I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the pending amendment be set aside so I can call up my amendment. I call up my amendment numbered 3795. I ask unanimous consent…
I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the pending amendment be set aside so I can call up my amendment.
I call up my amendment numbered 3795.
I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Mr. President, I support the Hollings-Stevens amendment, numbered 3795. My amendment strikes and replaces the underlying bill with language creating a national intelligence coordinator, or NIC. Important work since September 11th of the 9/11 Commission, numerous Senate committees and others has convinced all of us that we must enact intelligence reform. I am impressed by the efforts of my friends Senators Collins and Lieberman, and others, who have used their considerable skills to implement most of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. But I worry that the Senate is moving ahead with enormous restructuring, when we could address the main problem more immediately. 9/11 was clearly an intelligence failure, and we must act now to fix the most glaring problem--the lack of an intelligence coordinator.
My amendment fixes this most obvious, most severe problem with our intelligence structure by creating a national intelligence coordinator, or NIC. It will be the NIC's responsibility to sift through the work of all of our intelligence entities, both foreign, domestic and military and keep the President abreast of the intelligence community's findings in a coordinated, complete way. As it exists, the intelligence community's communications with the President cannot help but be haphazard. The President needs to have the huge volumes of intelligence information coordinated by someone he trusts, so he can make informed policy judgments. Thus, my amendment allows the President to select an intelligence coordinator as a member of the National Security Council, not subject to Senate approval. Just as President Bush has Karl Rove, whom he trusts and who coordinates the political intelligence throughout this Administration, the President needs a Karl Rove for national security intelligence.
This NIC will need sufficient staff and resources. So my amendment assigns to the NIC in his or her role as coordinator of intelligence activities, the staff and resources currently assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence, or DCI, that is now employed in the performance of his role as coordinator of the intelligence community, which he is not doing.
Many of the dozens of provisions in Collins-Lieberman would likely improve our system of intelligence. The Senate should study each of these provisions carefully, and enact the best of these provisions after such consideration. My amendment fixes the main problem in the meantime--the lack of a coordinator.
Collins-Lieberman creates a National Intelligence Director, or NID, and gives that person considerable power over budgets and personnel. The NID will control a new national counterterrorism center, and generally manage the intelligence community. The bill is problematic because the NID will wield unheard of influence over work of the intelligence entities, before that work even gets done. This is groupthink--personnel from 15 agencies work to get the Director the answers they know he wants. Personnel will neglect intelligence that takes them in directions they know the NID opposes. Reform should encourage more creativity, not less; more diversity within the intelligence community, not less. These agencies each do different things well--we need to take advantage of differentiation, not squelch it under the NID.
The national intelligence coordinator created by my amendment is unlikely to lead to this problem of Groupthink. The NIC will not control personnel and budget decisions. He will not have the power to fire people in other agencies that he disagrees with, or promote only people who share his worldview. He will not be able to manipulate policy direction of intelligence agencies and centers we may create. The NIC will coordinate, not meddle in the work itself. The 9/11 Commission decided that part of the reason the 9/11 plot was successful is the lack of creativity in our intelligence community. Stopping complicated terror plots before they happen requires flourishing intelligence diversity, and Collins-Lieberman will undermine diversity by concentrating intelligence output in one manager--the NID. We don't need a Director of Intelligence. We need a coordinator. We need to change the NID to NIC, the ``D'' to ``C''.
I would like to address concerns I have with the underlying bill related to Defense. In deciding what to do with
the Department of Defense's control over most intelligence dollars, Collins-Lieberman splits the baby. The bill transfers control over the budgets and some personnel decisions of the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, from the Secretary of Defense to the NID without transferring control of the agencies themselves to the NID. The NID will develop and present the President with an annual budget request for these and other intelligence programs. It is unclear whether the Secretary of Defense or the NID will control the actual payroll. Under Collins-Lieberman, ``tactical'' military intelligence and the Defense Intelligence Agency will remain under the DOD. But the bill does not define ``tactical.'' Obviously, DOD will seek to define that term broadly, and the NID will seek to define it narrowly. I understand Senator Feinstein may offer an amendment that would define ``tactical'' and provide some clarity, but even if that amendment is enacted, the battle will be waged over how to interpret the Feinstein definition of ``tactical.'' My friends Senators Specter, Roberts, Shelby, DeWine, Bond, Wyden, Bayh and others already think the NID should have even more control over agencies currently within the DOD than the Collins- Lieberman bill would allow, but their amendment failed.
