Mr. Speaker, let me take this means to congratulate the National War College on 60 years of excellence in national security policy and strategic thinking education. On April 5, 2006, I had the privilege to address the Commandant's dinner…
Mr. Speaker, let me take this means to congratulate the National War College on 60 years of excellence in national security policy and strategic thinking education. On April 5, 2006, I had the privilege to address the Commandant's dinner in celebration of this anniversary and I am proud to share that speech with the Members of the House:
National War College 60th Anniversary The Next 60 Years
Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you. I am honored that you
asked me to be your speaker. And thank you, General Peterson
for that generous introduction.
First, I have to say Congratulations. What you have built
here is truly a national treasure. You can be proud, as the
entire nation should be, of this school and your product--
because your product literally is the strength of this nation
as we anticipate and respond to world events. Among your
students and your faculty, you have educated some of the
finest strategists this country has ever produced.
I was going to give a short speech. But then I thought
about the critical time we live in and got excited all over
again about National War College. I don't want to take too
much time with serious thoughts, but it is important to
reflect on our past in order to respond to the challenges
ahead.
Sixty years ago, it was a novel idea--to create a college
that would focus on grand strategy and bring together a
diverse student body and faculty--senior officers from all
the services and senior officials from the state department
and, later, other agencies.
This was a place where students were presented with
strategic dilemmas, with a curriculum that ``focused on the
interrelationship of military and non-military means in the
promulgation of national policy.''
In 1946 Ambassador George Kennan, the first deputy for
foreign affairs here, explained that in those days of
``transition and uncertainty,'' there was little in the
policy world being done on the relation between war and
politics. Kennan noted, ``American thinking about foreign
policy had been primarily addressed to the problems of peace,
and had taken place largely within the frameworks of
international law and economics. Thinking about war, confined
for the most part to military staffs and institutions of
military training, had been directed . . . to technical
problems of military strategy and tactics--to the
achievement, in short, of victory in purely military terms.''
Kennan saw this school--its curriculum and its student/
faculty interaction--as a home for the development of new
strategic thinking at the beginning of the Cold War.
Through the years, National War College faculties have done
a magnificent job teaching national security policy and
strategy. This College's special place among the senior
schools of Professional Military Education has been based on
your attention to grand strategy. As Lieutenant General
Leonard T. Gerow--President of the Board which recommended
the War College's formation--said, ``The College is
concerned with grand strategy and the utilization of
national resources necessary to implement that strategy .
. . Its graduates will exercise influence on the
formulation of national and foreign policy in both peace
and war.'' It has also been based on your insistent
attention to academic rigor. And, your excellence has been
based on the inclusion, from the beginning, of interagency
and international students. These elements of excellence,
in the context of a residential program that builds
lasting ties between officers of different services,
different countries and different agencies, is unmatched
anywhere.
Congress has been supportive of your continuing advances in
all these areas. I guess I don't have to remind you of my
role in the Goldwater-Nichols reforms to increase
``jointness'' among the services and my investigations of the
Professional Military Education system.
But we can't rest here. Keeping your institution relevant
and on the sharp edge takes the constant attention of
Congress and the Chairman in support of each new Commandant,
and Dean, and the faculty.
Your graduates test your teaching every day in a very
complex environment. Senior decision makers have made some
mistakes that have increased the difficulty of their
missions. I know the current students review successes and
difficulties as case studies so they will be even better
prepared. But while today's wars demand our focus, we need to
be careful we don't become so myopic that we fail to see the
great challenges and opportunities ahead.
One challenge is that, with all our advanced technology,
when we still have failures. I believe this is because we are
ill-equipped intellectually and because we don't work
together well enough. Our successes are achieved because our
most astute military and civilian leaders understand people,
cultures, and root causes of problems or conflicts. And they
anticipate opportunities. In Iraq, Afghanistan, the global
war on terror, and even with Katrina and beyond, human
interactions have caused great uncertainty for our security
at home and abroad. Just these few examples show why any
success we have is not just a matter of doctrine and
technology.
We can all think about failures among leaders at
transitional periods such as Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. He
failed to grasp the impact on war of the transition from an
agricultural to an industrial age. This lesson shows that
what might appear to be tactical mistakes are really
strategic! And I'm convinced, we are once more at a
transitional period in our history just as Kennan was
sixty years ago.
