Mr. Speaker, the chairman can be assured that since my team was one and done, I will skip the bracket discussion here. Mr. Speaker, I want to start by thanking the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Poliquin) for his work on this very reasonable…
Mr. Speaker, the chairman can be assured that since my team was one and done, I will skip the bracket discussion here.
Mr. Speaker, I want to start by thanking the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Poliquin) for his work on this very reasonable legislation.
Stress tests are a good idea that should be standard practice in any company. What is not a good idea--and, quite frankly, not terribly helpful in promoting systemic financial stability--is the cryptic and arbitrary manner in which stress tests are handled today.
Today, the Federal Reserve imposes these stress tests on all financial firms with more than $10 billion in consolidated assets. This doesn't apply just to banks, despite the fact that the Fed is a bank regulator. This requirement to submit information extends to nonbank financial firms as well.
Mr. Speaker, let me take a moment to walk you through what one of these stress tests looks like. A financial firm is given cryptic instructions to run a number of scenarios to test the fortitude of the institution. That firm then submits tens of thousands of pages to the Fed. In some cases, that number can climb to more than 100,000 pages at a cost of millions of dollars.
Mr. Speaker, to give you an idea of what 20,000 pages is, in our committee hearing, we had a visual aid there with a table about this size right here in front of me today, about 3 feet tall, and boxes all around. That is 20,000 pages. Some of these stress tests, Mr. Speaker, are 100,000 pages, five times that amount, hundreds of thousands--if not millions--of dollars to do these stress tests; and, quite frankly, there is very little evidence that the Fed actually reads all the paperwork. In fact, one day you will probably get a call from the Fed, and they will tell you whether you passed or not. It is a very subjective test. There is no real explanation offered if a firm fails. The message is just to try again and keep trying until you finally pass the test and guess what the model is. This is not a productive exercise for anyone.
The truth of the matter is that the Fed has no business conducting and analyzing stress tests on nonbanks. Those firms have functional regulators, like the SEC and CFTC, which better understand the business models and performance of nonbanks and, as such, the risks those firms pose to the financial stability of the United States. The actual supervisor of these companies should be the only entity with the ability to require these sorts of activities, and Mr. Poliquin's bill allows for that.
Mr. Speaker, this legislation is about promoting thoughtful and effective legislation. It is about curtailing a one-size-fits-all--as the chairman mentioned earlier--approach to regulation, something Members from both sides of the aisle have claimed to support.
Mr. Speaker, I want to again thank the gentleman from Maine for his leadership on this issue, and I urge support of this legislation.