washington is swept by occupation analogies of World War II. Japan and Germany, it is noted, were occupied for more than five years after hostilities ceased. Hence, many are suggesting, we must be prepared to stay at least this long in Iraq.

I have seldom been more apprehensive about an historical analogy. Japan and Germany were the instigators of war; their citizens understood this. The Muslim population throughout the world does not see it this way. They see the U.S. as the aggressor. Images from Al- Jazeera portray a country under siege. In the Moslem world Iraq looks more like a police-cordoned West Bank than a great and ancient society on the move to a better life. Outsiders are viewed as unwanted intruders acting out of great power self-interest, disrespectful of the culture and values of the country being occupied.

Yet if we take the most difficult geo-strategic issues of the day, it is impressive how we seem to misunderstand the fundamentals of human nature. Publics in many parts of the world are crying out for two aspirations: respect and hope. But our policy response is an entirely parochial one, rooted in the so-called doctrine of American Exceptionalism, which neo-cons do not define as refining a shining City on a Hill but as the right of a superpower to place itself above the legal and institutional restraints applied to others.

In the Neo-con world, values are synonymous with power. The implicit assumption is that American security can be bought and managed alone, without allies, without consideration of contrasting international views or the effect of our policies on others. Treaties like a Comprehensive Test Ban, which every President since Eisenhower has propounded, have been rejected, as have negotiations to strengthen the verification provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention.

Legitimacy is critical for all countries. There may be times and circumstances in which the U.S. national interest requires action without the support of our allies or without United Nations sanction. But the U.N., in particular, is ignored at great risk, especially when the international community is largely at odds with American policies. In this context, recent rhetorical attacks by ideologues in and out of government on the U.N. and other multilateral institutions would appear to particularly ill-serve the American national interest.

The diplomatic issue our government has to come to grips with today is the problem of sequencing. Which comes first--the chicken or the egg--is the most cheerful and abstract philosophical discussion Americans engage in. But which precedes the other--talk or war--is neither cheerful nor abstract. Experience would seem to indicate that while war may not be averted by negotiations, it is less likely to break out if direct dialogue occurs beforehand. In adversarial situations pacific results can seldom be achieved without human interaction. That is why our founders clearly contemplated that the new American Republic would have diplomatic relations with undemocratic states. It is why Prime Minister Rabin, when faulted for talking to Arafat, noted that you don't make peace with friends.

There are few examples in history where empty chair diplomacy has proved effective. Indeed, it is next to impossible to reach mutual accommodation if there is not mutual understanding and a modicum of trust and respect which only personal relationships can provide.

The sequencing dilemma is particularly evident with regard to Iran. Not only should we not fear to negotiate, we must understand that as the stronger party, we can afford to put on the table steps, particularly related to process, that weaker parties are less able to initiate without seeming to capitulate. Unfortunately, we have over a number of Administrations chosen to isolate rather than engage Iran. The question is whether isolationist policies drive a proud people to greater extremes. A stigmatic refusal to interact has characterized our policy toward Iran for a generation and, just as haplessly, Cuba for two.

Some of us have fretted for a long time that a more forthcoming U.S. diplomatic approach might have produced a more stable Persian Gulf. Five years ago Senator Specter and I invited to Capitol Hill the Iranian Ambassador to the U.N. In a long meeting over dinner in a small room on the Senate side of the Capitol, I indicated that while many of us would like to see more direct contact between the U.S. and Iran, normalization of relations was inconceivable unless Iran ceased supporting Hamas and Hezbollah. The ambassador responded with frankness. He chillingly acknowledged Iranian support of Hezbollah but then asserted that such support would cease the moment a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians was reached in a framework acceptable to the Palestinians.

The slight hope implicit in this position may or may not have reflected Tehran's real position at the time, but it is apparent that Ahmedinajad is far more radical today than Khatami was yesterday. While neither has nor had the power of the Ayatollahs, the hardening of Iranian public attitudes toward us and Israel makes questions about the effectiveness of our strategic and psychological isolation of Iran important to ponder.

Last week the administration suggested a possible policy shift. We indicated a willingness to join the Europeans in talks with Iran if Iran first agrees to freeze uranium enrichment activities. This approach might presage a nuanced new American flexibility. But much depends on the Iranian response. Our position appears to be that we will proceed with sanctions and contemplate sterner actions if Iran does not capitulate on the uranium issue, but we will not talk to the government unless it first acquiesces. In other words, the goal of negotiations must be achieved before we will negotiate. Conditional approaches like this are needlessly ``high wire''; nevertheless, in contrast with prior diplomatic intransigence they may represent the best hope yet of yielding a conflict-averting break-through on the NPT issue.

Yet policymakers in Washington appear to underestimate a series of strategic phenomena. Hezbollah is far larger, more sophisticated and experienced in terrorist undertakings than Al Qaeda. A preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities would unleash a level of anarchy in world affairs that would be unprecedented. It would slow but not stop its ability to develop nuclear weapons. It would have little effect on Iran's ability to obtain such weapons elsewhere. The ``loose nuke'' phenomenon is real. A rich country has as good a chance to purchase or steal weapons of mass destruction as it does to develop them on its own. And if that country is attacked as part of an effort to block nuclear development, it has to be assumed it will have new incentives to seek and use such weapons. This prospect could presumably be heightened if bunker busting bombs tipped with small nuclear warheads are employed.

The U.S. thus faces a double catch-22: embargoing Iran hurts our economy more than theirs and attacking militarily the Iranian infrastructure ensures immediate asymmetric violent responses as well as the greater likelihood that weapons of mass destruction once obtained will be used against us and our allies at a later point.

This brings us to the last underestimation by Washington. We may be considering a conflict

of a few weeks duration--one to three weeks of intensive bombing. The Iranians may be thinking of a multi-decade or multi-century response. Western history has known a 30-year war. Eastern peoples carry in their hearts the burden of centuries of crusades, and many Islamic radicals today would like the 21st century to be a continuation of what they consider to be a struggle against Judeo-Christian intervention. Sequencing is a historical as well as diplomatic term of concern.

The Iranians, too, are in a quandary. They recognize that no American President can take the force option completely off the table. They suspect DOD has made extensive contingency plans and they see a President who has little hesitancy to take difficult, unpopular decisions. They know he is in his last term and does not want to pass on strategic problems to his successor. They may reason that a U.S. decision to attack is irrational because it would solidify a radical reaction in Iran, in other Muslim countries, and perhaps even within the U.S., but the government of Iran cannot be certain that the President will conclude that he would be passing on a bigger mess if he attacked rather than engaged.

The Iranian challenge is stickier than many Americans assume. The President may see himself in a position analogous to that of John Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy was dealing with Khrushchev and a Soviet system that had many despotic dimensions. But while communism was manipulated in such a manner as to become a quasi- state religion, it is fundamentally about political and economic rather than spiritual relationships. Iran, on the other hand, is a theocracy in a region where religion and, too frequently, its perversion are dominant themes. Just as the Iranian government must understand the strong will of the President, Washington has to come to grips with the pride and principles of an adversary which is the inheritor of one of the oldest civilizations on earth. Each side may understand the consequences of individual actions, but that does not mean that decisions in one or the other country will not unfold domino-like in a manner that could be catastrophic for all. That is why human interrelationship--diplomacy--is so key.

Let me suggest a corollary to Lord Acton's maxim that power corrupts and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely. The Leach corollary is that military power tempts and excessive power tends to tempt excessively. America's enormous military strength is critical at this stage in history. But while we are obligated to recognize that its maintenance is imperative, we must also realize that its utilization may not fit, and may indeed be counter-productive, in certain strategic settings.

Analogies between all wars exist, but comparisons between Iraq and Vietnam are frail. What must be understood is not that Iraq could be as bad as Vietnam; rather, that it is becoming far worse. Vietnam, after all, involved no WMD issues; and while the North was predominantly Buddhist and the South Catholic, there were no implications of a world- wide religious struggle; nor of a conflict that might last many decades, if not centuries. The issue at the time was Communism and fears that if Vietnam fell, neighboring governments would topple like dominoes. In retrospect, the real domino lesson of Vietnam was about political decision-making. Once the patriotic flag was raised, stands taken, words uttered, one doubtful decision precipitated another, and the pride of politicians did not allow a change of course until the people demanded common-sense reconsideration.

Interestingly, in the 19th century, two obscure Italian political theorists, Vito and Pareto, noted that for all the differences in political systems, one person alone at the top had the power to make critical decisions for a nation. While these decisions might be of a social magnitude, they are personal in the making.

Our Founders were moral as well as political thinkers. They feared kingly powers and wanted shared decision-making, especially when it came to war. But as we all have come to understand, modern times have produced wars without formal declarations approved by Congress. In response to Vietnam, Congress fashioned the War Powers Act to establish new constraints on the Executive. While most Constitutional scholars are convinced the Act would be declared unconstitutional if it were ever tested, it stands today as the law of the land. What is often overlooked, however, is that the Act also empowers the Executive wide- ranging options to commit American forces for a period of several months. Hence, there is little doubt that the administration assumes it has no need to come to Congress if it decides to launch an air assault on Iran, as long as it is only of multi-week duration.

Let me conclude with an observation about priorities, contrasts, and principles.

First, priorities. The Iraqi war has had the unfortunate effect of decreasing American attention on both Afghanistan and the Israeli- Palestinian dilemma, both of which have extraordinary consequences for U.S. national security. In addition, while I have assumed for most of my adult life that war and peace is the biggest issue in the world, the bigger challenge to life itself may be disease control. We have lost nearly 2,500 American troops in Iraq and 20 to 40 times as many Iraqis have been killed. But over the past two decades more than 20 million people have died of AIDS, and this number will double or triple in the next decade or two. Likewise, a new flu epidemic might match or exceed these numbers. Yet we are spending less on these problems than the cost of one month's fighting in Iraq.

