Madam President, I come to debate and to make an argument about whether we should continue funding Ukraine indefinitely, because this country and this U.S. Senate has not actually had much of an argument about whether we should continue to…
Madam President, I come to debate and to make an argument about whether we should continue funding Ukraine indefinitely, because this country and this U.S. Senate has not actually had much of an argument about whether we should continue to fund Ukraine indefinitely.
It has become extremely commonplace, among advocates for further Ukraine funding, to frame this as the courageous against the partisan; those who, in America's and Ukraine's, apparently, moment of need, are expressing the great spirit of patriotism that animated us in World War II and other moments of great world conflict; and that those who don't want to send another $61 billion to Ukraine, well, we are just knuckle- draggers. We are the people who are listening to the base; we are the people who are listening to the media--ignoring that so many of us have been criticizing America's Ukraine policy from the get-go, when both the media and the base were much more supportive than they are today.
One of the most preposterous arguments that I hear in defense of our policy in Ukraine is that it is bipartisan, that the experts know better. Perhaps, Senator J.D. Vance doesn't know what the Joint Chiefs of Staff do. Perhaps the Republican base doesn't know what the experts in national security do. Maybe, they, with their knowledge and their training and their intelligence briefing access, know something that the American people don't. So while the American people have grown more and more skeptical of this conflict, perhaps it makes sense that we should actually listen to the experts.
Where have we heard that argument? So many times in the last many decades have we been asked to listen to the experts, and yet we never actually ask what the track record of those experts is in matters of foreign policy.
The experts--the bipartisan consensus, of course--got us into Vietnam, a war that lasted nearly 15 years that saw the destruction of nearly 60,000 American lives; and for what?
It was the bipartisan foreign policy consensus--the experts--that got us into a 20-year war in Afghanistan, where American taxpayers, for two decades, funded things like how to turn Afghanistan into a flowering democracy or how to ensure that the Afghans had proper American thoughts about gender in the 21st century. Well, maybe that was a waste of money and maybe the experts were wrong.
Those same experts, of course, counseled us that we must invade Iraq because Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Yet Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, and the war led not only to the destruction of 5,000 American lives, and many, many hundreds of thousands of innocent people beyond that, but also led to the regional empowerment of Iran, which now we are told, by those same experts, is the biggest problem that we face in the Middle East.
Now those experts have a new crusade. Now those experts have a new thing that American taxpayers must fund and must fund indefinitely, and it is called the conflict in Ukraine.
Now, we--at least most of us, I think, in this body; nearly all of us, I hope--do not think Ukraine deserved to be invaded. We don't think what has befallen the innocent civilians of Ukraine was deserved. We condemn it, as we should.
But we have to ask ourselves: ``What are we doing there?'' not how we feel about it. ``What is our objective there?'' not how sad we feel about what has befallen the innocent civilians. We have to engage in what the bipartisan experts have failed to engage in for 50 years: a conversation about strategy--asking very specific, very discreet questions about what it is that we are doing there. What are we trying to accomplish? How long will it take to accomplish these things? And for how many millions or billions or trillions of dollars are we in for before we can accomplish these things?
Now, I have heard any number of explanations from my colleagues who support our policy in Ukraine about what it is that we are trying to do. At the beginning of the war, especially--you hear this argument far less--but at the beginning of the war, especially, you would hear an argument that we had to throw Vladimir Putin back to the 1991 borders. Well, we don't hear that argument so much anymore. Why? Because it was preposterous then, and it is preposterous now.
Ukraine is a country that now has about 28 million people. That is after many hundreds of thousands have died in the war and many, many millions have left the country, probably permanently, beyond that. Russia, by comparison, has 160 million people and has the industrial capacity to make many, many more times artillery shells and other critical weapons per day. So against that leviathan in Eastern Europe, we are told, somehow, the Ukrainians can win.
Well, again, what is victory?
We know now that throwing Russia back to the 1991 borders is preposterous. No one, not even the inner circle of Zelenskyy's own Cabinet, makes that argument. They did a few months ago, but they don't make that argument any more. So what is victory? And when you talk to people, both in public and in private, the actual thing that you can piece together that we are trying to do is to send enough weapons and send enough money to the Ukrainians until something good happens; until, maybe, the Russians get sick of the conflict, and they come to the negotiating table. That is one opportunity to end this war.
That is one opportunity to end this war that we are told is that if we just keep on going and we show our resolve, then Vladimir Putin will come to the negotiating table.
And yet if you listen to former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder or you listen even to some of the ministers in Zelenskyy's government or,
certainly, if you listen to a number of other Western European allies, they will say that Russia was willing to come to the negotiating table at the beginning of 2022, after the war had stalemated from the Russian perspective and after the Ukrainians had shown some real bravery and some real resolve.
Now, it is not just Vladimir Putin who says this; it is virtually everyone who has ever talked about this moment in the conflict. And they will say that British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, backed by any number of leaders within the American security apparatus, basically said: Tell Vladimir Putin to shove it. The Ukrainians are winning, the Russians are losing, so we will just keep this war going for as long as it takes.
So we had the opportunity to negotiate back in 2022, and if we had taken it, here is what would have happened: Many fewer hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians would have died. Many fewer innocent civilians would have lost their lives, their homes, their livelihoods. And a war in Eastern Europe that has put stresses on everything from food supply to energy prices would have concluded.
So, we are trying to get Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table. We don't have a pathway for how to do it, by the way; we just think that is a good thing, and we are going to try to do it if we continue to throw money. But yet that same negotiating table was on the offer about 18 months ago, and we told them to go shove it.
OK, so negotiating table, that seems to not be a realistic end goal if we just continue to funnel money and resources. So what is the end goal here? It is astonishing that not a single person from Joe Biden on down can actually articulate what another $61 billion can do.
They will tell you what it won't do. They will tell you what the absence of $61 billion will do, but how weird is it that they want to send $61 billion to America's ally, Ukraine, and they can't actually tell you what it is supposed to accomplish--what this will accomplish that the previous $120 billion didn't.
So, first, we have a complete absence of strategy, a complete failure for the President of the United States to articulate what we are going to do.
I try to imagine what it would have been as an American citizen if on December 8, 1941, Franklin Roosevelt stood before the country and said: The Japanese have attacked us. It is a day that will live in infamy, and so we are going to send money for as long as it possibly takes, with no articulation of what we are going to do, of what the battle plan is, of where we are fighting, of what we were going to have our manufacturing base try to accomplish. We are just going to send money and hope that, eventually, these guys come to the negotiating table. That is the equivalent of what we are doing at this moment in time with this particular conflict.
Now, I mentioned just now our manufacturing base. So let's talk about the costs of this conflict. We know there is no strategy. We know there is no plan to do anything other than just to funnel more and more money and more and more resources.
What are the costs of continuing our posture in Ukraine? Well, let's go through them. Now, let me just make an observation about costs, about actually thinking about costs and considering the consequences of our actions. It used to be common in American statesmanship that we hear this phrase, ``Speak softly and carry a big stick.''
The idea was be smart in your strategic decisions, be willing to hit back and hit back hard if you have to, but don't bluster. Don't brag. Don't pretend that you can do things that you can't. And a fundamental part of American statesmanship, I think, is asking ourselves: What is it that we are costing ourselves by continuing to fund this war?
Well, you have heard some of my colleagues talk about this already. We have $61 billion on top of $34 trillion in debt. Can we actually afford to send another $61 billion to Ukraine? Can we afford to send the $100 billion that will be requested at some point next year? Can we afford the hundreds of billions of dollars of reconstruction costs that we have effectively committed ourselves to by funding the war in Ukraine indefinitely?
You already hear these people like vultures with a carcass talking about how much money they are going to make on the reconstruction of Ukraine. And I ask myself, why are we destroying the country in the first place, given that we know the war is at a stalemate and American diplomacy could plausibly bring it to a close.
Now, here is another thing that this is costing us, something that doesn't get talked about nearly enough in this Chamber. But I am reminded of the only time that I have ever been in the White House with a sitting President of the United States. It was about a week before the inauguration of Donald Trump and Mike Pence, and so I was there with President Barack Obama.
I think it is important to never reveal confidences of private conversations. But he said something then, said something that was extremely interesting and I didn't expect to hear from a Democratic President. What he said is that the refugee crisis in Europe in 2015 would take down a number of liberal governments.
Now me as a conservative, I might not care about liberal governments going down, but I thought it was interesting that a theoretically pro- immigration guy--a guy much more committed to the cause of open borders than almost any Republican I know--would say that when you have wide, open borders and when you have uncontrolled migration, it destabilizes governments.
Well, of course, the former President was exactly right: Refugee crises do destabilize governments. Why are we not talking about the fact that in multiple countries in southern Europe right now, they are being overwhelmed with people--not bad people, by the way; most of them are just looking for food to feed their family or a job with a decent wage. But we are witnessing the beginning of what I believe will become the biggest refugee crisis in the history of the world. Why?
Because in Africa, which has 1.5 billion people, most of whom have a standard of living much lower than what we have in the United States of America, you have grain prices through the roof, wheat prices through the roof, barley prices through the roof. And if anybody who is advocating an endless war in Ukraine asks: What happens when 1.5 billion starving people start to move north to look for some food? You don't have to make any moral judgments about the plight that they will go on. You should make a moral judgment about the people in this building who refuse to think about the unintended consequences of their actions.
Are we really willing to have over a billion people, starving, trying to pour into the borders of Europe and the United States of America? Are we really willing to set up a refugee crisis, the likes of which the world has never seen? And if we do that, what effect will it have on our allies in Europe? What effect will it have in our own country? What effect will it have for millions of American citizens who are already dealing with the consequences of an overwhelmed southern border?
And I want to talk about that overwhelmed southern border in a second, but I want to keep talking about the unintended consequences of the war in Ukraine. Another unintended consequence is, What do energy prices look like all over the world?
We have no idea who blew up the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline. We can have some guesses. But isn't it kind of weird and isn't it unusual for our European allies to have had their most important fuel artery destroyed and they seem totally uninterested in asking questions about it?
We already know that governments like those in Poland, like those in Slovenia, like those in a number of other allied countries across Europe are under an extraordinary amount of stress because fuel prices are so high.
The country of Hungary, which has 10 million people, took in nearly a million Ukrainian refugees, an important American ally by any standard, and yet they are facing skyrocketing energy prices because of the war between Russia and Ukraine.
What effect does it have on the many millions of people who are living over there? What effect does it have on America's national security when we take down a number of allied governments because the people there can't
afford food and can't afford energy? That is another unintended consequence.
