Mr. President, I thank the Chair and appreciate the words of my colleagues. In spite of years of recognition that intelligence was in dire need of reform, the catalyst of this year's reform initiative was the tragedy of September 11, 2001.…
Mr. President, I thank the Chair and appreciate the words of my colleagues.
In spite of years of recognition that intelligence was in dire need of reform, the catalyst of this year's reform initiative was the tragedy of September 11, 2001. The intelligence failure of Iraq's WMD programs only underscores this point.
I applaud many of the provisions of the Collins-Lieberman bill. However, I stand in support of the Specter amendment as a means to provide absolutely essential powers to the national intelligence director. For those who may just happen to be listening for the first time, the national intelligence director is now known as the NID. But this NID must have powers to bring together fully and effectively our national collection efforts.
In spite of my respect and admiration for the efforts of my colleagues, I remind the Senate that now is the time for bold action. This deliberative body must be prepared to stare down very powerful executive branch bureaucracies--and a few of our own--that are instinctively protecting their turf. Three thousand dead Americans should be a message to all of us that we must make significant changes.
A witness before the Senate Intelligence Committee put it well. She said:
History's lesson is to make the most of reform
opportunities when they arise because they do not arise often
and they do not last long. We have one of those rare windows
of opportunity now. And if the past is any guide, there will
not be another chance for a generation. These realities mean
that reforms should be sweeping because they will be lasting.
The choices we make will be with us for decades to come.
I fear we are not being as bold in the underlying bill as circumstances demand. We all agree that the 9/11 Commission published a great report outlining in detail the events of September 11, 2001.
We could not and we should not detract from their efforts. However, one fundamental concern I have in this is that it is now 3 years after 9/11, and we are only now taking action, largely based on the recommendation of a panel not specifically chartered to focus on the intelligence failures leading to 9/11.
I am concerned that a commission directed by law to investigate the ``facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,'' has become the only basis for intelligence reform.
Well, there is a lot of work that has been going on in this body and in the other body about intelligence reform that is not covered in the 9/11 report.
Just since the end of the Cold War, there have been many major studies of intelligence reform, staffed by intelligence professionals. They include the joint Senate/House inquiry into 9/11, the Aspin-Brown Commission, IC21 study, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence study, the Scowcroft review, and many others.
As I listen to the debate on this Collins-Lieberman bill, I am concerned that the truly meritorious recommendations and thoughts from these other commissions have been largely disregarded. Rather, I seem to hear--behind most of the key provisions in the bill--the rationale that ``the 9/11 Commission said so.'' Well, we do respect and take seriously the work of the 9/11 Commission, but we must be sure that we consider the other recommendations of studies specifically examining the intelligence process. I happen to think that many of those are more accurately reflective of the needs of the intelligence community.
Recommendation No. 1, from the joint Senate/House inquiry into the 9/ 11 intelligence failure was:
Congress should amend the National Security Act of 1947 to
create and sufficiently staff a statutory director of
national intelligence who shall be the President's principal
advisor on intelligence and shall have the full range of
management, budgetary, and personnel responsibilities needed
to make the entire U.S. intelligence community operate as a
coherent whole.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's staff study entitled, ``IC21,'' or ``Intelligence Community in the 21st Century,'' stated:
The [intelligence community] would benefit greatly from a
more corporate approach to its basic functions. Central
management should be strengthened, core competencies
(collection, analysis, and operations) should be reinforced
and infrastructure should be consolidated wherever possible.
The 9/11 Commission's Vice Chairman, Lee Hamilton, for whom I have a great deal of respect, admitted to our committee in open session that they really had not even considered more bold reform. He said the Commission simply looked at things they thought they could accomplish. I believe the word he may have used was ``pragmatic.'' They simply did not consider more bold reforms, so maybe we ought not to consider their recommendations as final. It is up to us. We have the ultimate responsibility of passing this bill. Are we going to pass what is pragmatic, what seems to be the least upsetting to the bureaucracies or do we want to be bold and pass something that will make the intelligence community work? Count me in the latter category.
