Mr. Speaker, today I enter into the Congressional Record a report by the Iran Policy Committee (IPC) entitled, ``U.S. Policy Options for Iran.'' The IPC found that Iran presents a growing challenge to U.S. interests and values in a number…
Mr. Speaker, today I enter into the Congressional Record a report by the Iran Policy Committee (IPC) entitled, ``U.S. Policy Options for Iran.'' The IPC found that Iran presents a growing challenge to U.S. interests and values in a number of areas. The report examines the U.S. policy options for addressing these concerns and calls for change in Iran based on internal Iranian opposition.
We need to foster greater awareness and dialogue in Congress about this critical situation. To that end, I urge my colleagues to review this report and join me developing an effective U.S. policy on Iran.
U.S. Policy Options for Iran
Prepared by: Iran Policy Committee (IPC)
co-chairs
Ambassador James Akins, (ret.)
Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, USMC (ret.), CEO, wvc3, inc.
Paul Leventhal, Founder and President Emeritus, Nuclear
Control Institute
Dr. Neil Livingstone, CEO, Global Options, Inc.
Bruce McColm, President, Institute for Democratic
Strategies and Former President, International Republican
Institute
Lt. General (ret.) Thomas McInerney Former Assistant Vice
Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Captain Chuck Nash (ret.) President, Emerging Technologies
International
Lt. General Edward Rowny (ret.) Former Ambassador Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks
Professor Raymond Tanter Former Staff Member, National
Security Council
Major General (ret.) Paul Vallely, Military Committee
Chairman, Center for Security Policy
Executive Director: Clare Lopez Strategic Policy and
Intelligence Analyst
U.S. Policy Options for Iran: Executive Summary
Iran poses six threats to American interests and ideals:
Drive to acquire nuclear weapons.
Continuing support for and involvement with terrorist
networks.
Aid to groups working against the Arab-Israel peace
process.
Disruptive role in Iraq.
Expansionist radical ideology.
Denial of basic human rights to its own population.
With respect to these threats from Iran, Washington circles
largely divide between two alternatives--those who favor
engagement with and those who support military strikes
against the regime Few favor regime change as an end in
itself.
While the Bush administration does not yet explicitly call
for changing the regime, it advocates working with the
Iranian people as opposed to the unelected theocracy in
Tehran, which is an implicit policy of regime change.
By calling for change in Tehran based on the Iranian
opposition instead of the U.S. military, the Iran Policy
Committee (IPC) highlights a third alternative: Keep open
diplomatic and military options, while providing a central
role for the Iranian opposition to facilitate regime change.
IPC joins the debate in Washington over Iran policy
initiated by think tank reports on Iran--Council on Foreign
Relations (CFR), The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD),
and The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (TWI). In
contrast to the thrust of such reports, IPC suggests that
Iranian opposition groups ought to play a central role in
U.S. policymaking regarding Iran.
Comprised of former officials who have worked on the Middle
East in the White House, State Department, Pentagon,
intelligence agencies, Congress, and experts from think tanks
and universities, IPC welcomes the occasion to support the
Iranian people in pursuit of U.S. national interests. But
continued designation since 1997 of the main Iranian
opposition group, Mujahedeen e-Khalq (MEK), as a foreign
terrorist organization by the State Department assures Tehran
that regime change is off the table. Removing the MEK's
terrorist designation would be a tangible signal to Tehran
and to the Iranian people that a new option is implicitly on
the table--regime change.
U.S. Policy Options for Iran
Introduction
`` . . . liberty in our land depends on the success of
liberty in other lands . . . . So it is the policy of the
United States to seek and support the growth of democratic
movements and institutions in every nation and culture.--
President George W. Bush, Inaugural Address, 20 January 2005.
``As you stand for liberty, America stands with you.''--
President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2
February 2005.
Using the theme of liberty in general from his Inaugural
Address, President Bush refers directly to the Iranian people
in his State of the Union Address. In so doing, he tacitly
``targets'' the regime in Tehran.
The question is what means should the President use to
decrease threats posed by Iran:
Continued negotiations, including positive and negative
incentives.
Future military action.
Support for the Iranian opposition.
These options are neither mutually exclusive nor logically
exhaustive; but they do reflect courses of action being
considered in Washington.
Because the Iranian regime's policies pose direct threats
to national security interests
and ideals of the United States Government (USG) and those of
its allies and friends, Iran is on the front burner of
American foreign policy.
Consider these six Iranian threats to U.S. interests and
ideals:
Drive to acquire nuclear weapons.
Continuing support for and involvement with terrorist
networks.
Aid to groups working against the Arab-Israel peace
process.
Disruptive role in Iraq.
Expansionist radical ideology.
Denial of basic human rights to its own population.
The Iran Policy Committee (IPC) analyzes these dangers and
makes recommendations to meet them. It is not the intention
of the IPC to duplicate analysis already receiving
consideration in policymaking circles; rather, this policy
paper offers a distinct perspective and recommends a course
of action that is different in key aspects from what has been
proposed to date. IPC seeks to build upon the President's
disposition to work with the Iranian people by broadening
options for American policymakers regarding Iran.
For too long, Washington has been divided between those who
favor engagement with and those who support military strikes
against the Iranian regime. The Committee stresses the
potential for a third alternative: Keep open diplomatic and
military options, while providing a central role for the
Iranian opposition to facilitate regime change.
President Bush's 2005 State of the Union Address ignores
the leadership in Iran in order to converse directly with
Iranian people. And it is not his first time doing so;
indeed, the President's radio address of December 2002 began
the process of having a conversation with the people instead
of diplomatic discourse with the regime.
The IPC urges the administration to acknowledge the threat
posed to American national security interests by the
totalitarian theocracy in Tehran and to adopt a policy that
proactively steps forward to defend those interests.
Furthermore, the IPC believes that Washington should
support the Iranian people in their efforts to participate
meaningfully in a representative government that is
responsive to their concerns; implicit in such support is the
recognition that the Iranian people have the right to choose
and change their own government, as they see fit.
IPC joins the debate in Washington over Iran policy
initiated by think tank reports on Iran--Council on Foreign
Relations (CFR), The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD),
and The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (TWI). In
contrast to the thrust of such reports, IPC suggests that
Iranian opposition groups ought to play a central role in
U.S. policymaking regarding Iran.
Themes running through these think tank reports include the
following reasons for dissatisfaction with American policy
toward Iran. Critics hold that U.S. policy is not well
articulated because of bureaucratic differences; there are
too many or too few carrots in relation to sticks; and
American policy is not linked enough with Europe's approach
to Iran. The reports view the threat of sanctions and force
as well as the promise of diplomacy as complementary tools
in the Western arsenal. At issue is the mix between
negative and positive incentives, a formula for which
there is little accord among transatlantic partners.
While some place the burden on Washington to resolve Iran's
nuclear proliferation activities and its state sponsored
international terrorism, few place that responsibility
directly on the Iranian people. With the possible exception
of the CPD, there is too little acknowledgment of a role for
Iranians in general and groups opposed to the regime in
particular.