Second, contrasts. Educated Americans are well aware of the ideas that Samuel Huntington and Joe Nye of Harvard have propounded about the dangers of a clash of civilizations and of the importance of soft as contrasted with hard power in diplomacy. These are important frameworks of thought for the American public to dwell upon. But I would add to those considerations the elements of individual judgment and the contrasting model of realism vs. pseudo-realism in policymaking. Realists look to effect, not to appearance. But Washington today has come under the sway of the grim neo-con notion that diplomacy, particularly multi-lateral diplomacy, is soft-headed. Is this not pseudo-realism? What is more realistic and more consistent with the American heritage than attempting to advance the rule of law? An earlier excess of pseudo-realism caused the Senate to reject Wilsonian idealism and ignore the League of Nations. Nevertheless, it approved U.S. participation in the World Court. Americans want law and order. Americans also prefer to work in alliances. It is neo-con nonsense, realism inverted, to press a foreign policy rooted in snubbing the concerns of others.

One of the myths of our time is that realism is principally about might. Actually, realism is about the human condition. A great power must maintain a strong military capacity, but it is the human condition that must be improved if national security is truly to be secured. Impoverished nations are breeding grounds for radicalism. Where there is no hope, there is nothing to lose. When life, as Hobbs described, becomes nasty, brutish, and short in a jungle of hopelessness, and humiliation, it becomes easily expendable, sometimes by martyred self- choice.

Finally, a note about principle. Never has it been more important to return to the basics. Whether it be tax policy or foreign policy, the concern must be for justice and the common good, what the 19th century British utilitarians described as concern for the greatest good of the greatest number.

The public wants its leaders to unify and uplift. Elections are about whether political leadership is up to the task. Democracies provide continual verdicts. This fall will be one measure.

Mr. Speaker, recently, I attended my oldest son's eighth grade graduation, and graduating with him was Jennifer Davis, the daughter of Karen and Major Miles Davis, who could not attend because he was deployed to Iraq.

Mr. Speaker, this is why I believe we owe Americans an account of our progress in the world war on terror, an assessment of the situation, the stakes, and the strategy for victory in the battle for Iraq, as well as an affirmation that we will defend our country, defeat the enemy, and win this unsought struggle for survival. Unfortunately, this resolution fails to do so, for it is strategically nebulous, morally obtuse, and woefully inadequate.

This resolution sanitizes the hard truth that the enemy is trying not only to intimidate us but to kill us. It provides an abashed defense of our Nation's sovereign right to preemptively eradicate the terrorists and their state sponsors before they kill us. It implies our preemption of this threat must meet a global test for legitimacy.

It further fails to affirm the battle for Iraq was waged because Saddam Hussein's regime was a direct threat to the United States of America and was in violation of mandatory treaty obligations of said United States of America.

It fails to stress our mission is to ensure a sovereign, free, secure and united Iraq at peace with the United States, its coalition partners and all other peaceable nations.

It fails to stress that terrorists seek to destroy the new unity government because it threatens the terrorists' aspirations for the United States of America, Iraq, our coalition partners and the broader Middle East.

It asserts how despite the enemy having declared Iraq a central front in the war on terror, the United States and its coalition partners will continue to support Iraq as only a part of the war on terror.

It omits any mention of the battle for Iraq's difficulties and does not offer a comprehensive strategy on how to conquer them. It overlooks the fact our troops' return home hinges upon creating Iraqi security forces and destroying the enemy's insurgency.

Finally, this resolution calls the terrorists our adversary, not our enemy.

Mr. Speaker, at the graduation I did not try to comfort Karen Davis by declaring her husband, Major Miles Davis, was in Iraq defending global peace and security or enforcing United Nations resolutions. No, I thanked Karen for her family's sacrifice because Miles was in Iraq honoring his solemn pledge to God and to us to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies.

So in this time of war when we ask the best of our troops and we ask the best of their families, we must ask the best of ourselves. We have not done so with this resolution, and that is why I will be voting ``present,'' because I am committed to victory in the war on terror.

Mr. Speaker, recently, I attended my oldest son's eighth grade graduation. Graduating with him was Jennifer Davis, the daughter of my childhood friend, Major Miles Davis, who could not attend. That night, I talked with Miles' wife, Karen, who told me how painful it was for their family to have Miles so abruptly deployed to Iraq.

Such heart rending scenes throughout our land are why I believe we owe Americans more in this resolution than a simple declaration of our resolve in Iraq. We owe them an account of our progress in the world War on Terror; an assessment of the situation, the stakes, and the strategy for victory in the battle for Iraq; and an affirmation we will defend our country, defeat the enemy, and win this unsought struggle for survival.

Thus, I rise to express my profound disappointment with this resolution before us, because it is strategically nebulous; morally obtuse; and woefully inadequate.

To begin, this resolution's purpose is limited to ``Declaring the United States will complete the mission in Iraq and prevail in the Global War on Terror, the struggle to protect freedom from the terrorist adversary.''

This is patently inadequate to the task at hand; and, unfortunately, under continued examination the resolution fares no better. To wit, the first ``Whereas'' clause informs us: ``. . . the United States and its allies are engaged in a Global War on Terror, a long and demanding struggle against an adversary that is driven by hatred of American values and that is committed to imposing, by the use of terror, its repressive ideology throughout the world.''

This clause elicits elementary questions: what ``values'' of ours cause our enemy to hate us; and what, precisely, is the enemy's ideology? Sadly, this clause provides no clues.

The second clause recounts how: ``. . . for the past two decades, terrorists have used violence in a futile attempt to intimidate the United States.''

This clause is too sanitized. The hard truth is the enemy has not tried to intimidate us. The enemy has tried to kill us and too often succeeded. The enemy does so because our very existence as sovereign citizens of a free Republic constitutes a beacon of hope for all who are--and all who yearn to be--free; thus, we are our enemy's paramount obstacle to world dominion.

Next the third clause right asserts: ``. . . it is essential to the security of the American people and to world security that the United States, together with its allies, take the battle to the terrorists and to those who provide them assistance.''

Agreed. But this clause must stress both a philosophic principle and a strategic tenet.

Philosophically, any state-sponsor of terror is a threat to the United States, because terrorism is an attack upon the self-evident, inalienable human rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

Strategically, this clause falters as an oblique and abashed defense of our Nation's sovereign right to preemptively eradicate terrorists and their state-sponsors before they kill us. Instead, the clause must reaffirm our Nation's full right of self-defense.

The seventh clause decries how: ``. . . by early 2003 Saddam Hussein and his criminal, Ba'athist regime in Iraq, which had supported terrorists, constituted a threat against global peace and security and was in violation of mandatory United Nations Security Council Resolutions.''

Bluntly, this clause omits the obvious: By early 2003 Saddam Hussein and his criminal Ba'athist regime in Iraq, which had supported terrorists, constituted a threat against the United States of America and was in violation of mandatory treaty obligations to the United States of America.

By omitting the fact Hussein's regime deemed the United States not as just a part of the global community, but as a mortal enemy, this clause wrongly implies our preemption of his threat must and does meet a ``global test'' for legitimacy.

The eighth clause reiterates: ``. . . the mission of the United States and its Coalition partners, having removed Saddam Hussein and his regime from power, is to establish a sovereign, free, secure, and united Iraq at peace with its neighbors.''

Again, the point is missed. Our mission is to transform Iraq from a rogue dictatorship aiding terrorists into a representative democracy eradicating terrorists; and into a sovereign, free, secure, and united nation at peace with the United States, its Coalition partners, and all other peaceable nations.

Next, clause eleven's belief: ``. . . the terrorists seek to destroy the new unity government because it threatens the terrorists' aspirations for Iraq and the broader Middle East,'' also misses the point. As an American, I believe the clause should read: ``the terrorists seek to destroy the new unity government because it threatens the terrorists' aspirations for the United States of America, Iraq, our Coalition partners, and the broader Middle East.''

Now, at last, we reach the resolution's three lethal failings:

To start with, taken together, the ninth and fifteenth clauses raise a stark conundrum. Ignoring that the United States, in word and deed, first targeted Iraq as a ``central front'' in our War on Terror, clause nine notes: ``the terrorists have declared Iraq to be a central front in their war against all who oppose their ideology.''

Later, clause fifteen asserts: ``. . . the United States and its Coalition partners will continue to support Iraq as part of the Global War on Terrorism.''

These clauses' collective conundrum is this: if, after we militarily deposed Hussein, the terrorist enemy now deems Iraq a central front in its ``war against all those who oppose their ideology,'' why do we now view Iraq as but ``part of the Global War on Terror''? Upon this critical question and its ramifications, the resolution is silent.

The resolution's second lethal failing is found, interestingly enough, in clause twelve, which offers hopeful news of how we, our Coalition partners, and the Iraqis have: ``. . . scored impressive victories in Iraq, including finding and killing the terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.''

Well said. But nowhere does this resolution explain the battle for Iraq's past, present, and future difficulties, or proffer any concrete or comprehensive strategy as to how U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi forces will confront and conquer

these challenges. One irony proves the point. My allotted time to speak on this amendment is under the section dedicated to Iraqi reconstruction. Yet nowhere in this resolution appears the word ``reconstruction.''

The resolution's final, and paramount, failing occurs in clause thirteen, which assures us: ``. . . Iraqi security forces are, over time, taking over from the United States and Coalition forces a growing proportion of independent operations and increasingly lead the fight against terror in Iraq.''

This clause's logic implies the enemy will remain operationally active in Iraq when our military leaves the battlefield. This implication stems from the incessant lack of emphasis accorded the concomitant and equal pillar of the administration's military strategy in Iraq. Specifically, the time required to win and bring our troops home hinges upon creating Iraqi security forces and destroying the enemy's insurgency. Continuing to emphasize the creation of security forces while de-emphasizing the destruction of the terrorists' insurgency, will only lengthen the time required to accomplish the mission in Iraq and welcome our troops back.

Mr. Speaker, my time grows short, so, in conclusion, I will focus on the one word in the resolved clause which, in fact, inexplicably permeates the resolution; and, inexorably, precludes my support of this resolution. The offending word is ``adversary.''

