Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, how much time remains for me to discuss the Levin-Bond amendment and the Durbin amendment under the unanimous consent agreement? Mr.…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, how much time remains for me to discuss the Levin-Bond amendment and the Durbin amendment under the unanimous consent agreement?
Mr. President, let me speak for that 4 minutes to indicate my opposition to the Levin-Bond amendment. As I see that amendment, by adopting it, we would do two things. First, we would be erecting new barriers to the development of meaningful fuel economy standards. Secondly, we would be effectively walking away from an opportunity to do something right about decreasing our growing oil consumption. In both cases, we would be making a mistake.
The Bond-Levin amendment establishes additional criteria that would impose unnecessary hurdles to any significant increase in fuel efficiency standards. There are multiple new factors such as the effect of CAFE standards on the relative competitiveness of manufacturers and levels of U.S. employment. Those kinds of criteria are
being added to the current rulemaking process. In my view, adding those kinds of criteria will only cause the courts to revisit the careful balance that is already struck in the present statute.
NHTSA already considers in-depth evaluations of the impact of a standard on safety, on the environment, and on American jobs. And the Levin-Bond amendment complicates the agency's task by providing a lengthy list of 13 items which, in my view, are unnecessary and deliberately vague new statutory provisions that have to be considered.
This is not progress. We need to be honest with the American people and ourselves and recognize that if Alan Greenspan cannot even tell us the effect of a small drop in interest rates on the economy in the near future--as it is clear that he cannot and has not been able to, and he readily admits has not been able to--how can we expect the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration to possibly determine with accuracy the effect of any change in CAFE standards on employment levels or on relative competitiveness?
Passenger vehicles today already use more petroleum than is currently produced in the United States. The Energy Information Agency projects consumption to increase an additional 2 million barrels per day before the end of this decade. Consumer preference has switched to light trucks and sport utility vehicles in recent years, and this has caused the average fuel economy in the U.S. passenger fleet to actually drop rather than improve. We are going backward with regard to fuel efficiency in vehicles.
Today, we have the lowest fuel efficiency we have had since the early 1980s in our entire fleet of vehicles. A decision not to increase CAFE standards significantly is a decision to become more and more dependent on foreign energy sources.
I just returned from a meeting in the White House, where the President met with many of us, including my colleague from New Mexico, myself, the majority leader, the Democratic leader, and all of us were talking about how important it is that we move ahead with progressive energy legislation, and that we do so in order to reduce our dependence on foreign oil. The biggest factor causing an increased dependence on foreign oil is the increase in the use of oil and gasoline in motor vehicles. Instead of increasing the efficiency with which we reduce the efficiency of our motor vehicles, we are moving in just the opposite direction.
Despite what automakers are saying, new engines, transmission, and hybrid technologies are now available to give automakers the means to increase gas mileage over the next 10 years without reducing either vehicle size or weight. Mr. President, we drove to the White House a few minutes ago in a new Honda Civic that is a hybrid. The average miles per gallon of that vehicle is between 45 and 50 miles.
It is very unfortunate, in my view, that the only hybrid vehicles available to a U.S. consumer today are Japanese vehicles. They are the hybrid that is produced by Honda and the hybrid produced by Toyota.
I see that my time is up. I urge my colleagues to oppose the Levin- Bond amendment. I do support Senator Durbin's amendment. I hope we can adopt that amendment and make some significant progress toward increasing vehicle fuel efficiency.
I yield the floor.
Madam President, I send the amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The amendment Senator Domenici has now offered is a substitute for the entire electricity title of the Energy bill. It purports to contain consumer protections in order to compensate for the fact that in this bill we are also proposing to repeal PUHCA. What is PUHCA? That is the Public Utility Holding Company Act.
I have to agree the substitute amendment Senator Domenici has provided does contain some increase in the authority the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission will have to review mergers and dispositions; that is, some increase in the authority of FERC to review mergers and acquisitions compared to the previous bill. I also concluded the substitute does not do enough to solve the problem.