And while we are talking about the unintended consequences of energy prices in Europe, let's ask the very important question about why we are here.
Now my Democratic friends on the other side of the aisle act like Ukraine is the most significant issue confronting our country. You see the Ukrainian flag lapel pins. You see the way people talk about it on social media. There is a species of American liberal who thinks that the Ukraine war is the most important thing confronting our country, but it is not so important that they will pursue commonsense American energy policies.
The reason--the reason--why Russia is so powerful on the world stage today is one reason: because of stupid American and European energy policies, preposterous energy policies that drive up the cost of natural gas.
So while we, with the one hand, send $61 billion to Ukraine, we pursue a set of energy policies that drive up the cost of natural gas and enrich the Russian oligarchs who are paying for the war. We are literally paying for both sides of the war--the Russian side with our energy policy and $61 billion to Ukraine direct with American taxpayer subsidy. That is another unintended consequence.
And my Republican friends, who I assume all of them agree with me on the idiocy of our modern energy policies in 2023 and 2024, why are they supporting a conflict that, in fact, is a cover for those energy policies?
If they really cared about Ukraine as much as they say they did, perhaps they should force the President of the United States to stop enriching Russian oligarchs with terrible energy policies. But we are not doing that; we are going to continue to fund both sides of this war, and I guess that is just the way that it is going to be.
Let's talk about another unintended consequence of our Ukraine policy. We are, at this very moment, incredibly stressed in how many weapons we can manufacture. I tell this to people, and they are sometimes surprised by it. The first time that I heard it, I was surprised by it.
America, if you measure it by GDP, is, of course, the largest economy in the world, and we are 10 times the size of the Russian economy. And yet the most important weapon in Eastern Europe today are 155- millimeter artillery shells. It is one of the reason why 400,000 Ukrainians--that's the best estimate--have died during this conflict is because the Russians have an incredible advantage in artillery.
So you ask yourself: We are 10 times the size of the Russian economy, how many artillery shells do we make in a month, and how many artillery shells do the Russians make in a month? Well, we make, in a month, about 30,000 artillery shells. That is up from about 20,000 artillery shells a month at the beginning of the conflict. Guess how many the Russians make? They make about 25,000 artillery shells a day.
So in a month, the United States, the biggest economy in the world, makes weapons at a rate per month that the Russians are able to meet in a single day. Well, one thing that suggests to me is the GDP numbers are awfully fake. If you can't produce weapons to defend your own people, then you can't pretend that your economy is as strong as you might like to think.
Unfortunately for Wall Street, we cannot fight wars with dollars and derivatives; we need weapons, we need bullets, we need artillery shells, we need missiles. And America doesn't make nearly enough of those--not for our own security and certainly not enough to support both the Ukraine conflict and, God forbid, a conflict that might occur in east Asia.
So let's specify that a little bit more. We are, right now, depleting critical munitions, missiles, artillery shells, and bullets faster than we can replenish them, and then we send them to Ukraine.
I am sorry, why does that make an ounce of sense for our own national security? Shouldn't we rebuild our own manufacturing capacity before we spend all of it on Ukraine? Shouldn't we make more of our own weapons and gain some self-sufficiency in weapons manufacturing before we send all of those resources to Ukraine? The answer of the U.S. Senate is: Apparently not.
So on issue after issue after issue--
Madam President, I am happy to yield.
To my colleague from North Carolina--before I answer that question, Madam President, can I inquire how much time I have?
So, Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the only time used by the Senator from North Carolina be debited to his postcloture time and that, to answer his question, we not have time deducted from my account.
Madam President, to my colleague and friend from North Carolina, I want to answer that question. So the Senator is right that this legislation contains a lot of resources, and I think $35 billion is the number that he used to rebuild the American industrial base, and I have no reason to object to that number. I know that some people have had more time with this legislation than I have, but I believe, based on my own review, that number is correct. But we have to ask ourselves not just how much money is going to rebuild our industrial base, but combined with Presidential drawdown authority, how much of that will then be just redirected to Ukraine?
My understanding is that given the current authorizations and given the current appropriations, while a lot of this money will go--and I am glad that it will go--to places like Ohio and Alabama to manufacture weapons, those weapons will then be mostly sent to Eastern Europe because we are currently spending resources and munitions in Eastern Europe at a rate that is far faster than our own industrial base's ability to replenish them.
So what will happen, in effect, is that we will make the weapons, and literally faster than we can make them, they will then go out the door to Eastern Europe, unless, of course, in the next few months or the next couple of years, the conflict ends.
So the gentleman's question is well-taken, but it actually doesn't address the core concern that we are depleting munitions much faster than we can replenish them.
I want to just--on one final point here, if I may, and I will be quick because I know I am on borrowed time here. The question of whether we should rebuild our industrial base is something my friend and I agree on and I think most of my colleagues here in the U.S. Senate agree on. The more difficult question is, What do we do in the interim?
It will take years to get our industrial base to the point--maybe 3 years, maybe 5 years to get our industrial base to the point where it can support a war in Eastern Europe and a war in East Asia simultaneously.
We don't debate the need to rebuild our industrial base; the question is, What do we do in the interim? And I think, in the interim, continuing to support the Ukraine war indefinitely is a terrible, terrible mistake.
Madam President, I suppose I could go back on my own clock. I don't know what I am supposed to say here.
Madam President, I appreciate your charity, and I appreciate you having to sit up there and listen to me. Members of our Gallery chose this, but some of us did not, so I appreciate you and my staff.
Let me keep on going here on how we got here. I have articulated to the best of my ability why I think we don't have the strategy here and why I think it is important for us to actually articulate a strategy, what it means for us to not have that strategy, and importantly the unintended consequences of continued conflict in Eastern Europe backstopped by the American taxpayer.
But I want to talk about the politics of this. Not long ago--or I should say, excuse me, not long after Russia invaded Ukraine, I made an observation that frustrated a lot of my friends who advocate for continual conflict in Ukraine. I said: How can we support a war in Ukraine? How can we defend Ukraine's borders when we are not even defending our own American border under the Presidency of Joe Biden?
The response that came back went something like this, and I will paraphrase it as much as I can: America can walk and chew gum at the same time.
A great power should, in theory, be able to support an ally in Eastern Europe while at the same time securing its own southern border.
I think the events of the last week have revealed just how preposterous that argument is. We clearly are not able to walk and chew gum at the same time, and, in fact, if we were able to walk and chew gum at the same time, we would secure our border first, and we would have done it weeks or months ago, but certainly we would have done it this past week.
Now, here is the basic political dynamic that unfolded, and I know my colleague from Kentucky has discussed this. So have others. The basic political dynamic that unfolded is the Republicans in the Senate said: We want border security. That is the issue around which Republicans are unified. We want border security.
Of course, the Democrats are in charge. The Democratic leader is the majority leader of the Senate, and we have a Democratic President. So what do the Democrats want? What unites the Democrats that doesn't unite us? And the answer came back: Ukraine.
The Democrats want to send $61 billion to Ukraine. The Republicans want to secure the border. There was the root of a potential compromise. In divided government, sometimes you have to make compromises. Nobody is happy, but there was a potential compromise that could be made.
Here is how the argument went: If we are going to send $61 billion to Ukraine, we should do it first in tiers. We shouldn't send it all at once; we should stagger it out a little bit. The reason we should do that is to ensure that Joe Biden actually keeps his promise and enforces the American southern border.
In other words, we tell the President: You don't get another dime of American taxpayer money for Ukraine unless you bring illegal border crossings to the level that they were during the Presidency of Donald Trump.
That, to me, was the negotiation as it was set up by the Republican conference. That was the understanding that I and so many of my colleagues in the Republican conference had.
Of course, that negotiation could go many places. It could go a place that might make Democrats uncomfortable. It could go to a place that might make some of my Republican friends uncomfortable. In theory, to get a deal, it would sort of get everybody a little uncomfortable, but you would be able to get 60 Senators to pass it and send it on to the House.
Well, that is not what happened. What was produced instead was a secret negotiation where Republican Senators by and large had very, very little input in the process and where we had no idea what was actually in the final package. We heard it through rumor and through conversations with friends. But immigration law is complicated. What a colleague--even a well-meaning colleague--tells you exists in a piece of immigration law doesn't matter nearly as much as the text of the actual immigration law.
So that text finally dropped on Sunday of last week. I believe on February 4 that legislation dropped, a 370-page piece of legislation that would commit many, many billions of dollars to Ukraine, a few billion dollars to East Asia, a few billion dollars to Israel, and a few billion dollars, combined with some policy changes, to the American southern border.
Now, here is the problem: It actually inflamed some of the worst-- when you read the text, you realize that it inflamed some of the problems that make the southern border crisis the worst. Let's just walk through a few of those.
No. 1, parole. The last Democratic President, Barack Obama, paroled approximately 5,000 illegal aliens per year; that is 5,000 per year. Joe Biden, in 3 years, has paroled between 600,000 and close to 1 million illegal aliens per year. That is not a typo or an overstatement. So Joe Biden radically increased parole authority, and that doesn't just have the direct effect of making nearly 1 million illegal aliens legal, it also has a secondary effect, because if you are in Central America or you are anywhere in the world and you would like to come to America and not go through the proper channels, now, all of a sudden, the clarion call has gone out. Joe Biden has thrown open the southern border, and if you come across illegally, he will parole you close to a million times per year, when the last Democrat did it 5,000 times per year.
That is the first effect of Joe Biden's parole, and our great border compromise did nothing to limit Joe Biden's parole authority.
No. 2. Another problem with our border law is that it has been manipulated so that we turn so-called illegal aliens into so-called asylum seekers. Here is how it works. We, of course, want to be a country that is welcoming to those who are fearing persecution. So if you come into this country as an economic migrant and you come illegally, you come having not followed the laws of this country, you can claim asylum. If your asylum claim is granted, you immediately receive amnesty, and you are on the track to becoming a citizen of this country even though you never followed the law to get into the country in the first place.
The other effect of our jacked-up--excuse me--the other effect of our problematic asylum laws is that even if the asylum claim is not granted, you can be released into the country for a period of years, sometimes even decades, before an immigration judge hears your claims.
So let's say you are an economic migrant. You show up at the American southern border. You say: I am an asylum claimant fearing persecution.
An administrative official from Customs and Border Patrol says: Well, we have to adjudicate your asylum claim. You can't do that right now, so what we will do is ask an immigration judge to hear that claim in 12 years. You are free to hang out in America for the next 12 years.
Well, that is an effect of amnesty, and, again, it sends a message all across the world that America is open for business, and we can have a wide-open southern border. That is what it does.