Today we not only face the continuing transition from the
industrial to the information age, but we are also
recognizing that adversaries can capitalize on technologies
in unanticipated ways. As new technologies have increased the
complexity of our world, we see two other phenomena. Our
adversaries use tactics we would be familiar with if we
studied history. And, with our focus on technology, we must
not neglect the critical dimension of human interaction.
This brings me to my real point. The challenges and
opportunities before us place as great an intellectual demand
on our national security professionals as at any time in our
history. And while their understanding of the art of war and
international relations might be pretty good today, it must
be even better tomorrow. And it must be broader. It must be
even better integrated across all the instruments of national
power. And it must be more expansive to include
nontraditional national security partner agencies and
departments, as well as more and different foreign partners.
Beyond the employment of joint forces, beyond the effort to
pursue the newest technologies of the science of warfare, you
know that National War College graduates must be prepared not
just to adopt technical transformation, but also must
understand the art of statecraft as well as war.
While I do not pretend to understand the Future Combat
System or the avionics of the F-22, I do know they will be
useless unless we have wise leaders who know the value of all
the instruments of national power and have the skills to use
them at the appropriate times and in the appropriate
combinations. I know it's easy to measure the increased
payloads and speeds brought by new technology. But while it's
difficult to quantify the value of a Kennan, a Powell, or a
Pace, it's more important than ever to recognize the value of
our best strategists.
As we used to say about jointness, ``this can't be a pick
up game.'' Now, it's our interagency planning and operations,
and our focus on a broader definition of national security
that must not be ad hoc or ``come as you are.''
What would help? I want to challenge the Services and other
agencies, to design systems that deliberately select the
right people for the right level of professional education
and the right school for strategic studies. They should be
able to articulate why they send one person to Air, Naval or
Army War College and another to this College or ICAF, or to a
Fellowship. At the same time, they need to place a real value
on how well their members take on what is taught. Your
graduates' future assignments should not only reflect that
they went to the premier interagency national security
strategy institution. Their selection for command, senior
leadership, and interagency positions should be based in
greater measure on how well they perform here. Did
National War College Distinguished Graduates and
outstanding faculty get treated any differently by their
Service detailers or their agency human resource directors
than those who did not do quite as well, or as those who
were not selected for this outstanding education? Perhaps
they went back to the very same job they were doing. This
is what I mean when I have spoken about the Services
taking intellectual performance at PME seriously. This is
what I mean when I critique them for not promoting
officers who have excelled teaching or studying world
affairs and the art of war and politics.
Is this impossible? Only if we're wedded to machine age
personnel systems. The Services and agencies need information
age human resource systems that can recruit, retain, train
and educate the innovative people we need in government and
the military.
And, we need a sufficient number of people in the Services
and agencies if we are going to build intellectual capital,
fight these wars and prepare for the next catastrophe or
conflict. We have to have enough people to be able to send
exceptional military and agency leaders to be students or
faculty in school assignments. The cost of preparing for the
challenges of tomorrow pale in comparison to the price we
will pay if we are caught without the cadre of wise leaders
we need for the future.
You know, whenever I haven written the Chairman, or NDU
President or you as Commandants a letter, I have been pretty
consistent in my questions. Do you select the right officers
and civilians to serve as faculty and in the right balance?
Have you kept your faculty to student ratio low with 10-12
students per seminar? Are you emphasizing history, political
science and foreign area studies? Does the faculty have these
credentials? Do you have the resources to ensure your
students are able to conduct field or regional studies? Do
your resources enable faculty to contribute to national
strategy and policy through research and sabbaticals? Do you
stay relevant by using real world and historical case
studies? Have you fully integrated your reserve component,
civilian and foreign students?
To me these are not academic questions, if you will pardon
the expression. These are about the character and the
continued relevance of this school.
Let me be clear. We know that the National War College has
no counterpart among civilian universities. Not Harvard, not
Princeton, not Stanford--none of them has a faculty, or
curriculum or student body remotely comparable. This College
must be protected and supported as the elite institution
it is. The nation's future security requires it. The
quality of the faculty, of the instruction, of the
curriculum, of the students must not be compromised. A
false choice must never be forced on us between spending
on current operations and new military technologies, and
investing in the education of our future premier national
strategists.
