Mr. Chair, I rise to offer an amendment to suspend implementation of section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Mr. Chairman, this misguided provision in Dodd-Frank requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to mandate that public companies…
Mr. Chair, I rise to offer an amendment to suspend implementation of section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Mr. Chairman, this misguided provision in Dodd-Frank requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to mandate that public companies disclose whether so-called ``conflict minerals'' they use in their products benefit armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its nine adjoining countries.
Despite its best intentions, section 1502 has been ineffective and, in some cases, has been shown to have increased violence is central Africa. That is why this suspension that I am proposing passed the House last year as an amendment to the FSGG appropriations bill, and a full repeal of section 1502 passed the House this Congress as part of the Financial CHOICE Act.
Conflict minerals refer to tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold, which have been used in a variety of products, from cell phones, cosmetics, jewelry, footwear, apparel, and even auto suppliers located in west Michigan.
Mr. Chairman, the breadth of voices opposing section 1502 is remarkable, and I would like to start with those that matter most. For too long, the people of central Africa have been overlooked in this debate, even though they are the ones who suffer from Dodd-Frank's unintended consequences.
I include in the Record an open letter from 70 Congolese leaders and other regional experts.
An Open Letter
Dear governments, companies, non-governmental
organisations, and other stakeholders implicated in efforts
of various kinds related to the issue of `conflict minerals',
In early 2014, two international industry giants--Intel and
Apple--issued refined corporate social responsibility
policies for minerals sourced in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC). The announcements followed an
unprecedented wave of
guidelines, law-making, and initiatives over the past few
years to `clean up' the eastern DRC's mining sector, and were
met with widespread praise.
Perhaps the most widely publicised of these efforts is US
legislation known as Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act,
which asks all companies registered on the US stock market to
reveal their supply chains to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) when sourcing minerals from the eastern DRC
or neighbouring countries. Canada is in the advanced stages
of developing similar legislation, and many other countries
are looking closely at the issue. The European Union has
introduced a voluntary conflict minerals regulation scheme
for all member states, and the United Nations (UN) and
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
have developed guidelines on sourcing natural resources in
high-risk areas such as the eastern DRC.
These efforts primarily target artisanal (or `informal')
mining in the eastern DRC, due to widespread international
recognition that so-called conflict minerals (most notably
tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold) produced by artisanal
mining in this part of the world have helped conflict actors
generate revenue to finance their operations in the DRC over
the past two decades.
The Situation
Despite successes of activists in shaping policy, the
conflict minerals campaign fundamentally misunderstands the
relationship between minerals and conflict in the eastern
DRC. First, while the minerals help perpetuate the conflict,
they are not its cause. National and regional political
struggles over power and influence as well as issues such as
access to land and questions of citizenship and identity are
just some of the more structural drivers of conflict. The
ability to exploit and profit from minerals is often a means
to finance military operations to address these issues,
rather than an end in itself. Internal UN assessments, for
instance, show that only 8% of the DRC's conflicts are linked
to minerals, and specific motivations vary greatly across the
vast array of different armed groups.
Second, armed groups are not dependent on mineral revenue
for their existence. The eastern DRC is a fully militarised
economy, in which minerals are just one resource among many
that armed groups--and the national army FARDC--can levy
financing from. The M23, until recently the most powerful
non-state armed group in DRC, never sought physical control
over mining activity.
Moreover, few local stakeholders have been included in on-
going international policy-making, and as a result realities
on the ground have not always been taken into account.
Setting up the required systems and procedures to regularly
access and audit thousands of artisanal mining sites in
isolated and hard-to-reach locations spread across an area
almost twice the size of France would be a challenge for any
government. In the eastern DRC, where road infrastructure is
poor to non-existent and state capacity desperately low, the
enormity of the task is hard to overstate. But in demanding
that companies prove the origin of minerals sourced in the
eastern DRC or neighbouring countries before systems able to
provide such proof have been put in place, conflict minerals
activists and resultant legislation--in particular Section
1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act--inadvertently incentivize buyers
on the international market to pull out of the region
altogether and source their minerals elsewhere.
The Result
As a result, the conflict minerals movement has yet to lead
to meaningful improvement on the ground, and has had a number
of unintended and damaging consequences. Nearly four years
after the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act, only a small
fraction of the hundreds of mining sites in the eastern DRC
have been reached by traceability or certification efforts.