In short, there is confusion over what Collins-Lieberman transfers from the DOD to the NID and what it does not transfer. There is confusion over what ought to be placed underneath the NID, and what stays with the DOD. There is confusion over how budget, personnel and other types of authority can be bifurcated and trifurcated. This is a time for clarity, not confusion. The NID will also receive the appropriation for these and other intelligence programs, and in Collins-Lieberman the NID can transfer funds from one office to another as the Director sees fit. If the underlying bill is enacted as it is currently written, I forecast open warfare between the Secretary of Defense and the NID. Especially during a time of war, DOD will insist on funding defense/military-related intelligence work its way. This kind of turf war is bad for the country, and we should not enact intelligence that we can see is likely to pit the Secretary of Defense against the NID. If this painful transition needs to occur, we should at least consider waiting until after combat operations in Iraq have ended.
I am also concerned about some potential problems with the underlying bill's blurring of domestic and foreign intelligence. While I support the concept of fusing foreign and domestic intelligence, because that is what modern investigating and technology requires, this is a very sensitive and tricky area. Our Nation's history of domestic covert governmental operations shows the need to be careful here. Collins- Lieberman places the FBI's domestic counterterrorism activities and those of the CIA and DOD under the NID. But it does not address problems with locating domestic covert operations outside the FBI. The NID would have the power to ask the CIA or DOD to engage in such covert domestic operations. Our current governmental arrangements keep the CIA from participating in domestic intelligence activities, yet none of this would apply to the NID. Who is to say that the NID will not begin using the CIA to conduct extensive covert domestic activities? This new role for the CIA may actually be appropriate, but we have to be careful to draw rules for CIA domestic conduct that respect our Bill of Rights and other basic traditions. Using agencies other than the FBI for these domestic tasks also removes the Attorney General from its supervisory function. The Department of Justice is qualified to make difficult Bill of Rights judgments, but these other agencies may not be. These other agencies may not even be inclined to exercise restraint when they are investigating Americans. We could ruin cases against suspected domestic terrorists, because our intelligence operatives do not conduct their investigations according to constitutional requirements, and the cases get thrown out. And unless the stovepipes we hear so much about are eradicated immediately under this bill, which seems unrealistic, we may even have multiple agencies conducting duplicate investigations against American citizens, trampling all over each other and the law.
Collins-Lieberman also enacts the largest ever surveillance intelligence network, which can be data-mined by personnel in various levels of government. Senator Stevens and others point out that we do not even have the technology to meld all this intelligence in one database. While coordinating information among agencies is laudable, it is unclear that Collins-Lieberman addresses dangerous side effects of a new network database. Collins-Lieberman directs the White House to violate privacy protections, but of the three branches, the executive branch has the least incentive to balance individual rights concerns. Congress never held any hearings to address the civil liberties problems with such a network, or with turning over to the White House power to write privacy guidelines. Administration guidelines and a civil liberties board, contained in the bill, are not as likely to strike the correct balance over privacy issues as Congressional oversight and public debate would. At the very least, we need committee hearings to consider the consequences to our civil liberties of enacting a national network database.