As a result, there is a niche for the Iran Policy Committee
to address Iranian threats from the perspective of
encouraging the people to be principal agents change. Without
the active participation of Iranians, moreover, regime change
from the outside is unlikely to succeed.
En route to her first overseas mission to Europe on
February 3, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice held
that the Iranian people should have a chance to ``change
their own future,'' a statement IPC considers as a euphemism
for regime change.
Summing up the U.S. government's principal concerns with
respect to Iran, Rice further stated that, ``The goal of the
administration is to have a regime in Iran that is responsive
to concerns that we have about Iran's policies, which are
about 180 degrees antithetical to our own interests at this
point.''
While the debate in Washington concerns whether to make
explicit its tacit policy of regime change for Iran, the
debate in the region is the race between two clocks--a
diplomatic and a nuclear timepiece.
On one hand, at issue is whether negotiations can slow down
Tehran's march toward nuclear weapons status before Iran
acquires such status. The Committee holds that the diplomacy
is moving too slowly in relation to nuclear weapons progress.
On the other hand, unless working with the Iranian people
rapidly leads to regime change in Tehran, the pace of nuclear
weapons development might leave Washington with what he
Committee believes is the least desirable option of waging
military strikes against Iran.
Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program
Regarding impact in the region, the nature of the regime in
Tehran is of greater import than its nuclear weapons
capability: An Iran with representative institutions with a
nuclear weapons capability would not be as destabilizing as
nuclear weapons in the hands of the unelected, expansionist
theocracy. The best outcome is a freely-elected,
representative government without nuclear weapons; only with
such a government would such an outcome be possible.
The nightmare scenario is that a nuclear weapons capability
in the hands of an aggressive and repressive regime in Tehran
raises the possibility that it could and would collaborate
with transnational networks to carry out nuclear terrorism.
In any event, of the six critical threats posed by Iran, its
drive to acquire nuclear weapons is the first and most
urgent.
According to June 2004 testimony by Undersecretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton,
defense experts in the United States strongly believe that
Iran has a clandestine program to produce nuclear weapons.
Speaking in January 2005, moreover, Bolton told reporters
that Iran's repeated support for terrorism makes it
particularly dangerous if Tehran were to acquire nuclear
weapons.
There have been new revelations about the rapid pace of
Iran's nuclear weapons progress since 2002. It is known that
Iran is developing its indigenous uranium mines; has built a
uranium conversion facility at Isfahan in central Iran; is
building a massive uranium enrichment facility at Natanz,
which is designed to house tens of thousands of centrifuges
plus numerous centrifuge production workshops, a heavy water
production plant at Arak, and a laser enrichment facility.
Revelations by diplomatic sources on February 3, 2005
suggest that Iran is testing components of its centrifuge
rotors, despite a November 2004 pledge to freeze all such
activities related to enrichment. That pledge led to an
agreement among Iran's European interlocutors and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to put a hold on
U.S. attempts to report Iran to the UN Security Council for
violations of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT). The new revelations deal a serious blow to any
hopes that Iran intends to forego uranium enrichment en route
to a nuclear weapons capability.
In separate developments on February 3, a spokesman for the
main Iranian opposition group charged that Iran has obtained
materials and expertise to make neutron initiators
(``triggers'') for an atomic bomb. A senior official of the
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), speaking in
Paris, cited secret sources inside Iran's nuclear development
programs. This person accused Tehran of conducting a secret
program to develop a nuclear triggering mechanism using
smuggled materials. He claimed that Iran has produced or
purchased from abroad quantities of polonium-210 and
beryllium, two elements required for building a ``neutron
initiator,'' which is an integral part of a nuclear bomb.
The facility where this work allegedly is taking place is a
military installation on the outskirts of Tehran, known as
Lavizan II. Remarkably, the IAEA has not inspected Lavizan II
yet, nor does it appear to be pressing for inspections there,
despite the site first being identified by the NCRI in
November 2004.
The NCRI has been instrumental in exposing Iran's secret
nuclear facilities in the past. By relying on its network
inside Iran of a member organization, the Mujahedeen e-Khalq
(MEK), the NCRI revealed a number of significant nuclear
sites including Natanz, Arak, Ab-Ali, and Lavizan.
Despite the fact that Iran is a signatory to the NPT,
Tehran has repeatedly violated its provisions and continues
to play fast and loose with IAEA efforts to monitor
compliance. The regime appears to be counting on the
apparently inexhaustible patience of the IAEA and the
Europeans, who have agreed to compromise after compromise
with Iran, to avoid having the issue brought before the
United Nations (UN) Security Council, as pursued by the
United States. The longer this negotiation takes, the more
time Iran has to engage in covert activities, enabling it to
acquire fissile materials to build and test nuclear weapons.
In other words, time is on Iran's side. The world cannot
wait for proof ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' of an Iranian
bomb. The risks of delay are too high. The international
community should be prepared to act on the recent discoveries
of evidence of weapons-related nuclear activities.
Discoveries over the past two years, along with the
revelations by Iranian opposition groups that Iran is
developing a nuclear trigger, constitute ``clear and present
evidence'' of illicit activities that, unless halted, may
lead to bomb-making.
The general view among the experts is that, if left
undeterred, Iran is only one to three years away from
producing a nuclear bomb. Indeed, there are reports from a
secret meeting that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
has ordered technicians to accelerate Iran's nuclear
program in order to achieve nuclear weapons status by the
end of 2005.
There is a notion in certain policy circles that, if Iran
feels threatened, the hard-line clerics will be further
induced to go nuclear. They propose offering additional
security assurances to Iran as an incentive to convince it to
give up its nuclear weapons program.
Given the nature and behavior of the regime, the more
plausible argument is that unless they feel threatened, the
Iranian clerical rulers will continue their nuclear weapons
program on the assumption they can get away with it. Only the
prospect of severe consequences threatening the very
existence of the regime could induce them to forego nuclear
weapons out of fear of the consequences.
nuclear delivery systems: the iranian missile program
Iran possesses one of the largest missile inventories in
the Middle East. It has acquired complete missile systems and
developed an infrastructure to build missiles indigenously.
During military exercises held in September 2004, the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards successfully test-fired a ``strategic
missile,'' likely the Shahab-3 rocket, which reportedly has a
range of up to 2,000 kilometers and is capable of carrying a
760-1,000 kilogram warhead. The Revolutionary Guards is
officially armed with the Shahab-3 missiles.
Taken in combination with Iran's drive to achieve a nuclear
weapons capability, its continuing support for radical
Islamist terrorist groups and avowed opposition to the
existence of Israel, Iran's demonstrated capability to field
an intercontinental ballistic missile raises much concern
among defense officials of many countries.
In December 2004, Iran's main opposition coalition, the
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), uncovered a
new missile program secretly pursued by Iran, as well as a
program to develop a nuclear warhead. The new secret missile,
produced at the Hemmat Missile Industries Complex in
northeast Tehran, is named Ghadar, NCRI reported. North
Korean experts are believed to be assisting the Iranian
program at this complex.