For sixty years the National War College has been the crown
jewel of Professional Military Education. Since the days when
President Harry Truman sat in student seminars to learn about
the Soviet Union, this College has been the place where
strategic thinking has been nurtured, taught and refined. At
a historic moment of great challenge and peril George Kennan,
worked in this building, to formulate the containment
strategy that ultimately won the Cold War without a nuclear
exchange. Today, at another moment of great challenge, the
need for strategic direction and thinking could not be
greater. The price of failure is far too high. We have to get
it right. We have to have wise people, with the right
education, in the right positions, to think through these
challenges and take action in concert.
When you think about all the political debates, the
expedient compromises, and the resource trade-offs that take
place in this town each day, it's a miracle that a college of
this quality has been able to survive and prosper within the
larger bureaucratic confines of the government. In a more
immediate sense, I have always been concerned that
bureaucracies can kill even the healthiest intellectual
organization. A college such as this can decline and die if
bureaucracies and administrative arms bloat while they
cut corners, dumb down, impose numbing uniformity, enshrine
group think, standardize mediocrity or gorge themselves on
the resources meant to be spent on the real stuff of
education--the interaction between small groups of faculty
and students wrestling with the profound issues of the day.
The National War College has always embodied something
unique. As I look at you leaders of this college during
different eras of war and peace, I sense a continuity of
intellectual engagement and energy in these historic halls.
It is called excellence.
Why is it here? Yes, you have an outstanding faculty, and
superior students, an ever adapting curricula and your
wonderful location here in Washington.
But the key, from the beginning--the genius of General
Eisenhower's vision--is that experienced professionals from
various backgrounds and come together, over an extended
period of time, to learn from each other, and to tackle
problems together in an environment that fosters
understanding. This is one institution that has had no agenda
other than to make wise and thoughtful leaders. In the
current atmosphere of partisan tensions, this College
remains a refuge from the bureaucratic skirmishes and
wars.
As the first War College Commandant, Admiral Harry T. Hill
explained, his intention was to ``make the students ponder'',
to give the students practical problems upon which to think
and arrive at individual conclusions.
This is a safe space for men and women to engage each other
in the search for a better understanding of each others'
agencies and departments. They can gain a true appreciation
of the character and conduct of war, the complexity of
strategy, and the utility of the diplomatic, political and
economic instruments of state. Your product is strategists.
They are still critical to our future.
I can see this in your graduates . . . General Pace, our
Chairman; General Martin Dempsey on the ground now in Iraq;
David Sedney, our first senior State Department officer in
Afghanistan after 9/11 and now deputy chief of mission in
China; Buzz Mosley, Chief of Staff of the Air Force . . .
generals, ambassadors, foreign military officers, and
interagency leaders. Even one of our newest Armed Services
Committee staffers, Lorry Fenner, is a former member of your
faculty and a National War College graduate. I could go on
and on . . .
This is a proud tradition and serves as the foundation for
the next 60 years ahead. I hope the War College will continue
to lead the way in inter-agency and inter-service strategic
education. As we broaden our definition of the national
security community to include homeland defense and increased
international cooperation, I hope that the War College model
and experience can be used to broaden government's approach
to our nation's challenges.
George Kennan, typing away in his office right next door to
this room, charted a strategy to meet a past threat . . . a
policy that endured and was adapted, through Administrations
of both parties. You all have been the watchful guardians of
this heritage.
I want to challenge you tonight continue to work with us in
Congress and at this College to think about how to improve
interagency planning and operations to defeat our adversaries
and to capitalize on opportunities. Lend your wisdom to the
significant questions we face today--should we be working on
a National Security Act for 2007 or 2009? How can we adapt a
Goldwater-Nichols type reform to the interagency process?
These are only two of the topics we wrestle with. You can see
how significant they are and imagine the sustained, long term
effort they will require.
So, we enjoy a celebration tonight, but tomorrow we must
start again to renew and reinvigorate this great project of
creating national security strategists. Given your history,
and the imperative for the future, I am confidant this
College's faculty and students are up to this challenge.
Thank you for including me in your celebration. I welcome
your continued engagement on these issues.