I thank the Chair, and I yield myself 3 minutes. Madam Chairman and Members of the House, it is disgraceful but true that in much of the United States, it is perfectly legal for employers to fire workers simply on the basis of their sexual…
I thank the Chair, and I yield myself 3 minutes.
Madam Chairman and Members of the House, it is disgraceful but true that in much of the United States, it is perfectly legal for employers to fire workers simply on the basis of their sexual orientation.
I am proud that today the House will vote on legislation to end this discrimination. It has no place in American society.
The legislation we are considering was first introduced in the House in 1975, more than 30 years ago, and in the last three decades, gay, lesbian, and bisexual Americans have waged a courageous campaign for their workplace rights. I regret that they have had to wait so long for this vote, but I am pleased that this historic day has finally arrived.
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act ensures that employment decisions are based upon merit and performance and not prejudice. Federal law and the laws of 30 States permit employers to discriminate against employees based solely on their sexual orientation. In those 30 States, employers can fire, refuse to hire, demote, or refuse to promote employees on the basis of sexual orientation alone.
Earlier this year, under Chairman Andrews, the Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions Subcommittee heard testimony from Michael Carney, a highly decorated police officer. Officer Carney was initially denied the opportunity to return to his job with the Springfield, Massachusetts Police Department because he is gay. Fortunately, Massachusetts is not one of the 30 States to deny these basic rights to gay workers, and Officer Carney was eventually able to return to his job.
But that was not the case for Brooke Waites, who testified at the hearing. Ms. Waites was fired from her job in telecommunications after her employer discovered that she was a lesbian. Since the State of Texas allows employers to fire workers based on sexual orientation, Ms. Waites had no recourse. She could not get her job back.
It's hard to believe that fully qualified, capable individuals are being denied employment or fired from their jobs for these completely nonwork-related reasons. This is profoundly unfair and certainly un- American. Unless we act to outlaw this discrimination, millions of American workers will continue to live with the legitimate fear that they could be fired or denied a job and wind up unable to provide for themselves and their families. That is why it is essential that this Congress act to protect the rights of all workers, regardless of their sexual orientation.
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act extends employment nondiscrimination protections to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and heterosexual people. It prohibits employers, employment agencies, and labor unions from using an individual's sexual orientation as a basis for employment decisions such as hiring and firing, promotion, or compensation. The bill prohibits employers from subjecting an individual to different standards of treatment based upon the individual's sexual orientation. The bill does not apply to businesses with less than 15 workers, private membership clubs, or the U.S. Armed Forces. And it does not apply to religious schools or other religious organizations.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), the Chair of the subcommittee that did a marvelous job in handling this legislation.
(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Madam Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank), one of the pioneers of this legislation.
I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Woolsey).
I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Pryce).
I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop).
I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Emanuel).
May I just say, Madam Chairman, it's a rather interesting set of remarks, except it has nothing to do with the underlying legislation that is before us today.
I yield for the purpose of unanimous consent to the gentlewoman from New York.
(Mrs. MALONEY of New York asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Ellison).
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Wisconsin (Ms. Moore).
Madam Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
Madam Chairman, I appreciate the frustration of my colleagues on the other side the aisle. They really don't like this bill. They don't believe that we should be outlawing discrimination against gay and lesbian individuals. What they are upset about is that most of the handles that they thought they could grab on to to destroy the consensus for this bill are gone.
Why are they gone? Because we went through a markup. We listened to our colleagues on the other side, and we made adjustments. We had a religious exemption in that many of the religious organizations strongly supported. We listened to the debate. We went back to them and suggested that a straight exemption from title VII would be preferable for all of those involved.
So we have continued to listen as that process has gone through. And, yes, we have a bill here now that is far more acceptable to far more Members of the Congress of the United States because it does what it says it is going to do.
Madam Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Davis).
Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).
Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).
Madam Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Clyburn), the distinguished majority whip in the House.
Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Inslee).
(Mr. INSLEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
Madam Chairman, I yield myself 4\1/ 2\ minutes.
Madam Chairman, I rise in support of an amendment to this ENDA legislation that I and Mr. Stupak have written to ensure that this law will protect religious liberties of religious corporations, societies, associations, and in particular, religious schools, including those religious schools that are not affiliated with any particular church or denomination. Our amendment would make it clear that the ENDA exemption matches the religious exemption found in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under my amendment, a religious corporation, association, or school would be categorically exempt from ENDA.
In addition, our amendment also clarifies that the references to the term ``married'' refer to the Federal definition of marriage as between one man and one woman, as enacted in the 1996 Federal law referred to as the Defense of Marriage Act.
With respect to the religious exemption, this issue has been the cause of a lot of confusion in the past weeks. The religious exemption that was part of the ENDA bill that passed out of the Education and Labor Committee on October 18 was exceptionally broad; however, several nondenominational religious schools raised concerns that they might not be covered under the ENDA exemption.