The Ghadar missile may have a range of 2,500 to 3,000
kilometers (1,550 to 1,860 miles). NCRI also reported that
Iran has improved the guidance and control system of its
Shahab-4 missiles, based on a system acquired from China.
In late January 2005, a Ukrainian legislator alleged that
Kiev sold nuclear-capable cruise missiles to Iran and China
during the period from 1999-2001. The Kh-55 cruise missile
has a range of 3,000 kilometers and is capable of carrying a
200-kiloton nuclear warhead.
In addition to Iran's nuclear weapons program and its
advanced delivery system, a second threat posed by the regime
is its support for and involvement with international
terrorist networks.
regime support for international terrorism
The Islamic Republic of Iran is the world's number one
state-sponsor of terror. It created Hizballah, supports al
Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, Hamas, and Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Tehran operates at the heart of a
network of terrorist organizations engaged in murder,
kidnapping, bombing, and other atrocities calculated to sap
the will of the United States and the West to resist.
Iran's logistical, financial and operational assistance
takes the form of providing terrorists safehaven, travel
documents such as passports, weapons, training and technical
expertise.
Information reveals a pattern of operational contacts
between the Iranian government and Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda
organization. These contacts include: joint planning of
terrorist operations, military training of bin Laden
operatives inside Iran and by Iranian IRGC and MOIS officers
in Syria and Lebanon, financial assistance to clandestine
terrorist and surveillance cells, false passports, and
communications.
The 9/11 Commission report documented in great detail the
logistical, operational, and material support provided by
Iran and Hizballah to al Qaeda. This report, released in July
2004, echoes the earlier federal grand jury findings about
links between Iran and al Qaeda. The Commission's report
stated that Iran's support of al Qaeda dates back to 1991,
when operatives from both sides met in Sudan; by 1993, ``al
Qaeda received advice and training from Hezbollah'' in
intelligence, security, and explosives, especially in how to
use truck bombs. The training took place in the Beka'a
Valley, Hizballah's stronghold in Lebanon.
According to the 9/11 commission report, there is strong
evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al Qaeda
members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and that
some of these were future 9/11 hijackers. Iran's support
for al Qaeda has continued.
Iran's Opposition to the Arab-Israel Peace Process
Tehran was instrumental in the creation of Lebanese
Hizballah, which formed in 1982 under the sponsorship of
Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who arrived in
Lebanon as the vanguard of Khomeini's Islamic revolution.
Iran continues to provide Hizballah with money, equipment,
training locations, and refuge from extradition. Its overall
financial support to Hizballah and Hamas totals tens of
millions of dollars in direct subsidies each year.
Iranian Designs in Iraq
Demography and geography facilitate the impact of Iran's
expansionist ideology. With a population three times Iraq's
and a contiguous territory four times Iraq's, Iran exerts a
naturally powerful influence on its western neighbor. Iraq's
longest border is with Iran (over 900 miles), and the vast
majority of the Iraqi population lives within a 100-mile
distance from the Iranian border, placing it well within the
sphere of Tehran's expansionist ideology.
Shiite pilgrims began flowing once again after 2003 between
the holy places in Iran and those in Iraq, especially the
holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala. Iranian intelligence
agents also flooded the country. They quietly and effectively
set up a network of agents across Iraq, recruiting and
training local village people, former Iraqi military
officers, politicians, and young men to collect intelligence
on Coalition forces and facilities.
A long period of secular Ba'athist domination in Iraq
punctuated by a savage eight-year war between Iran and Iraq
countered Iranian political influence in the region. During
this time, westward expansion of Iran's theocratic ideology
declined. With the April 2003 collapse of Saddam Hussein's
regime and ensuing breakup of existing security and border
patrol forces, Iran seized the chance to spread its influence
and launched a multifaceted military, intelligence, and
political campaign in Iraq.
Along with intelligence agents, the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS)
also sent suicide bombers, money, and weapons to support
insurgents fighting against Coalition forces in Iraq.
Testimony and documentary evidence show that officials at
the highest level of the Iranian regime have been involved
with planning and providing support for terrorists and
suicide bombers affiliated not only with the upstart
Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, but with the forces of
wanted Jordanian terrorist and al Qaeda associate, Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, and Ba'athist loyalists as well.
In late January 2004, an Iraqi terrorist leader captured in
Falluja and accused of carrying out beheadings and deadly
attacks, claimed that his group was linked to Tehran. In
footage aired January 8, 2005 on the U.S.-run television
channel, AI-Hurra, Ahmed Yassin, a leader of the Jaish
Muhammed (Muhammed's Army) and a former colonel in Saddam
Hussein's army, said two members of his group went to Iran in
April or May, where they met a number of Iranian intelligence
officials and Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei. Iranian
officials provided money, weapons, and even ``car bombs.''
During December 2004, the Najaf police chief said that the
commander of three terrorists arrested in connection with a
car bomb that exploded in the holy city on December 26, had
extensive connections to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence.
Tehran also recruited over four thousand volunteers for
suicide operations in Iraq in public ceremonies in Iran
attended by prominent Revolutionary Guards commanders.
Iranian intelligence services have pumped millions of
dollars and hundreds of operatives into Iraq. In a press
conference in October 2004, Iraq's national intelligence
chief, Mohammed Al Shahwani, accused Iran's Baghdad embassy
of recruiting elements for sabotage operations and
assassinations of his intelligence agents. He said that
documents showed Iran had a $45-million budget for sowing
chaos in Iraq. At least 27 people working in the Iranian
embassy in Baghdad were coordinating intelligence gathering
operations and assassinations, the spy chief added.
Iranian meddling is aimed at frustrating the emergence of a
stable and representative government in Iraq and also at
keeping the United States so occupied in dealing with the
insurgency that it would have neither the will nor the
resources to pressure Iran on the nuclear issue. In the
months and weeks leading up to national elections in January
2005, both Iraqi President Ghazi al-Yawar and Jordan's King
Abdullah charged that Iran was heavily involved in attempting
to influence the outcome to produce a Shiite dominated
government similar to Iran's. In an interview with the
Kuwaiti daily, Al-Qabas on January 6, 2005, Iraqi Defense
Minister Hazem Shaalan accused the Iranian regime of
``interfering [in Iraq] with money, guns, and
intelligence.''
With the apparent success of the Iraqi elections, Iraq has
now entered a new phase. Only a day after the January 2005
elections, Iranian media and web sites claimed victory,
comparing the Shiites' gain in the elections with the Iranian
revolution that brought an Islamic system to power or with
the rise of Hizballah in the Lebanese political scene in the
Middle East.
The first and most pressing post-election challenge is to
ensure the selection of a representative National Assembly
that would draft a modern, broadminded constitution for Iraq.
The aim would be to reflect Iraq's Islamic soul but avoid a
narrow formula for governance based solely on Sharia law. It
is to be expected that Iran will seek to influence the
members of the National Assembly and their drafting of this
constitution.