At this time I would like to say a few words about this underlying bill's possible impact on a couple of our intelligence agencies. Because of the bill's considerable scope, I will only raise a few of the potential problems with the bill's agency reforms. The bill hampers the FBI Director's ability to manage the FBI. The bill creates conflicting reporting requirements for the FBI's Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence, making her responsible to the FBI Director and the NID. She will support not only the FBI's counterterrorism and counterintelligence programs, under the NID, but also the FBI's criminal and cyber missions, which are not under the NID. The bill provides no clear way to separate FBI criminal investigations from its intelligence work. I would not want to be the Executive Assistant Director of Intelligence under this structure--with dueling bosses and duplicative reporting requirements. Also, will the National Security Council's role be weakened by the creation of a separate board chaired by the NID? Will the NID be allowed to deny the Secretary of State and other cabinet-level Secretaries personnel decision-making over their own subordinates? I understand Collins-Lieberman will give the NID authority over analysis. Where does this leave CIA analysts? The bill does not address what the new role for CIA analysts will be. Have these matters been worked out, or even discussed in a public forum? I have focused on several agencies I am particularly acquainted with through my experience on the Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations Subcommittee. I am sure my colleagues are raising similar problems with reforming the agencies under their Committees' jurisdictions, and I encourage them to come forward and help us understand these important issues.
Mr. President, I'd like to say a few words about policy too. This administration is extremely reticent to spend money in Afghanistan, and it was trying to funnel to Iraq funds Congress allocated for Afghanistan long before the President started the Iraq war. Collins- Lieberman empowers the NID to transfer funds and personnel directed by Congress from one agency to another. For example, this body may substantially increase U.S. assistance to Afghanistan--I understand Senators McCain and Lieberman have advocated just such an increase. If we add funds for Afghanistan onto this bill, the NID could scrap the funds for Afghanistan and transfer them to fund a new operation in Syria or Iran. The NID would have a responsibility to inform Congress that he had moved this money, but these funds would be moved nonetheless. It is Congress's duty to allocate such funds. Empowering the NID to override Congress's funding priorities is bound to lead the NID to undermine Congress's powers, and instead use shift funds allocated by Congress to advance the administration's agenda.
As we consider this bill under great political pressure and with the election looming, we have considerable analogous precedent to reference. Recent hasty Congressional enactments of Homeland Security legislation and the Patriot Act show the need for more
measured action. Collins-Lieberman is thrown together in a matter of weeks. Surely most of us agree that at least some of its provisions are problematic. Much of the conversation I have heard on the floor this week sounds more like campaigning than legislating. The White House identifies problems throughout Collins-Lieberman--will the House version appeal more to the White House? A hastily thrown together conference resolving differences in the House and Senate versions will not be conducive to finding and fixing these inevitable problems. My friend Senator Stevens says, ``Do no harm''. Whatever comes back from conference will have a tremendous head of steam behind it. By acting too fast on Collins-Lieberman, the Senate may get stuck with House provisions in a conference report that are unpalatable. Once reform is enacted, fixing missteps is extremely difficult. Experiences of homeland security legislation, passed right before an election, and the Patriot Act, prove that hasty restructuring results in confusion, mistakes and paralysis.
I conclude by asking my colleagues to support my amendment. Let's act now and enact my amendment, which fixes the main problem of the lack of a coordinator, and then let's continue to act as we learn. Let's sift through the litany of approaches being advanced by my colleagues in the underlying bill, and the rival approaches being advocated by others both within this body and outside it. My amendment starts us on the right track to improving our intelligence structure, and it avoids the potential to start us on the wrong track.
I appreciate the outstanding work Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman have done and thank them for that. They met over the break in August and worked around the clock to produce a product so we could get something done before we leave in time for the elections in November.
However, in those pressures of time, they have come out with a product that needs many more hearings, more deliberation, and more consideration. In essence, they have a national intelligence director who directs and manages. Immediately that raised the red flag for this particular Senator.
When I say ``raised the red flag for this particular Senator,'' let me tell of an experience. It was 50 years ago we had the Hoover Commission Task Force investigating the intelligence activities of this Nation. We had the McCarthy days, McCarthy charging there were Communist spies and agents within the State Department, within the Defense Department, within the executive branch, and everywhere throughout the Government. President Eisenhower appointed the Doolittle Commission and they came out with what was considered generally in the Congress as a whitewash. The White House and Congress got together and agreed efforts should be conducted to reorganize the executive branch, thus, President Hoover's commission came to be.