The amendment I am offering contains the language we passed in last year's Senate Energy bill, language we believe fills this inadequacy, solves this problem in the underlying provision. Not only did the amendment pass the Senate last year, there was an amendment that would have removed this language. That amendment lost in the Senate by a vote of 67-29. Forty Senators voted for much stronger merger review authority than the provision contains.
FERC's merger review authority is essential in this industry which has been based on a system of local and regional monopolies. It is essential that authority be vested in FERC. The industry we are talking about historically has been based on local and regional monopolies and is moving toward depending much more on a competitive wholesale market for electricity generation. The industry is highly concentrated. Consolidation of generation and distribution transmission can prevent the development of a genuinely competitive market.
There are two big problems in the substitute provision Senator Domenici has provided with relation to merger and acquisition authority. Let me try to explain those.
First, this proposal does not cover the generation of energy. Everyone understands there are various parts to the energy industry. There are generation companies involved in generation, there are those involved in transmission, those that are involved in distribution, and some that are involved in all. However, generation is not covered under this language.
The second big problem is there are no real protections against cross-subsidies or encumbrance of assets owned by utilities. That raises a real prospect that people who pay utility bills will wind up subsidizing nonprofitable, unprofitable ventures that companies get into, particularly in the case where there are holding companies involved.
Let me talk about each of these issues. The first key failure I have talked about in the Domenici substitute is it does not make generation acquisitions or dispositions jurisdictional under the law. That means it does not give FERC authority over those. There is no requirement anyone oversee it at the Federal level and sign off on it.
For generation mergers, while it is true most activities in this area are divestiture of generation by vertically integrated utilities at this time, that may not always be the case. Utilities getting rid of generation do tend toward deconcentration of the market but not if they sell to large and growing generation companies. Instead of leading to less concentration, it can lead to more concentration, depending upon who is buying these generation facilities.
Without the authority provided in my amendment, FERC, which is charged with making sure the competitive market produces just and reasonable rates, would have to stand by and watch while the industry reconcentrates rather than deconcentrates. A single company could acquire every generator in this country and FERC could do nothing about it under the Domenici substitute. This is not compatible with the development of a competitive market. Even when the transaction is only the sale of generation facilities, there are serious issues at stake.
Many of the utilities in the headlines lately because they are either facing bankruptcy or have deep financial troubles have come as a result of the utility spinning off its generation to an affiliate who then gets into the unregulated electricity market. As a result, there are companies such as Xcel and Allegany that are experiencing serious financial distress because of the activities of their generation and marketing affiliates, but these affiliates are not under the jurisdiction of the FERC, so there will be no Federal oversight.
The second failure in the Domenici substitute is it does not require the FERC to create real protection against cross-subsidy or against encumbrance of assets in the new merged company. My amendment strengthens the standards under which FERC reviews mergers. Our provision requires the transactions can be shown to do no harm, either to competition, to consumers, or to the capacity of regulators to regulate. Further, it requires that FERC determine there will not be any cross-subsidy of affiliate companies and there will not be any encumbrance of assets for the benefits of the affiliate. This is essential if we are going to protect ratepayers. We did not allow that cross-subsidy to exist. The underlying Domenici amendment does not require that of the Federal Regulatory Commission.
Essentially, our provision requires that FERC create some way to determine the goals of the requirement be met. Perhaps the only way to accomplish this is to create real corporate insulation between the utility affiliate of a holding company and its unregulated affiliates. That could be done by creating firewalls around the utility affiliate, by enacting rules about transactions between affiliates or in a combination of the two.
The purposes behind the Public Utility Holding Company Act which we are ready to repeal as part of this overall Energy bill are to ensure consumers are not harmed by the complexity of corporate structure, that regulation not be made too difficult by that complexity, and that utility affiliates not be allowed to benefit from cross-subsidization or to cross-subsidize nonutility affiliates so that resources of the utility wind up being drained away from service to the customers. This is exactly what the bill requires FERC to do before approving a merger. That is what our amendment requires FERC to ensure before approving a merger.