The makeup of the future interim government is equally
important and might succeed to avoid Iranian dominance by
seeking as diverse participation as possible from all sectors
of Iraqi society. In the transitional period before the
constitution comes up for a vote and a permanent government
and military and security structure is in place, it will be
critical to monitor Iranian efforts to influence the process.
Expansionist Radical Ideology
Iran's ``Velayat e-Faqih'' system poses both an immediate
and continuing threat to neighbors because of its aggressive
policy of expansion. This policy is evident in Iranian
actions in Lebanon and Iraq, where calculated cultivation of
terrorism is an inseparable characteristic of the theocratic
system.
Export of terrorism and extremism is an intrinsic attribute
of Iran's theocratic system. Tehran's rulers believe their
power lies in awakening the Islamic world to their Islamist
ideology. Iran's leadership clearly believes the Islamic
Republic's survival depends on the support of such a global
force.
Denial of Basic Human Rights to its own citizen
The human rights situation in Iran has deteriorated
severely over the past year. Ironically, the European Union's
``human rights dialogue'' has had the opposite effect from
that intended because the regime has continued its
suppression of the Iranian citizenry.
In December 2004, the United Nations in a resolution
criticized Iran for public executions, arbitrary sentencing,
flogging, stoning, and systematic discrimination against
women. The measure also condemned ``the execution of minors
below eighteen years of age, and the use of torture and other
forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.'' It also
rebuked Iran for discrimination against minorities, including
Christians, Jews, Sunnis, and the Baha'is.
Gender discrimination and violence against women in Iran
continue to give cause for grave concern. The parliament has
called for placing more restrictions on women's attire and on
their social freedoms. Deputies have also called for
segregating men and women at universities and for other
limits on women's activities. The number of publications
closed down and of people arrested, prosecuted and sentenced
for the peaceful expression of their opinion has increased.
While the human rights situation deteriorated in Iran, the
public discontent has been on the rise.
Political Dissent in Iran
Over the past year, hundreds of anti-government
demonstrations were held in Iran, further destabilizing the
regime. Originating with complaints over municipal issues, a
series of anti-regime demonstrations that erupted in 2004 in
many provincial cities, such as Feraydoun Kenar, Boukan, and
the earthquake-stricken city of Barn, reportedly targeted
government buildings, vehicles, and security forces.
In December 2004, students at Tehran University gave
President Khatami an angry and humiliating reception when he
admitted to the role he played in preserving the regime. They
shouted, ``Shame, shame'' while calling him a liar and
demanding his resignation.
The anti-regime movement, partly derailed by the false
expectations aroused as a result of the election of Khatami
as president in 1997, has now gained a new momentum. The
disillusionment of the population with Khatami took place in
July 1999, when he failed to support a student demonstration
that turned into a six -day popular uprising, spreading to 19
cities and shaking the foundations of the regime. In the
midst of a bloody crackdown on the students, Khatami opted to
stand by the establishment; many believe he may have
ordered some of the crackdown himself.
The opposition movement meanwhile continued its expansion,
and since 1999, many student demonstrations and popular
protests have rocked Tehran and other cities.
In Search of a New Approach toward Iran: Options
Some American policy advisors urge the administration to
refrain from taking a hard line with Tehran because they
interpret recent developments inside Iran as pointing to an
impending collapse of the system, much like the Soviet
implosion that led to the end of the communist regime in the
USSR. Other policymakers advocate engagement with the ruling
clerics in Tehran in order to solve controversial issues
outstanding between the two countries.
In a difficult atmosphere of diplomatic gridlock, internal
and international ideological divisions, and faced with an
unappealing slate of military options, the United States
needs a broad set of options. This paper outlines a full
spectrum of approaches toward Iran, beginning with diplomacy
and moving through increasingly more coercive measures,
culminating with an outright commitment to regime change.
Diplomacy
Proponents of the diplomatic approach hold that the United
States has not offered enough carrots to Iran to address its
security concerns. In addition, it is necessary to convince
Tehran that it is in its own interests to abandon outlaw
behavior, they contend.
There are several carrots that might be offered to the
Iranian regime in the hope that a good-faith demonstration by
the West to an approach of engagement would elicit desired
compliance with international norms of behavior. Most of
these incentives have already been placed on the table.
This diplomatic approach requires that Washington cooperate
with Europeans to present a united front to the regime. With
the example of U.S. resolve in Afghanistan and Iraq before
them, the Iranian leadership might be persuaded to reach the
appropriate conclusions, if the principal European
interlocutors were to emphasize the limits of their ability
to influence, much less control, American foreign policy
decisions. In a version of ``good cop-- bad cop,'' the
message would be conveyed that there are consequences for
noncompliance that are beyond European ability to control.
An effort to acknowledge the legitimacy of Iranian national
desires for a civilian nuclear power program might provide
Iran an opportunity to demonstrate its peaceful intentions,
according to diplomatic approach.
To enhance the acknowledged benefit of exchange programs
that bring foreign students and business leaders to the
United States for study and travel opportunities, Washington
should look for ways to expand such exchange programs,
consistent with the requirements of homeland security.
Coercive Diplomacy
A frank evaluation of the track record so far on attempts
at diplomatic engagement with the ruling regime in Tehran
must conclude that such an approach is not working and
probably will not ever succeed, if not stiffened with more
stringent measures. Such measures would begin exacting
penalties from Iran if it does not comply.
At the top of the list of penalties are economic sanctions,
which will not succeed unless applied in concerted and
cooperative fashion by all of Iran's major Western trading
partners. Such sanctions would include oil; ban on airline
travel; prohibition of financial transaction, bilateral or
multilateral economic assistance, and general trade.
Increased funding and strong congressional backing for
radio and satellite television broadcasts into Iran would
send the message that Washington wants to reach out to the
Iranian people. Public statements of support from American
officials in favor of imprisoned and exiled Iranian political
leaders would be an encouraging sign of support for the
people.
The U.S. State Department can send a strong message of
disapproval to the regime in Tehran by refusing to issue
visas to its United Nations representatives that would permit
them to travel beyond the immediate radius surrounding New
York City (as occasionally has been done).
In the same vein, the activities of Iran's diplomatic
representation at the regime's interest section in the
Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, as well as at the regime's
UN mission in New York, should continue to be closely
observed by the appropriate domestic intelligence and other
agencies for possible unlawful activities that may include
espionage, threat, intimidation, or unlawful lobbying with
Members of Congress.
Also relevant is a threat of action by an international
tribunal for Iranian leadership crimes. It might charge the
leaders with support for transnational terrorism and human
rights abuses. This threat might be made tangible by bringing
a legal case against Supreme Leader Khamenei.
Most important of all, the United States must stay the
course in Iraq to ensure that a moderate system takes hold,
which is representative, committed to fairness for all
Iraqis, and intolerant only of terrorism and violence.
Helping the voices of moderate Iraqi Muslims to be heard and
protecting them from intimidation by agents of Iranian terror
should go a long way to encourage emergence of like-minded
moderates within Iran.
As efforts on the diplomatic front are under way, the
United States should accelerate its outreach to the Iranian
people, as part of the process to help them change their
future.