This particular legislation actually made that problem worse. Now, on the one hand, it tried to increase the standard for granting asylum from a credible fear standard to a reasonable fear standard, but, importantly, it changed the people who were enforcing that standard from immigration judges to CIS officers at United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. These are people who are widely believed to have some of the most pro-asylum views within the U.S. Government.
So millions of people could come across the southern border, claim asylum, and have their claim granted unilaterally. That would put them on the pathway to citizenship. That would put them in a competitive posture with American citizens for jobs and for
other important benefits. Yet this legislation trying to fix the border actually made the asylum process worse. So here we are with a border compromise that actually makes the border security problems in this country worse.
Let me just say that what we would need to do if we really wanted to secure the border is very simple: We just have to make Joe Biden do it. He has the tools necessary. He has the legal authority necessary to secure the border. The real debate, whether you are using Ukraine money as leverage or something else, is, how do we force Joe Biden to do his job? This legislation didn't do that. It didn't even come close to doing that, and so most Republicans rejected it.
So now here we are an hour after the first foray of border security negotiations, the first volley where Democrats give us border security and Republicans give $61 billion to Ukraine, and what happens? It doesn't succeed. For the reasons I just articulated, the gross majority of my Republican colleagues didn't like that proposal, and so it got dropped.
What you might expect to happen in a good-faith negotiation that was actually about the border, if we were actually trying to secure the border, you might have said: This is not the Democrats' best offer. Let's go back to the negotiating table. Let's continue to push for border security because that is the most pressing crisis that we face as a country.
What happened instead is, after an hour, Senate Democrats and even some in Republican leadership decided that we should move on from border security. They had checked the box. Now let's move on to their real priority, which is sending another $61 billion to Ukraine.
It stinks to my high heaven, ladies and gentlemen. No one who watched this process unfold believes that Republican leadership negotiated in good faith for border security or that Democrats did the same. It was always kabuki theater. It was always an excuse to say: We tried on the border. Now let's move on to the thing that really matters, which is the money for Ukraine.
That failure, the way that it blew up in the faces of our leadership, and the appearance gave lie to the idea that this was ever really about border security.
By the way, it alienated millions of Republican and Independent voters who want their government to focus on the most pressing problem for this country, and that is the border.
When I go back home to Ohio and I talk to audiences about their views on Ukraine, most people agree with me, but some people disagree with me. But if you go to an audience in the State of Ohio--a State that is affected tragically by the fentanyl problem, where you will drive on highways and see billboards for sex trafficking victims to call the hotline because they are being sex trafficked in the State of Ohio by Mexican drug cartels who have been given free reign at the southern border--if you talk to people and ask them ``What are the most pressing problems the country faces?'' none of them will say Ukraine, even those who would like to send more money to Ukraine. None of them will say Ukraine.
So what are we doing? Why did we give up so easily? Why did Republicans stab their voters in the back? Why did we not fight for border security, ladies and gentlemen? That is exactly what we promised we would do.
Many of us did, by the way. Even some of my colleagues who disagree with me on the Ukraine question at least have the courage to stand and fight for border security. But unfortunately far too many Republicans refused, and so we are where we are.
Now let me just make an argument about where we are on this particular border situation. We have millions of people coming into the country illegally every single year. We have hundreds of thousands dying just in the first 3 years of Joe Biden's term from fentanyl overdoses. We have a President who has invited the opening of the American southern border, and now we are living with the consequences.
The American people know that this was the direct result of Joe Biden's policies, and they know he could stop it. So let's debate real border security--border security that actually forces the President to do exactly that.
There are a number of options on the table. You will sometimes hear some of my Democratic colleagues and even some in the Republican leadership say: We can't have a bill because Donald Trump doesn't want us to have a bill; that if we advance commonsense border security, Donald Trump would destroy it.
That is the furthest thing from the truth. In fact, just last week, Donald Trump proposed a border security bill that would force Joe Biden to secure the southern border. You may agree or disagree with the policy, but the idea that there is no policy that would get Republican buy-in, including at the top of the Republican ticket, is preposterous. It is something that does not exist in reality.
Madam President, how much time do I have left?
Great.
So I have given my spiel here, and I want to get a little bit into the details of what we are trying to accomplish here and how we might try to accomplish it. But, first, let's start with a conversation about the American southern border.
I want to read a piece from the Washington Post, an argument that I want to read and that I want to respond to:
Having failed to convince the American people that a blank
check to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is in their
interests, the Ukraine First caucus now claims the aid
primarily benefits American workers. Mark A. Thiessen's [who
drafted an] op-ed [on this point] exemplified the pivot.
This is disingenuous and dangerous.
And this is partially in response to some of the arguments that I have heard earlier. We cannot rebuild our industrial base by building capacity and sending all of it to Ukraine. It doesn't make sense.
Now I support--
We support increasing defense spending and building up our
defense-industrial base. An expansion of our military
manufacturing capacity benefits American workers and bolsters
our national security. Washington is more focused on sending
our limited military stockpiles to a conflict in Ukraine with
no clear path to victory.
The Biden administration's new message fails to account for
grave shortages in our stockpiles. Thanks to nearly two years
of mission in Ukraine, the United States is perilously
unready for any additional contingency. Anything with a solid
rocket motor is in short supply--
1Solid rocket motors are the rocket motors that power so
many of the critical missile systems that we need. And
whether it is Javelins or Stingers or Patriot missiles, we
are critically in short supply of not just the missiles
themselves but of some of the components that are necessary
for building those missiles--
including the SM-6s that would be needed in the Pacific. The
high demand for Stingers, Javelins and Patriot interceptors
in Ukraine means we are desperately short of the weapons that
would be needed in Taiwan. Replenishing them is going to take
years.
I want to just pause here to make an observation. One of the arguments my friends make in defense of $61 billion to Ukraine is that we need to send a message to Vladimir Putin that if we give up and walk away from the Ukrainian battlefield--even though the leader of Ukraine's own military, until recently, said they had no chance of victory on that battlefield--if we give up, then it will send a message to Xi Jinping, the leader of China, that we are not a steadfast ally.
What they are arguing, in effect, is that it will weaken American deterrence, that process by which we prevent our enemies and our adversaries from doing things we don't want them to. Well, in classical foreign policy circles, deterrence is the combination of, on the one hand, resolve and, on the other hand, capacity. And they are making an argument about resolve. They are saying that if we show weakness to Xi, we will be showing a weakening of American resolve. We will show that America can't stand in there and fight the fight. And, look, I am obviously a critic of further aid to Ukraine, but it is true that American resolve is important, and we should do everything we can to show American resolve.
But you know what is more important than American resolve? Do you know what is more important than thumping our chests like eighth graders on a playground and saying we are tough, we are strong, we can do it? What is much stronger than that is to
actually have the capacity to defend ourselves and our allies. And that is what is so weak.
Xi Jinping does not care how tough America acts. He cares how strong America is.
And if we use our ammunition, our missiles, our artillery, on a war in Eastern Europe when we don't even have the bullets to defend ourselves or our allies, it doesn't matter how tough we act, Xi will do whatever he wants all over the world. And that is what this is ultimately about. We are trying to rebuild our country. What do we do in the interim? What do we actually do when our country is in a weak enough place because of decisions made over 30 or 40 years?
I find it interesting that so many of the people, from the news commentators to my Senate colleagues, Republican and Democratic, who actively advocated shipping our industrial base to East Asia and Mexico are now the people who are most fervently advocating for endless war in Ukraine.
Here is the game they played: Send all of our weapons manufacturing; send all of our industrial base; send it everywhere but the United States of America. And now that America is in a tough spot, we should fight every conflict everywhere, even though we don't make the weapons that we need to support those conflicts. And why don't we make those weapons? It is because these guys encouraged us to ship our industrial base overseas.
Those of you who are students of history will have heard the term ``arsenal of democracy.'' America was ``the arsenal of democracy.'' We won World War II, not because of chest thumping, not because we showed the strongest resolve, but because we had the strongest people and the strongest economy in the world.
So at a time when America faces a number of problems--including the southern border here at home, at a time when we are weaker in manufacturing capacity than we have been at any time in the last half century, this is the point when these people want to send unlimited weapons to Ukraine? This is the point where they want to send weapons not just to Ukraine but to many theaters all across the world?
Let's have an honest conversation about the decisions that have been made and how they have made this country weaker. Let's not pretend that weakness doesn't exist and send an unlimited number of weapons to Ukraine in the interim.
``Oh, The Places You'll Go!''
Now, I want to move on to another argument. But before I do, I am mindful of something that is very close to my heart personally. I have three beautiful children. I have a 6-year-old baby boy named Ewan--not so much of a baby anymore. I have a 2-year-old baby named Mirabel who is still very much a baby, and I love her very much. And I have a little guy named Vivek Gabriel Vance who was 3 years old yesterday but turned 4 today.
And I am sorry, Vivek, that I can't be with you for your birthday dinner, but I want you to know that Daddy loves you very much. And I am going to read this into the Record because maybe you can watch it at home.
``Oh, the Places You'll Go!'' by Dr. Seuss.
Oh, the Places You'll Go!
Congratulations!
Today is your day.
You're off to Great Places!
You're off and away!
You have brains in your head.
You have feet in your shoes.
You can steer yourself
in any direction you choose.
You're on your own. And you know what you know.
And YOU are the guy who'll decide where to go.
You'll look up and down streets. Look 'em over with care.
About some you will I say, ``I don't choose to go there.''
With your head full of brains and your shoes full of feet,
you're too smart to go down any not-so-good street.
And you may not find any
you'll want to go down.
In that case, of course,
you'll head straight out of town.
It's opener there,
in the wide open air.
Out there things can happen
and frequently do
to people as brainy
and footsy as you.
And when things start to happen,
don't worry. Don't stew.
Just go right along.
You'll start happening too.
Oh, the places you'll go!
You'll be on your way up!
You'll be seeing great sights!
You'll join the high fliers
who soar to great heights.
You won't lag behind, because you'll have the speed.
You'll pass the whole gang and you'll soon take the lead.
Wherever you fly, you'll be best of the best.
Wherever you go, you'll top all the rest.
Except when you don't.
Because, sometimes, you won't.
I'm sorry to say so
but, sadly, it's true
that Bang-ups
And Hang-ups
can happen to you.
You can get all hung up
in a prickle-ly perch.
And your gang will fly on.
You'll be left in a Lurch.
You'll come down from the Lurch
with an unpleasant bump.
And the chances are, then,
that you'll be in a Slump.
And when you're in a Slump,
you're not in for much fun.