The rest remain beyond the pale, forced into either
illegality or collapse as certain international buyers have
responded to the legislation by going `Congo-free'.
This in turn has driven many miners into the margins of
legality (for instance, feeding into smuggling rackets),
where armed actors return through the loopholes of
transnational regulation. Others have simply lost their jobs,
and in areas where mining has ceased, local economies have
suffered. To put this in context, an estimated eight to ten
million people across the country are dependent on artisanal
mining for their livelihood. Some former miners have returned
to subsistence agriculture, but persisting insecurity levels
leave them in abject poverty facing dire living conditions,
in fear of missing harvests due to displacement. Others have
been prompted to join militias as a means to quick cash in
the absence of other opportunities; a particularly perverse
impact, when one considers the intentions of the movement.
Alongside the impact on mining communities and local
economies, several armed groups have responded by turning to
different businesses such as trading in charcoal, marijuana,
palm oil, soap, or consumer goods. Those remaining in the
mining sector have largely traded mineral exploitation on
site for mineral taxation a few steps down the supply chain,
operating numerous roadblocks that can bring in millions of
dollars a year. Others are reported to have sent in family
members or civilian allies to run business for them on site,
while they remain safely at a distance.
For the few mining sites fortunate enough to be reached by
Joint Assessment Teams responsible for determining their
`conflict-free' status, these teams have been unable to
provide the regular, three-month validation visits envisaged
in legislation. There is an additional delay of several
months following these visits before the Congolese Ministry
of Mines reviews and approves the assessment at the national
level. Given the speed at which situations can change in
volatile environments, infrequent assessments and lengthy
delays raise concerns over the accuracy of certification and
the credibility of the system.
More worrying still, multinational corporations such as
Apple and Intel are auditing smelters to determine the
conflict-free status of the minerals they source, and not the
mines themselves. As smelters are located outside of the DRC
and audits are not always conducted by third parties, these
processes raise further concerns over whether conflict-free
certifications reflect production realities.
By far the most advanced site in terms of producing
`conflict-free' minerals for sale to the international market
is Kalimbi, a tin mining area home to externally-financed
initiatives running an industry-led bagging-and-tagging
scheme called iTSCi. Yet even here, despite the establishment
of a `closed pipeline' from mine to exportation, the mine
still suffers from the sporadic influence of armed actors,
and miners are made to bear the additional costs of
`conflict-free' schemes. This raises further concerns over
the credibility of the system in place, and its suitability
for the scale-up and expansion to other, more remote mine
sites currently underway. Coupled with slow progress in
implementation, the trend towards the monopolisation of
`conflict-free' supply chain initiatives, in particular
traceability by iTSCi, is economically damaging to local
populations since it currently excludes and isolates the
overwhelming majority of mining communities from legal access
to international markets.
The Alternative
There is broad consensus for the need to clean up the
eastern Congo's minerals sector, yet much disagreement about
the international community's current model for achieving
this goal. As such, efforts to improve transparency in the
eastern DRC's mineral supply chains should continue. Yet a
more nuanced and holistic approach that takes into account
the realities of the eastern DRC's mining sector and the
complexity of the conflict is needed. To this end, we make
the following five recommendations:
Improve consultation with government and communities:
Congolese government and civil society were poorly consulted
on Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act prior to its passing,
and as a result many were unaware of its implications. The
few who were consulted were unanimously pro-Dodd-Frank,
creating additional conflicts on local levels where
endorsement and dissent compete. More Congolese voices must
be listened to, and the local context and power structures
taken into account. This would ensure greater understanding
of the local context and better harmonisation with existing
national and regional initiatives, such as the International
Conference of the Great Lakes Region's (ICGLR) Regional
Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources.
Work towards meaningful reform: The audit process should be
designed to improve policies and practices rather than to
just provide window-dressing. The dominant belief that static
oversight and validation processes ensure `conflict-free'
mineral trade is misplaced given the volatile security
situation in most of the eastern DRC. Both mines and smelters
should be regularly inspected and the time period between
inspection and certification minimized. Where this is not
feasible, additional waivers or similar measures should not
be ruled out.