I have three charts that will try to make this clearer. This is complex. Frankly, one of the difficulties of trying to begin in the evening at 6 p.m. with this very difficult, complex subject, there is an awful lot of knowledge Senators need to have in order to vote intelligently on these issues. Let me try to go through it with the charts.
The first chart is FERC jurisdiction at the present time. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC, has jurisdiction over mergers of two different utilities. We are talking about, under the Federal Power Act, utilities that are vertically integrated. That is the traditional utility, the utility that provides electricity to my home in New Mexico, provides electricity to my home in Washington, DC, and to homes all around this country. Utilities own the generation capacity, own the transmission, and own the distribution. If two utilities want to merge, they have to present their proposal to merge to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission looks at that and says this is OK or this is not OK because we have determined it is not going to adversely affect the ratepayers. The people at home who are being served by one or the other of these utilities will not have to pay more if we approve this
merger. That is what FERC has to determine at this point.
In the past, all generation was owned by jurisdictional utility companies. This is the way the system was operated. If you had a plant to generate power, almost certainly that plant was owned by a utility company. There were no independent companies out there saying all we want to do is generate power and then we will sell it to utilities. It was all owned by utilities. If a utility merged with another utility, the merger was jurisdictional at FERC under the Federal Power Act. That means that FERC had to sign off on the deal, essentially, and that was the protection that was built into the law for consumers.
Since all generation except for small renewable generators and cogenerators under the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act was owned by utilities that were, in fact, under FERC jurisdiction, all mergers involving generation came under the jurisdiction of FERC.
That was a good system as far as it went, but that was the system which made sense when the Federal Power Act was enacted because then we were dealing with vertically integrated utilities.
The world has changed, so let me go to chart No. 2.
Before I talk about the changed world, let me describe this second chart. The title of this chart is ``PUHCA Jurisdiction.'' I said before, PUHCA is the Public Utility Holding Company Act, and the Public Utility Holding Company Act provides essentially a set of restrictions on what holding companies are able to do, and particularly what holding companies are able to do with regard to purchase or acquisition of utilities. If a holding company acquired a utility company, then the Securities and Exchange Commission under PUHCA, the Public Utility Holding Company Act, had jurisdiction and authority to review that acquisition. The relationships between the utility and all of its new affiliates were governed by the Public Utility Holding Company Act.
The proposal we have here before us in the Senate is let's repeal this entire thing. All of the restrictions under which holding companies operate today would no longer apply. The question is, If we do that, what are we going to substitute for that jurisdiction or for that oversight to ensure that consumers are not adversely affected? This shows the holding company over here on the right, and under it you see it owns a utility, it owns other affiliates, it owns perhaps another utility, generation and marketing affiliate--it has a variety of companies it holds as a holding company. The question is, Who is going to have the responsibility to be sure there will not be cross- subsidy so that ratepayers of utilities are not adversely affected if we eliminate the Public Utility Holding Company Act?
Let me move to the third chart to try to explain this. In the new world in which we now find ourselves, we no longer have as many vertically integrated utility companies. More and more we are seeing generation of electric power done by other companies which are not vertically integrated utilities. In this new world, generation is separated from the utility company, and it is either sold to a stand- alone generation company or spun off as an affiliate of a holding company that owns a utility. The sales or the spinoff would not be under FERC jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act, since generation facilities were not specifically put under FERC's authority. Generation facilities wound up under FERC's authority because they were part of integrated utilities. Now we are saying: OK, what do we put in place to live with this new world?
We are saying we need to specify that generation facilities are under FERC authority. They clearly would not be covered--there is no jurisdiction under FERC for the generation affiliate down below, or the generation affiliate of this utility. If those generation affiliates decide to merge, there is no prohibition against that. There is no requirement that any Federal agency review that to see whether it helps or hurts utility payers, ratepayers.
We get back to the point I was trying to make at the very beginning of my comments, which is you could see a company come along and buy up this generation affiliate, that generation affiliate, buy up all the generation affiliates in a region of the country, and do whatever it wished with regard to their rates for electricity, and nobody at the Federal level has oversight to review that.