Starkly and sanely understood, within Iraq and the overarching world War on Terror we do not have an adversary. We have an enemy. Thus, because words have meaning, even if I could ignore the fact this resolution is strategically nebulous, I will not overlook the fact it lacks the moral clarity to call the terrorists our enemy.

Mr. Speaker, at St. Edith's eighth grade graduation, I did not try to comfort Karen by declaring her husband Major Miles Davis was in Iraq defending global peace and security; I did not try to comfort Karen by proclaiming Miles was in Iraq to enforce violated U.N. resolutions; no, I thanked Karen for her family's sacrifice, because Miles was in Iraq honoring his solemn pledge to God and to us to ``support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies.''

Mr. Speaker, amidst an anguished era ennobled by our sacrifices in the unsought struggle against a bloodthirsty enemy, we ask our troops to do their best; we ask their families to do their best; and we ask our fellow citizens to do their best But we, in ``the people's house,'' have not done our best; and upon this resolution I will be voting ``present.''

I submit for the Record President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Ninth Annual Message to Congress, January 6, 1942.

In fulfilling my duty to report upon the state of the

Union, I am proud to say to you that the spirit of the

American people was never higher than it is today--the Union

was never more closely knit together--this country was never

more deeply determined to face the solemn tasks before it.

The response of the American people has been instantaneous,

and it will be sustained until our security is assured.

Exactly one year ago today I said to this Congress: ``When

the dictators . . . are ready to make war upon us, they will

not wait for an act of war on our part . . . They--not we--

will choose the time and the place and the method of their

attack.''

We now know their choice of the time: a peaceful Sunday

morning--December 7, 1941.

We know their choice of the place: an American outpost in

the Pacific.

We know their choice of the method: the method of Hitler

himself.

Japan's scheme of conquest goes back half a century. It was

not merely a policy of seeking living room--it was a plan

which included the subjugation of all the peoples in the Far

East and in the islands of the Pacific, and the domination of

that ocean by Japanese military and naval control of the

western coasts of North, Central, and South America.

The development of this ambitious conspiracy was marked by

the war against China in 1894; the subsequent occupation of

Korea; the war against Russia in 1904; the illegal

fortification of the mandated Pacific islands following 1920;

the seizure of Manchuria in 1931; and the invasion of China

in 1937.

A similar policy of criminal conquest was adopted by Italy.

The Fascists first revealed their imperial designs in Libya

and Tripoli. In 1935 they seized Abyssinia. Their goal was

the domination of all North Africa, Egypt, parts of France,

and the entire Mediterranean world.

But the dreams of empire of the Japanese and Fascist

leaders were modest in comparison with the gargantuan

aspirations of Hitler and his Nazis. Even before they came to

power in 1933, their plans for that conquest had been drawn.

Those plans provided for ultimate domination, not of anyone

section of the world, but of the whole earth and all the

oceans on it.

When Hitler organized his Berlin-Rome-Tokyo alliance, all

these plans of conquest became a single plan. Under this, in

addition to her own schemes of conquest, Japan's role was

obviously to cut off our supply of weapons of war to Britain

and Russia and China--weapons which increasingly were

speeding the day of Hitler's doom. The act of Japan at Pearl

Harbor was intended to stun us--to terrify us to such an

extent that we would divert our industrial and military

strength to the Pacific area, or even to our own continental

defense.

The plan has failed in its purpose. We have not been

stunned. We have not been terrified or confused. This very

reassembling of the Seventy-seventh Congress today is proof

of that; for the mood of quiet, grim resolution which here

prevails bodes ill for those who conspired and collaborated

to murder world peace.

That mood is stronger than any mere desire for revenge. It

expresses the will of the American people to make very

certain that the world will never so suffer again.

Admittedly, we have been faced with hard choices. It was

bitter, for example, not to be able to relieve the heroic and

historic defenders of Wake Island. It was bitter for us not

to be able to land a million men in a thousand ships in the

Philippine Islands.

But this adds only to our determination to see to it that

the Stars and Stripes will fly again over Wake and Guam. Yes,

see to it that the brave people of the Philippines will be

rid of Japanese imperialism, and will live in freedom,

security, and independence.

Powerful and offensive actions must and will be taken in

proper time. The consolidation of the United Nations' total

war effort against our common enemies is being achieved.

That was and is the purpose of conferences which have been

held during the past two weeks in Washington and Moscow and

Chungking. That is the primary objective of the declaration

of solidarity signed in Washington on January 1, 1942, by

twenty-six nations united against the Axis powers. . . .

Plans have been laid here and in the other capitals for

coordinated and cooperative action by all the United

Nations--military action and economic action. Already we have

established, as you know, unified command of land, sea, and

air forces in the southwestern Pacific theater of war. There

will be a continuation of conferences and consultations among

military staffs, so that the plans and operations of each

will fit into the general strategy designed to crush the

enemy. We shall not fight isolated wars--each nation going

its own way. These twenty-six nations are united--not in

spirit and determination alone, but in the broad conduct of

the war in all its phases.

For the first time since the Japanese and the Fascists and

the Nazis started along their blood-stained course of

conquest they now face the fact that superior forces are

assembling against them. Gone forever are the days when the

aggressors could attack and destroy their victims one by one

without unity of resistance. We of the United Nations will so

dispose our forces that we can strike at the common enemy

wherever the greatest damage can be done him.

The militarists of Berlin and Tokyo started this war. But

the massed, angered forces of common humanity will finish it.

Destruction of the material and spiritual centers of

civilization--this has been and still is the purpose of

Hitler and his Italian and Japanese chessmen. They would

wreck the power of the British Commonwealth and Russia and

China and the Netherlands--and then combine all their forces

to achieve their ultimate goal, the conquest of the United

States.

They know that victory for us means victory for freedom.

They know that victory for us means victory for the

institution of democracy--the ideal of the family, the simple

principles of common decency and humanity.

They know that victory for us means victory for religion.

And they could not tolerate that. The world is too small to

provide adequate ``living room'' for both Hitler and God. In

proof of that, the Nazis have now announced their plan for

enforcing their new German, pagan religion all over the

world--a plan by which the Holy Bible and the Cross of Mercy

would be displaced by Mein Kampf and the swastika and the

naked sword.

Our own objectives are clear; the objective of smashing the

militarism imposed by warlords upon their enslaved peoples--

the objective of liberating the subjugated nations--the

objective of establishing and securing freedom of speech,

freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear

everywhere in the world.

We shall not stop short of these objectives, nor shall we

be satisfied merely to gain them and then call it a day. I

know that I speak for the American people--and I have good

reason to believe that I speak also for all the other peoples

who fight with us--when I say that this time we are

determined not only to win the war, but also to maintain the

security of the peace that will follow. . . .

The superiority of the United Nations in munitions and

ships must be overwhelming--so overwhelming that the Axis

nations can never hope to catch up with it. And so, in order

to attain this overwhelming superiority the United States

must build planes and tanks and guns and ships to the utmost

limit of our national capacity. We have the ability and

capacity to produce arms not only for our own forces, but

also for the armies, navies, and air forces fighting on our

side.

And our overwhelming superiority of armament must

be adequate to put weapons of war at the proper time into

the hands of those men in the conquered nations who stand

ready to seize the first opportunity to

revolt against their German and Japanese oppressors, and

against the traitors in their own ranks, known by the

already infamous name of Quislings. And I think that it is

a fair prophecy to say that, as we get guns to the

patriots in those lands, they too will fire shots heard

'round the world.

This production of ours in the United States must be raised

far above present levels, even though it will mean the

dislocation of the lives and occupations of millions of our

own people. We must raise our sights all along the production

line. Let no man say it cannot be done. It must be done--and

we have undertaken to do it. . . .

Our task is hard--our task is unprecedented--and the time

is short. We must strain every existing armament-producing

facility to the utmost. We must convert every available plant

and tool to war production. That goes all the way from the

greatest plants to the smallest--from the huge automobile

industry to the village machine shop.

Production for war is based on men and women--the human

hands and brains which collectively we call Labor. Our

workers stand ready to work long hours; to turn out more in a

day's work; to keep the wheels turning and the fires burning

twenty-four hours a day, and seven days a week. They realize

well that on the speed and efficiency of their work depend

the lives of their sons and their brothers on the fighting

fronts.

Production for war is based on metals and raw materials--

steel, copper, rubber, aluminum, zinc, tin. Greater and

greater quantities of them will have to be diverted to war

purposes: Civilian use of them will have to be cut further

and still further--and, in many cases, completely eliminated.

War costs money. So far, we have hardly even begun to pay

for it. We have devoted only 15 percent of our national

income to national defense. As will appear in my Budget

Message tomorrow, our war program for the coming fiscal year

will cost $56 billion or, in other words, more than half of

the estimated annual national income. That means taxes and

bonds and bonds and taxes. It means cutting luxuries and

other nonessentials. In a word, it means an ``all-out'' war

by individual effort and family effort in a united country.

Only this all-out scale of production will hasten the

ultimate all-out victory. Speed will count. Lost ground can

always be regained--lost time never. Speed will save lives;

speed will save this nation which is in peril; speed will

save our freedom and our civilization--and slowness has never

been an American characteristic. . . .

We cannot wage this war in a defensive spirit. As our power

and our resources are fully mobilized, we shall carry the

attack against the enemy--we shall hit him and hit him again

wherever and whenever we can reach him.

We must keep him far from our shores, for we intend to

bring this battle to him on his own home grounds.

American armed forces must be used at any place in all the

world where it seems advisable to engage the forces of the

enemy. In some cases these operations will be defensive, in

order to protect key positions. In other cases, these

operations will be offensive, in order to strike at the

common enemy, with a view to his complete encirclement and

eventual total defeat.

American armed forces will operate at many points in the

Far East.

American armed forces will be on all the oceans--helping to

guard the essential communications which are vital to the

United Nations.

American land and air and sea forces will take stations in

the British Isles--which constitute an essential fortress in

this great world struggle.