Un-slumping yourself
is not easily done.
You'll come to a place where the streets are not marked.
Some windows are lightened. But mostly they are dark.
A place you could sprain both your elbow and your chin!
Do you dare to stay out? Do you dare to go in?
How much can you lose? How much can you win?
And IF you go in, should you turn left or right . . .
Or right-and-three-quarters? Or, maybe, not quite?
Or go around back and sneak in from behind?
Simple it's not, I'm afraid you will find,
for a mind-maker-upper to make up his mind.
You can get so confused
that you'll start in to race
down long wiggled rocks at a break-necking pace
and grind on for miles across weirdish wild space,
headed, I fear, toward a most useless place.
The Waiting Place . . .
. . . for people just waiting.
Waiting for a train to go
or a bus to come, or a plane to go
or the mail to come, or the rain to go
or the phone to ring, or the snow to snow
or waiting around for a Yes or No
or waiting for their hair to grow.
Everyone is just waiting.
Waiting for the fish to bite
or waiting for the wind to fly a kite
or waiting around for Friday night
or waiting, perhaps, for their Uncle Jake
or a pot to boil, or a Better Break
or a string of pearls, or a pair of pants
or a wig with curls, or Another Chance.
Everyone is just waiting.
Thank you, Mr. President.
I want to read this piece, which articulates my argument for peace very well, written in Responsible Statecraft, published on July 6, 2023. We are now--think about it--nearly a year since this piece was published, and its arguments are, if anything, more prescient today than they were last summer:
Last year, referring to the possibility of escalation that
the Russo-Ukrainian war entails, President Joe Biden
announced that America and the world are closer to a
destructive nuclear war than ever since the Cuban Missile
Crisis in 1962.
Perhaps no other statement from the highest level of
government could so directly affirm the failure of American
grand strategy and foreign policy in the post-Cold War world.
What seemed to be a Hollywood sci-fi scenario that the
average American in the 21st century did not even think about
is now a possibility that experts, policymakers, and world
leaders like President Biden discuss regularly.
As America and the world grapple with the tectonic shifts
that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has unleashed, war
budgets around the world keep increasing. In 2022, global
spending on defense reached an all-time high of $2.24
trillion. The U.S. defense budget accounted for almost 40
percent of the total, surpassing the next 10 countries
combined, including China, Russia, India, the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany.
Yet, America's ever-increasing military expenditures have
hardly translated into success stories in the 21st century.
The trillions of dollars pumped into questionable military
adventurism abroad, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003,
have yielded equally questionable results not only for U.S.
interests and national security, but also for global
security. America's overreliance on the military to achieve
policy objectives and the unilateral actions pursued without
an international mandate have backfired in the form of a
growing coalition of dissatisfied states that refuse to
accept a world order that they see as unjust and
hierarchical.
In April of 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered
his famous ``Chance for Peace'' speech in which he compared
the enthusiasm for a just and peaceful world after World War
II to the unstable, hostile, and unpredictable environment of
the Cold War. ``The eight years that have passed have seen
that hope waver, grow dim, and almost die. And the shadow of
fear again has darkly lengthened across the world,'' he said,
before laying out his vision of a just and peaceful order and
warning against the unbalanced political influence of
military interests.
Today, 70 years later, the world faces the same ``shadow of
fear'' as the unpredictable war unleashed by a revisionist
Russia shakes the international system. Biden's promised end
of ``America's forever wars'' that was supposed to bring
stability and predictability back to the realm of
international affairs while also allowing the United States
to reorient its resources towards a much-needed domestic
revival did not materialize.
While the war in Ukraine poses a significant threat to U.S.
national security interests and necessitates an appropriate
policy response, including security assistance to Ukraine for
self-defense, U.S. military spending was growing even before
Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This pattern should raise
questions about whether the United States should have
increased spending on the military in response to the crisis
in Ukraine.
The war has also turned into a talking point for those
whose direct interests tied to military spending overshadow
the actual interests of the American people. Many are now
pushing for the concept of a long standoff with foreign
rivals, without accounting for the real costs and
implications that will be borne by ordinary citizens, both in
America and abroad.
In foreign affairs, discourse and reality are sometimes
interwoven in complicated and nuanced ways. Conflict can
arise as much from actual strategic disagreements, security
considerations, and national interests as from discourse and
perceptions. In this context, embracing conflict and
promoting discourse that emphasizes a long-term confrontation
is a dangerous path for America to follow. The very cause of
World War I has been attributed to the perceptions of threats
and the interpretation of actions by states as ``hostile,''
leading some scholars to argue that European leaders
``sleepwalked'' into a conflict they neither desired nor
expected to win easily.
The question for Americans today, especially the new
generation that will be inheriting a more unstable and
dangerous world, is whether they will allow America to
sleepwalk into a conflict that the United States neither
needs, nor can afford to win. Traditionally, American voters
do not attach much importance to foreign and defense policy
issues. Yet, the citizens of a country that will be spending
a record $842 billion on the military cannot afford to close
their eyes on such critical policy issues that, in fact,
profoundly affect their livelihoods.
The question is not whether America should abandon its
legitimate security needs and interests, nor neglect the
foreign threats that necessitate spending on the military. We
must understand how much of the current spending is actually
justified. We also need to assess the efficiency of the
military to protect the American people and interests abroad
without overextending resources wastefully and prompting a
dangerous arms race that will paralyze growth, development,
and more importantly--the long-term prospect for peace and a
new, more just world order.
This is why young Americans should be especially concerned
with the unchecked influence of special interests that seek
to inflate threats, instill the inevitability of long-term
conflict confrontation in the world, and justify ever-
increasing spending on the military. The new generation
will be the primary bearer of the burdens, costs, and
consequences that decisions taken in Washington today will
have. Ultimately, it boils down to a simple question of
the kind of vision young Americans have for their country
and for their world.
This question is especially critical given America's own
undeniable internal strife. Those seeking to downplay the
legitimate critique of the overreliance on military forget or
deliberately neglect that foreign policy is ultimately
dependent on domestic policy. Both experts and the general
public now agree that the once-hailed American democracy is
threatened. The inflection point for America is serious: the
country is facing a crisis of identity, social cohesion, a
growing discontent with the economic model that has
marginalized an ever-growing segment of the population, and
what is more concerning--a waning belief and trust in the
country's most foundational institutions.
Those championing a new age of unnecessarily militaristic
and confrontational foreign policy that relies on growing and
unbalanced defense budgets should rethink the use of those
resources. A stroll in the streets of Portland or in the
infamous Skid Row in Los Angeles could be beneficial to re-
evaluate priorities and distribution of limited resources to
deal with the most pressing issues America faces. Ultimately,
the strength and attractiveness of the United States on the
global stage and America's competitiveness vis-a-vis its
rivals depends on the domestic revival of a country that has
been decaying silently for decades in virtually all key
aspects.
This is why a new generation of Americans must step in to
seize the new chance for peace before it is too late. As the
world order continues to fracture, only a wave of
democratization of the most undemocratic sphere of
policymaking in Washington can trigger the kind of
reassessment and accountability the American people should
expect from their elected leaders.
Unless we take steps now to usher in an overdue reckoning
in Washington, we may miss, as President Eisenhower said, ``a
precious chance to turn the black tide of events.''
That was by Martin Makaryan, and that, again, is from ``Responsible Statecraft''--an important argument and an important piece.
Let me address just a couple of points brought to mind by that piece and by that argument.
You will hear--especially in the last couple of days after former President Donald Trump criticized NATO, you will hear a strong argument about what NATO means to the United States of America. I think it is important for us and for our citizens to be honest not just about the problems inherent with NATO and the lack of burden-sharing but also the problems that exist in NATO's own countries--countries that most of us love, that most of us see as important allies, but that have deep, deep pathologies and problems that must be addressed.
Something that is often said is that in this particular conflict of Ukraine versus Russia, NATO is actually carrying its fair share of the burden. You will see charts that make an argument that NATO, which has the economy approximately the size of the United States of America, is spending, actually, more resources on Ukraine than the United States of America. Now, that argument has a few critical flaws. Let's walk through them.
First of all, NATO is providing a large amount of humanitarian assistance, and of course they are absorbing a large amount of refugees; they are doing it because Ukraine is in their backyard. But the critical weapons and
munitions that are being provided are overwhelmingly the responsibility of the United States of America. NATO is not carrying its fair share of the burden when it comes to weapons, and that is the most important thing that the Ukrainians need to win.
Second, even if we assumed--and it is wrong--but even if we assumed that NATO was carrying its fair share of the burden over the last 18 months, NATO has failed to carry its fair share of the burden for literally decades, ladies and gentlemen. Look at just how much money the United States has spent on defense since 1992 and compare that to our NATO allies. Ladies and gentlemen, we have been subsidizing European security to the tune of trillions of dollars. It might feel nice when we go to Munich and the Europeans thank us, and it might be great to get a pat on the back from a European head of state, but the American people demand that NATO carry its fair share of the burden.
Germany is the largest economy in Europe. They have promised for decades and especially over the last years that they would meet the NATO threshold of 2 percent of GDP spent on defense. They are still not there. Italy--a massive economy--still underspends on defense. In fact, most of the economies of Europe--outside of the UK and France and some economies in Eastern Europe--most of the economies of Europe massively underspend on defense, and that has invited aggression not just from Vladimir Putin but from other places as well.
At the same time that world leaders play armchair general with the Ukraine conflict, their own societies are decaying. Not a single country--even the United States--within the NATO alliance has birth rates at a replacement level. We don't have enough families and children to continue as a nation; yet we are talking about a problem 6,000 miles away. We are being invaded by up to 10 million illegal migrants over the course of Joe Biden's term in office, and we have apparently no President with the willpower to stop that problem. We have a fentanyl crisis that has led to the deaths of over 100,000 people per year in the last few years of our youngest and brightest people. Mental health crises are skyrocketing. Youth suicides are skyrocketing. Every single place--not just the United States but every single one of the countries in the NATO alliance sees similar or in some cases even more troubling dynamics on most of those metrics, from migration to economic malaise.
What are we doing, ladies and gentlemen?
China and Russia. If we want them to fear us, we need to rebuild our own countries. We need to rebuild a strong Europe and a strong America. We need to rebuild a civilization that can support conflicts instead of just run away from them because right now we don't have that. We do not have a country and we do not have a NATO alliance that is strong enough to do the things that need to be done.
So our message to the Europeans needs to be simple: Fix your own country. Share your own burden. Spend more on defense. Fix your own problems.