I do not think that is in the best interests of consumers. I do not think that is in the best interests of ratepayers. Accordingly, I think we should fix it.
There are some horror stories that should make the point that what I am talking about is not just academic. This isn't something we dreamed up in some ivory tower somewhere. These are horror stories that can be read about in the mainstream press, in the trade press; in fact, it is hard to pick up a news publication that does not tell a new story about how some utility or other is in trouble because of its investments in and involvement in nonutility businesses. That is a very common problem that has arisen.
This is a quote from the December Wall Street Journal.
Energy companies burned by disastrous forays into
commodities trading and other unregulated businesses are
increasingly seeking to pass some of the financial burden
onto their utility units. This could lead to higher
electricity rates for consumers in coming years.
That is the Wall Street Journal, which is not a left-wing publication. According to the Journal:
Utilities are being nudged to buy assets from affiliates,
to make loans to down-at-the-heels siblings, or to pass more
money to their parent companies.
Then the story goes on to say:
In many cases, regulators can do little to prevent energy
holding companies from milking their utility units.
What my amendment is trying to do is put in place some protections against this milking of utility units. When you talk about milking a utility unit, that is easily translated into raising electricity rates, raising the rates of the ratepayers in order to compensate for bad business judgments, unprofitable investments in other areas.
It is not enough for us to have in place some vague idea that we want to be helpful to consumers. What we want to say is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission needs to make a finding when it approves one of these acquisitions or mergers. It needs to make a finding that there is not going to be a cross-subsidy, that we are not going to see the assets of the utility encumbered in order to help some other part of this business, some other part of this holding company. That is what we are saying.
All of these stories result in negative effects on ratepayers and consumers.
When the utility is downgraded, its consumers pay increased costs of capital. Where the utility itself is facing bankruptcy, the effects on consumers can be even worse than that.
Wesstar is one example. Wesstar's regulators have been left with the unpleasant alternative of saddling the utility's ratepayers with $100 million per year, which is the cost that is required to pay down the debt the company caused by its investment in unregulated ventures.
It is clear that utility customers need to be protected against these excesses; that firewalls need to be built between the utility affiliates of a holding company and its unregulated affiliates.
These are not stories from the distant past. These are stories from today's headlines. Let me go into a little more detail on a few of them. Let me mention Wesstar. Wesstar I just mentioned. Let me go into a little more detail about the problem.
Wesstar is the largest utility in the State of Kansas. It is owned by a holding company, WRI, that also owns KP&L, the other large utility in the State. It owns a variety of nonutility companies and holdings. All of these together used to be the Kansas City Power and Light and Kansas Gas and Electric.
Wesstar came under scrutiny last year because of its problems caused by nonutility affiliates. Wesstar had invested in a number of unregulated ventures, including a home security company. That investment did not turn out well. The holding company shifted $1.5 billion of debt from the unregulated companies to the utility.
The Kansas Corporation Commission began an investigation. The Justice Department began an investigation last summer. The Federal investigation
resulted in the indictment of the CEO of the company for bank fraud. The Kansas Corporation Commission investigation resulted in a dramatic restructuring of the company to separate the utility from the unregulated companies of the holding company.
The utility customers, in spite of all that has since happened--these investigations occurred after the fact--are still left with an obligation to reduce the debt of the utility by $100 million a year because of the activities of the unregulated affiliates. Ratings agencies have reduced the debt rating of the company to below investment grade at this time. That is one example.
Let me mention another. AES is a holding company that owns generation assets and marketing assets around the world. In 2000, AES acquired Indiana Power and Light, which is a regulated utility in Indiana. Because of the difficulties in wholesale electricity markets, the utility has been propping up the debt of the parent company over the last 2 years. For the 2 years of 2000 and 2001, the utility's dividend payments to the parent exceeded its earnings by over $100 million. The parent company's rating has dropped from AA minus to double B since 2001. The utility's IPL is at the lowest investment grade. The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission had no jurisdiction to review the acquisition of the utility by the holding company.