For example, the president of Wheaton College in Naperville, Illinois, sent a letter to Representative Tim Walberg in advance of the Education and Labor Committee's markup on ENDA. Mr. Walberg then shared that letter with the entire committee, and our Republican colleagues argued that Wheaton College, which is clearly a religious school despite the fact that it is not controlled by or affiliated with any specific church, may not be covered by the ENDA exemption. That argument was incorrect.
Wheaton, along with other religious schools and organizations such as the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities, asked that we ``ensure that the act categorically exempts religious organizations as in section 702(a) of title VII,'' and we have done precisely what Wheaton College and the Council for Christian Colleges has asked us to do.
Under this amendment, if a religious organization, including a religious school, is exempt under either section 702(a) or the arguably broader section 703(e)(2), then that organization or school is exempt from ENDA, period. So, if a school qualifies for either one of those exemptions under title VII, it is categorically, as they requested, exempt from ENDA. By directly referencing title VII, we also ensure that the many decades of case law on title VII's religious exemption is imported to ENDA.
This amendment provides clarity for religious schools that have experience with the title VII exemption, and it should satisfy all of their legitimate concerns about ENDA.
Let me be clear, the title VII exemption, and therefore, the ENDA exemption, applies to both nondenominational religious schools like Wheaton and church-affiliated schools. And as one court explained, ``Even though a Christian corporation or organization is nondenominational, it nevertheless may subscribe to particular religious views with which other Christians do not agree, and conversely, it may disagree with the religious views of other Christians.'' And to go on, the court said, ``This is precisely the situation for which the title VII exemptions were enacted; the exemptions allow religious institutions to employ only persons whose beliefs are consistent with the views of the religious organization.'' And that is the purpose of this exemption. That is the purpose of this amendment.
In addition to clarifying the scope of the ENDA religious exemption, my amendment also specifically states that the references to marriage in ENDA refers to the definition of marriage as defined in Federal law. Specifically, these terms in ENDA are given the meaning provided by the Federal law that is referred to as the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines marriage for Federal purposes as the union of one man and one woman. That is the definition that applies to ENDA, and my amendment makes that definition absolutely clear.
Madam Chairman, because our amendment offers strong protections for religious organizations, including nondenominational or nonaffiliated religious schools, and because our amendment clarifies that the Defense of Marriage Act operates to define the term ``marriage'' in this bill, I trust that the Miller amendment will receive a large bipartisan vote in its favor.
Madam Chairman, I would like now to yield 4 minutes to my cosponsor of this legislation, Mr. Stupak.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Does the gentleman have additional speakers? We only have one speaker left and we have the right to close.
Madam Chairman, I yield the remaining time to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
I ask unanimous consent to claim the time in opposition.
Madam Chair and members of the Committee, I first want to correct some of the mistaken assumptions that I think Mr. Souder just made in his remarks.
He claims that the language of section 8(a)(3) would undermine the definition of marriage that some States have chosen to adopt. This is untrue. Even after ENDA becomes law, regardless of whether section 8(a)(3) remains in the bill or is taken out, the States, for purposes of State law, decide marriage issues for themselves. Nothing in ENDA would change that. Nothing in ENDA would alter the Federal laws referred to in the Defense of Marriage Act.
Second, Mr. Souder makes a claim that section 8(a)(3) would have prevented an employer from firing an employee who has extramarital sex. Frankly, I don't see anything in the text of 8(a)(3) that discusses extramarital sex. In fact, I don't see anything anywhere in the text of ENDA that discusses extramarital sex, and I can't understand how Mr. Souder's come to this conclusion about extramarital sex. But the entire issue is just a diversion from what ENDA actually does.
ENDA is very simple. ENDA will prevent employers from firing a perfectly qualified gay, lesbian or bisexual employee just because of that employee's sexual orientation.
Madam Chairman, in short, I will vote for this amendment, but the fact of the matter is I don't think it is necessary. But Mr. Souder has pursued this course, and I think that it's important. Another important provision of ENDA is the nondiscrimination section that already outlaws employers from discriminating based upon sexual orientation through any pretext policy including the pretext of marital status.
Moreover, many States, including Mr. Souder's home State in Indiana, have already created State laws that allow a plaintiff to sue their employer based upon marital status discrimination. And those State laws would further protect against pretextual discrimination against gay and lesbian Americans.
Finally, I want to explain in more detail why I will vote for Mr. Souder's amendment. I have realized that section 8(a)(3) is redundant. It is unnecessary. The concern that section 8(a)(3) has sought to address and will actually be addressed in many cases by section 4 of
How much time do I have remaining?
I yield 15 seconds to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank).
I yield 15 seconds to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.