That will deal with the problem in Russia far more than a $61 billion check to Ukraine will. In fact, we are subsidizing them. We are enabling their refusal to spend enough resources on defense.
I see that my time is up. Thank you.
Madam President, pursuant to section 314(e) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, I raise a point of order against all emergency designation provisions contained in Senate amendment No. 1388 to H.R. 815, a list of which I am sending to the desk.
The list is as follows:
S.A. 1388 to H.R. 815, Emergency Designation Provisions
Division A. Title I--Department of Defense
Military Personnel
1. Military Personnel, Army
2. Military Personnel, Marine Corps
3. Military Personnel, Air Force
4. Military Personnel, Space Force
Operation and Maintenance
5. Operation and Maintenance, Army
6. Operation and Maintenance, Navy
7. Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps
8. Operation and Maintenance, Air Force
9. Operations and Maintenance, Space Force
10. Operations and Maintenance, Defense-Wide (including
transfers of funds)
Procurement
11. Military Procurement, Army
12. Procurement of Ammunition, Army
13. Other Procurement, Army
14. Weapons Procurement, Navy
15. Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
16. Other Procurement, Navy
17. Procurement, Marine Corps
18. Missile Procurement, Air Force
19. Other Procurement, Air Force
20. Procurement, Defense-Wide
21. Defense Production Act Purchases
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
22. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Army
23. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy
24. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force
25. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-
Wide
Other Department of Defense Programs
26. Office of the Inspector General
Related Agencies
27. Intelligence Community Management Account
General Provisions--This Title
28. Section 104
29. Section 105
Division A, Title II--Department of Energy
Energy Programs
30. Science
Atomic Energy Defense Activities National Nuclear Security
Administration
31. Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
32. Federal Salaries and Expenses
Division A, Title III--Department of Homeland Security
Protection Preparedness, Response and Recovery
33. Federal Emergency Management Agency Operations and
Support
34. Federal Assistance
Division A, Title IV--Department of Health and Human Services
Administration for Children and Families
35. Refugee and Entrant Assistance
General Provisions--This Title
36. Section 401--
Division A, Title V--Department of Defense
37. Military Construction, Navy and Marine Corp
Division A, Title VI--Department of State and Related Agency
Department of State
38. Administration of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Programs
39. Office of Inspector General
40. Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service
United States Agency for International Development
41. Funds Appropriated to the President Operating Expenses
42. Office of Inspector General
Bilateral Economic Assistance
43. Funds Appropriated to the President International
Disaster Assistance
44. Transition Initiatives
45. Economic Support Fund
46. Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia
47. Department of State Migration and Refugee Assistance
48. Department of State International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement
49. Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related
Programs
50. Peacekeeping Operations
51. Funds Appropriated to the President Foreign Military
Financing Program
International Assistance Programs
52. Multilateral Assistance Contribution to the
International Development Association
General Provisions--This Title (including transfers of funds)
53. Section 612(c)
Thanks to my colleague from Nebraska, who confided in private to me that he didn't think he could go for the full hour, but I would have welcomed at least another 20 minutes of speaking from my friend from Nebraska.
But it is 3:15 in the morning, and we are here discussing sending another $61 billion to Ukraine as part of a $95 billion security supplemental. I think it is important to at least give some context to the four people who are also currently still awake as to how we got here and why we got here and why we managed to fumble, I think, a great opportunity in this Chamber to actually do some real border security.
First, months ago, my Republican colleagues and I discussed the possibility of doing a border security package as a point of negotiation with our Democratic colleagues over Ukraine. The basic setup of the negotiation went something like this: Republicans are unified--at least allegedly--in our view that the border is a national security crisis. This is allegedly a national security supplemental, and the border is the most important national security issue that we confront. On the flip side, Democrats are united in their view that Ukraine must receive another $61 billion or even more of American aid. There were the seeds of a potential deal that could be cut between Senate Democrats and Senate Republicans.
Now, there are a few problems with this, as we learned. The first was that while our Democratic colleagues might agree that the border has some problems, they apparently did not agree it is quite the same crisis that we do. That is one problem.
Another problem is that apparently our Republican colleagues are not nearly as united as we thought we were or as we pretended to be. In fact, the closer we got to an actual resolution of the negotiation, the more we learned that our Republican colleagues--at least a small subset of them--cared a hell of a lot more about the Ukraine package than they did about securing the American southern border.
It is negotiation 101 that if you go into a negotiating posture where you desperately want the thing the other side of the table also desperately wants, you are not in an especially good position. If Republicans are as desperate to send $61 billion to Ukraine as Democrats are, then it isn't very shocking that the Democrats were not willing to give us a large amount on border security.
Now, this is what, of course, everyone knew. This is what, of course, everyone now knows because after a mere hour of debating a border security package as part of a broader supplemental, Senate Republicans joined with Democrats to immediately move on to a discussion of Ukraine's supplemental--literally an hour.
If you had dreamed up something from the fever swamp conspiracy theory of the American conservative movement, you could not have come up with something more egregious than this fake negotiation, what it produced, and how it immediately led to a debate--not about our southern border but about Ukraine.
Now, there are a few problems with this particular negotiation, a few problems with the way that it unfolded.
The first. The first is that it was done in secret. A border security--and by the way, this is problems from the perspective of conservatives, problems that the Republicans in our conference who were supporting this should have been mindful of if they wanted to actually get to a security package that could have gotten a majority of Republican support, because after many months of negotiations, there was a border security package that received, I believe, four Republican votes. And now we have a Ukraine supplemental that received far less than the majority of the Republican conference.
If you wanted to get a majority of Republicans to support this border security package, you should have observed a few basic rules.
The first is that you should not have done a secret negotiation. Many of our voters and many of our colleagues are mistrustful of secret negotiations. They are mistrustful of the people who participate in secret negotiations because if you are not getting the details of a plan out as it unfolds, you are not doing a few things.
First of all, you are not actually allowing people who know the immigration law best within the conservative movement to understand what is in it, to offer feedback, to try to improve the bill, to ensure that whatever text is coming together actually matches the terms of an alleged negotiation deal.
No. 2, you are denying the American people an opportunity to actually understand what is in the border security deal that is unfolding.
No. 3, you are denying Senate colleagues a real opportunity to debate the merits as they came together.
What actually happened was not, you know, you negotiate for a couple of weeks, and this is where the Democrats are and this is where the Republicans are, and maybe you can find some seeds of a compromise here. What actually happened is that after months of negotiation, Senate Republicans started asking: Well, what is in this deal? What shape is it taking? What are the Democrats giving? What are the Democrats asking for in return?
This was all mediated through a very, very small number of channels, and that process bred mistrust before we even knew any of the details of what was in the border security package.
Now, if you were a cynic, you would say this was by design, that we designed a package that was meant to create mistrust, that we designed a process that was meant to create mistrust and was never meant to lead to any significant majority. And I hate to say it, but I think that is actually the package that was produced.
So after months of secret negotiations, after months of denying some of the smartest immigration experts in the world the opportunity to critique and offer feedback on this package, after months of breeding mistrust within the American body politic, the details of an immigration grand bargain started to leak out, and the details were pretty troubling.
There were some good things, of course, some things that we liked and some things that we think were necessary, but it is interesting that even in the most generic terms, the details of the immigration plan started to create some backlash among most Republicans. Again, if you can't pass a border security package without the support of most Republicans, then it is not actually going to pass.
So here we are, early 2024, with a promise of a grand bargain on border security and a national security supplemental to boot. Yet every single detail turns out to have not been manifested in the text, turns out to have not produced something in the text that would have actually meaningfully secured the border.
So if you were serious about border security, the first thing you would want to do is to limit the President's ability to parole close to 1 million illegal migrants a year. If you go back to the Obama administration, the Obama administration paroled about 5,000 illegal aliens every single year. Senate Republicans think that is too much, but 5,000 a year is far less than the 750,000 or close to 1 million a year the Biden administration has decided to parole.
Now, it is not just the direct effect--you are taking close to 1 million people a year who have violated our immigration laws and giving them what amounts to effective legal status--you are also sending a message all across Central America and all across the world that America is open for business.
This is why, when you put a camera or a microphone in front of somebody who is crossing the southern border illegally and ask ``Why are you coming now?'' they will say ``Because Joe Biden and Kamala Harris invited us in.''
The parole policy has thrown open the floodgates, and this grand border compromise contained almost nothing that would meaningfully reduce the number of paroles that the President of the United States can issue.
It required a report, I believe, but nothing that would limit the President's discretion to grant parole en masse, as he has done for the last 3 years of his administration. That was the first problem.
The second problem is that the grand border compromise did very little on the question of asylum. It pretended to do something on the question of asylum. It changed the asylum standard. It increased that standard from a credible fear to a reasonable fear. But it also changed who was enforcing that standard to CIS agents, who are among the most pro-asylum people in the entire U.S. Government. So you changed the standard, but you created a person who is enforcing that standard who has almost no reason to meaningfully enforce American asylum laws.
Why is this a problem? Well, because we have fundamentally at the U.S. southern border an economic migrant crisis that is pretending to be a massive asylum crisis. People who are traditional economic migrants come into our country at ports of entry or elsewhere, they claim asylum. They say that they are persecuted, they say they are fleeing persecution, and then the asylum officer usually will tell them: You have to come back in 6 years or 12 years or however many years down the road to have your case adjudicated before an immigration law judge. And, of course, for those 10 years or maybe more that they are in the country, they effectively have legal status. They are in our country, and many of them never show up for their court date even though the court date is years later. So the asylum process has turned millions of economic migrants into alleged asylum claimants.
I find it interesting that when you look at who is actually coming across the southern border, it is very, very often young men between the ages of 20 and 35, unaccompanied by women or children, because if we know anything about world affairs, it is that when people are politically persecuted, it is always the young, unaccompanied men who are the most politically persecuted, not the women or children. And my colleagues will forgive my sarcasm there.
Why is it that the people who claim the greatest persecution, the people who are flooding across our southern border--why are women and children so poorly represented among them? Because this is not about asylum, and this is not about political persecution; this is about manipulating America's laws to turn an economic migration crisis into an asylum crisis. It is a legal arbitrage that immigration attorneys in the United States of America have cooked up.
Oh, and by the way, one of the great things about the grand border compromise is that we decided to pay immigration attorneys who are undercutting our immigration laws massive amounts of legal fees from the American taxpayers because why not have a handout for the immigration attorneys who have helped create a system where we undercut our immigration laws?
That was the second major problem with the grand border compromise.
A third major problem with the grand border compromise is that it did not meaningfully increase the President's authority or, frankly, force the President's hand into deporting anyone who is currently here illegally.