American armed forces will help to protect this

hemisphere--and also help to protect bases outside this

hemisphere, which could be used for an attack on the

Americas.

If any of our enemies, from Europe or from Asia, attempt

long-range raids by ``suicide'' squadrons of bombing

planes, they will do so only in the hope of terrorizing

our people and disrupting our morale. Our people are not

afraid of that. We know that we may have to pay a heavy

price for freedom. We will pay this price with a will.

Whatever the price, it is a thousand times worth it. No

matter what our enemies, in their desperation, may attempt

to do to us--we will say, as the people of London have

said, ``We can take it.'' And what's more we can give it

back--and we will give it back--with compound interest. .

. .

Many people ask, ``When will this war end?'' There is only

one answer to that. It will end just as soon as we make it

end, by our combined efforts, our combined strength, our

combined determination to fight through and work through

until the end--the end of militarism in Germany and Italy and

Japan. Most certainly we shall not settle for less.

That is the spirit in which discussions have been conducted

during the visit of the British prime minister to Washington.

Mr. Churchill and I understand each other, our motives, and

our purposes. Together, during the past two weeks, we have

faced squarely the major military and economic problems of

this greatest world war.

All in our nation have been cheered by Mr. Churchill's

visit. We have been deeply stirred by his great message to

us. He is welcome in our midst, and we unite in wishing him a

safe return to his home.

For we are fighting on the same side with the British

people, who fought alone for long, terrible months, and

withstood the enemy with fortitude and tenacity and skill.

We are fighting on the same side with the Russian people

who have seen the Nazi hordes swarm up to the very gates of

Moscow, and who with almost superhuman will and courage have

forced the invaders back into retreat.

We are fighting on the same side as the brave people of

China--those millions who for four and a half long years have

withstood bombs and starvation and have whipped the invaders

time and again in spite of the superior Japanese equipment

and arms.

Yes, we are fighting on the same side as the indomitable

Dutch.

We are fighting on the same side as all the other

governments in exile, whom Hitler and all his armies and all

his Gestapo have not been able to conquer.

But we of the United Nations are not making all this

sacrifice of human effort and human lives to return to the

kind of world we had after the last world war.

We are fighting today for security, for progress, and for

peace, not only for ourselves but for all men, not only for

one generation but for all generations. Weare fighting to

cleanse the world of ancient evils, ancient ills.

Our enemies are guided by brutal cynicism, by unholy

contempt for the human race. Weare inspired by a faith that

goes back through all the years to the first chapter of the

book of Genesis: ``God created man in His own image.''

We on our side are striving to be true to that divine

heritage. We are fighting, as our fathers have fought, to

uphold the doctrine that all men are equal in the sight of

God. Those on the other side are striving to destroy this

deep belief and to create a world in their own image--a world

of tyranny and cruelty and serfdom.

That is the conflict that day and night now pervades our

lives. No compromise can end that conflict. There never has

been--there never can be--successful compromise between good

and evil. Only total victory can reward the champions of

tolerance, and decency, and freedom, and faith.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the time allocated by House Resolution 868 to the ranking minority members of four committees instead be controlled by the minority leader or her designees.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 minutes.

All of us know, all of us understand stability in Iraq is important, not only to the United States but to the world.

It is no secret that Iraq is of particular importance because of its oil. The United States consumes 20.6 billion barrels of oil per day. Yet we produce only 5.1 billion barrels of oil a day. China is the second largest consumer, with 6.9 million barrels per day, and they produce 3.6 million barrels per day. Iraq has the fourth largest oil reserve in the world. Saudi Arabia is number one, Canada number two and Iran number three. So all of us agree Iraq is important. But how do we get to a conclusion?

Let me compare Gulf War I with Gulf War II. In Gulf War I, Kuwait was attacked by Saddam Hussein. It was a brutal attack. President Bush I immediately reacted. He sent his emissary, Secretary Cheney, to Saudi Arabia. They got an agreement from Saudi Arabia to use their land to put troops in. He immediately sent in the Airborne Division, and he immediately sent in F-16 fighters to deter Saddam Hussein. All of us knew that there was a possibility at that time that he would have complete control of the oil in the Middle East. So we knew how important it was.

Then President Bush started calling up the Reserves. He called a number of Members of Congress over to the White House, and he consulted and talked to them. I do not remember if the gentleman from Illinois was there, but there were seven or eight of us went to the White House. We talked to him about calling up the Reserves and having other people pay.

This is important not only to the United States. This is important internationally. This oil supply, this stability in the Middle East is important to the whole world, and he went to work. He called every major nation. He called Egypt, and this was no easy task for these countries to come around to decide to support the United States.

Matter of fact, President Mubarak said to me that King Hussein came to him and said if you support the United States, you will cut the throat of Saddam Hussein, and yet Egypt decided that they were going to go along with us.

Then he talked about that we needed to have a U.N. resolution, which we did have. Then we had to have a resolution in the Congress of the United States. But the big thing that he promoted was he got a coalition together, and this coalition ended up with 400,000 American troops and 160,000 coalition troops.

And I remember during this debate, I remember calling Secretary Cheney, calling General Scowcroft saying, you have got 250,000 troops over there, you don't need any more. Let's get this war going. And General Scowcroft said something I have never forgotten. He said, we are going to give General Schwarzkopf whatever he wants. He wants more troops, we are going to give him more troops. And Secretary Cheney called me and said we are going to have to send another 180,000 troops. We are going to have overwhelming force when we go into Kuwait.

And they did have overwhelming force. It went on for 6 months. The troops were out in the field, they trained, and when they went in they did a magnificent thing. It was overwhelming. And it was paid for by other countries. Sixty billion dollars came from other countries. President Bush I convinced other countries that they had to help pay for this because it was not only important to the United States, it was important to them, the stability in the Middle East.

Now, let me talk about the second Gulf War. The second Gulf War we had intelligence that said there were weapons of mass destruction; there was an al Qaeda connection. I believed that. As a matter of fact, I listened to the reports, and I was hesitant about the al Qaeda connection, but I believed that they had biological weapons. Matter of fact, a week or so before the war started, Ms. Pelosi, as the new minority leader, wanted to go overseas on her first trip. She wanted to visit the troops. Even though she had been against the resolution to go to war, she wanted to tell the troops she supported the troops. And anybody that votes for the Defense Subcommittee appropriations, anybody that belongs to the Armed Services Committee shows their support of the troops.

So we went over, and on our way over we stopped in Turkey. Imagine, the 4th Division was sitting outside Turkey. It was supposed to outflank the Iraqis. And the State Department asked me, okay, talk to the Turkish government about letting us go through. Now, we had the most modern division, the most technologically advanced division in the whole world sitting there off Turkey. I talked to them and I became convinced they weren't going to let us go through, even though they had voted the very day I was there, and they voted by a majority, but not the supermajority they needed to allow the United States to go through.

I went then to Kuwait and we listened to the commanders. The commanders told us that there is a red line drawn around Baghdad and if we cross the red line they are going to use biological weapons. And I believed that. I believed. As a matter of fact, they said if you cross this red line, we have already verified this by monitoring their telephones, by monitoring their cell phones. When we monitored cell phones of Saddam Hussein's headquarters they said use biological weapons. The troops believed it. They were prepared. They felt like they could go in there with protective gear, they could go in there with what they needed and the hot air, the winds, would dissipate the weapons. And, of course, they crossed the red line and nothing happened.

But I still thought there were weapons of mass destruction. I still thought there were biological weapons. I came back and we sent a team over there.

And the team went over and the team looked for those weapons of mass destruction. Matter of fact, at first a fella named Kay, that was so strong about it, former CIA, said, we will find them. And he looked for months and couldn't find anything at all. Absolutely no evidence of any kind of weapons of mass destruction. No biological weapon, no capability, no nuclear capability, no al Qaeda connection.

When we go to war, we should go to war, first of all, if it is a threat to our national security. It was a threat to our national security when you talk about the first war, because it destabilized and he would have controlled all the oil in the Middle East, which is so important to the free world. The second time was no threat to our national security. Now, we didn't find that out, those of us who voted for it, didn't find this out until after we had gone to war.

The second thing is you go with overwhelming force. I talked to one of the commanders who was in a meeting with five officials; there was him, there was Secretary Rumsfeld, there was Secretary Wolfowitz, General Pace, and General Myers. And he said we recommended 350,000 troops. And as you know, they gave him a lot less troops than that. The coalition troops at the most were up to 30,000 and now they are down to 20,000.

The first war, 160,000. And the first war was all paid for. It cost us $5 billion. The reason I remember this so vividly is I was chairman of the committee at the time the money came through our committee, and we then sent it over, reprogrammed it over to the Defense Department itself. But the discrepancy that we have seen, the mischaracterization, the optimistic predictions are the problems that I have had.

Now, I sent a letter, with Duncan Hunter and a number of other people, and I said to the President, we need 100,000 more troops. Well, the President decided he didn't need 100,000 more troops. Now, imagine this, we are on the ground and we have won the war. The troops did a magnificent job, as we knew they would, but they completely miscalculated the problems that we were going to have afterwards.

Now, I talked to a tribal leader the other day in Anbar Province. He told me that, as far as he saw, the first 6 months we had occupied Anbar. Now, Anbar is the province we are having the most trouble right now. It is where Ramadi and Fallujah are. Those are the areas where there is the most contention. In the first 6 months there wasn't a shot fired. Not a shot fired. I said, let me ask you right now, what kind of progress have we made economically? No water, no electricity, no jobs in Anbar Province. Two million people.

And we talk about Saddam Hussein. Almost 900,000 people left when Saddam Hussein was there. They left the country as refugees. The time we have been there 900,000 people have left the country. They voted with their feet. The President went in the other day, he says he was glad to see democracy in action. You know where he went? The same place I go, in the fortress. In the Green Zone. That is where he went. They are afraid to go outside the Green Zone.