Create incentives towards better practice: Legal frameworks
must be supported by real projects on the ground that can
meet their requirements. If this is not possible--which is
clearly still the case today, nearly four years after the
passing of Dodd-Frank--then transition periods must be
extended and the lowering of excessively high standards for
`conflict-free' minerals should be considered. Similarly,
former conflict actors should be incentivised where
appropriate to join new `conflict-free' schemes. This may
help avoid the eventual subversion or infiltration of the
`clean' system put in place, as has been seen to date.
Promote fair competition: Regulation must be based on
competition that allows not only international businesses but
also Congolese producers to influence (i.e. increase) local
price schemes. This in turn would encourage a regime that
ensures minimum wages which mining cooperatives can guarantee
to their members based on their increased leverage on the
price fluctuation.
Widen the lens: Root causes of conflict such as land,
identity, and political contest in the context of a
militarized economy, rather than a single focus on minerals,
must be considered by advocates seeking to reduce conflict
violence. Furthermore, efforts to eradicate conflict minerals
should not overlook the fact that artisanal mining is a key
livelihood in the eastern DRC that holds as much potential to
help steer the region away from conflict as it does to
contribute towards it. More supportive measures are needed--
such as those found in the earlier 2009
draft of the US Conflict Minerals Act--that can help capture
the economic potential of artisanal mining. Finally, other
critical challenges such as access to credit, technical
knowledge, hazardous working conditions, and environmental
degradation should not be ignored by multinational
corporations if they seek to improve business practices and
increase transparency in their supply chains.
So far, progress has been made in producing more ethical
products for consumers, but stakeholders have not yet
proceeded to improve the lives of Congolese people, nor
address the negative impact current `conflict-free'
initiatives are having. If the conflict minerals agenda is to
lead to positive change on the ground, legislation passed by
national governments and steps such as those outlined by
Apple or Intel need to be grounded in a more holistic
approach that is better tailored to local realities. Failure
to do so will continue to seriously limit the ability of
conflict minerals initiatives to improve the daily lives of
the eastern Congolese and their neighbours. Worse, these
initiatives will risk contributing to, rather than
alleviating, the very conflicts they set out to address.
List of Signatories
1. Aloys Tegera (Director, POLE Institute Goma)
2. Ann Laudati (Lecturer at the School for Geographical
Sciences, University of Bristol)
3. Ashley Leinweber (Assistant Professor of Political
Science, Missouri State University)
4. Ben Radley (Researcher, International Institute of
Social Studies & `Obama's Law' Producer)
5. Bonnie Campbell (Professor of Political Science,
Universite du Quebec a Montreal)
6. Christiane Kayser (Independent Analyst & Civil Peace
Service-Bread for the World mobile team)
7. Christoph Vogel (Researcher, University of Zurich &
Independent analyst/writer)
8. Cyprien Birhingingwa (Executive Secretary, COSOC-GL &
Coordinator of CENADEP Kivu)
9. Daniel Rothenberg (Professor of Practice, School of
Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University)
10. David Rieff (Independent Author and Commentator).
11. Deo Buuma (Executive Secretary, Action pour la Paix et
la Concorde--APC, Bukavu)
12. Didier de Failly s.j. (Directeur, Mason de Mines du
Kivu, Bukavu)
13. Dominic Johnson (Africa Editor and Deputy Foreign
Editor, die tageszeitung)
14. Dorothea Hilhorst (Professor of Humanitarian Aid and
Reconstruction, Wageningen University)
15. Emmanuel Shamavu (Director, APRODEPED, Bukavu)
16. Eric Kajemba (Coordinator, Observatoire Gouvernance et
Paix, Bukavu)
17. Esther Marijnen (Researcher, Institute for European
Studies/Vrije Universiteit Brussel)
18. Evariste Mfaume (Executive Director, ``Solidarite des
Volontaires pour l'Humanite'')
19. Gabriel Kamundala (Researcher, CEGEMI & Universite
Catholique de Bukavu)
20. Ganza Buroko (Cultural Operator & Coordinator of
Yole!Africa, Goma).