Just a couple weeks ago, in New York City, a group of illegal immigrants violently assaulted a police officer. Those people, as far as I know, are still in our country because we don't deport people-- even those who violently assault police officers. We deport an incredibly small number of the people who come into this country illegally.
A fourth problem with the grand border compromise cooked up by my colleagues is that it had an emergency border shutoff authority, which was really an effort--an admirable effort--to force Secretary Mayorkas's and the President's hand. The way it went was basically something like this: If border crossing reached a certain threshold-- 5,000 a day, I believe, in the text that we received--then there is an emergency shutdown authority that applies for a certain number of days per year--270 days in the first year, less in the second year, and less in the third year.
Now, that sounds not too bad, right? Once you hit a certain threshold of illegal border crossings, you should shut down the border. I happen to think that number should be close to zero but whatever. Opinions will differ on where we should set that authority. Yet that authority, set at 5,000 a day, which effectively says that you could have nearly 1.9 million illegal aliens come into the country before you trigger that authority--it has multiple provisions that would allow us to waive it. It has a 45-day emergency waiver authority for the President. It has a 180-
day discretionary waiver for Secretary Mayorkas. For those who are good at math, 180 days plus 45 days is 225 days. So in a 270-day border emergency shutdown authority, 225 days can be waived by the President or the Secretary who refused to enforce our immigration laws. That is not much of an emergency authority if they only have to use it 45 days in the first year given what is going on at the American southern border.
The fundamental problem, as so many of my colleagues have recognized and as so many of my colleagues have noted, is, how do we get Joe Biden and Secretary Mayorkas to enforce the border law when they clearly don't want to? This is a forcing function because the real negotiation here, as was obvious to anybody from the start, was, how do we force Joe Biden to do his job, and what leverage do we have in order to force that very thing?
Instead, we went into a negotiation where--again, it was in secret-- our colleagues who were negotiating fundamentally didn't understand or didn't enforce this fundamental insight. They wanted to give Joe Biden additional authorities. Well, he might not use those authorities even if you give them to him. They wanted to give Joe Biden a number of discretionary, ``get of jail free'' cards, where even if you create authorities for him to enforce the border, you give him the discretion to get out of it. We don't need to be granting Joe Biden more discretion. We need to be constraining his discretion because it is Joe Biden's discretion that has led to the border crisis that we have.
Now, a number of my colleagues have mentioned the terrible consequences of the border problem and what it looks like for so many of our citizens. There is no overstating the catastrophe that is going on at the American southern border. There is the fentanyl crisis that is killing over 100,000 citizens of our country. Of course, the fentanyl is now transitioning to other drugs just as the heroin transitioned to the fentanyl and just as the prescription pills transitioned to the heroin. One of the many gifts of our wide-open southern border is a virtually limitless supply of increasingly more powerful synthetic opioids to kill our citizens.
If you read anything about the history of the opium war, you wonder if we are witnessing right now the reverse opium war where precursors to synthetic opioids come in from communist China, and the Mexican drug cartels manufacture them and then ship them across the southern border.
If you were actually serious about addressing this crisis, the first thing that you would want to do is limit Joe Biden's and Secretary Mayorkas's authority to open the floodgates and invite millions of illegal aliens into this country. You would limit their discretion. That was always the only pathway to meaningful border enforcement under this administration.
As so many of my colleagues have mentioned, Joe Biden clearly doesn't want to enforce the border. So, ladies and gentlemen, how do we force the President to enforce the border?
The basic deal that was offered by a number of my colleagues and friends went something like this: If the Democrats are so desperate to send another $61 billion to Ukraine, then what we could do is meter the money based on border enforcement metrics. This is, in fact, what was discussed in the Republican conference, and it received support from Ukraine supporters, like Jim Risch and Ron Johnson, to people who were more skeptical of the conflict, like me, to people who were in the middle, like Ted Cruz.
The basic idea was, we are going to force as much as possible Joe Biden to enforce the southern border, and unless he gets illegal border crossings under a certain level using his existing authority, maybe with some additional tools, then we will not provide support to the security supplemental. In other words, if he wants his $61 billion for Ukraine, Joe Biden is going to have to do a little border enforcement despite the fact that he obviously doesn't want to.
That was the deal that we thought was on the table, and that, unfortunately, was not the deal that was actually on the table once it was advanced by our leadership team.
Of course, on Sunday night, February 4, we received the text of the grand border compromise. Typically, with a field of law as complicated as immigration, you would expect days, weeks, months of committee markups, of debates, of negotiation over text; of trying to understand how one provision influences another provision; of how another provision affects the other. This process of legislative policymaking is what was completely short-circuited by this secret negotiation.
So, on Sunday, the text dropped, and on Wednesday, we were expected to vote on it. So, for 3 days--from February 4 to February 7--my staff and, I imagine, the staffs of nearly every Republican Member worked long nights to try to understand what was actually in the border security package. They identified many of the problems that I just repeated that actually exist within the policy. Even where it looked good on the surface, it very often contained provisions where Democrats had, frankly, outnegotiated Republicans.
It reminds me a little bit of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, where the President's negotiators took to the New York Times to brag afterward that while then-Speaker Kevin McCarthy had gotten a lot of concessions out of the White House, those concessions had fallen apart when the concessions were translated to legislative text. That is a problem. If the legislative text isn't very good, no matter how good the headline promises of the legislation are, then you shouldn't support the legislation. That is, of course, what happened.
On Wednesday, Republicans decided as a conference that they would not support the border security package that came out. A curious thing happened then. If you had really been serious about border security, if you had really wanted to advance the ball in any negotiation, the other party comes with an offer. You consider the offer. You read it. You try to understand it. You decide it is not good enough. What do you do if you are serious about the problem? You then go back and say: Well, you know what, this just isn't good enough. We need to keep going down this pathway. We need to keep on fighting for a way to secure the border.
But that never happened. Why that never happened is because too many within the Republican conference were desperate--desperate--for money for Ukraine--so desperate that they were willing to short-circuit any meaningful border security. That is the fundamental truth.
As much as I am frustrated at my Democratic colleagues for not doing more to secure the border, as much as I am frustrated at Democrats writ large and the President of the United States for not doing his job, on this particular negotiation, the simple truth is that too many Senate Republicans cared far more about Ukraine than they did about their own country.
You heard it earlier today or earlier this evening when one of my colleagues said that this was the most important vote that any of us had ever taken in the U.S. Senate. I can't imagine what leads a person to think that sending $61 billion to Ukraine at this moment of crisis for our country is the most important vote we have taken. My God. Maybe we should take some far more important votes that actually solve the problems that confront this country. Maybe we should confront the mental health crisis in our country, the fact that our teenagers seem to have rising depression rates, the fact that our young people have rising suicide rates, the fact that we have a wide-open southern border, the fentanyl and sex trafficking crisis. All of these things are substantially more important than what we are about to vote on in the U.S. Senate and what we voted on last night--but not, of course, if your main priority is securing Ukraine's border rather than fixing the problems of your own country.
This is unfortunately where we are. This is unfortunately the problem we are confronting. We have a Democratic Party that wants an open border, and we have a Republican Party wherein most of us want to fight for border security, but a few of us actually care more about Ukraine. Therein is the seed of the real bipartisan compromise that we have in this country, which is constantly focusing on the problems of other countries instead of on the problems of our own.
So let's talk a little bit about the Ukraine policy because that is now--after the border security deal fell apart, now we are on to focusing on Ukraine. Of course, this has become
the main focus of so many of my Senate colleagues. This has become the reason for breathing, the reason for waking up in the morning, the reason for coming to work in the U.S. Senate--to ensure that we send another $61 billion to Ukraine.
There are so, so many problems with our Ukraine policy, and I am going to start from the most obvious all the way, hopefully, to the unintended consequences if we have enough time and if I am still standing.
Let's start with the most obvious problem of our Ukraine policy: There is no strategy.
A year ago, I spoke with Secretary Blinken, and I had a number of private conversations with people in the administration. What was the goal of our Ukraine policy? Then the goal was to ensure that Ukraine had enough weapons so that they could launch a much-anticipated counteroffensive. That counteroffensive would allow them to gain large amounts of territory. It may even allow them to push the Russians out of Crimea.
Then, of course, you could have peace settlements where Ukraine was from a position of strength and Russia was from a position of weakness. We would, in other words, throw the Russians back to close to the 1991 borders of Ukraine, and then we would try to negotiate with them.
This leaves out, of course, an important historical detail, which is that back in April of 2022, as everybody from Gerhard Schroder, the former Chancellor of Germany, to a number of our NATO allies has pointed out, the Russians wanted to negotiate back in April of 2022. The negotiation was possible back then, but Boris Johnson, the Prime Minister of the UK, and, of course, our own administration refused to engage in that negotiation. We wanted the Ukrainians to fight and to fight on. Of course, they have at great cost to themselves and at great cost to the American taxpayer.
Now, here is the problem with this idea that the Ukrainians would ever throw the Russians back to the 1991 borders: They are massively outmanned and massively outgunned.
Ukraine has a population today of about 28 million people. Russia has a population today of 145 million people. Russia manufactures far more artillery shells not just than Ukraine but more than the United States of America--an economy that is 10 times as large. Russia is not going to lose the war. That is a fundamental fact that everybody needs to accept. They are not going to lose. It is existential to them. It is the main focus of Vladimir Putin's. They are bigger, and they have more weapons.
So the question then becomes, How do we preserve as much of Ukraine as possible? How do we prevent as much innocent loss of life as possible? How do we ensure that this war comes to a negotiated peace in a way that prevents a number of negative consequences? That is the goal here--a peace that prevents as much bad from happening. But that is not our strategy. Our strategy is to throw money and weapons at the problem indefinitely.
So, if a year ago we were praying for a counteroffensive, we could ask ourselves: How did that counteroffensive go? Well, the Ukrainians lost tens of thousands of soldiers; they gained miles of territory--not hundreds of miles; miles of territory--in a country that is massive; and they lost some of their best troops and some of their best equipment. That was the result of the counteroffensive. That was the lynchpin of the American strategy.
So, having failed to accomplish what we set out to accomplish, did we say: Well, maybe our experts are wrong. Maybe we should revisit some of our assumptions. Maybe we should design an actual strategy that is achievable. No. No. We just moved on to the next thing. Without even blinking an eye, without even addressing the American people, the Biden administration just went on to the next thing.
The next thing is, well, we are just going to try to give the Ukrainians as much as possible to hope that they don't lose. That is now the strategy, such as it is, of the American President with Ukraine--throw resources, throw weapons, and throw munitions at the problem and hope against all hope that something good will happen.