When I first went there, the first two or three trips I went, I could go anyplace. I drove around all over Iraq. The last time I landed at Baghdad Airport, they flew me to Anbar Province down in Haditha, and we flew so low because of the threat we had to come up over the wires in order to get down, and I didn't see a person the whole time. There were 2 million people in Anbar Province. Not one project. Not one.

I said on the floor of the House the most important thing in that first supplemental, in the $87 billion, was the $18 billion that went for reconstruction. And of course there are so many projects that haven't been finished. Now, after we sent the letter about the 100,000, and during that period of time, we asked a fella named Hamre, who was the former Under Secretary of Defense, who went over to Iraq and he did a study for the Defense Department. He came back and said, you have got 3 to 6 months to get this straightened out.

And what did he suggest had to be done? They weren't big projects. He suggested we had to have trash picked up, sewage taken care of, electricity, and jobs. Those are the kinds of things he talked about, and securing the border. Those are the things he said had to be done in 3 to 6 months, and if it is not done, it will go the other way. And all of us know what has happened. All of us know what has happened with the insurgency.

Now, let me go through why I get so distressed by the reports that I get about how well it is going. First of all, the number of daily attacks in Iraq have gone from in 2004, daily, 53 attacks in 2004, 70 attacks in 2005, and in 2006, 90 attacks a day.

Estimated size of the insurgency. Now, we are supposed to be making progress. That is what we hear. The estimated size of the insurgency in 2004 was 15,000. In May of 2005 it was 16,000. In May of 2006 it was 20,000.

This is the way I measure whether there is progress or not progress.

The amount of cash paid to families, this is an important point, to Iraqi civilians killed or maimed by the operation involving American troops went from in 2004, $5 million to $20 million.

Now, what does that mean? The problem is that all of us want to solve the problem, all of us want to have a satisfactory answer in Iraq. The problem is the way we have to operate as a military. The reason we won the first Gulf War is we were fighting a conventional force and we wiped them out. Nobody can match our military. They are the best in the world. But now we are fighting a guerilla war, and that is the type of problem that we have.

For instance, we went into Fallujah, we put 300,000 people outside their homes and only 100,000 have come back now. And when we put 300,000 people outside their home, every one of those are an enemy.

Abu Ghraib. Why did Abu Ghraib happen? Abu Ghraib happened because we had insufficient forces and untrained people and unsupervised people in that prison.

Now, what do I mean by untrained? We had one fella, who happened to be from my district, that had a court order against him because he had abused his family, and he couldn't carry a gun in Pennsylvania. And he said, I can't do this. This is against my nature. I don't know anything about taking care of prisoners. He is now in jail. But the point is he was untrained in that particular job, and even though he told them, they put him in the job. And of course we know the tremendous consequence, at the very time we went into Fallujah, at the very time we put 300,000 people outside their home.

And listen, I endorse this. I know we have to have, when we go into an area, we have to use overwhelming force. That is the way the military has to operate. But, you see, these payments from $5 million in 2004 to $20 million last year, that is because when we go into a place we kill them inadvertently. And when we kill people inadvertently we make enemies, and Abu Ghraib was the biggest public relations disaster we had since My Lai during the Vietnam War.

The number of complete or reconstructed projects, as I said, in al Anbar Province, imagine now, this is one-third of the geography of Iraq, and they have 2 million people, zero. Zero. Number of civilians who died in Baghdad last month, 1,400, in sectarian violence. What is the definition of sectarian violence? A civil war.

All of us want to end this thing. All of us want to find a way to prevail in Iraq. This is a civil war and we are caught in a civil war. There is less than a thousand al Qaeda in Iraq. They have diminished al Qaeda. But we are caught in this civil war between 100,000 Shiias and 20,000 Sunnis fighting with each other.

The average monthly U.S. war expenditure in Iraq: $4.4 billion in 2003, $5 billion in 2004, $6.1 billion in 2005, and $8 billion. The average monthly expenditure, $8 billion. Now, think what I am saying. The first Gulf War, and Duncan Hunter remembers this, they paid internationally. We paid $5 billion. He was on the Armed Services Committee. He knows what I am talking about. We paid $5 billion and they paid $60 billion. They had 160,000 troops in the first Gulf War.

Now, let me talk about the sentiment and talk about the polls taken. We all look at the polls to see what is going on. Now, the only poll taken of U.S. forces in Iraq, about 3\1/2\ months ago: 72 percent of the American troops serving in Iraq think the U.S. should exit the country within a year.

Now, I can understand that. Let me tell you, it is hot, they are wearing 70 pounds every day when they are out there in the field, and I can certainly understand that. Forty-two percent say they do not know what the mission is. And that is devastating when they do not understand the mission.

A public opinion Iraqi poll, a segment of 18 provinces, all 18 provinces: More than half the Iraqis say they are headed in the wrong direction, and 82 percent say the economic situation is either poor or fair. Now, these are the Iraqis. Ninety percent say the security situation is poor or fair.

And who do they trust? Who do they trust for personal security? Forty-three percent trust the Iraqi police, 35 percent trust the Iraqi army, 6 percent trust the insurgents, 6 percent trust the insurgents, 4 percent trust the armed militia, and 1 percent, 1 percent trust the multinational force. In another poll taken at the beginning of this year, 47 percent approve the attacks on the United States forces, and 87 percent of the Iraqis endorse a timetable for withdrawal.

Our global image couldn't have been higher after the first Gulf War, with 80 to 90 percent of the people in the world thinking the United States did a marvelous job. We had recovered from Vietnam, finally, in the first Gulf War.

Ten of 14 countries polled said the war in Iraq has made the world more dangerous, and most of the countries rated the U.S. troops in Iraq a bigger danger to world peace than the threat posed by Iran. Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Russia, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan, and Turkey all have more favorable ratings of China than the U.S.

Now, this resolution is a restatement of the failed policy of this administration, and it is no surprise that that is what this is.

We can't win this. This cannot be won rhetorically. We cannot sit here, stand here in an air-conditioned office and say we support the troops, say we support the policy.

I visit the hospitals every week, and the only person to visit them more than I do is Bill Young and his wife. I see these young people. I am so impressed by their determination, and I am so hopeful we can end this terrible tragedy.

When I got into this 6 months ago, I got into it because of the troops and because of the fact that I felt we couldn't do anything more militarily. We had done everything we could do militarily, and, second, because of the future of the military.

The bill we are going to pass next week, and very few people are going to vote against it, if you want to really support the troops, that is what you vote for. You vote for that legislation. That will say we will run out of money for personnel for the troops because we cut $4 billion out of the base bill by September. We will take care of that. We will find a way to do it. But the point is the base bill was cut by $4 billion.

Now let me tell you the difference in what I believe is the answer. I believe we redeploy and be ready; that is what I say. I say redeploy and be ready.

We are the targets. We are causing the problem. You know who wants us to stay in Iraq right now, the al Qaeda wants us there because it recruits people for them. China wants us there. North Korea wants us there. Russia wants us there. We are depleting our resources, just like Russia depleted their resources in Afghanistan. The same thing is happening with the United States. We will have spent $450 billion by the end of this fiscal year. Now think, the first gulf war we spent $5 billion. We have spent $450 billion.

Stay and we will pay, not only pay in dollars, in money; we are going to pay long term.

I figure it took us through the Reagan administration to pay for the Vietnam War. We had 18 to 21 percent interest rates during the Reagan administration, and the reason we did was because Lyndon Johnson, the President of the United States, said we can have butter and we can have guns, and he didn't raise the taxes he should have raised when we had the war going on.

So we continue to pay with lives lost in terms of financial treasure and more than $8 billion a month. We pay in terms of international reputation. We pay in terms of the future of our military. We stay and pay. I say redeploy and be ready.

Let me tell this one last story.

When I came out of Vietnam, they gave me this small bullet. It is a 45 caliber without any powder in it. It says: ``First Marines, everything is going to be all right.''

A month after I came out of Vietnam in 1967, Lyndon Johnson said, and I believed in the Vietnam War. I thought we were fighting communism. But Lyndon Johnson said, and they had an election, one month after I came out of Vietnam, everything was going to be all right. Do you know how many people we lost from 1967 until we pulled out? 37,000.

Rhetoric does not answer the problem. Only the Iraqis can solve the problem in Iraq. They are fighting with each other, and our troops are caught in between. I say it is time to redeploy and be ready.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Let me comment on a couple of things the distinguished gentleman from Illinois said.

He talks about early exit. This war has gone on, Mr. Chairman, this war has gone on longer than the Korean War. It has gone on longer than World War I, and it has gone almost as long as the European War.

If I believed we were making progress, we can't win this militarily. What I am saying is to redeploy, to get our troops out of harm's way is the key. I see no progress at all in this operation. I see the opposite.

When I see, you talk about al Qaeda being encouraged by what we say. Al Qaeda has gone from 15,000 to 20,000. Incidents have gone from 50 a day to 90 a day. That is the thing that worries me. And we are not making progress. We are losing progress.

I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton).

Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I believe we send them a message when we vote on the armed services bill. Very few people voted against it. I believe we voted, in the defense subcommittee of appropriations, only 15 or 16 people voted against it. But Theodore Roosevelt said, ``If you disagree with a policy and you do not say anything, you are actually treasonous.''

I disagree with the policy. I do not disagree with supporting the troops. There is no one that supports the troops better than the Members of this Congress. And that is shown by the few people that vote against the bill.

One other thing: I think the gentleman made a mistake when he said we are for the war, against the war on terror. We are actually fighting for the war on terror is what we are doing. But I appreciate what the gentleman is saying.

I appreciate the fact that he and I both asked for more troops at one point. He was the lead sponsor at that particular time.

I recognize the gentleman from California for 13 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

This all sounds good. It is all rhetoric. It is rhetoric. The number of daily attacks in Iraq have gone from 2004, 53 attacks per day; May 2005, 70 attacks per day; May 2006, 90 attacks per day. Electricity is less than prewar level. No water available to all, only 1 hour a day, Mr. Speaker, and the oil production which was supposed to pay for the war is less than prewar production.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. George Miller).

(Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

I yield myself 1 minute.