Destabilization
Application of the diplomatic measures may not alter the
regime's behavior on those issues of paramount concern to the
international community, such as support for terror, pursuit
of WMD programs, meddling inside Iraq, and violation of its
citizens' human rights. If not, then Washington should be
prepared to embrace a new option, short of direct military
action, but which might have the best chance for success.
The middle option would open a campaign of destabilization,
whose aim would be to weaken the grip of the ruling regime
over the Iranian people sufficiently that Iranian opposition
groups inside the country and abroad are empowered to change
the regime. To the extent that any or all of the foregoing
diplomatic measures, coercive or not, are deemed useful,
their application should be sustained during a
destabilization phase.
However implausible or unlikely to be taken seriously, an
American call for Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and his
cohorts ``to return to the mosque'' might set the stage and
be used as a point of departure for further negotiations.
Such a call might give the international community a
foundation upon which to build a case against the regime.
The next stage of an American-led campaign to compel
conformity to international norms of behavior would be to
encourage Iranian opposition groups. This is an option that
has never actually been on the table and has not been
explored sufficiently; this option relies on the Iranian
opposition to take the lead role in coordinating a campaign
for regime change and establishing representative
institutions.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told reporters on her
February 2005 European trip, ``The Iranian people should be
no different from the Palestinians or Iraqis or other peoples
around the world.'' That is, the people of Iran are not
immune to the wave of democracy in the Middle East.
In January 2005, six prominent members of the U.S.
Congress, led by House International Relations subcommittee
chair for
Middle East and Central Asia, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), as
well as Tom Lantos (D-CA), Eric Cantor (R-VA), Howard Berman
(D-CA), Steve Chabot (R-OH), and Gary Ackerman (D-NY),
introduced the Iran Freedom Support Act (H.R. 282), with more
than 50 co-sponsors. It would provide U.S. assistance to
independent broadcasts into Iran and to pro-democracy groups.
The best-known of the Iranian opposition groups is the
Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK). Founded in the 1960s by college
students, the MEK participated in the 1979 revolution against
the Shah, but quickly fell out with Ayatollah Khomeini, who
executed thousands of its members and leaders. Following the
start of mass executions in June 1981, the group went
underground, and many of its leaders fled to France from 1981
to 1986, after which the MEK took refuge in Iraq.
While in Iraq, the group formed an army equipped with
tanks, armored personnel carriers, and field guns,
implementing cross-border attacks against the Iranian regime.
The MEK network in Iran also carried out military operations
against the Revolutionary Guards and other government
targets. The MEK has represented a significant security
threat to the Iranian regime ever since the end of the Iran-
Iraq War and could continue to do so, were it released from
its circumscribed status in Iraq.
United States policy toward the MEK has been ambivalent and
controversial over the years and reached a nadir in 1997,
when the Department of State placed the MEK on its Foreign
Terrorist Organizations list. This inclusion was primarily a
goodwill gesture to Mohammad Khatami, the newly-elected
Iranian president, whose administration was looked to with
much hope for its reformist promise. Despite the State
Department's accusations that the MEK murdered Americans in
mid 1970s and supported the U.S. embassy takeover in
Tehran in 1980--charges the organization denies--the MEK
has not attacked or targeted U.S. interests since the 1979
Iranian revolution.
Nevertheless, the State Department added the major
political wing of the Iranian opposition, NCRI, to the
Department's terrorist designation; previously, NCRI had
operated in the United States as a legitimate, registered
organization.
Before surrendering hundreds of tanks and armored personnel
carriers to the U.S. military, the MEK had notable mechanized
and infantry capabilities. The fledgling Iraqi Army uses some
of this equipment, since 2004.
The MEK seems to have an impressive network in Iran, where
it has been gathering intelligence on Iran's nuclear weapons
program as well as its activities in Iraq. The MEK published
a book detailing the particulars and pictures of nearly 22
thousand people--mostly associated with the MEK--executed for
political charges by the Iranian government.
There is sizable support among the exile Iranian community
for the MEK, which often draws large crowds to its rallies
and demonstrations in western capitals.
the MEK's relationship with the u.s. military in iraq
Months before the start of the 2003 War in Iraq, the United
States' major concern was Iraq's eastern neighbor, and its
perceived involvement in the conflict that might have
complicated the situation in the region. Washington,
therefore, offered to alleviate Iran's concerns by bombing
and destroying the MEK, hoping to reach an accommodation with
Iran in a post-Saddam Iraq.
Days after the start of U.S. bombing of Saddam's forces in
late March and early April of 2003, Coalition planes heavily
bombed nearly a dozen bases belonging to the MEK, killing
dozens of fighters and wounding many more.
U.S. Special Forces worked out a ceasefire agreement with
the MEK in April 15, 2003, once the MEK consolidated its
forces in a few camps north of Baghdad. The United States
decided in May 2003 to disarm the group, and confiscated
2,139 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces,
air defense artillery pieces, and miscellaneous vehicles
formerly in the MEK's possession.
In August 2003, in what appeared to be a response to
Iranian demands, the State Department acted to close down the
offices of MEK associate groups in Washington.
Tehran has been particularly sensitive to the MEK
activities inside Iran and abroad, signaling that it takes
the dissident group most seriously. European governments and
some U.S. administrations have used the MEK as bait to
improve relations with Tehran. In a similar vein, the
November 2004 European Union nuclear agreement with Iran
includes an EU promise to treat the MEK as a terrorist group,
which addressed Iran's security concerns.
Although it is difficult if not impossible to gauge the
level of support MEK enjoys in Iran, this organization is
indisputably the largest and most organized Iranian
opposition group. There are nearly 3,800 of its members in
Camp Ashraf, 60 miles north of Baghdad. Females constitute
nearly a third of its rank and file.
As of February 2005, the State Department still listed the
MEK as a foreign terrorist organization, despite calls for
its removal from the list by many members of the U.S.
Congress and others.
The MEK and other Opposition Groups Support of U.S. Interests
The lack of viable intelligence about Iran continues to
plague analysts and planners. As stated earlier, the MEK and
NCRI revealed much of the information that has been verified
about Tehran's nuclear weapons programs. In this respect,
Washington might consider using intelligence made available
from opposition groups as lead information, i.e., to be
verified using independent means.
A 16-month investigation by the State Department and other
government agencies of the MEK members in Iraq culminated in
the 2004 judgment that they were ``protected persons under
the Fourth Geneva Convention,'' and that there was no basis
to charge any of them with terrorist actions.
At this juncture in 2005, therefore, a review of U.S.
policy concerning the MEK and the overall Iranian opposition
is in order. The designation of the MEK as a foreign
terrorist organization by the State Department has served,
since 1997, as an assurance to the Iranian regime that the
United States has removed the regime change option from the
table. Removing the terrorist designation from the MEK could
serve as the most tangible signal to the Iranian regime, as
well as to the Iranian people, that a new option is now on
the table. Removal might also have the effect of supporting
President Bush's assertion that America stands with the
people of Iran in their struggle to liberate themselves.