Let me give one more example. That is Portland General Electric. Portland General Electric is a regulated utility in Oregon. PG&E in the late 1990s was acquired by Enron Corporation. The Oregon Public Utility Commission required a number of conditions before it agreed to approve that acquisition. As a result of the corporate separation required by the public utility commission, the effect of Enron's bankruptcy has been less than other similar acquisitions in other States. But even so, PG&E is now a parentless company. It is in danger of being taken over by another company. The fate of the parent company has also had an effect on the ability of the company to gain access to capital markets.
I think the Senators from Oregon are probably better qualified than I to talk in detail about the frustration and dissatisfaction that utility ratepayers in Oregon have felt as a result of their unfortunate circumstance after being purchased by Enron.
The amendment I have offered is straightforward. In my view, it closes a very significant loophole that still exists in the electricity title and substitute electricity title Senator Domenici has presented to the Senate. It will help us head off the kinds of crises and the kinds of inflation or dramatic increase in utility rates that unfortunately have been seen in some parts of the country.
This is one of these issues where I think 2, 3, or 5 years from now people may look back and say, I wonder why I didn't vote for that amendment when we had a chance to plug that loophole. Those of us on the Energy Committee, quite frankly, will be saying, OK, who do we call before the Senate Energy Committee to hold accountable when these problems arise? The reality is it is going to be very hard to call anyone before the Senate Energy Committee unless we strengthen this legislation and put in there some very clear, bright-line tests that ensure we don't have crossover, to ensure the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is held responsible for overseeing the acquisition, sale, or purchase of generation facilities. If we make a decision here to not vest that responsibility somewhere in the Federal Government--and obviously the place to do it would be the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission--then I think we will rue the day we stopped short of doing that.
I hope my colleagues will support this amendment. It goes to the very heart of the electricity title of this bill. It would correct a very major deficiency in the electricity title of the bill as it now comes before the Senate.
I yield the floor. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
Mr. President, let me make a few comments in response to my colleague, my good friend from Wyoming. I do think that he is in an awkward position because he was cosponsor with me of this exact language in the consideration of the Energy bill in the last Congress-- the exact language that I am now proposing by way of amendment. I thought it was the right policy then. I still think it is the right policy. I hope very much we can persuade Senators to adopt it as part of this bill.
His statement was that we are preempting State authority if we adopt the language that I have offered by way of amendment. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners--those are the State commissioners--characterized the bill we had last year that had this provision in it, the provision I am now offering, as ``an admirable compromise between Federal and State jurisdictional issues.''
That does not sound like the words of an entity that believes it has been preempted to the point that it is unable to do its job. While it is true that States have some ability to deal with some of these problems, it is almost always the case that their statutes do not reflect the degree of protection that is currently in the law in the Public Utility Holding Company Act. They have not needed to have laws to provide those protections because PUHCA was in place. It has been Federal law for many years.
It is also true that many States that have found their customers to be victims of such abuse have not had the ability to deal with the problems. I gave you a couple of examples before where the States came along after the fact and tried to investigate, tried to find some way to make their consumers or their ratepayers whole, and found that they are not really able to do that. Some are trying. Some are trying in the face of tremendous opposition from their utilities to get the necessary authority from their State legislatures.
Do we have to wait for every State in the country to realize that their protections are inadequate once we repeal the Public Utility Holding Company Act or should we not here in the Congress provide at least some minimum protection at the Federal level to replace the protections we are eliminating as we repeal the Public Utility Holding Company Act?
I think we owe it to those who sent us here to provide this minimal protection. PUHCA broke up the industry into manageable chunks and focused on its core business--that is, the provision of a monopoly electric provision service by requiring that utilities either operate primarily in a single State or be regulated stringently at the Federal level by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Utilities were also forbidden to engage in businesses that were not directly related to their monopoly electric service without explicit approval from the SEC. Large utilities were forbidden from such activities completely. A holding could not acquire more than one utility company in more than one State without coming under these very severe bans.