One of the Members said, ask Spain about the threat. Fifty-six percent of the population of Spain believes the U.S. in Iraq is the most dangerous threat to world peace. They rank Iran lesser of a threat than the United States.

And one other thing. When we look back at the intelligence cuts, President Bush I felt it was a peace dividend and started to cut the intelligence budget years ago. So we have to make sure we don't let our rhetoric get ahead of the facts.

I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Emanuel).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

This is rhetoric. It is not getting better. I spoke out November 17, and things have gotten worse than it was 6 months ago. They are worse today than they were then.

When I left Vietnam in August of 1967, they gave me this bullet, and they said in this bullet that everything is going to be all right. The President of the United States said we just had an election, and we have a new election in Vietnam, and this was a month after I got out of Vietnam, and everything is going to be all right. We lost 37,000 people.

It is not a matter of whether we want to prevail in this operation, it is a matter of how we are going to do it, and I disagree with the way we do it. I disagree with the policy. That is what I disagree with. I think our troops have become the targets. Incidents have increased every day, and more Americans are being killed every day. And we are going to pay a heavy price in people being killed and also we are going to pay a heavy price for the individuals in the future with the debt increasing at $8 billion a month.

I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes. I was in Beirut the day after the attack, and I recommended to President Reagan, I recommended to the President of the United States, get out of Beirut because we didn't have enough troops; 2 months later he got out of Beirut because he didn't have enough troops.

I know what rhetoric is, and I know what fighting on the front lines are. I know the difference between them. I know that standing here does not solve the problem, and it has gotten better, it has gotten worse. That's the problem. And you are not talking about Iraq. The gentleman up there was talking about the war on terror. I am talking about Iraq. That's what I am talking about.

Mr. Speaker, I recognize the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Clyburn) for 4 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

The problem is that the opposite is happening. That is the problem we have. We can stand here and say we want to fight the terrorists in Iraq. Actually, al Qaeda we think is less than 1,000.

We think we are caught in a civil war. It is the way that we are doing it. The military cannot win this war. The military commanders, even General Pace admits we cannot win this militarily.

What we are caught in, we have become the target of the insurgency of the sectarian violence. It is the way that we are doing it is what I disagree with.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Larson).

Mr. Speaker, I recognize the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) for 30 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentlewoman from California control the 30 minutes and yield to people.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 60 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters) from the Out of Iraq Caucus, and I ask unanimous consent she control the time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Capps).

Mr. Speaker, I recognize the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Pastor) for a unanimous consent request.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Mrs. Jones).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), and I ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to control the time and yield the time.

Mr. Speaker, I might offer that I am proudly a member of the Out of Iraq Caucus out of a duty and a sense of patriotism and love of my country. And so this is a very somber debate.

And I remind my colleagues of the very tense moments of the presentation of Secretary Powell before the United Nations. All of us were in a sense of awe, listening to the devastating evidence of why we should go to Iraq. So I come to this podium today with a very heavy heart because we are constrained, not Members of Congress, we are of no relevance, but the American people are constrained in not allowing a debate or dissent. That is what we are showing here today, that we can have no dissent, we can have no recognition that Democrats and others, we do have a plan.

And so, on the birthday of the Army, I want to salute the Army. Mr. Murtha, I want to salute you for your service and your plan. And I want to salute all of the United States military. And might I say that our soldiers are doing their job. They have done their job. And out of doing their job, the casualties are some 19,000, and today, I am very sad to say that 2,500 of them are now dead.

And so I come with a heavy heart to suggest that there are myths that we need to overcome. And one of them is that there is something called ``cut and run.'' It is not ``cut and run.'' It is the opportunity of involvement, debate and patriotism, a belief that we can put forward a plan that the American people will believe in.

The Bush Iraq policy has harmed the United States military, and I might say that I am glad to stand with a retired Marine Lieutenant General, Gregory Newbold, who says, ``my sincere view is that the commitment of our forces to this fight was done with a casualness and a swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these missions or bury the results.''

And so I come again to suggest that no, there is no ``cut and run.'' There is reality. A Pentagon commission study concluded that the Army cannot maintain its current pace of operation in Iraq without doing permanent damage to the quality of the force.

We realize that the large and extended deployment of the National Guard units overseas has undermined the ability of the United States to deal with terrorist attacks or natural disasters. We realize that resources are being diverted and, therefore, we are not able to fight the global war on terror.

I don't want my friends to pigeonhole us. We want a debate and a plan to save lives, and we want a free, independent and democratic Iraq. That can happen with a new change, a new day, Democrats and others, who believe in leading this country to a new future.

I don't want the same old plan, and I am not ashamed of saying so. That is why I am here to open the doors to dissent, tell the American people to come marching into the United States Congress. Don't let us talk for you. You want redeployment. You want the troops out. You don't believe the Democrats believe in ``cut and run.'' You understand that the General, Lieutenant General, has said we are careful about this war. Come home.

Murtha plan, the Out of Iraq Caucus is proud of our patriotic stand.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I thank the gentlelady for yielding. I rise to speak on H.R. 861, a resolution which declares that the ``United States will prevail in the Global War on Terrorism.'' I believe that it is the resolve of all Members of this House and of all Americans. But to prevail in the global war on terrorism, we must remain focused on the global war on terrorism, and not allow ourselves to be diverted or distracted.

Unfortunately, we have been distracted from waging a full-scale, all- out global war on terrorism by the President's fateful decision to go to war in Iraq. Before and after 9/11, Iraq was not a part of the global war on terror, much less the central front. It only became so when the President launched his ill-advised preemptive attack.

I am proud to be among the majority of House Democrats who voted against the Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military Force, AUMF, in 2002, which authorized the President to use military force to disarm Iraq of its alleged weapons of mass destruction, WMD. I voted against going to war in Iraq because I thought it a diversion from the important task facing the Nation and that was winning the global war on terror. History has shown that we were right. The ill-advised rush to war in Iraq has not only been a diversion from the war on terror but a strategic disaster of epic proportions. As Thomas Jefferson would say, to prove this let facts be submitted to a candid world.

(I) The Bush Iraq Policy Has Harmed the U.S. Military

We just learned today the sad news that the 2,500th soldier has been killed in Iraq. More than 19,000 others have been wounded. The Bush administration's open-ended commitment of U.S. troops to Iraq has weakened the U.S. Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserves. The extended deployments in Iraq have eroded U.S. ground forces and overall military strength. A Pentagon-commissioned study concluded that the Army cannot maintain its current pace of operations in Iraq without doing permanent damage to the quality of the force. So more than 3 years of a continuous deployment of U.S. troops to Iraq has:

Contributed to serious problems with recruitment, with the U.S. Army missing its recruitment targets last year;

Forced the Army to lower its standards for military recruits; and

Led to military equipment shortages that hamper the ability of U.S. ground forces to do their job in Iraq and around the world.

The large and extended deployment of National Guard units overseas has undermined the ability of the United States to deal with terrorist attacks or natural disasters. For example, State officials in Louisiana and Mississippi struggled to overcome the absence of National Guard members from their States in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. In Louisiana, about 100 of the National Guard's high-water vehicles remain abroad--even as the State continues to rebuild from Hurricane Katrina. Coastal North Carolina is missing nearly half its Humvee fleet, and Guard officials there say shortages have forced the State to pool equipment from different units into one pot of hurricane supplies.

In addition, the equipment the Guard needs to help in the aftermath of natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina is in shorter supply because the gear is in use in combat zones, is battle-damaged, or has been loaned to cover gaps in other units.

(1) War in Iraq has diverted resources and attention from other fronts in the fight against global terrorist networks.

The killing of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi last week was a major success for U.S. troops, but it is not likely to diminish Iraq's insurgency. Iraqis make up 90 percent of Iraq's insurgency, unlike foreign fighters like Zarqawi, and a primary motivation for Iraq's insurgency is the U.S. troop presence. Even after the Samarra shrine attack in February threatened to push Iraq into all-out sectarian civil war, the vast majority of attacks still target U.S. forces.

Outside of Iraq, the Bush administration has failed to present a realistic strategy for countering the threat posed by the global terror networks. In a recent survey of more than 100 of America's leading foreign policy experts conducted by Foreign Policy magazine and the Center for American Progress, eight in 10--84 percent--do not think that the United States is winning the war on terror. The war in Iraq has not helped America win the broader fight against global terrorists. Instead:

By invading Iraq without a realistic plan to stabilize the country, thei Bush administration created a new terrorist haven where none had previously existed.

By maintaining an open-ended military presence in Iraq, the Bush administration is presenting U.S. terrorist enemies with a recruitment tool and rallying cry for organizing attacks against the U.S. and its allies.

According to the National Counter-Terrorism Center, the number of large-scale terrorist attacks in Iraq increased by over 100 between 2004 and 2005, with a total 8,299 civilians killed in 2005.

Osama bin Laden remains at large and Al Qaeda offshoots proliferate.

By diverting resources and attention from Afghanistan to an unnecessary war of choice in Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration has left Afghanistan exposed to a resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The United States needs to complete the mission in Afghanistan and cannot do it with so many troops bogged down in Iraq.

By focusing so many U.S. resources on Iraq, the Bush administration has taken its eye off the ball in places like Somalia, which was overrun by Islamist militias tied to Al Qaeda last week.

(2) The War in Iraq has increased the burden on U.S. taxpayers without stabilizing Iraq or making Americans safer.

Over the last 3 years, the United States has spent more than $300 billion in Iraq, yet the investment has failed to stabilize Iraq or improve the overall quality of life for most Iraqis. According to the Congressional Research Service, total assistance to Iraq thus far is roughly equivalent to total assistance, adjusted for inflation, provided to Germany--and almost double that provided to Japan from 1946 to 1952. Yet on key metrics like oil production, Iraq has failed to advance beyond pre-war levels, and quality of life indicators remain dismal:

Oil production is below pre-war levels--2.6 million barrels per day in 2003 vs. 2.1 million barrels per day in May 2006;

The majority of water sector projects and health care clinics planned in 2003 remain not completed, despite spending hundreds of millions of dollars;

One in three Iraqi children is malnourished and underweight, according to the United Nations Children's Fund.