In the same way that the United States was receptive to
South African anti-apartheid leaders and the Soviet Union's
anti-communist activists, Washington should invite prominent
opposition figures both in Iran and in exile to the United
States. They might meet with U.S. officials, Members of
Congress, academics, think tanks, and the media. The European
Parliament offered such an example in December 2004, when it
invited Maryam Rajavi, the president of the NCRI to its
headquarters in Strasburg, where she offered an alternative
view to that of the Iranian regime. Tehran's angry reaction
to this invitation served to highlight the effectiveness of
such measures.
As an additional step, the United States might encourage
the new Iraqi government to extend formal recognition to the
MEK, based in Ashraf, as a legitimate political organization.
Such recognition would send yet another signal from
neighboring Iraq that the noose is tightening around Iran's
unelected rulers.
In light of the MEK's status as protected persons under the
Fourth Geneva Convention and the continued protection that
the U.S. military provides the group in Iraq, Washington has
an opportunity to decide whether to return to the MEK its
weapons, which would relieve responsibility from the American
military for the protection of its camps and personnel. Such
a move also would send an unambiguous signal to the Iranian
regime that it faces an enabled and determined opposition on
its borders.
Iranian groups, whether domestic or internationally-based,
which seek to broadcast or publish pro-democracy messages
inside the country might be provided with equipment,
facilities, funding, and support. Relatively modest
expenditures on such purposes can spell the difference
between a capability for such groups to get their message out
to international publics and in Iran.
The United States should make it official policy to protest
publicly cases of human rights violations, crackdown on
Iranian student demonstrators, and application of inhumane
and degrading punishments, such as stoning to death,
flogging, eye gouging, and amputation. Washington should be
particularly vigilante in providing political and moral
support to student demonstrators in Iran and hold Tehran
accountable for the arrest and killing of students during
anti-government demonstrations.
Should the United States reach a decision to support an
explicit policy of regime change in Iran, a Presidential
Finding would be a necessary first step, enabling many
activities by U.S. entities that cannot take place without
such a finding.
The United States should ensure that Iran understands that
neither it nor the Iranian opposition will take any option
off the table, if Iran remains unwilling to address
adequately international concerns about its nuclear programs
in particular. The goal is to ensure that democracy,
tolerance, and the rule of law are established in an Iran
that abjures use of WMD, terrorism, and threats against its
neighbors. Bringing Tehran's flagrant non-compliance with the
NPT before the U.N. Security Council would be an important
first step.
In Search of a New Approach: The Military Option
``We do not want American armies marching on Tehran,''
then-Secretary of State Colin Powell said in November 2004.
Despite the official position of the administration, there
are some who suggest that given the failure of the engagement
option over the past quarter century and the urgency to
counter the Iranian threat, Washington should adopt a
military option. Despite its risks and implications, they are
willing to absorb the costs and consequences. Proponents of
strikes believe that United States interests are better
served by taking preventive military action in the present
than facing the future nightmare of a nuclear Iran with
extensive regional dominance armed with the ideology of hate.
Conventional force military options have a broad spectrum
upon which to draw, which
individually or collectively might evoke different results
and/or responses from the Iranian regime.
Air options include low-end, minimal-risk overflights of
unmanned aerial vehicles into Iranian airspace for purposes
of reconnaissance, psychological impact, testing of Iranian
response and capabilities. In addition, maximum options
consist of airstrikes by manned aircraft and drones as well
as cruise missile attacks against targeted facilities,
installations, bases, and command or research centers.
Naval options range from low end overt open waters
surveillance and harassment of Iranian shipping to maximum
options such as introduction of major forces into theater and
a full blockade of Iranian ports and waters.
On one hand, ground forces options include a low-end
approach of pressuring Iran through the buildup of
conventional ground forces and supporting logistics
capability along borders and at strategic locations within
the region. On the other hand, there are high-end options,
such as a well-planned, fully-coordinated and -executed
ground assault into Iran.
On one hand, Special Operations Forces options include low-
end clandestine ground operations supported by air insertion/
extraction to acquire target information, emplace sensors or
precision guidance beacons, or preposition arms/equipment for
local insurgents. On the other hand, high-end options consist
of direct action missions against pre-selected targets, link-
up with indigenous forces to engage and attack government
facilities, bases, and personnel. In total context,
combinations of the various minimal to maximum options
provide a wide array of choices that can exert significant
impact on Tehran and influence the regime economically,
diplomatically, and politically.
Given the above capabilities, potential military options
include:
Limited Actions: Clandestine insertions of Special
Operations Forces to acquire precision target information,
emplace remote sensors, and preposition arms/equipment. Such
actions offer the ability to gather unobtrusively more
reliable information than currently available through other
military means; these actions also might establish
sustainability for future operations. But, such actions do
not cause the regime to react as long as such actions remain
clandestine and the regime unaware. There is the possibility
of extremely negative reaction from various entities
internationally and in Iran if such activity were compromised
or uncovered.
Moderate Actions: Limited naval blockade that overtly
conducts surveillance and harasses Iranian flagged shipping;
overt overflights of Iranian airspace by U.S. surveillance
aircraft and unmanned platforms; limited buildup of U.S.
forces, supplies, and equipment in friendly countries
adjacent to Iran; stationing of U.S. Marine amphibious forces
off the coast; overt equipping of Iranian dissident groups;
limited precision strikes or special operations activities
against known WMD targets or munitions factories.
As such measures become increasingly visible to the
international public, a negative reaction might occur from
many quarters, including, of course, Iran, which would seek
diplomatic support in world forums to oppose U.S. activities.
Assuming the effectiveness of any actual military strikes
that cause damage to Iran's WMD or other indigenous military
capabilities, such offensive measures would degrade Iran's
ability to employ/deploy its weapons against United States
or other friendly interests.
Outrage from some corners of the globe is to be expected;
the possibility of loss or capture of some U.S. service
personnel might create a new dimension to the problem;
outright military action also might toughen the resolve of
the Iranian regime and even turn some of the Iranian people
against the attacking forces. Serious consideration must be
given to the likelihood that under the extreme stress of
being attacked, Iran might unleash Hizballah and other
terrorist organizations around the world to launch terrorist
attacks against United States and/or other friendly
interests. The ultimate potential for pulling Washington into
a full-scale military confrontation with Iran must be weighed
before any military action, however limited, is considered.
Maximum actions: Full-scale naval blockade, the landing of
U.S. Marine Corps amphibious forces at strategic locations,
introduction of airborne, Ranger, Green Beret, or SEAL forces
to seize key objectives, and crossborder invasion by land
forces. All these actions would be fully supported by
preparatory airstrikes intended to disable and destroy
command and control centers, anti-aircraft capabilities, as
well as key military and logistics centers.
Full-scale military invasion on the scale of Iraq or
Afghanistan would be a very serious step, embarked upon with
only one ultimate objective in mind: the overthrow of the
regime in Tehran and the forcible occupation of the country.