What is that good thing that will happen? Well, we have no idea. The war is at a stalemate, and, as I already mentioned, Russia has more money, more manpower, and more weapons. So we have no strategy.
Why are we giving $61 billion to Ukraine when we have no strategy for how they are going to use it, we have no sense of how they are actually going to bring this war to a close, and we have no realistic possibility of getting to any reasonable goal within any reasonable timeframe?
We are America's legislative body. Our only real role in foreign policy is to approve nominees the President makes to his own government--posts, of course, that have importance in foreign affairs. That is No. 1. No. 2 is we control the purse strings. The point of controlling the purse strings gives us leverage to ensure that the people's business is actually being done. What are we doing with that leverage here? We are writing, effectively, a blank check, with no guarantee that it will produce a strategy, with no demand that the President actually tell us what this $61 billion is meant to produce.
We know where this will end, ladies and gentlemen. We know exactly where this road ends. This road ends at some kind of a negotiated settlement. The only question is, How many Ukrainians die before we get there? How many American dollars are wasted before we get there? How many American weapons are spent not for our own national security but for the national security of another nation? That is it. How much death and destruction do we promote on the path to peace? My answer is, we should be promoting as little as possible. We should be promoting a negotiated peace. We should be trying to get there as quickly as we possibly can.
Where, I wonder, is the anti-war left?
It is interesting that in Washington, DC, in 2023, 2024, you hear a whole lot about the bipartisan consensus on Ukraine. Yet you never hear people asking: Where has that bipartisan consensus led in the past?
I am 39 years old. In the 1970s, the bipartisan consensus was lined up behind the Vietnam war, a conflict that killed nearly 60,000 Americans over the span of a decade and a half.
In early 2000, the bipartisan consensus was not just that we should knock out Osama bin Laden's terrorist network in Afghanistan but that we should rebuild Afghanistan into a flowering Western-style democracy. We should put resources into training the Afghan population to think about gender roles as Americans do in the 21st century, to promote the creation of democratic institutions to train an Afghan army.
For 20 years, American blood and treasure was committed to that project, and that project fell apart in a matter of weeks. It turns out the Afghans don't want Western-style democracy. It turns out the Afghans don't want to fight for a country that, apparently, very few of them actually believed in because it took about 3 weeks--3 weeks-- before the Taliban rolled over their country.
The bipartisan foreign policy consensus got us exactly there. That same bipartisan consensus got us to Iraq under the pretense of weapons of mass destruction. Many of the people in this Chamber who supported the war in Iraq are now supporting limitless supplies of arms to Ukraine. It is interesting how that bipartisan consensus works out.
That same consensus supported knocking out Libyan dictator Qadhafi, which led, of course, to incredible chaos and destruction in that country.
The bipartisan consensus led us to get involved in Syria and yet another quagmire in the Levant.
And that bipartisan consensus has found a new passion project-- limitless war, limitless weapons, and limitless money to Ukraine.
Why is it that we think that the same people who have been wrong for a half a century are somehow right about this question? Why do we not learn the lessons of Iraq? One of the most important lessons of Iraq-- as the great, late GEN Colin Powell pointed out--is that we didn't have a defined strategy. What is the mission? What are we trying to accomplish? What is America's blood and treasure actually trying to do? And how long must we be required to spend it?
Never has that question been answered in Ukraine. Never have we tried
to answer that question over the last 40 years of failed foreign policy experiments.
I look at this country over the time I have been alive, and I look at what its leadership has accomplished, and it is hard to not think that the bipartisan consensus in American foreign policy has led to, effectively, graveyard after graveyard after graveyard, $34 trillion in debt. We have purchased on the backs of our children and grandchildren a number of graveyards all across the world. I don't know what we have accomplished beyond that.
Yet people in this Chamber, including my friends on the left, who used to have a real anti-war sentiment--the left used to have a real understanding that war has terrible unintended consequences, that it enriches all of the wrong people, that it kills many innocent people. There was no meaningful pushback on this conflict from the left. I find that shocking.
I find it depressing, frankly, because those of us on the right who are sick of war, and sick of our children and grandchildren paying for it, would actually like some allies in pushing back against this latest conflict.
In fact, just to meditate on this point about strategy a little bit longer, if you look for the arguments for why we should be in Ukraine, they all boil down to: Unless we send continual resources, something terrible will happen. The Russians will overrun the Ukrainians when they don't have enough resources, and they won't stop at Kyiv, we are told. They will go on to Poland. They will go on to other NATO allies. And then it will be Americans who are on the frontlines of Germany defending against the terrible aggression of Vladimir Putin.
What must be said is, first of all, this is a fantasy. No credible military expert, no person with a thinking brain believes that Vladimir Putin has the capacity to march all the way to Berlin. He does not have the capacity to march all the way to Kyiv. Of course, he can't march all the way to Berlin. So the fearmongering doesn't work. That dog just doesn't hunt.
Now, of course, if Vladimir Putin could--let's just entertain this thought experiment. Let's just assume that Vladimir Putin could march all the way to Berlin. What would that mean about our NATO allies?
One thing it would mean is that they are a lot weaker than they pretend to be. Another thing it would mean is the fact that we know that NATO needs to step up and spend a lot more resources on their own national defense.
If Vladimir Putin could march all the way to Berlin, that suggests that the Germans have got to do a lot better at defending their country, and they have to step up.
NATO was never meant to turn Europe into permanent welfare clients of the American taxpayer. It is time for Europe to step up.
Some of my colleagues give the Europeans far too much credit for doing their part over the last 18 months of conflict in Ukraine. They point to charts that say if you include humanitarian assistance and economic assistance, the Europeans have actually spent about as much as the Americans--maybe even more than the Americans--on Ukraine. Well, that chart misses a couple of important facts, the first of which is that the most critical thing is not money; it is weapons. And the United States has supplied a disproportionate share of the weapons to the Ukrainians at great cost to ourselves and at great degradation of our defense capability.
The other thing it leaves out is that NATO has, for decades, sucked on the teeth of the American taxpayer. Trillions and trillions of dollars have gone into American defense budgets that have been an implicit subsidy to NATO--an implicit subsidy to NATO. So forgive me if I am not impressed that the Europeans are stepping up a little bit for a war that is literally in their backyard.
The other thing this misses is that the war in Ukraine hasn't been going on for 18 months. It has been going on for a decade. Of course, the conflict that brought us to Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine has been going on in Ukraine since at least 2014.
If the Europeans want to compare who is spending more, the relevant point of comparison is 2014 or maybe 1992. It is not 2022. So we are bailing out the Europeans--$61 billion to bail out the Europeans on a preposterous set of circumstances, on a preposterous subsidy.
By the way, many of our European allies--thanks, in part, of course, to our subsidy--have managed their own financial houses much better than we have. The Germans have far lower budget deficits and far lower public debt than we do. If any time was the time for them to step up, it might be now that we are $34 trillion in debt.
So every argument for why we should support limitless war in Ukraine ultimately falls apart. It ultimately boils down to fearmongering-- fearmongering that doesn't have any basis in reality.
Again, I would ask: If the goal is to prevent Vladimir Putin from overrunning Ukraine, the question has to become: For how long are the American taxpayers on the hook? What if this goes on another 10 years? Are we on the hook to the tune of $500 billion of security assistance and $1 trillion of reconstruction?
At what point is enough enough? At what point do we say the war is a stalemate? It is going to end in a negotiated settlement anyway. Let's stop wasting lives. Let's stop wasting money. And let's get on with the peace.
That is what American diplomacy could be used for. Unfortunately, the President seems uninterested in that.
But I am worried more about the unintended consequences in Ukraine. A friend of mine made the observation today, actually, in a public conversation that I hosted, that we are seeing the acceleration of an economic and military alliance that will challenge the United States over the coming decade and the coming generation. The cooperation between Russia and China has accelerated significantly over the last 2 years.
We have attempted to set off a financial bomb using America's incredible financial power. The rules-based international order has given America's financial system great power, and we used it to try to set off a bomb in the Russian economy. But that bomb appears to have fizzled.
The Russian economy has consistently defied growth expectations and forecasts. Our own leadership has admitted that its sanctions haven't worked nearly as well as we wanted them to. And the Russian economy, now put on a war footing by Vladimir Putin, is producing weapons at a faster rate than the United States, which, of course, has an economy ten times the size of Russia.
So if the goal was to weaken Russia here, we have catastrophically failed. What we have done, actually is created an alternative financial system around Russia, China, and other countries. And we have created an accelerating military alliance between two of our most dangerous adversaries in the world. That is the net effect of our policy. That is unintended consequence No. 1.
Unintended consequence No. 2 is that we are, at this very moment, destabilizing governments all over the world with higher fuel prices and higher food prices.
I made this observation earlier. So my colleagues, hopefully, will forgive me for repeating myself. But one of the most interesting conversations I have ever had was with former President Barack Obama, just days before he left the Oval Office, about a week before Donald Trump and Mike Pence were inaugurated.
Obama made the observation that though he was obviously more a fan of--I will call it mass migration--than I am, that he knew that if you created too many immigration pressures in a country, it could destabilize that country. He made this observation in the context of the 2015 European refugee crisis, telling me--I am paraphrasing here; I don't want to violate any confidences--that he felt that the 2015 refugee crisis that actually destabilized a number of European Governments, in fact, had led to the election of his political adversary, Donald Trump, in 2016.
I thought that was a smart and insightful observation from the former President. Of course, I disagree with his politics and his immigration policies, but it was an interesting and a very self-reflective observation.
What, I wonder, happens--if the European refugee crisis of 2015 destabilized Europe, what happens when we
apply massive energy and food price increases to the entire continent of Africa--1.5 billion people, almost all of whom have a much lower quality of living than the average American or the European?
We know exactly what would happen. If you take 1.5 billion people-- most of whom are just good people who want to feed their families--and you make it impossible for them to feed their families in their own country, they will move. And where are they going to move? They are going to move to Europe, and they are going to move to the United States of America.
Can we, at a time of a historic border crisis, possibly absorb hundreds of millions--at the very least, millions--of starving people moving?
And why are they starving? They are starving because Eastern Europe is the bread basket of the world--especially that part of the world-- and grain prices, barley prices, wheat prices have skyrocketed over the last 2 years.
We are creating the predicate for a refugee crisis that will destabilize Europe and destabilize the entirely world.
We are also, while we are at it, enriching Vladimir Putin. While we spend $61 billion in Ukraine. We are enriching Vladimir Putin with idiotic energy policies.