21. Godefroid Ka Mana (Professor, ULPGL Goma & UEA Bukavu &
Universite Kasavubu Boma)
22. Godefroid Muzalia (Professor, Institut Superieur
Pedagogique de Bukavu)
23. Henning Tamm (Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow,
Nuffield College, University of Oxford)
24. Herbert Weiss (Emeritus Professor of Political Science,
City University of New York)
25. James Smith (Associate Professor of Anthropology,
University of California/Davis)
26. Jean Ziegler (Former UN Special Rapporteur for the
Right to Food and Professor at University of Geneva)
27. Jeroen Cuvelier (Postdoctoral Researcher, Wageningen
University and Ghent University)
28. John Kanyoni (Independent Consultant and Vice-President
of the Congolese Chamber of Mines)
29. Josaphat Musamba (Assistant Professor, Universite Simon
Kimbangu of Bukavu)
30. Joschka Havenith (Independent Researcher and
Consultant, Cologne).
31. Jose Diemel (Researcher, Special Chair for Humanitarian
Aid & Reconstruction, Wageningen University)
32. Joshua Walker (Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University
of the Witwatersrand)
33. Josue Mukulumanya (President of the South Kivu mining
cooperatives board GECOMISKI)
34. Justine Brabant (Independent Researcher and Journalist)
35. Juvenal Munubo (Member of Parliament, Democratic
Republic of the Congo)
36. Juvenal Twaibu (Director, Centre Independant de
Recherches et d'Etudes Strategiques au Kivu)
37. Ken Matthysen (Researcher on artisanal mining in
eastern Congo, Antwerp)
38. Kizito Mushizi (Member of Parliament, Democratic
Republic of the Congo)
39. Koen Vlassenroot (Director, Conflict Research Group &
Professor, Ghent University)
40. Kris Berwouts (Independent Consultant and Author).
41. Kristof Titeca (Assistant Professor, University of
Antwerp)
42. Laura Seay (Assistant Professor of Government, Colby
College)
43. Ley Uwera (Independent Journalist and Author, Goma)
44. Loochi Muzaliwa (Programme Coordinator, Life and Peace
Institute DRC)
45. Micheline Mwendike (Activist, on behalf of LUCHA--Lutte
pour le Changement/Struggle for Change)
46. Manuel Wollschlager (Conseiller Technique, ZFD-AGEH in
Bukavu)
47. Milli Lake (Assistant Professor, Arizona State
University)
48. Nicole Eggers (Assistant Professor of African History,
Loyola University New Orleans)
49. Odile Bulabula (Deputy Coordinator, RIO--Network for
Organisational Innovation, Bukavu)
50. Padraic MacOireachtaigh (Regional Advocacy and
Communications Officer, Jesuit Refugee Service).
51. Pamela Faber (Researcher, St Catherine's College,
University of Oxford)
52. Passy Mubalama (Independent Journalist and Author,
Goma)
53. Paul Muhindo Mulemberi (Member of Parliament,
Democratic Republic of the Congo)
54. Paul-Romain Namegabe (Professor of Law, Director of
CEGEMI, Universite Catholique de Bukavu)
55. Paulin Bishakabalya (Director of Humanitarian
Assistance and Development Committee, Bukavu)
56. Peer Schouten (Postdoctoral Researcher, University of
Gothenburg)
57. Phil Clark (Reader in Comparative and International
Politics, SOAS / University of London)
58. Rachel Niehuus (Postdoctoral Researcher at University
of California, San Francisco)
59. Rachel Strohm (Researcher in Political Science,
University of Berkeley)
60. Raf Custers (Independent Journalist and Author on
Mining).
61. Remy Kasindi (Director, Centre for Research and
Strategic Studies in Central Africa, Bukavu)
62. Rodrigue Rukumbuzi (Coordinator, AGAPE-Hauts Plateaux,
Uvira)
63. Rosebell Kagumire (Independent Consultant and Blogger,
Kampala/Addis Ababa)
64. Salammbo Mulonda Bulambo (Director, PIAP, Bukavu)
65. Sara Geenen (Postdoctoral Researcher, Institute of
Development Policy, Antwerp University)
66. Sekombi Katondolo (Director, Radio Mutaani, Goma)
67. Severine Autesserre (Assistant Professor, Barnard
College, Columbia University)
68. Thomas Idolwa Tchomba (Consultant and Mining Expert,
Goma)
69. Timothy Makori (Researcher, Department of Anthropology,
University of Toronto)
70. Timothy Raeymaekers (Lecturer in Political Geography,
University of Zurich)
71. Yvette Mwanza (President of the Mining Committee,
Federation des Entreprises Congolaises North Kivu)
72. Zacharie Bulakali (Independent Researcher on mining in
eastern Congo).