Rather than a record of progress and achievement, the Bush administration's record is one of corruption and waste:

$8.8 billion given to Iraqi ministries by the Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA, remains unaccounted for, according to the Congressional Research Service;

Iraqi Defense Ministry officials spent $1 billion on questionable arms purchases;

The Interior Ministry has at least 1,100 ghost employees, costing $1.3 million a month.

In short, we have no strategy, no support from allies or friends in the region, a nascent civil war in the country we are supposed to be helping, an overstretched military, a misdirected counterterrorism effort, and a massive diversion of funds in support of a failed effort.

(II) Responding to Administration Myths and Fantasies

The Bush administration and its rubber-stamp Republican allies in the House have politicized national security in the past. They have used national security as a wedge issue to divide the country and push for policies that have not made Americans safer. But today a majority of Americans are now skeptical about the Bush administration's Iraq policy.

Myth 1: Democrats want to quit while we are ahead and the Iraqis are just getting started.

Conservatives argue that Democrats who criticize and offer alternatives are snatching defeat from the jaws of victory, retreating just as the Iraqi Government needs the most help.

Fact: The time has come for the United States to give Iraqis the incentive to stand on their own two feet and take control of their own affairs. In a few short months, the U.S. military involvement in Iraq will be longer than it took the United States to win World War II. The open-ended commitment of U.S. troops fuels as much as it retards the insurgency and civil conflict in Iraq. Nearly 9 in 10 Iraqis approve a time line for U.S. withdrawal, and 70 percent of the Iraqi public supports the withdrawal of U.S.-led forces by the end of 2007. A growing number of Iraqis, including the new prime minister, are saying that Americans must begin to leave.

U.S. troops have done their share. By getting rid of Saddam Hussein, they have given Iraqis an historic opportunity to take charge of their destiny.

By fostering the birth of the constitution and the holding of elections, they have assisted in the building of a new democracy. They have trained more than a quarter of a million Iraqi security forces. It would be self-defeating for the United States to want Iraq to succeed more than Iraqis do.

Myth 2: Democrats offer only ``cut and run'' and ``retreat and defeat.''

Facts: Belittling opponents will not divert attention from a failed policy. Staying the course and offering a vague and open-ended commitment of U.S. troops gives Iraqis a blank check and a veto of America's national security.

The future of Iraq cannot be more sacred to Americans than to Iraqis. Responsible redeployment offers Iraqis a chance to take responsibility for their political and security future after we have already aided in the creation of a new constitution, the staging of two elections, and the training of a quarter of a million security forces.

Myth 3: Democrats who raise questions and oppose the Bush Iraq policy are unpatriotic.

Over the past 3 years, the Bush administration has questioned the patriotism of its critics.

Facts: Our country's democratic system requires the active involvement of Congress on key policy questions--particularly at a time of war. The United States has a strong tradition of its Congress asking tough questions. During a time of war, including the hearings organized by Democratic Senators like Senator Harry Truman during World War II and Senator William Fulbright during Vietnam, even though the White House was controlled by Democrats.

It is the patriotic duty of Members of Congress to hold the executive branch accountable, especially during a time of war. Two prominent Vietnam war veterans, Republican Chuck Hagel and Democrat John Murtha, have recently argued that it is unpatriotic not to raise questions in a time of war. America suffers when Congress and the public are silent.

Myth 4: Democrats reject the Bush administration's efforts to advance freedom.

Facts: The Bush plan for Iraq is solidly grounded in a flawed view of combating terrorism, arguing that promoting a narrow vision of democracy will crowd out and defeat terrorists.

The United States must and should support real democratic transitions around the world. But the Bush administration's naive approach to democracy promotion--narrowly focused on elections--has failed by giving terrorist organizations an opening to seize the reins of power, as seen by the Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections earlier this year. Terrorists have been exploiting the Bush administration's flawed and narrow strategy focused on the most ostensible images of democracy, like purple fingers in elections.

Despite impressive gains in Iraq's political transition, the country remains in the very early and fragile stages of a long-term process of building a real democracy. Contrary to the rhetoric put forth by the Bush administration, Iraqis do not live in freedom, according to Freedom House, which measures trends in political rights and civil liberties over the past three decades. The rights of women and minorities are not protected; the rule of law is honored more in the breach than the observance; and political violence remains rampant. Despite much work left undone, the Bush administration has cut funding for programs to support freedom and democracy in Iraq this year.

Myth 5: Democrats who criticize the Bush policy hurt the morale of the troops.

The Bush administration and its conservative allies have said that offering criticisms and concrete policy alternatives on Iraq hurts the morale of U.S. troops.

Facts: There is no evidence that debate at home has any effect at all on the morale of troops. But other factors directly impact the lives of U.S. troops and morale--including going to war without the equipment and armor, not having a realistic strategy for Iraq and not taking care of the troops after they come home.

Not equipping the troops. When asked by a soldier in the field why U.S. troops did not have the right armor for their vehicles, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, ``As you know, you have to go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you want.'' Iraq was a war of choice, and the Bush administration had time to get ready.

Not taking care of the troops when they come home. The Bush administration has not developed policies to take care of the troops when they return from battle. Health care has proven inadequate, and wounded veterans have been hounded by debt collectors because of inefficiencies in the Pentagon's administrative systems.

Myth 6: Democrats who oppose the Bush Iraq policy are ignoring and not listening to the generals.

Facts: It is the Bush administration that has failed to listen to top U.S. generals before and during the invasion by not sending enough troops to stabilize the country. It is Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld who has constrained free expression in the military by firing or forcing out those who disagree.

Nonetheless, even the current commanding officers argue that the United States needs to take realistic steps to reduce its military presence to remove the fuel that fires the insurgency. For example, in October 2005, GEN John Abizaid, the commander of Central Command Forces, argued that the United States must reduce its ``military footprint'' in Iraq and the region as a means to create more stability, but President Bush has continued to stick with a ``stay the course'' message.

Myth 7: Democrats who criticize the Bush Iraq policy are helping the terrorists and giving them what they want.

The Bush administration has argued that questioning its plan emboldens America's terrorist enemies, an unconstitutional argument aimed solely at shutting off real debate at home. Harkening back to 2002, when Bush officials warned that people should ``watch what they say,'' President Bush and top officials in his administration have warned against ``irresponsible'' debate to limit and control democratic political debate at home, even while the Bush administration purports to advance democracy abroad.

Facts: Bush policies at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib do more to undermine our place in the world than any words spoken by administration critics. The Bush administration policies that coerce rather than create cooperation through dialogue and common purpose undermine how others view us. A new poll by the Pew Research Center finds that America's image has slipped further, and global support has declined for the U.S.-led war on terrorism.

Myth 8: Democrats prefer a world with Saddam Hussein still in charge of Iraq.

Facts: Saddam Hussein was an evil dictator, and it is a good thing that he is no longer in power. But that is not the key question today. The key question is: Where is Iraq now, and where does it go from here? And the many mistakes made by the Bush administration--including sending in too few troops to secure the country and invading without a clear and realistic plan for Iraq's reconstruction--have made the situation in Iraq much worse off than it should have been.

Iraq has become a failing state and is suffering from several major internal conflicts--in large part the consequence of the Bush administration's failure to plan for the post-war situation. And moving forward requires Iraqis, not Americans, to be in charge of the future.

Myth 9: Democrats just want to criticize and politicize Iraq and do not have plans about what to do.

Facts: This is simply not true. A growing number of leading Democrats and other progressive leaders have offered sensible alternative visions about what the United States should do next to set the right course in Iraq. Nearly all progressive plans recognize that the United States must intensify its political and

diplomatic efforts in Iraq and that the commitment of U.S. troops to Iraq should not be permanent or open-ended.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I close by quoting from the Declaration of Independence and the motto of the U.S. Army, which marks its 231st anniversary today. It may seem odd to quote the two together. But I do so because real patriots have courage--courage to face the truth and the courage to speak truth even when it is unpopular. The Declaration of Independence, with its affirmation of the inalienable human rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness gave patriots the courage to fight for a cause that was just but at the time thought by most to be unattainable. A motto of the U.S. Army is ``We will not falter, we will not fail.''

The war in Iraq does not help us in the global war on terror. There are only two directions to take in Iraq: President Bush's plan of staying the course and letting a future President clean up the mess, or the Murtha plan to change the direction of that course. I stand with Representative Murtha in calling for the redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq to make our country safer, our military stronger, and the region more stable. I support the Murtha plan. It is the only plan for success in Iraq that is worthy of the sacrifices made by our troops. And I support a plan for greater coalition support for Iraq as it moves to protecting itself as a soverign nation.

Our troops in Iraq have never faltered and they have never failed. They were never defeated in battle. They won the war they were sent to fight. They completed their mission. They performed magnificently. Well done. Well done. Well done.

Our troops have earned the right to return home and be reunited with their families and loved ones. Now is not the time for us in Congress to falter or fail. Now is the time to embrace a plan for our troops in Iraq that offers a chance of success. We need a plan that will work. There is only one such plan. It is the Murtha plan that allows for redeployment of our troops as soon as practicable and allows for redeployment of troops at the perimeter of Iraq to be used in time of crisis. This is a plan that will work.

Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, the media just reported the sad news that we have just reached a sad milestone: 2,500 Americans have lost their lives in the Iraq war. Mr. Speaker, I respectfully ask at the outset of this very important debate that the House observe a moment of silence for all those who have given the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of our country.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to speak on this issue today, this important issue for so many Americans across the country, from my home State of Missouri. So many families such as mine have young people in uniform. But this resolution before us today is not what we requested, nor is it what we were told we would have before us to debate. We expected a resolution confined to the country of Iraq and the conflict there. That is not what the resolution is. This resolution covers the Middle East waterfront, trying to blend together the Iraqi war and the war against terrorism, which has its genesis in Afghanistan.