A task force was headed by General Mark Clark. I served as one of those members of the task force investigating the CIA, the FBI, the Army, Navy, air intelligence, Secret Service, Q clearance, atomic energy intelligence, and on down the list. We spent some 2 years. After hearings and consideration of the generally speaking minute intelligence information at that time--I say ``minute'' for the simple reason that the intelligence information now correlated by the various entities and departments and agencies is like drinking water out of a fire hydrant. You have much, much greater volume. But even then we found the need for a coordinator.
I can see Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency. Director Dulles of the CIA said, I have my hands full trying to get the work done properly of the CIA, much less as the head of intelligence activities in the Government, namely the coordinator of all intelligence, the centralizer of all intelligence. That is why it was called the Central Intelligence Agency. He said, I have too much work to do. What we need is one single intelligence coordinator to coordinate all of it--my work, the FBI, Defense Department, military.
In those days all we had was foreign intelligence and military to bother with. We did not have terrorism threats and counterterrorism within the continental limits. Now we have heaped upon the responsibilities of the intelligence community all kinds of duties that need further deliberation and estimation because, as I say, the director of the national intelligence, when they said ``direct,'' when they said ``manage,'' I said heavens above, here is a flaw of September 11 intelligence. It was directed. It was managed. Everyone knows that now after the hearings.
The Vice President had his own little cabal in that Department of Defense. They had met with the head of the Defense Advisory Council, Richard Perle, and Scooter Libby and that group. They had submitted to the country of Israel in 1996--Benjamin Netanyahu was coming in as Prime Minister, and they submitted at that time that Saddam ought to be replaced with the Hashemite rule and they wanted to democratize Iraq back in 1996.
When Netanyahu refused doing that, they came back and organized themselves into the Project for the New American Century and they have been pressing forward ever since.
So when you direct and when you manage intelligence, you have a flawed product. We need coordination. You need to take the best of the best from the CIA, from the FBI, from the National Security Agency, from the National Reconnaissance Organization, and all these other entities and coordinate into a product to give to the President.
Suppose you were President in the next 10 minutes and you heard about a terrorist threat, not only foreign but domestic. What you would want in line, you would want a Karl Rove on intelligence. Now, the President has a Karl Rove on political intelligence. Karl Rove can tell you for any section of the country what is going on in any particular State. He has pollsters. He can give a consummate judgment or alternative to the President to make a judgment. That is fine business. We have that without legislation.
We need just that in security intelligence--not only foreign, not only domestic, not only military, but all three--security intelligence coordinator.
So when I say the national intelligence director directing and managing, I am saying, here is a flaw of September 11. You know the group-think policy of the President. If you are directing and managing intelligence, what you do is go immediately and give that intelligence to the folks making the Presidential policy and you develop a group- think and a flawed product.
We do not want, necessarily, a director, certainly with all the duties that this particular director is burdened with but, rather, we want a coordinator. He should be or she should be in the National Security Council, appointed by the President, without confirmation by the Senate. You have to have your own person in there. And you have to not have him or her running over to several committees in the Senate and several committees in the House testifying about this management, this direction, this decision, this or that policy. He will have his hands full just with what the President wants.
Necessarily, we transfer those coordination responsibilities from the CIA over to this national intelligence coordinator. This is a short, two-page amendment by Senator Stevens, Senator Inouye, Senator Cochran, and myself. This was worked out this afternoon. I was trying to listen to the debate, and the more I listened, the more it impressed me that we needed much more deliberate work and consideration, and not the crunch of a national election to get all of us out of town and do something. So we are trying to respond to that edict of ``don't just stand there, do something.'' I am afraid we are going to enact the ``Alka Seltzer'' intelligence bill: I don't believe we passed the whole thing.