So the sprawling empires of interconnected corporations owning electricity utilities were broken up. Companies were required to choose between their other businesses--staying in those other businesses or staying in the electric industry.
If we are going to repeal the Public Utility Holding Company Act, as we are proposing to do in this bill, then it is essential that we lodge the consumer protections that are so important to all Americans in a meaningful place. We have seen, over the last few years, how far astray from the goals of providing electricity to consumers at affordable prices our industry can wander. As we move forward, we must be sure that consumers are protected.
Let me make a comparison between the language that I proposed by way of amendment and the underlying language. The reason I am offering my amendment is that the Domenici substitute has in it, in my view, very inadequate language to ensure that consumers are protected. It says:
After notice and opportunity for a hearing, the Commission
shall approve the proposed disposition, consolidation,
acquisition, or change of control--
That is any merger or acquisition anyone proposes and brings before the commission--
if it finds that the proposed transaction will be consistent
with the public interest.
Well, that is fine. I certainly want everything to be consistent with the public interest. But that is somewhat in the eye of the beholder as to what is meant by that phrase. It goes on to say:
In evaluating whether a transaction will be consistent with
the public interest, the Commission shall consider whether
the proposed transaction will adequately protect consumers,
will be consistent with the competitive wholesale markets,
will not impair the ability of the Commission or State
commission from having jurisdiction following the completion
of their transaction over any public utility, and will not
impair the financial integrity of any public utility that is
a party to the transaction, or an associate company or any
part of the transaction, and satisfies such other criteria as
they think is consistent with the public interest.
Essentially, it is going back and saying the Commission has tremendous
authority to decide what is consistent with the public interest and what is not consistent with public interest. Whatever they decide pretty much controls.
What I have proposed in the amendment that I have sent to the desk, and what we had in our bill last year, which my good friend from Wyoming supported last year, was much more specific. It said:
After notice and opportunity for a hearing, the Commission
shall approve the disposition, or consolidation, or
acquisition of control if it finds that the proposed
transaction, No. 1, will be consistent with the public
interest; second, will not adversely affect interests of
consumers of electric energy; third, will not impair the
ability of the Commission or the State Commission; and,
finally, will not lead to cross subsidization of associate
companies or encumber any utility assets for the benefit of
an associate company.
It seems clear to me that we should want to be sure that cross- subsidy will not occur. That is a bedrock requirement, as I see it, if FERC is going to sign off on these acquisitions and mergers. That is why we proposed this amendment.
The other thing we propose in this amendment, which I think is also bedrock, is that companies involved with generation--the purchase and sale of those companies should also be under the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The FERC has not had to have that authority up until now because we have had the Public Utility Holding Company Act, which ensured there was oversight. There was regulation of those generation companies. That will no longer be the case once the Public Utility Holding Company Act is repealed.
The question is, Who is going to oversee the purchase and sale of generation companies? Who is going to try to ensure that electric utility rates in a region, in a State, in a particular area do not go up because of the noncompetitive merger, or acquisition, or purchase of various generation facilities?
So, clearly, our amendment tries to plug some major loopholes. It is exactly the language we offered in the debate last year. It was adopted at that time by a substantial majority of Senators. It was supported by my good friend from Wyoming last year. It is good policy. It was good policy then, it is good policy now, and it is the kind of test which, if we don't adopt it, we will regret that we did not. It is another one of these circumstances where at some future date we will be giving speeches on the Senate floor saying let's tighten up the regulation, strengthen the regulation; we don't want to see somewhere around the country any more of those problems like we just saw.
I think the opportunity is here today. We know enough about the problem of cross-subsidization. We know enough about the economic difficulties, the financial difficulties that lead to cross- subsidization to anticipate this problem and to get ahead of it and deal with it. That is what my amendment does. I urge adoption of my amendment.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I would like to say a few more things about the pending amendment.
Then I do have a second amendment which I am glad to offer this evening as well.