We are actually funding both sides of this conflict. Putin's economy depends substantially on natural gas, on petroleum. And our energy policies, our refusal to empower America's energy producers--the Biden administration, just a couple of weeks ago, blocked additional exports of liquid natural gas. That enriches Vladimir Putin's Russia. Every time you take an action that drives up the cost of energy, you are enriching Vladimir Putin's Russia.
So with the one hand we pursue energy policies that enrich Vladimir Putin, and with the other hand, we send $61 billion to Ukraine. I don't think we should fund either side of this conflict, but it is the height of idiocy to fund both sides of the conflict simultaneously, and that is exactly what we are doing, thanks to President Joe Biden's energy policies.
Another unintended consequence--we have already seen this, by the way. Allied governments in Slovenia, in Poland, and other countries are under an incredible amount of pressure because food prices and energy prices are really high. Food prices and energy prices destabilize governments. How many American allies will have their country's politics destabilized because we are pursuing policies that ensure higher food and higher energy prices? Inflation is bad in the United States. Inflation is bad, in part, because we are pursuing policies in Europe that inflame the cost of food and energy.
It is always funny when I hear my Democratic friends say that inflation is not Joe Biden's fault; it is the fault of what is going on in Eastern Europe. Well, if Joe Biden was a little bit smarter and used diplomacy more aggressively, perhaps what is going on in Eastern Europe would not be quite as prolonged, and perhaps we could bring it to a quick close.
That is unintended consequence No. 3. We are impoverishing our own people on this conflict. So $34 trillion in debt--we are on the hook now for close to $200 billion to Ukraine. But that doesn't include the reconstruction assistance they will certainly need. That doesn't count the numerous ways--energy prices, food prices--that this conflict is putting pressure on the wallets of American citizens. It doesn't count all of the ways in which we are distracted by a conflict in Eastern Europe and are unable to pursue smart policies elsewhere in the world.
We are impoverishing a generation of Americans. We are making it harder for them to achieve their American dream. And we are doing it to empower defense contractors and to bring a war to effectively a never- ending stage. That is what is happening. We know this conflict has no end in sight. We know that only America, using its diplomatic power, could apply the leverage necessary to bring it to a close. We are instead using our financial military and diplomatic power to prolong the stay as much as possible.
There are other unintended consequences. And I worry that we have no statesmen left at the senior leadership of this country. For a generation, we have been told that the important thing is to thump our chest, to talk tough, to act tough, but not actually do the things that are necessary to strengthen our country and make our country more powerful.
You hear my friends on both sides of the aisle say that if we don't show resolve in Ukraine, that it will invite Xi Jinping to invade Taiwan. And, of course, I believe a Taiwanese invasion by Xi Jinping would be one of the worst things that could happen on the world stage. Our colleagues are right to worry about it.
But the argument is that they will invade--the Chinese will invade-- unless we show resolve in Ukraine. But the unfortunate truth is that the Chinese don't care about our resolve; they care about our strength. In classic foreign policy schools, deterrence is the combination of resolve and capacity. You have to both want to do something, but most importantly, you have to have the ability to do that thing. And we have no capacity to deter the Chinese in East Asia and help the Ukrainians fight a war in Eastern Europe.
For many generations, our leadership shipped our industrial base, our manufacturing jobs overseas. And that has left us in a place where we don't produce enough weapons; we don't produce enough missiles; we don't produce enough artillery shells; we don't produce enough of the critical munitions that are necessary to fight conflicts all over the world.
So every time we spend critical resources on Ukraine, we ensure that they will not be available to a contingency necessary for the United States of America. That is not hypothetical, and that is not abstract. We, even now, are sending weapons to Ukraine far faster than we can make them.
Why are we sending cluster munitions to Ukraine right now? Again, I will ask: Where is the anti-war left? What happened to the left that was worried about sending cluster munitions to various conflicts all over the world? Why are we sending cluster munitions to Ukraine? It is because we don't make enough artillery shells to send to Ukraine, to Israel, and to other partners.
We cannot fight a war on multiple fronts because of the leadership made, frankly, by some of the Members of this Chamber, we don't have a strong enough manufacturing base to support both of these conflicts.
Now, my colleagues will say that this particular bill--this particular legislation--has billions of dollars designed to rebuild the American industrial base. But you can't rebuild the industrial base by making weapons and sending them to Ukraine faster than you make them for your own country and for your own defense purposes.
The question is, If we start rebuilding our defense industrial base tomorrow, how long does it take? Three to 5 years at the very least. Call it 3 years if we started tomorrow before we could support contingencies in Eastern Europe and East Asia.
So what do we do in the interim when our country, by every metric, does not produce enough weapons to support a multipronged conflict? What do we do in the interim? The solution and the answer, apparently, of this Chamber is: We send everything possible to Ukraine. We get as much as possible to Ukraine; consequences--let's not worry about those. Let's not worry about the fact that we do not have enough weapons to deter aggression all over the world right now, and we have no viable pathway of getting in there for the next 3 years.
I think that a lot of my colleagues are living in a boomer paradise where America can do everything all the time without limits and without constraints. And that is not the world that we live in. Frankly, it is not the world we live in, in part because decisions made by people in this Chamber and the leadership of this country over the last generation.
But we are in this situation. Let's rebuild our own country before we overextend ourselves in a multipronged conflict. This is something out of every history book for how empires fail. Countries allow themselves to become eroded. They allow internal division to weaken their resolve. They allow economic might to degrade. And then, at the point when they are weakest, they overextend themselves militarily.
That is where we are right now. We are at the weakest point in a generation. In the 1980s, our relative power
and manufacturing was significantly stronger than it is today. My colleagues on the other side will say, Well, you know, it is weaker; it is a bipartisan problem. It is not just Democrats' fault that our manufacturing base is weaker.
And I would grant that point every day and twice on Sunday. It was a bipartisan failure that led our manufacturing economy to grow so weak, but it needs to be a bipartisan solution to figure out what to do until we rebuild it.
No one has offered a solution for how to rebuild our manufacturing base quickly, and no one has told me what we are going to do while we are rebuilding that manufacturing base. We cannot supply unlimited arms all over the world when we don't even make enough for our own purposes. Yet that is exactly what the U.S. Senate proposes to do later this morning.
Now, one final observation here about where we are in Ukraine. I am going to read just a brief summary here produced by my staff. The $60 billion in Ukraine aid included in the $95 billion supplemental would be the largest single Ukraine aid package Congress has passed to date.
Nonetheless, it was put on the floor with less than a day's notice and could obstruct future efforts to bring the war in Ukraine to a peaceful conclusion. The bill will commit $60 billion for Ukraine over multiple years, and it will provide nothing to secure America's southern border. If enacted, it would represent 34 percent of the total appropriated supplemental Ukraine aid, almost as large as the first three supplemental bills combined.
It represents a 26-percent increase over the largest previous supplemental bill at a time when Ukraine's prospects on the battlefield have grown significantly worse. And it has done all this with less than a week of real debate. I am trying to think of any amount of money where we have not adequately debated, reviewed, amended, and corrected such a large spending package to Ukraine--or to any other country.
I mean, normally, these bills spending $100 billion of American taxpayer money, normally, you might expect a real debate. We received text on this on February 7. Wednesday, February 7, is when we received final text on the package that we are voting on today; $100 billion and 5 days of debate, most of which, of course, was occupied by the Super Bowl media cycle.
The American people have been deprived of an actual debate on these matters from their elected legislature. The U.S. Senate has deprived them of the debate. And why? I don't know why. I think maybe the reason why we are pushing this so quickly is because a few of my colleagues are desperate. They are desperate to get to Munich next weekend and tell the leaders of the world that, yes, they did not secure their own southern border, but they did the most important thing: They got the $61 billion to Ukraine.
It is shameful. It is shameful to conduct foreign policy through blank check writing to never-ending war, and it is extra shameful to do it while ignoring the problems of your own country.
Can I ask how much time I have?
I hate to keep my distinguished colleague from Utah waiting, but I will keep going here for another few minutes.
I want to make, in the time that I have remaining, a political observation. When you craft legislation that is 370 pages long and you deprive the American people and your Senate colleagues of a debate, you oftentimes find that there are things in the legislation that were unintended--or maybe they were intended, but they should have been corrected and taken out.
In 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives impeached Donald Trump under a spurious and ridiculous argument. But the argument went something like this: that there was money that had been appropriated under the USAI--the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative; the USAI had appropriated money, and Donald Trump refused to spend it exactly as it had been required by law.
And the argument is, because he had violated this appropriations requirement and because it is in the requirements of the Impoundment Control Act, Donald Trump had violated the law and had to be impeached.
It was a ridiculous argument then; it is a ridiculous argument now. But I find it interesting that given that Ukraine aid is a hotly contested political item for the 2024 elections and given that Donald Trump was already impeached for the exact same reason that so many congressional Republicans seem desperate to tie the President's hands in the next administration--because built into this ``Ukraine First'' supplemental is money that will be spent in '25 and '26--money, just as in 2019, that was appropriated and will tie the hands of the next administration. And whether it is a Democrat or a Republican, I think we ought to empower the next administration to do diplomacy as they would like to.
So for my colleagues who are desperate to send $61 billion to Ukraine, one request that I would make is--because this is going to come back from the House. The House will not pass this package as it exists. One request that I would make is, let's cut off the end of funding at the end of 2024. For my Republican colleagues, it may save Donald Trump a spurious impeachment trial. For my Democratic colleagues, it may save the next President the ability to conduct diplomacy on his or her own terms.
Now, we should not be doing this with such little debate and such little consideration. There are all kinds of things--all kinds of beautiful gems--that I am sure that we will identify in this legislation in the coming weeks.
As Nancy Pelosi once said: You have to read a piece of legislation after you pass it. I would prefer that we read a piece of legislation before we pass it. But, most importantly, I would prefer that we debate and challenge the legislation before we pass it.
You cannot write $100 billion worth of checks in 4 days of public debate. You need more time. You need to correct it. You need to fix it. You need to address the problems, like what I just mentioned, that we put an impeachment timebomb for the next Trump administration in this legislation. You need to fix problems like this. And a real process is how you fix it.
Now, I appreciate that some of our colleagues prefer a fake process because that process has empowered Senate leadership. Well, you know who it hasn't empowered? It has not empowered the American people. This is ridiculous. And this is ultimately, in my view, a farce.
I have been in the U.S. Senate for a year. It is the professional honor of my lifetime. And I serve across the aisle with distinguished colleagues, with brilliant people, people who are publicly minded, despite our disagreements. But I think this process is an insult to them. We can do better. We should do better.