Look what it does. It directs and manages, but what intelligence is under the Department of Defense and what intelligence is under the national intelligence director. I searched and I found conflicts throughout the particular Collins-Lieberman measure, especially during a time of war. I can tell you, you are going to find all kinds of conflicts there. There are conflicts going on right now with the war in Iraq and the Secretary of Defense saying he is not going to stand for it. The national intelligence director has the defense intelligence budget, but then the
secretary of intelligence has the defense intelligence function and responsibility. And the Secretary of Defense does not have budget control over what he has responsibility. And then there is the ``ying'' and the ``yang'' of defense intelligence versus tactical intelligence. And I have listened to some, the distinguished Senator from California and others, on what they consider tactical intelligence.
On civil liberties, there are real grave concerns there because there is within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that investigates crimes and protects civil liberties, a culture, a paradigm, and a discipline. The Justice Department has developed that over the years of different FBI Directors. Now, with respect to the national intelligence director, he can direct covert activity to be taken on by the FBI with none of that discipline and none of those checks and balances.
You have heard the distinguished Senator from Alaska with respect to the national intelligence director's transfer of funds, not only the reporting of funds. I can tell you now that will never happen where you can transfer funds because the Appropriations Committee has that responsibility.
I can go down the different disclosure of funds and various other things. What I want to emphasize is that I am not trying to disparage any of the wonderful work being done by our Governmental Operations Committee. They have a product out here now that we can develop and work upon and iron out the differences. But it should not be under the pressure that we are in and having passed ipso facto the Collins- Lieberman bill. You would not satisfy the problem of 9/11, and that is coordination.
You need the President's man or woman in that National Security Council, auditing, gaining, and getting. And mind you me, don't worry about getting it, now that you have a coordinator sitting there with the President. For example, that Arizona flight school information that did not get through the FBI to the coordinator, because they did not have one, is excused. That Minnesota terrorist who did not want to land the plane, all he wanted to do was fly it into a building; that came to the CIA but did not get to the White House. Known terrorists came into the country, passed the Immigration department, and the Naturalization Service. That did not get to the Director.
But mind you me, if you have a coordinator, and the information of that importance does not get through to that coordinator, the opposite is going to be true. Rather than the old days when you held within your particular department or agency your intelligence and your information, and you did not tell the FBI, and the FBI did not tell the CIA, here you are going to try to regurgitate and spit up and throw out and report to that coordinator. Because if he does not get it at the White House level, heads are going to roll.
So we have changed the culture and discipline by having one coordinator. That is all you need. We can go home and know that the job is done. The FBI is working. The CIA is working. The National Security Agency now knows not to wait until tomorrow to translate their go signal. As they went into the World Trade Towers, they were a day late in translating documents.
We can go home and know that the President is equipped with a coordinator. And immediately, if I am running the CIA or FBI, I am going to start getting my information out rather than hiding it. That is the real difficulty: The dots were there, but the dots were not joined. With the Collins-Lieberman bill what you are instituting and legislating into law is the flaw of 9/11. You have a director of intelligence. You have a manager of intelligence. And that is how they got into the World Trade towers and into the Pentagon. It was managed.
I can see the President on October 7, 2002, in Cincinnati. ``Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait until the smoking gun is a mushroom cloud,'' he said. Seven days later I voted for the authority to go to the war when the President asked--I did not sit on the Intelligence Committee. When my Commander in Chief says: ``Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait until the smoking gun is a mushroom cloud,'' I voted aye. Then I found out there weren't no smoking guns, there were no mushroom clouds, there were no facilities, there were no weapons, there were no terrorist threats. But that is another argument.
I am trying to get something done where we in good conscience can protect our national security, protect us against domestic terrorism. And we can fix this bill.
Now, let me add one little thing. I don't know whether Senator Stevens, my dear colleague, or Senator Inouye or Senator Cochran wants to talk. But I would agree, I don't need, unless I am questioned, another 10 minutes. And I know they have amendments of their own. So I would agree to a time limit on either side if the distinguished managers of the bill are trying to get to a vote.