I indicated there are several organizations that have supported the amendment I have sent to the desk, the American Association for Retired Persons, AARP, the Air Conditioning Contractors of America, Consumers for Fair Competition, the Consumers Union, the National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates, National Electrical Contractors Association, Plumbing, Heating and Cooling Contractors, National Association of Public Citizens, U.S. PIRG. All of those groups support the amendment I have offered.
In addition to that, we have a statement from the Bush administration
which was from last year supporting FERC review of transfers of generation assets, which is part of what the amendment does that I have sent to the desk. I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.
The administration includes language in its draft Electric Reliability Transmission Act to clarify the commission's authority over holding company mergers, and mergers and asset sales involving generation facilities. In another place in the administration's statement it says they support clarifying FERC authority over holding company mergers and mergers and asset dispositions involving generation facilities.
What I am proposing is not a radical policy proposal. It is exactly what we adopted last Congress. It was adopted by a substantial majority of the Senate. It was supported by the Bush administration. Now we are backing away from that.
I am told the Senator from New Mexico, my good friend Mr. Domenici, says this is agreed to by the Public Power Association and by the Rural Electric Cooperative Association. That is fine. I can understand that there are other things in the bill, in the overall electricity title, which cause them to believe this is something they should be quiet about or be willing to support--swallow hard and support, I would add-- but the reality is, it is not good policy for us to leave this issue unaddressed, this issue of adequate authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to oversee the acquisition or sale of generation facilities. That ought to be covered if we are going to pass an electricity title.
Clearly, there should be authority and an enforceable responsibility on the part of FERC to ensure cross-subsidy does not occur. Those are the two primary things my amendment tries to deal with. I think they are very important.
I have a letter from MBIA, Richard L. Weill, who is the vice chairman of MBIA Insurance Corporation. I will read portions of that for my colleagues, because I think it is instructive. He says:
I am writing on behalf of the MBIA Insurance Corporation in
support of your proposed amendment to the Energy Policy Act
of 2003 that would strengthen the regulatory framework of
utility mergers.
MBIA Insurance Corporation is the largest financial
guaranty insurance company in the world. We have guaranteed
the timely payment of principal and interest on more than $14
billion of electric utility debt. Our guarantee is
unconditional and irrevocable, even in the event of fraud. In
that context, we are profoundly concerned about the strength
and integrity of the regulatory scheme of electric utilities.
We are, in a sense, a gatekeeper to the capital markets for
these utilities. We provide investors with our unconditional
and irrevocable guarantee and, as a result, provide the
utilities with the lowest possible cost of access to the
capital markets. Our Triple-A rating by all major rating
agencies enables the utilities to sell debt at the lowest
interest rate. We can continue to serve these investors and
this industry only if we can be assured of the probity,
comprehensiveness and fairness of the regulatory framework.
Your amendment would require that proposed mergers promote
the public interest that is defined as encompassing the
effects on competition, economic efficiency and regulatory
oversight. It would also close loopholes that enable certain
corporate combinations to avoid being characterized as
mergers.
We believe that this amendment will be viewed favorably by
the capital markets.
We are trying to close loopholes that enable certain corporate combinations to avoid being characterized as mergers. That is exactly the problem with the substitute proposal Senator Domenici has laid before the Senate.
By adopting the language in my amendment--that was in the bill last year--we close those loopholes, we guarantee consumers will be protected, we guarantee these utilities will get the lowest possible interest rates and that this insurance arrangement can remain in effect.
This is a very good amendment. I hope my colleagues will support it. It will strengthen this bill. This is not an amendment offered with the intent of undermining the electricity title. This is an amendment offered with the intent of strengthening the electricity title. It is very well crafted, in my view, to accomplish that.
I yield the floor, and at the appropriate time I will offer another amendment on a different aspect of the electricity title.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the amendment that I just sent to the desk.
Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
Mr. President, my colleague from Wyoming is here. I mentioned to him that this is an issue which I would like us to try to find some way to resolve. This is something that we may well be able to avoid having a vote on tomorrow, if we can find a way to resolve it.
