Mr. President, is it appropriate for me to speak on the bill for a few minutes, please. Thank you very much. Mr. President, on a big bill, I find this a very puzzling situation where for the second time the other side of the aisle has…
Mr. President, is it appropriate for me to speak on the bill for a few minutes, please.
Thank you very much.
Mr. President, on a big bill, I find this a very puzzling situation where for the second time the other side of the aisle has essentially said, We won't let you go to a vote on a motion to proceed to debate until there is agreement on the bill. How can there be agreement on the bill if there isn't debate and if the majority at least isn't allowed to present its position? I find on a bill of this size and the complexity of the bill, to refuse to go to a debate on the bill to be an amazing thing. I hope the other side of the aisle will begin to see that and relent.
I had a chance today to listen to some of the questions being asked in the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of Goldman Sachs, and if anything should show the need for this bill, it is what is going on in a Subcommittee of this body. Yet, out here, we cannot even begin the debate on the bill. We cannot hear from the chairman of the committee. We cannot hear from the ranking member. We cannot understand both points of view. We are prevented essentially from debating one of the most important bills this Congress will pass.
I wanted to come to the floor today to say that, as well as to speak in support of the derivatives position put forward on Monday by Chairman Lincoln and Chairman Dodd as part of the financial and commodities market reform package.
I think it is fair to say I have long advocated for more aggressive regulation of derivatives which, in the main, are very complex financial instruments exempted from Federal oversight through loopholes in the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000. In other words, prior to the year 2000, we could regulate these. After the year 2000, they floated free, nontransparent, no audit trail, no antifraud, no antimanipulation oversight whatsoever. The Dodd-Lincoln bill is the most aggressive and comprehensive proposal to regulate the out-of- control derivatives market that has been offered yet in this Congress, and I strongly support it.
The Dodd-Lincoln bill will require robust Federal oversight. It will establish transparency. It will reduce systemic risk. I believe this bill is the best chance to tackle these unregulated markets that were responsible for bringing down Enron, AIG, Lehman Brothers, with terrible repercussions for the American economy and millions of hard- working families. This bill will also rein in reckless traders who lack a moral compass.
Today there is nothing more important than restoring faith in the American economy, and we cannot do it without this bill. To do that, we have to restore America's faith in our ability to take strong corrective action against the bad actors who perpetrated this crisis. Yes, this is our moment to act, yet we cannot. The other side of the aisle will not let it happen.
Derivatives were exempted, as I said, from regulation in the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000. That law created massive regulatory loopholes such as the Enron loophole which prohibited the Commodity Futures Trading Commission from overseeing electronic exchanges; the London loophole, which allowed for unregulated trading of U.S. commodities on overseas exchanges, and the swaps loophole, which allowed for unregulated bilateral trades through brokers, swap dealers, and direct party-to-party negotiations. Together, these loopholes have been responsible for some of our Nation's worst economic crises. They must be closed.
I first became aware of the problem of unregulated derivatives during the Western energy crisis. The years were 2000 and 2001, when Enron traders fleeced Californians for approximately $40 billion in artificially inflated electricity and natural gas prices.
Without Federal oversight rules in place, it took us some time to realize what was going on in California, and then when we did, the party in power would not believe us. We learned the hard way the dangers of having no paper trail, no one to raise the alarm, no cop on the beat to enforce penalties.
Some experts told us this was just supply and demand. I even remember going to the White House and hearing these exact words. We didn't know that traders were in it just for greed.
That is why I will never forget the day Senator Cantwell, another long-time champion for derivatives reform, handed me a copy of the taped conversations between Enron traders. These tapes from Enron's west coast trading desk demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that energy traders would do anything to make a buck.
When a forest fire shut down a major transmission line into California, cutting power supplies and raising prices, Enron energy traders celebrated. Here is the quote:
Burn, baby, burn. That's a beautiful thing.
That is what a trader sang about the massive fire, which threatened homes and lives.
The tapes also confirmed that in secret deals with power producers, traders deliberately drove up prices by ordering powerplants shut down.
When California regulators tried to get money back from Enron, their traders joked this way:
They're . . . taking all the money back from you guys? All
the money you guys stole from those poor grandmothers in
California.
That was the mentality. Another trader responded:
Yeah, Grandma Millie, man.
This was an eye-opening experience, to say the least.
In 2002, 2003, and 2004, I offered four separate amendments to restore regulation to derivatives markets, and each time the President's working group on financial markets advocated against the amendments, and they went down.
Our Nation's financial experts argued that private parties would protect the public interest by looking out for their own interests, and Congress trusted our experts.
But the experts were wrong. They ignored the growing risk these products posed to our financial system.