All the signatories listed express their support to the
open letter in its above form but not necessarily approve of
accompanying opinion pieces and/or explanatory notes, which
remain their respective authors' views.
Mr. Chair, they state in the letter that section 1502 provisions ``. . . inadvertently incentivize buyers on the international market to pull out of the region altogether and source their minerals elsewhere.
``As a result, the conflict minerals movement has yet to lead to meaningful improvement on the ground, and has had a number of unintended and damaging consequences.''
Dodd-Frank's impact on African miners may seem unimportant to many rich-country activists, but in the Congo, it has been the question of life or death.
According to a Washington Post article entitled ``How a well- intentioned U.S. law left Congolese miners jobless,'' section 1502 ``set off a chain of events that has propelled millions of Congolese miners and their families deeper into poverty.''
The article goes on to share the story of how a Congolese teenager could no longer feed himself after Dodd-Frank ravaged the country's mining sector, forcing the young man to actually join an armed group; the outcome diametrically opposed in the goal of section 1502.
Mr. Chairman, no one can claim that these effects were unforeseeable. In fact, in a letter to the SEC commenting on section 1502, leaders from three Congolese mining cooperatives predicted that the conflict minerals rule would lead to a devastating boycott.
These miners wrote: ``We cannot continue to suffer any longer. Do we now have to choose between dying by a bullet or starving to death?''
I ask my colleagues to remember the Congolese aren't alone in their suffering. The SEC's rules apply to nine
other nations as if they were all one single country. Section 1502 treats over 230 million Africans living in 10 distinct nations as one undifferentiated group.
Dodd-Frank's supporters will say that at this point, some countries neighboring Congo may help smuggle minerals on behalf of armed groups, which is why we need to paint with such a broad brush. But I would ask my colleagues to name another example where a country's economy and each of its neighbors is targeted due to a presumed smuggling risk.
Do we design Russia sanctions to apply to each of its 14 adjoining countries, too?
Do Iranian sanctions implicate all seven of its neighbors?
Perhaps advocates for section 1502 believe that there is no smuggling from Russia and Iran, but the real issue seems to be this: Dodd-Frank supporters have no problem treating Africans differently from other regions of the world.
I find that troubling. So now let's consider implementation of section 1502 itself.
In April of this year, the GAO reported that section 1502 has produced little meaningful information on conflict mineral sourcing. It found that more than half of the companies in 2016 couldn't even determine what country their minerals came from. Most importantly, virtually none of the companies could tell whether their minerals benefited armed groups, a conclusion that echoed GAO's findings from 2015 and 2014 as well.
No wonder companies can't figure this out, Mr. Chairman. Even the Department of Commerce has reported that it is unable to determine whether smelters around the world use minerals traceable to armed groups. In other words, Dodd-Frank is asking U.S. companies--some of which are very small and medium-sized entrepreneurs in large corporations' supply chains--to produce information that even the Federal Government can't provide.
As if that weren't enough, the courts also struck down parts of section 1502 for violating companies' First Amendment rights.
The Trump administration's SEC has had enough of section 1502 failures, and is now reexamining the conflict mineral rule. The State Department is now conducting a review to see how responsible sourcing can be undertaken more effectively. The amendment I am offering today would suspend section 1502 while the administration completes its assessment.
Mr. Chairman, the facts I have laid out on section 1502 aren't partisan, and a suspension shouldn't be either. So let me close with the words of Barack Obama's Securities and Exchange Commission Chair, Mary Jo White, who, in 2013, said: ``Seeking to improve safety in mines for workers or to end horrible human rights atrocities in the DRC are compelling objectives, which, as a citizen, I wholeheartedly share. But as Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission, I must question, as a policy matter, using the Federal securities laws and the SEC's powers of mandatory disclosure to accomplish these goals.''
It should tell us something when even Democrats' own Securities and Exchange Commission Chair warns that Dodd-Frank overreached on conflict minerals. A suspension would be something that Republicans and Democrats can agree on, and I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.