The amendment I have sent to the desk tries to clarify something in the bill that I think is very important. Senator Domenici's substitute contains a delay in the issuance of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's standard market design rulemaking until July 2005. I understand that. That is fine. I am not trying to disturb that. I believe the rule goes too far and should be dramatically modified or completely abrogated.
I know there are Members of the Senate who think 2005 is the wrong date, that we ought to go to 2008 or some other date. Others believe FERC should be permitted to go ahead, and as quickly as they would like. I am not taking a position on that issue with my amendment. I, frankly, can see both sides of the argument.
My amendment leaves the delay of the standard market design rule that Senator Domenici has included in his substitute in place. However, in an effort to prevent the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission from renaming the rule and issuing it under a new title, the bill also goes on to prohibit ``any rule or order of general applicability on matters within the scope of the rule.''
That means the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission cannot issue a rule or order of general applicability on any issue that is dealt with in the proposed rule during the 2 years of the delay.
What kind of actions would this prevent? That is the obvious question.
I think it would prevent the Commission from doing its job. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission currently has a rule in the process on interconnections to the transmission grid. No matter what that rule says, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission would be prohibited from issuing it under this language that we have in the Domenici substitute.
Other matters dealt with in the rule that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission would be prevented from dealing with in a generic manner are such issues as market oversight, market litigation, transmission pricing, the scope of regional transmission organizations--RTOs--the adequacy of rules or transactions across RTO boundaries, and, in short, just about anything that the Commission does about transmission or markets because the proposed rule touches on all of those issues.
There are even rules that the Commission is required to issue by other provisions in this Domenici substitute that they would be prohibited from issuing because of this provision that I am here trying to change. There are a number of rules necessary to get the reliability section to work. The bill requires rules on mergers, on transmission access by public power entities, on participant funding, and other matters.
The provision that I am here trying to modify or change would prohibit the issuance of those rules whereas in another place in the same title we are saying the Commission is directed to issue.
It would be ironic, indeed, if the rule's opponents who want stronger participant funding language in the rule were to have prevented the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission from issuing this rule related to participant funding that they want to see issued because of their zeal to prevent the standard market design from being issued.
I also believe that some of the orders that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued in the Western market crises would be defined as orders of general applicability and would have been prohibited.
If we have another crisis which occurs during these upcoming 2 years,
would we not want the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to bring order to those markets the way they finally did in the West 2 years ago in the summer?
Everybody, both the opponents and the supporters of the standard market design, should support the amendment I am offering. It is an amendment to clarify that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is not banned from issuing any orders or rules that deal with any matter in the proposed rule; that they should only, instead, be prohibited from issuing a standard market design rule by any other name.
So I believe what I am proposing is something that all colleagues who have looked at this issue would agree with. We are just trying to clarify the language so we do not wind up prohibiting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission from doing the very things we are going to be calling upon them to get done, and that is the effect of the language that is in the Domenici substitute at this time.
So that is the thrust of my amendment. As I say, this is an issue which, frankly, we should not have to be dealing with by amendment on the Senate floor. I would hope we could just get this resolved at a staff level. We have not been able to. I hope that can still happen and that we can avoid having to go to a vote on this question because I think in the final analysis, if anybody will spend a little bit of time trying to understand this issue, they will agree with this change in language that I am proposing. And they will agree that is, in fact, what the Senate would like to see done.
So, Mr. President, with that, let me yield the floor. My colleague may want to speak on this same amendment.
Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of my friend from Wyoming. Now that we know the procedure--that this will not be voted on until tomorrow at some point--therefore, there will be an opportunity, perhaps this evening or early tomorrow, when our staffs can get together to see if there is any way to accommodate this concern I am trying to deal with in this amendment. As I say, it is a concern which I think many Senators will share if they will focus on what we are trying to deal with.
So the amendment is pending. If we have to, we can have a vote on it, but I would hope we could find another way to deal with this issue that will be acceptable to the chairman of the committee and to my colleague from Wyoming and to all Senators.
Mr. President, that is the only other amendment I intended to offer this evening.
With that, I yield the floor.