In 2007, finally, the Senate took action to close the Enron loophole when it approved bipartisan legislation that I authored with Senator Snowe and others. That legislation brought regulatory oversight to electronic commodity exchanges such as the IntercontinentalExchange, and it established antifraud and antimanipulation standards for our Nation's electronic energy futures markets. But then they went offshore and traded on the London exchange to avoid the law. We learned that soon there were other loopholes that remained open.
Beyond the reach of Federal oversight the derivatives market swelled to the size of $600 trillion. There were no rules to prevent systemic failure, fraud, or manipulation. No one ensured that these products served any commercial function beyond gambling, and no one worked to make sure traders understood the products they traded.
It turns out traders often use the stockholder value of major financial institutions to gamble in markets they did not understand-- with bets large enough to put the entire financial system at risk.
They bet on oil. They bet on natural gas. And with the creation of the credit default swap, they began to bet on each other's demise.
New exotic financial products were dreamed up, such as the recent one to trade movie box office futures, which was proposed by Cantor Exchange this
year. What public benefit is served by trading box office futures? All it does is create a huge problem for the motion picture industry.
In 2008, AIG and Lehman collapsed under the weight of unregulated financial derivatives. But this time it was not only Western energy consumers who suffered. The unregulated derivatives market brought our entire economy to its knees.
That is why it is so vital that we learn from this experience and implement the derivatives reform proposals that have been put forward by Senators Lincoln and Dodd.
Let me take a few moments to describe some of the bill's key positions.
It will require every trade to be reported in real time to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, so regulators will know for the first time what is actually going on in these markets. They will be transparent; they won't be dark markets. Everyone will know.
It will require standardized high-volume trades to be cleared through a regulated clearinghouse. This will ensure that everyone in the system gets paid even when one trader defaults. Had we had this system in place, AIG's collapse would not have posed a systemic risk.
Swap dealers who sell uncleared contracts to end users, which are more risky than cleared trades, will be subject to significantly higher capital requirements enforced by the CFTC in cooperation with bank regulators.
The bill helps small commercial end users such as utilities or trucking companies hedge their risks, but major financial institutions and mutual funds will have to conduct their trading in regulated markets. That is a good thing.
It will require all cleared contracts to be traded on an exchange or on a swap execution facility. Trading on exchanges or execution facilities provides for pretrade transparency--again, light--which is necessary to fully understand and manage the risks being taken by market participants, to provide more efficient and accurate pricing, and to facilitate more cost-effective risk management.
It will require speculative position limits to be set in the aggregate for each commodity, instead of contract by contract. Position limits provide an important restriction on market manipulation and the amount of risk that can build up in any one market participant.
For the first time, the CFTC will be able to prevent speculators from assembling massive positions in a particular commodity, such as oil, by assembling large positions in multiple contracts. See how they do that.
Traders can now simply buy positions in Brent Crude Oil when they have exceeded limits in West Texas Intermediate crude oil, and that makes no sense. See, it is a way to hide the size of your trading position.
Aggregate position limits will prevent manipulative practices, such as those deployed by the defunct hedge fund Amaranth in 2006, which assembled massive positions in two separate natural gas contracts and manipulated one in order to profit on the other. Let there be no doubt about this, Amaranth settled and paid a huge fine in substantial millions of dollars.
Further, the bill will close the London loophole so they can't go around American law, by requiring that Foreign Boards of Trade adhere to minimum standards comparable to those in the United States and report all trading activity to United States regulators on a timely basis.
Finally--and perhaps most importantly--the bill will prevent FDIC- insured retail banks and banks with access to the Federal Reserve discount window from engaging in the extremely risky practice of swaps dealing with a government guarantee. That is important.
This innovative and important provision effectively implements the Volcker rules and protects taxpayers. So you can see what a big provision this is--remember, it was derivatives that brought the house of cards down. Now there will be transparency, clearing, and position limits. I very much thank the chairman of the Banking Committee for negotiating with Senator Lincoln and achieving this. It is a monumental gain.
I very strongly believe that all swap activities and commercial banking should be distinct, so that taxpayers do not supplement, subsidize, guarantee, or insure the riskiest activities of large financial institutions.
There is no denying that opponents of the bill are trying to come up with new and creative ways to block this bill.
With so much at stake, it is not surprising that allies of the big banks and Wall Street lenders have already launched a multimillion dollar ad campaign to frame the debate and fight these changes. They are cynically twisting the facts to assert that this legislation will perpetuate more bailouts in the future. Nothing could be further from the truth. The big Wall Street firms that caused this crisis have hired lobbyists to portray Wall Street reform as something that is bad for taxpayers.
