Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert the following article entitled ``Why the Crackdown in Cuba,'' by Wayne S. Smith into the Record. Why the Crackdown in Cuba? (By Wayne S. Smith) Various newspaper articles reporting the deplorable…
Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert the following article entitled ``Why the Crackdown in Cuba,'' by Wayne S. Smith into the Record.
Why the Crackdown in Cuba?
(By Wayne S. Smith)
Various newspaper articles reporting the deplorable
crackdown on dissidents in Cuba have correctly noted that the
situation there earlier had seemed to be inching toward
somewhat greater tolerance. During his trip to Cuba in May of
last year, for example, President Carter met with Cuban
dissidents and in his televised speech to the nation spoke of
the Varela Project, an initiative of theirs calling for
greater political freedoms. And both before and after
Carter's visit, many other Americans, myself included,
regularly and openly met with the dissidents as part of a
broad effort to expand dialogue and improve relations between
our two countries.
Oswaldo Paya, the principal architect of the Varela
Project, was even recently allowed to come to the United
States to receive the W. Averell Harriman award from the
National Democratic Institute in Washington, and from there
he went on to Europe. The Cuban government may not have liked
what he had to say while abroad, but he wasn't punished for
it when he returned home. It did indeed seem that things
might slowly be moving toward somewhat greater tolerance of
dissent on the island.
Why then the recent arrest of dissidents? Is it, as some in
the United States quickly posited, that Castro was simply
hoping the rest of the world was so distracted by the war in
Iraq, that no one would notice or react to the detention of a
few dissidents in Cuba?
No, that explanation simply doesn't hold up. First of all,
no one in his right mind (and whatever else he is, Castro is
that) would have expected the arrest of over 80 dissidents,
many of them well-known international figures, to go
unremarked. The Cubans expected a firestorm, and they got it.
Second, the timing could hardly be worse from Castro's
standpoint. The UN Human Rights Commission has just begun its
annual deliberations to decide, among other things, whether
to condemn Cuba for violations of human fights. Given the
greater tolerance discussed above, there had seemed a good
chance that Cuba would not be condemned this year. The
cralckdown, coming just now, makes that far less likely.
Given all that, why the crackdown and why now? To answer
those questions, we must first note that the greater leeway
for dissent noted above came in response to the overtures of
groups in the American Congress and the American public, not
to any easing of the hard line on the part of the Bush
Administration. Quite the contrary, its policies and rhetoric
remained as hostile and as threatening as ever. It ignored
all Cuban offers to begin a dialogue and instead held to an
objective of regime change. As Mr. James Cason, the Chief of
the U.S. Interests Section has stated publicly, one of his
tasks was to promote ``transition to a participatory form of
government.''
Now, we would all like to see a more open society in Cuba;
that indeed, is what we are all working toward. But it is not
up to the United States to orchestrate it. In fact, it is not
up to the United States to decide what form of government
Cuba should have. Cuba is, after all, a sovereign country. To
the Cubans, for the chief U.S. diplomat in Cuba to seem to be
telling them what kind of government they should have seemed
a return to the days of the Platt Amendment.
The Bush Administration was uncomfortable with signs of
greater tolerance on Castro's part, for that simply
encouraged those in the United States who wanted to
ease travel controls and begin dismantling the embargo.
New initiatives along those lines were expected in the
Congress this spring. What to do to head them off?
What the Administration did is clear enough. It ordered the
Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to begin a
series of high-profile and provocative meetings with
dissidents, even holding seminars in his own residence and
passing out equipment of various kinds to them. He even held
press conferences after some of the meetings. The
Administration knew that such ``bull-in-the-china-shop''
tactics would provoke a Cuban reaction--hopefully an
overreaction. And given that the purpose was ``regime
change'', the Cubans came to see them as ``subversive'' in
nature and as increasingly provocative. Those arrested were
not charged with expressing themselves against the state, but
with ``plotting with American diplomats.''
The circumstances are different, but to understand Cuban
sensitivities in this case, let us imagine the reaction of
the U.S. Government if Cuban diplomats here were meeting with
members of the Puerto Rican Independence Party to help them
promote Puerto Rico's transition from commonwealth to
independence. Perhaps the Attorney General would not arrest
everyone involved, but I wouldn't take any bets on it.
And the beginning of the war in Iraq did play a role in the
crackdown. The Cubans saw it as a signal that the United
States was determined to throw its weight around and to blow
away anyone it doesn't like through the unilateral use of
force. As one Cuban official put it to me recently: ``This
new preemptive-strike policy of yours puts us in a new ball
game, and in that new game, we must make it clear that we
can't be pushed around.''
It was this kind of mind set that led to the crackdown and
that turned the latter into a massive overreaction. The
Cubans did exactly what the Bush Administration had hoped
they would do. Virtually the whole active dissident community
has now not only been arrested but put on trial (or notified
that they soon will be) and given extremely heavy sentences.
Tragic. This is a blot that will not be easily erased and
that will impede any significant progress in U.S.-Cuban
relations until there is some amelioration of conditions in
Cuba. The Bush Administration meanwhile will certainly
continue the pressures, and the provocations, so as to
prevent any such amelioration.
It has been argued that Castro simply saw this as a
propitious moment to halt dissent in Cuba, and there are
doubtless some elements of truth to that argument. Castro has
never liked to be criticized. Still over the past few years,
he had tolerated criticism of the system. All things being
equal he might have continued to do so. But the situation has
changed, not just between the U.S. and Cuba, but
internationally, in ways that the U.S. public is just
beginning to understand.
In the dark days that lie ahead, people of good will in the
United States who want to see a more normal relationship
between our two countries, and to see a more open society in
Cuba, should hold to the demonstrable truth that the best way
to bring about both is through the reduction of tensions, the
beginning of a meaningful dialogue and increased contacts. As
Elizardo Sanchez, Cuba's leading human rights activist, has
often put it, ``the more American citizens in the streets of
Cuban cities, the better for the cause of a more open
society; so why do you maintain travel controls?'' The
policies followed by one administration after another over
the past 44 years have accomplish nothing positive. True to
form, the policy followed by the Bush Administration, and the
clumsy tactics of the U.S. Interests Section, have produced
only a crackdown. Exactly what we should not want!