Yesterday, my good friend, the chairman of the committee writing this bill, alluded to some of the concerns I have. When responding to concerns about DOD being shortchanged by the NID's budget authority, she reminded us all that ultimately the President determines the budget. That will always be the case. Let us not also forget that the bureaucracies of the OMB and many committees of the Senate and the House also determine the budget. There is simply too many ways to water down the limited real authority that budgetary powers provide. More real day-to-day authorities are needed, especially if we are to hold a NID accountable for our intelligence efforts. As bothersome as the OMB is in the effective operation of Government--I say that only half facetiously--does anybody think the OMB runs the agencies of Government? They mess them up sometimes. There are a lot of areas I can tell you where the OMB has shortchanged vitally important activities. But run them? I don't think so. Budgetary authority is not the same thing as running an agency.
The way I read the bill, it seems as though any agency or department that didn't want to chafe under a powerful NID has found a way out. This bill leaves the door open for several key agencies, such as the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR; major portions of the FBI'S intelligence operations capabilities; the Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence; the Treasury Department's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and others, to avoid the authority of a NID. So under the Governmental Affairs bill, a NID who declares war on al-Qaida--as referenced by Chairman Roberts of the Intelligence Committee a few minutes ago--will have even fewer troops to try to muster for this war, and little additional power that doesn't already exist today.
Let us recall that every knowledgeable voice on this issue is adamant: If you create a NID, he must be given power; otherwise, you create an intelligence czar and have made the problem worse. We have created a drug czar
and all kinds of czars, but they are not able to get the job done. As I continue to listen to DOD proponents, I am concerned that insufficient authorities are granted in the GAC bill, and they will be even further eroded, putting us one step closer to creating an intelligence czar with a great title and very little authority.
One of the recurring themes we always hear on the Intelligence Committee--on which I have had the pleasure to serve for only a year and three-quarters--is the reluctance of the agencies to share information with those who need to know. We know all too well there are many legitimate reasons not to share intelligence. We understand the need to protect sources and methods. We also understand that decisions not to disseminate some information may rightly involve protecting U.S. civil liberties. But parochialism, poor information architectures, and bureaucratic confusion should not be included amongst the reasons to squirrel away intelligence that we need by cognizant analysts throughout the community.
Three years after 9/11, and after dozens of hearings in which intelligence community management describes ``seamless'' intelligence sharing, we end up prying a little deeper to find out that it simply is not the case. While there have been improvements in some areas of intelligence sharing, they are often done under duress. As soon as the ``heat'' is off, you can bet that those parochial agencies will return to intelligence hoarding, not intelligence sharing. We must empower a NID to force appropriate intelligence sharing even in times when the congressional and executive spotlights are not on the issue.
I believe it has already been referred to on the Senate floor that at a recent hearing, the intelligence committee was truly dumbfounded as we listened to different agencies talk about a specific threat. Two agencies had a very different view of the severity of that threat when they started talking to each other at the witness table.
One of the agencies said: We have information that you don't have.
They were supposed to be working on the same threat. I asked a dumb question. I said: Why didn't you share it? They said it was sensitive information. Well, wait a minute. They were trying to give us a recommendation on a very serious matter, and the two agencies that were supposed to work together on this serious matter didn't want to share information with each other? I used to think when we worked on a need- to-know basis, if you have a sensitive collection system, you need to keep the name and identity very closely guarded. They were happy to tell us in the Intelligence Committee the reason they were keeping a particular source on another matter in confidence was because it was so sensitive. I will tell you one thing. If you have ever seen a sieve, it looks too much like the Intelligence Committee. We don't need to know the names or even the identifying features of an intelligence source in the committee. But if that is the essential element on which the analysts are going to determine whether this particular source is reliable, they ought to be sharing it on a very limited basis with all of the people involved in the task.
I understand that the information that was gathered by the Iraqi Survey Group after the war was very effective because they brought in collectors and analysts from different agencies who were working on the same problem and they put their heads together. What a wonderful thing. They must have had a table. They laid out the information on the table. They did what informally is called ``red teaming'' and they came up with better estimates.
The NID, the national intelligence director, needs to be able to take care of this himself, not to negotiate with the positions with other departments or go to the White House and Congress and say, will you get these guys together to talk?
This reluctance to share information appears to be so deeply ingrained that only direct orders to do so are adequate, not budgetary influences.
Let me be candid. As a member of the Intelligence Committee I am convinced that the worst offenders of not sharing intelligence are the CIA and the NSA, but there are others. Arm twisting that is largely limited to budgetary problems and powers will not solve the problem. We know getting the information shared among agencies, red teaming, as they say, is very important. In other words, if the players are at the table, they are going to get their best result when everybody turns over their cards and shows what they are holding, but right now some of the agencies are going to the table and keeping their cards face down, saying, boy, we know some stuff, it is in our hand, and we are not going to show you.