The loudest detractors of financial regulatory reform claim that it will be another government intrusion in the free market. Well, we have found out that the free market is not self-regulating.
Recently, the Wall Street Journal reported that opponents of regulatory reform have adopted talking points distributed by a messaging firm whose clients include Bank of America, Chase Card Services, and UBS. The memo suggests that the best way to kill the bill is to link it to the big bank bailouts.
My colleagues on the other side of the aisle have adopted these talking points and are doing everything they can to block this critical bill. This is both dangerous and absurd. If we have learned anything from the recent past, it is that the disorderly failure of massive financial institutions is extremely destructive.
For the first time, with the passage of this bill, we will have a process in place to ensure the most minimal disruption necessary in order to wind down failures on Wall Street. That is what this is about. And the $50 billion is not government money. The $50 billion is a fund that the companies contribute to, which is held in escrow by the government so that if it has to be used, it can be used.
I stand behind Chairman Dodd when he emphasizes the level of bipartisan negotiations that have gone into the bill before us. But bipartisan compromise does not mean withholding support until you get everything you want. Financial reform is not a zero-sum game. We need solutions, not threats to block meaningful reform of our financial markets. Without strong reform, every American who has been blindsided by the profit-above-all-else mentality of Wall Street will lose, lose, lose, and that is what is at stake in these cloture motions.
Anyone who has taken basic economics knows markets only function when market participants have good information--in fact, perfect information and when the transactions occur free of fraud, abuse, and manipulation. Handing control and oversight of financial markets to the biggest Wall Street banks does not produce a free market with good information, free from abuse, as has been painfully illustrated over the last few years.
Accusations of fraud against Goldman Sachs, announced the Friday before last, underscore the need for financial reform. Goldman Sachs will have their day in court, but the allegations against the firm cry out for greater transparency at giant Wall Street banks.
Let me return to where I began. I was 1 of the 40 Senators on the telephone in September of 2008, when both Secretary Paulson of the Treasury and Ben Bernanke of the Federal Reserve talked to Senators and said--and I am paraphrasing, but this is the sum and substance of it-- we are a hair's breadth away from a major collapse of the entire financial marketplace of our country, and it will be worse than the Great Depression if it happens.
I never expected to hear that. I never thought these market activities could do that. To some extent, I believed the market was self-regulating, but it isn't. We found that out in spades. I think we are deleterious in our duty if we do not address this, if we do not fully debate it on the floor, if everybody who hears the debate doesn't understand what the evils are that are out there; that naked swaps, that credit default swaps need oversight, that hedge funds without any regulation must have transparency, must be regulated, and that trading must go over an
exchange. This bill accomplishes that. This bill protects the American people.
I can't understand why anyone would not support this bill. If truly what we believe in and what we came to this office for and what we took our oath of office for was to protect the American people, this bill is mandatory. Not to do it is malfeasance of duty, in my view. Not to let us move forward with a robust debate, to waste time with cloture votes day after day--and it looks like they will continue--I believe is improper. To demand that a bill has to be agreed upon by both sides before it is even debated on this floor as a major bill is something that in this day and age, with the economic troubles of this Nation, I thought we would never ever hear.
So the bottom line is: Now is the time to act. Now is the time to close the gaps in regulation. It is time to hold the big banks accountable to the people they serve. It is time to put a moral compass into trading. It is time to ensure that taxpayers will never again be forced to bail out big banks because they are too big to fail. No bank is. That is what Wall Street reform will achieve. That is why I feel so committed to making it happen and why I am asking for the support of all our colleagues.
Senator Dodd and Senator Lincoln have assembled the strongest provisions of each of their respective bills into a proposal to reform the bilateral swaps and derivatives market that is more effective than any proposal to date. So I wish to thank both of them for their leadership in bringing this bill to the floor. I am very proud to stand with them, along with my long-time colleagues in this effort, Senator Snowe, Senator Cantwell, Senator Dorgan, Senator Harkin, Senator Brown of Ohio, and Senator Nelson of Florida. They have worked for a long time to bring about strong regulation of the derivatives market.
So the question remains: What will happen? Will this bill be allowed to see the light of day? Will this bill be able to regulate fraud and manipulation? Will this bill be able to see that the American taxpayer is protected so we can say, truly, in good conscience: Never again will this happen in the United States.
So I say to the other side: Stop this nonsense. Let this bill come to the floor. Come down to the floor and debate it. Vote against it, if you don't like it. That is the American way. I don't believe that when a bill comes out of committee by a majority vote, regardless of how that majority is achieved, whether it is bipartisan or the product of one party, that it should be refused debate on the floor. We have a chance to change that. I hope the Republicans will. I hope we will debate and pass this bill.
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.