Mr. Speaker, these are two separate and distinct wars. We did the right thing by going into Afghanistan, toppling the Taliban, which supported and protected the al Qaeda terrorists. And then came along the discussion, the international discussion about Iraq and Saddam Hussein and the weapons of mass destruction.

We made the decision, as a country, to go into Iraq. At that time, Mr. Speaker, knowing the history and the culture of the Middle East, I sent two letters to the President of the United States, one on September 4, 2002, and one on March 18, 2003, before we went into Iraq. My letters warned against the aftermath.

They sent an Assistant Secretary of State and an Assistant Secretary of Defense over to see me and said, ``Ike, it will be all right.''

We know what happened in the aftermath insurgency because we allowed the looting, we sent the Iraqi Army home, rather than give them a paycheck and a shovel, and didn't have enough troops to quell any insurgency. And it arose. And here we are, some 3 years later.

Despite the fact that this resolution is a broad one, let's talk about Iraq, which should be the complete subject of the resolution before us.

Mr. Speaker, this Nation is at a strategic crossroads. We are spending $8 billion a month, over $300 billion on this war. And more strikingly, we are losing, Mr. Speaker, a battalion's worth of casualties killed or injured between Iraq and Afghanistan. By far, most of them are, sadly, in Iraq. And there are increasing insurgent inspired attacks.

Now, what makes this resolution so interesting is the fact that it flies in the face of the law that we passed here in the Congress of the United States and the President signed. The bill, the defense bill of 2005 said this: ``Calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating conditions for the phased redeployment of the United States forces from Iraq.'' That is the law of our land. That is what the defense bill said last year. ``Thereby creating conditions for the phased redeployment of the United States forces from Iraq.''

What does this mean to us in the long run? Well, farmers in Missouri know that the quality of the corn that they plant will bring about the quality of the corn that grows. And we find ourselves militarily eating our seed corn in the country of Iraq. Sadly, a few moments ago we had a moment of silence for the 2,500th American that sacrificed a life in that sad country. But it means eating up the equipment, and we are using equipment right and left and it is going to take 3 years to refurbish the United States Army if the war would stop today equipment- wise. There are challenges in recruiting and retention. But I have to tell you how proud I am of those young people in uniform today. But if we do not take serious thought about the phraseology that is in the law creating the condition for the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq, I think that we may be eating our military seed corn. And what does this mean? It means that the United States of America will be less prepared to either deter or defend an attack that might come at some future date.

This is serious business. We need to remain strong militarily. That is the way you deter problems. Should North Korea, somewhere in Asia, somewhere in Latin America, somewhere in Africa that would cause us to be involved, the question is, Mr. Speaker, would we be prepared militarily to meet that challenge?

That is why it is very important that we do our very best to take seriously the law regarding transition this year, the significant transition.

And what will it take? It will take the Iraqi government to stand up on its own, and it is on its way there, to transfer the security problem and situation to their police force and to their military, and we have some 250,000 Iraqi military either fully trained or nearly fully trained. We have to hand the baton over to them. We as a country, whether militarily or not, cannot determine the fate of Iraq. The Iraqis have to do it themselves, their own government, their own military, and their own police force. We can be of help. We have been of help. We have been there some 3 years. I think it is time for us to seriously look at where we are, where we are going, and do our very best to keep ourselves militarily strong for those days that are bound to happen.

And, Mr. Speaker, let me remind the Members I have been in Congress 29 plus years thanks to those wonderful folks in Missouri. During that time, we have had 10 military confrontations with other countries. History being what it is reflects that, and the future may hold something similar. We hope not. But the question is will we be militarily prepared when the time comes?

The Iraq adventure needs to be looked at in light of the law that we passed last year. The calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq. That is the law. That is what the Congress passed. That is what the President signed. And that is where we are.

Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the Record at this point my letters in full to the President, dated September 4, 2002, and March 18, 2003.

Committee on Armed Services,

House of Representatives,

Washington, DC, September 4, 2002.

The President,

The White House,

Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. President: Thank you for inviting me to the

briefing this morning. I share your concern about the

continuing threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his efforts to

produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I would like to

offer my assistance as the administration considers how to

deal with this threat.

Before Congress can authorize any military action that

might be part of the administration's plan, we must have

answers to more questions than were able to be raised. at

today's meeting. Our constitutional duty requires us to

ensure that all implications of such action are considered in

advance. The case has not yet been fully made as to what the

threat is, why military force is an appropriate way of

addressing the threat, and why action must occur now. In

short, Congress and the American people must be clear on your

strategic vision before we can authorize a specific course of

action. I believe, like Clausewitz, that in strategy there is

an ``imperative . . . not to take the first step without

considering the last.''

Your strategy for dealing with Iraq must address the

fundamental questions of the threat, the method of acting,

and the timing. Furthermore, any strategy to eliminate Iraqi

WMD must also address several component issues, each of which

raises critical questions.

1. How to manage Iraq's transition to a stable post-Saddam

regime:

As I mentioned to you this morning, this is a crucial

question for administration strategy to answer in advance of

any military action. I have no doubt that our military would

decisively defeat Iraq's forces and remove Saddam. But like

the proverbial dog chasing the car down the road, we must

consider what we would do after we caught it.

As Sun-Tzu said in the classic strategic treatise, The Art

of War, ``To win victory is easy; to preserve its fruits,

difficult.'' Military planners and political leaders alike

knew this in World War II. Planning for the occupation of

Germany and Japan--two economically viable, technologically

sophisticated nations--took place well in advance of the

end of the war. The extreme difficulty of occupying Iraq

with its history of autocratic rule, its balkanized ethnic

tensions, and its isolated economic system argues both for

careful consideration of the benefits and risks of

undertaking military action and for detailed advanced

occupation planning if such military action is approved.

Specifically, your strategy must consider the form of a

replacement regime and take seriously the possibility that

this regime might be rejected by the Iraqi people, leading to

civil unrest and even anarchy. The effort must be to craft a

stable regime that will be geopolitically preferable to

Saddam and will incorporate the disparate interests of all

groups within Iraq--Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd. We must also plan

now for what to do with members of the Baath party that

continue to support Saddam and with the scientists and

engineers who have expertise born of the Iraqi WMD program.

All these efforts require careful planning and long-term

commitment of manpower and resources. The American people

must be clear about the amount of money and the number of

soldiers that will have to be devoted to this effort for many

years to come.

2. How to ensure the action in Iraq does not undermine

international support for the broader war on terrorism:

In planning for military operations in Iraq, we cannot

ignore the lack of international support to date. Pre-emptive

action against Iraq is currently vocally opposed by many of

our allies and friends throughout the world and particularly

in the Middle East.

When we are seen as acting against the concerns of large

numbers of our friends, it calls into question the ``humble''

approach to international relations you espoused during the

presidential campaign. More than that, it has several

potentially damaging long-term consequences. First, it risks

losing the large number of partners needed to prosecute the

global war on terrorism. To ferret terrorist groups out of

their many hiding places, we must have broad allied support.

Second, it risks seriously damaging U.S. moral legitimacy,

potentially providing states like India and Pakistan with a

preemptive option that could drive long-standing conflicts

beyond containable bounds.

Finally and perhaps most dangerously, actions without broad

Arab support may inflame the sources of terrorism, causing

unrest and anger throughout the Muslim world. This dynamic

will be worse if Iraq attacks Israel--perhaps with weapons of

mass destruction--and draws them into the conflict. Iran,

which has the potential to seize a reformist path, may well

move away from the United States in the face of attacks that

could next be taken against them. Together, these dynamics

will make achieving peace in the Middle East more difficult

and may well provide the rationale for more terrorist attacks

against Americans.

These concerns do not make military action in Iraq

untenable. They do, however, highlight the depth and

importance of the issues to be addressed before we strike. We

need to ensure that in taking out Saddam, we don't win the

battle and lose the war.

3. How to ensure that the United States can execute this

operation successfully as well as its other military

missions:

As you are well aware, Mr. President, the consideration of

military action against Iraq comes at a time when U.S. forces

are actively engaged throughout the world in a range of

missions. Given the operational pressures these forces

currently face, we must ask what the risks and trade-offs

will be of defeating Iraq, particularly if Iraqi forces mass

in Baghdad for urban operations. How many casualties must the

American people be prepared to take in a worst-case scenario?

What will the impact of sustained operations be on so-called

high-demand, low-density assets? What military operations

might we have to forego because of continued demands in Iraq?

Will we still be prepared for the range of other threats that

might emerge throughout the world? With little allied support

and contributions, will we still be able to maintain military

spending on transformational technologies and on sound

quality of life for our forces if we are bearing a huge

wartime cost alone? What will be the impact on the domestic

economy of these resources drains and of the long-term costs

of reconstructing Iraq? These questions must be answered

before any military action commences so that the American

people understand the risks and the sacrifices involved.

I ask these questions only to highlight the complexity of

the undertaking and the need for Congress, the American

people, and our friends around the world to understand

exactly what is at stake and why we must act now. Only such a

comprehensive strategic approach will ensure that we commit

U.S. troops consciously and with full knowledge of the range

of challenges we face--both in the initial campaign and in

the long aftermath to follow. Even a strategy that has

military action as its centerpiece will require great

diplomatic efforts to ensure its success. I look forward to

hearing the administration's answers and to working with you

to find the best course of action.

Sincerely,

Ike Skelton,

Ranking Democrat.

Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Ortiz).

(Mr. ORTIZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Meehan).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Abercrombie).

(Mr. ABERCROMBIE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Snyder).

Mr. Speaker, I take this opportunity, in light of the gentleman from Arkansas' comments, Dr. Snyder, to remind the body, Mr. Speaker, that it was the Investigation Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee that produced the all important legislation we now call Goldwater-Nickels, which brought about jointness within the armed services.

And I also might mention that all 29 Democrats sent a letter to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, from which we have not received an answer, recommending and asking that the Investigations Or Oversight Subcommittee be reestablished.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Smith).

(Mr. SMITH of Washington asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Loretta Sanchez).