Budget authority alone is not going to get them to turn over the cards. Red teaming cannot be successful unless the cards are turned over and the red team knows what cards the CIA is holding, for example.
Full deference should be given to civil liberties concerns, and I hope that the Collins-Lieberman provisions for improving information architectures within the intelligence community will allow for getting the right intelligence to the right people, and in the case of very sensitive intelligence or any other critical, possibly damaging intelligence, only to the right people. But it has to be gotten to the people who need it.
Some have argued that the Specter amendment will lead to too much centralized control, therefore group-think. Not likely. Let's be clear. The Specter amendment deals with national collection, entities of the NSA, NGA, portions of the DIA and CIA. This will help streamline collection and reduce inefficiencies. It will allow the NID truly to harness the collection capabilities against our Nation's primary threat: The terrorists.
This leaves capabilities organic to the DOD currently funded under the Joint Military Intelligence Program, JMIP, and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities, somewhat glamorously acronymed the TIARA, still firmly under DOD control, as they should be. DOD will not be shortchanged and our Nation will have a more effective collection effort.
Today, the DOD is the most voracious consumer of intelligence. That is why they have the lion's share of the intelligence budget and significant organic collection assets whose sole function is support to the warfighter. However, national collectors must be unified in an effort to meet national needs which include those of the key intelligence entities in our war or terror: DOD, CIA, FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security, where the appetite for terrorism- related intelligence collection will only continue to grow.
I heard debate yesterday on the combat support agencies. Nobody denies that these agencies, the NRO, the NSA, and the NGA, are still combat support agencies, but as their name suggests, they also serve national interests. When we examine this in a larger light, we realize that having these agencies report directly to the Secretary of Defense solely made sense during the Cold War. However, as I mentioned earlier in this statement, the decisions we make today will be with us for decades to come.
The world has changed. The war on terror is not going to go away soon. While DOD is still a voracious consumer of intelligence, it is now a partner with the CIA, FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and others in the war on terrorism. As other agencies continue to join CIA and DOD as coequals, it makes sense to have a national intelligence director who can see to the needs of all of these agencies and best harness all national collection capabilities to meet our national needs.
Again, we need to look decades down the road. We must recognize the need to empower a NID to meet these needs. I believe Chairman Roberts has already mentioned this several times, but let me state that the Directors of the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency stated that having their agencies transferred to the control of a NID would not degrade their level of support to the military. Considering their testimony, as well as other commentary and the maintenance of DOD's military intelligence collections, the Pentagon need not fear the Specter amendment in any way.
It so happens I have a personal interest in this. As many of my colleagues know, my son is a young ground intelligence second lieutenant in the Marine Corps. I certainly do not want to
do anything that would interfere with his or his comrades' ability to get the information, the intelligence, the estimates, and the tactical intelligence they need to leave them hanging out without adequate cover. My colleagues can bet I would never do that.
I conclude by giving some thoughts from Dr. David Kay, the interim head of the Iraqi Survey Group, who testified before us many times and who was a real bright light in gathering intelligence. He is certainly not afraid to speak the truth in spite of whom he may offend. He told the Intelligence Committee:
I am concerned, however, that simply creating a national
intelligence director, even one that seems to have--and we
think has--real powers . . . and we think budget and
personnel authority is real power, we will not end up
addressing the real problems . . .
Well, budget and personnel authority is some power but, as Dr. Kay indicated, it is not real power.
Dr. Kay further stated:
I think you need to place the national intelligence
director in charge, charged by you, Congress, with ensuring
that all of the collection assets of this government work to
support the national intelligence strategies and priorities.
Dr. Kay recognizes the need for a unified collection effort. We cannot afford to waste or misuse scarce collection assets. I think Dr. Kay also knows the frustration of fragmented control quite well. He was a DCI special adviser on Iraq and then, as I have noted, headed the intelligence efforts of the Iraq Survey Group, or ISG. He wrestled with authorities quite frequently. In large part, this was due to the limited powers of the DCI vis-a-vis other department heads, but when they made progress is when they coordinated and cooperated and the agencies worked together.
I urge my colleagues to support the Specter amendment. This is a key fix to give the NID some of the powers he or she will need if we are to ask the NID to be accountable for our national intelligence effort.
I yield the floor.
I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 3706