In addition to the destruction of regular army, IRGC, and
MOIS military units together with their armaments, such an
invasion would also number among its objectives the
elimination of Iran's WMD programs, and thereby, the ending
of WMD threats from Iran.
Full-scale military invasion of Iran, even if supported by
an international coalition, would be likely to elicit outrage
from many corners of the globe. An invasion would be likely
to incur higher casualties and a much longer period of
intense, widespread conflict than that experienced in Iraq.
Given the size and population of Iran, a full-scale invasion
would require a force several times the size of the force in
Iraq; continued strain on the overall U.S. military structure
and its available resources would affect long-term
sustainability of any such operation and the overall ability
of U.S. armed forces to respond to crises elsewhere.
Conclusion:
Recall the nuclear time clock that is ticking down as Iran
drives to reach nuclear weapons capability. If the regime
continues to prove intransigent with respect to fulfilling
its obligations under the NPT, the international community
may not have the luxury of pursuing only a regime change
policy. The theocratic leadership in Tehran must know that
they will not be permitted to achieve a nuclear bomb status.
A military option, which could include limited strikes
against Iran's nuclear program infrastructure, clearly would
be a last option but must clearly be understood to remain on
the table.
Given the realities in the region and the fact that the
United States continues to be engaged in Afghanistan and
Iraq, a full-scale military invasion is the least appealing
of all the options on the table for dealing with Iran.
Nevertheless, as the ultimate means of ensuring U.S. national
security interests, such military action must remain
unambiguously among the options at U.S. disposal.
The moderate action option that includes limited military
strikes would at best buy time while leaving intact or even
enhancing the overall threat of the regime in areas like
terrorism, opposition to the Arab-Israel peace process, and
involvement in Iraq. Nevertheless, limited, precision
military strikes, executed according to high quality
targeting information with minimal collateral damage and
casualties might not only set back Iran's nuclear program to
a significant degree but likely would also help destabilize
the regime.
In addition, diplomacy pursued by the Europeans and several
U.S. administrations has produced little tangible result over
the past quarter century. And unless the potential for U.N.
Security Council sanctions is on the table, diplomacy is
likely to yield few results in the future.
While keeping open diplomatic and military options,
Washington should consider a third alternative, one that
provides a central role for the Iranian opposition to
facilitate regime change.
Appendix
Iran Policy Committee (IPC)--Co-Chair Biographies
James Akins, Ambassador (ret.): James Akins was U.S.
ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the Nixon administration.
An internationally respected expert on Middle East and energy
issues, Akins has been an active and outspoken proponent for
a just resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a
prescient analyst of the Middle East peace process and Arab
politics in general. Author Jean-Jacques Servan Schreiber has
called Akins ``the westerner who knows the most about the
Middle East and has the closest relationship of trust with
its leaders.''
Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, USMC (ret.), co-founder of wvc3, inc.:
Bill Cowan is an internationally acknowledged expert in areas
of terrorism, homeland security, intelligence, and military
special operations. A retired Marine Corps officer, Cowan
spent three-and-a-half years on combat assignments in
Vietnam. From 1989 through 1994, Cowan was involved in
numerous operations in the Middle East in response to
terrorist incidents and the holding of Western hostages in
Beirut and Kuwait. He was directly involved in every facet of
the Beirut hostages drama, including international
negotiations leading to their release in 1991.
In 1990, on behalf of a major New York law firm and working
with former CIA Director Bill Colby, he organized and
successfully conducted a series of operations resulting in
the repatriation of a number of Western hostages from Iraqi-
occupied Kuwait. Cowan is a FOX News Channel contributor and
a co-founder of the WVC3 Group, a company providing homeland
security services, support and technologies to government and
commercial clients.
Paul Leventhal, Founder and President, Nuclear Control
Institute: Paul Leventhal founded the Nuclear Control
Institute (NCI) in 1981 and served as its President for 22
years prior to becoming Senior Advisor and Founding President
in June 2002. He prepared four books for the Institute and
lectured in a number of countries on nuclear issues,
including as Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Cambridge
University's Global Security Programme. Prior to establishing
NCI, Leventhal held senior staff positions in the United
States Senate on nuclear power and proliferation issues.
Leventhal was Special Counsel to the Senate Government
Operations Committee and Staff Director of the Senate Nuclear
Regulation Subcommittee; Leventhal was responsible for the
investigations and legislation that resulted in enactment of
two landmark nuclear laws--the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. He also
served as co-director of the Senate Special Investigation of
the Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident and Assistant
Administrator for Policy and Planning at the U.S. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Leventhal
holds a bachelor's degree from Franklin and Marshall College
and a master's degree from the Columbia University Graduate
School of Journalism.
Dr. Neil Livingstone, CEO, Global Options, Inc., an
international risk management and business solutions company,
headquartered in Washington. Livingstone is author of nine
books on terrorism and national security topics and more than
200 articles that have appeared in such publications as The
Washington Post, The New York Times, and The Wall Street
Journal. He serves on numerous corporate and other advisory
boards, and has appeared on more than 1100 television
programs. He holds an A.B. from the College of William and
Mary, three master's degrees, and a Ph.D. from the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy.
R. Bruce McColm, President Institute for Democratic
Strategies and Former President, International Republican
Institute: McColm is the President of Democratic Strategies,
a non-profit organization committed to strengthening
democratic processes abroad. For the past 25 years, he has
been actively involved in the global movement toward
democracy and has written extensively on political
transitions in Latin America, Africa, and Central Europe. He
has served on numerous boards of directors and acts as a
trustee for various private foundations and advocacy groups.
McColm served as president of the International Republican
Institute, where he extended the organization's capacity to
provide technical assistance on economic and political reform
around the world, introducing the use of information
technologies to democracy programs. Previously, McColm worked
in a variety of capacities at Freedom House, a New York-based
human rights organization and also was elected a member of
the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights by the General
Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS). McColm
was educated at William College, Harvard University, and the
University of Chicago.
Lt. General Thomas McInerney USAF, (Ret.): General
McInerney established his own consulting firm, GRTT
(Government Reform Through Technology) in January 2000.
Working with high-tech companies that do business with
federal, state, city, and local governments, GRRT helps
them introduce advanced technology into the private
sector. From 1996-1999, Gen. McInerney was Chief Executive
Officer and President of Business Executives for National
Security (BENS), a national, nonpartisan organization of
business and professional leaders, with headquarters in
Washington. Prior to joining BENS, Gen. McInerney was Vice
President of Command and Control for Loral Defense
Systems-Eagan. He joined Loral (then Unisys Electronic
Systems Division) in 1994, following 35 years as a pilot,
commander, and Joint Force Commander in the United States
Air Force. Gen. McInerney retired from military service as
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and as
Director of the Defense Performance Review (DPR),
reporting to the Secretary of Defense. In that capacity,
he led the Pentagon's ``reinventing government'' effort,
visiting more than 100 leading edge commercial companies
to assimilate their ideas about business reengineering.
Gen. McInerney earned a Bachelor of Science degree at the
U.S. Military Academy in 1959 and a master's degree in
international relations from George Washington University in
1972. He completed Armed Forces Staff College in 1970 and the
National War College in 1973. Gen. McInerney is a member of
several Boards of Directors.