Let me reserve 10 minutes. I don't know if I will use it.
Mr. President, I will use just 1 minute for the Hollings-Stevens-Inouye-Cochran amendment. It is my policy, and it is not to be treated casually. It is to be treated seriously because what we are going through is this exercise here. And if you had the Collins- Lieberman bill up, I would vote to get it to the House and let them try to hammer it out. They don't have the coordinator.
I was just about to say, the reason they didn't have that coordinator is that the 9/11 Commission is even Stephen, Republican-Democrat. And they wanted to have a unanimous report, and I agree with that. So they didn't hammer and zero in or bull's-eye the real need and the real fault of 9/11. They didn't join the dots. They didn't have a coordinator. And if they were going to come out on that unanimously, they would have found fault at the White House level. It is just as simple as that.
I know another time in the history of this Government where we knew full well that President Reagan knew about the Contras, at least I was convinced so. But you couldn't report it. You couldn't say it. You couldn't do it for the simple reason that these so-called commissions that are now sanctified are really politically balanced, and they leave out the necessary one. In this particular instance, we need a coordinator. You can get all of the directors. You can get all of the budgets. You can get all hammered out about the Defense Department. Just leave it all alone or put it all through. And you haven't satisfied and gotten a coordinator at the National Security Council.
We had that amendment early on last year, and the vote was 49 to 48. We put him on. I had that amendment up. It was a partisan vote.
Now I have worked yesterday and today to explain it to colleagues on the other side of the aisle, and it is bipartisan by the most responsible of Senators other than myself. I hope we don't treat it casually as something to be tabled and walk away and say: Let's have another amendment. We don't want to vote on Friday. Let's get some votes.
We are all thinking about procedure and not thinking about the country. We are all thinking about the campaign and not the country.
I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time.
Well, two points quickly: I don't go back to 1947, but I go back to 1953 and 1954 under the Hoover Commission. And I would refer you to that report. They ask for a national intelligence coordinator. Allen Dulles would say--he was directing Central Intelligence--you can run the National Security Agency, you over at the Department of Defense, and you can direct and manage military intelligence and these different departments. But take those cold turkey facts of intelligence and information and have them coordinated--not superduper $40 billion. It sounds pretty on paper, but I can tell you right now, that is what was wrong with 9/11. The intelligence was directed, was managed.
Why do you think the head of the CIA hammered and slammed his fist on the desk of the President and said, Slam dunk, Mr. President, we got all the information you need on weapons of mass destruction, when he didn't even have an agent in downtown Baghdad. We were about to invade Iraq, and we had not an agent. That was the same director who was the staff director before Gulf Storm and Senator Bill Cohen and I came back to be briefed on Iraq and Baghdad, against Saddam. And George Tenet, the staff director at that time, said: Gentlemen, we don't have an agent in Baghdad. We don't have one in Iraq. We will have to call over to the Defense Department. Here, 11 years later, we still don't have somebody down there. Now we have operative agents and everything else trying to manage elections and what have you. So the idea is to coordinate impartial, objective intelligence facts, not manage intelligence.
Secondly, the Congress stays out of it, Senator Collins, most respectfully. The Congress stays out of the affairs of Condoleezza Rice. She is the National Security Adviser. We don't call her up willy- nilly before 15 different committees here on the Hill and say testify here and there. You don't want that. If you are the President, you want it coordinated subject to you. That is what you need. You don't call Karl Rove up here and ask him about political intelligence; you have him working around the clock. He has us Democrats on the run.
I want the same kind of job done in domestic intelligence, foreign intelligence, and military intelligence. I want it coordinated for the President so the buck doesn't stop here because the dots were not joined. Now we are about to join the dots in this amendment. Of all people, they say let's don't join them, let's just manage; and we have $40 billion or $30 billion, whatever it is, and we are going to manage indirectly and we are going to screw up the Defense Department, the FBI, civil rights, and everything else, in the head-on rush we have here this afternoon.
I yield back the remainder of my time.