Captain Charles T. ``Chuck'' Nash, USN (ret.) is the
founder and President of Emerging Technologies International,
Inc. (ETII). The company's focus is to understand military
requirements and then actively search out and identify high
leverage, emerging technologies that can be inserted quickly
and inexpensively into tools for the U.S. military. Clients
include government laboratories and commercial technology
companies. Previously, Capt. Nash served as Vice President,
Emerging Technologies Group, Santa Barbara Applied Research,
Inc. For 25 years before that, Capt. Nash served as an
officer in the U.S. Navy, accumulating over 4,300 hours of
flight time and 965 carrier landings on nine different
aircraft carriers as a Naval Aviator. He served in a variety
of command positions with Naval Operations at the Pentagon
and U.S. Naval Forces Europe and has filled billets with U.S.
and foreign special operations forces in Turkey, Northern
Iraq and elsewhere. Capt. Nash previously served on the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and on the Naval Air
Systems Command (NAVAIR) Expert Panel for the Supersonic
Cruise Missile Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. He
was a sponsor and co-chairman of the OPNAV High Speed Strike
Information Day, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory
(JHAPL). Currently, he serves on a number of Boards
of Directors and is an advisor to the Chairman of the
Board of Isothermal Systems Research, Inc. and to the
President and CEO of Vision Technologies International,
Inc. Capt. Nash earned his B.S. in Aeronautics from Parks
College of Aeronautical Technology, St. Louis University
and attended the National War College at Fort L. J. McNair
in Washington. Currently a Fox News Channel Military
Analyst, Capt. Nash frequently appears on the network to
discuss military, terrorism and aviation issues.
Lt. General Edward Rowny, USA (ret.): General Rowny began
his military career following graduation from the Johns
Hopkins University and the U.S. Military Academy, two Masters
degrees from Yale University and a Ph.D. from American
University. He fought in WW II, Korea, and Vietnam,
commanding units from platoon to Corps size. Later, he served
in the 1970s and 1980s as an advisor to the SALT II talks and
as the chief negotiator of the START negotiations, with the
rank of ambassador. From 1985 to 1990, he was Special Advisor
for Arms Control to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W.
Bush. In 1989, President Reagan awarded him the Presidential
Citizens Medal. The citation reads that Gen. Rowny is ``one
of the principal architects of America's policy of peace
through strength. As an arms negotiator and as a presidential
advisor, he has served mightily, courageously, and nobly in
the cause of peace and freedom.'' In 1991, Ambassador Rowny
retired from government and currently consults on
international affairs.
Professor Raymond Tanter, Former Senior Staff Member,
National Security Council: Raymond Tanter is Visiting
Professor at Georgetown University, where he teaches courses
on International Relations and Terrorism. Tanter is adjunct
scholar at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and
was scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute in
Washington. He researched U.S. policy options regarding Iran
at both think tanks. After receiving a Ph.D. from Indiana
University in 1964, Prof. Tanter taught at Northwestern,
Stanford, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Tanter was
a fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford and the
Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington and a
Fulbright scholar, University of Amsterdam. In 1975, Tanter
spent a month as scholar-in-residence at the American
Embassy, Tokyo, lecturing on petroleum interruption
scenarios, with special reference to the Middle East. In
1967, Tanter was deputy director of behavioral sciences at
the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department
of Defense and a member of the Civilian Executive Panel,
Chief of Naval Operations, 1980-1981. He served at the White
House on the National Security Council staff, 1981-1982. In
1983-1984, he was personal representative of the Secretary of
Defense to arms control talks in Madrid, Helsinki, Stockholm,
and Vienna. He is a member of the Council on Foreign
Relations. Among Tanter's publications is Rogue Regimes:
Terrorism and Proliferation, New York: St. Martin's Press,
1997. Tanter is a member of the Council on Foreign
Relations, Committee on the Present Danger, American
Political Science Association, and the Iran Policy
Committee.
Major General Paul E. Vallely, USA (Ret.): General Vallely
retired in 1991 from the U.S. Army as Deputy Commanding
General, U.S. Army Pacific in Honolulu, Hawaii. Gen. Vallely
graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and
was commissioned in the Army in 1961, serving a distinguished
career of 32 years in the Army. He served in many overseas
theaters, including Europe and the Pacific Rim countries, as
well as two combat tours in Vietnam. He has served on U.S.
security assistance missions on civilian-military relations
in locales around the world. Gen. Vallely is a graduate of
the Infantry School, Ranger and Airborne Schools, Jumpmaster
School, the Command and General Staff School, The Industrial
College of the Armed Forces and the Army War College. His
combat service in Vietnam included positions as infantry
company commander, intelligence officer, operations officer,
military advisor and aide-de-camp. He has over 15 years
experience in Special Operations, Psychological and Civil-
Military Operations. Gen. Vallely was one of the first
nominees for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations under President Reagan and commanded the 351st
Civil Affairs Command during the 1980s. He has served as a
consultant to the Commanding General of the Special
Operations Command as well as the Department of Defense Anti-
Drug and Counter-Terrorist Task Forces. Gen. Vallely is a
military analyst for Fox News Channel and is a guest on many
nationally-syndicated radio talk shows. He also is a guest
lecturer on the War on Terror and has just co-authored a book
entitled The Endgame, Winning the War on Terror.
Clare M. Lopez, Executive Director, IPC is a strategic
policy and intelligence analyst with a focus on Middle East,
homeland security, national defense, and counterterrorism
issues. Based for the last five years in the private sector
environment of the Washington metro area, Lopez began her
career as an operations officer with the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), serving domestically and abroad for 20 years in
a variety of assignments. Lopez served as a Senior
Intelligence Analyst, Subject Matter Expert, and Program
Manager for the Alexandria, VA firm, HawkEye Systems, LLC.
Lopez previously produced Technical Threat Assessments for
U.S. Embassies at the Department of State, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, where she worked as a Senior
Intelligence Analyst for Chugach Systems Integration. During
Lopez's CIA career, she served under diplomatic cover in
various postings around the world, acquiring extensive
regional expertise with a career focus on the former
Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
She has served in or visited over two dozen nations
worldwide and speaks several languages, including Spanish,
Bulgarian, French, German, and Russian. Lopez began a
study of Arabic in 2003 at the Department of Agriculture
Graduate School before transferring to the Middle East
Institute (MEI) in downtown Washington.
Lopez received a B.A. in Communications and French from
Notre Dame College of Ohio
and an M.A. in International Relations from the Maxwell
School of Syracuse University. She completed Marine Corps
Officer Candidate School (OCS) in Quantico, Virginia before
declining a commission in order to join the CIA. Lopez is a
Visiting Researcher and an occasional guest lecturer on
counterterrorism, national defense, and international
relations at Georgetown University. Lopez is a member of the
International Association of Counterterrorism and Security
Professionals (IACSP), Women in International Security (WIIS)
and the Middle East Institute (MEI).