Legislative Line Item Veto Act Of 2006
Mr. Speaker, I congratulate the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) for the work he has done on this very important bill. We have had our differences, but in the meantime he has been more than cooperative. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition…
Mr. Speaker, I congratulate the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) for the work he has done on this very important bill. We have had our differences, but in the meantime he has been more than cooperative.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Legislative Line Item Veto Act. My opposition is based on Congress's experience with previous efforts to give the President line item veto authority, as well as my serious concerns over what this bill would do to the balance of budgetary power between the Legislative and Executive Branches.
During 1997, President Clinton exercised his authority under the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 to cancel spending authority or tax benefits 82 times. Total cancellations of discretionary budget authority amounted to $479 million, or less than three one-hundredths of one percent of the total fiscal year 1998 Federal budget.
The cancellations made during this period were mired in controversy. On October 6, 1997, President Clinton cancelled $287 million for 38 military construction projects in 24 States. Soon after the cancellations were announced, the administration admitted, in response to bipartisan criticism, that they had used flawed information in deciding to cancel nearly half of the projects.
The administration used three criteria in making these decisions. The cancelled projects: (1) were not requested by the military; (2) could not make contributions to the national defense in fiscal year 1998; and (3) would not benefit the quality of life and well-being of military personnel. These criteria were applied by the bureaucrats within the White House and OMB without consulting either the Department of Defense or the Members of Congress who sponsored the projects.
Congress's motivation for funding many of these projects was safety. A Live Fire Command and Control Facility at Fort Irwin, CA, would enable the Army to safely train personnel in the live firing of ordnance. Renovations at White Sands Missile Range, NM, would address the absence of fire suppression systems.
Other projects provided much-needed housing. One would provide housing at Dyess Air Force Base in Texas, where there were no existing facilities to house the 13th Bomb Squadron.
Appropriations Chairman Bob Livingston singled out a particularly egregious cancellation relating to the money for Army reserve units in Utah. He said, in a letter to President Clinton, ``I can only conclude that your decision was based on something other than an altruistic yearning to cut spending. Mr. President, this was an embarrassing mistake . . .''
The Clinton Administration responded to some of the criticism by stating that many of the cancelled projects would be requested in future budgets anyway. This only fueled congressional objections, however, as Members could not understand why the projects were not necessary now when they could be considered necessary in the next budget cycle.
Congress responded by passing a bill to disapprove the President's military construction cancellations. The bill was vetoed by the President. The House voted 347-69 and the Senate voted 78-20 to override the veto, enacting the bill and nullifying the cancellations.
On June 25, 1998, the Supreme Court ruled that the Line Item Veto Act violated the presentment clause of the Constitution, thus ending a divisive and contentious fight between the Executive and Legislative branches.
The experience of the original Line Item Veto Act should cause Congress to be extremely cautious about giving the President new line item veto authority. Even though implementation under H.R. 4890 differs from the 1996 Act, the proposed bill would transfer a great deal of budgetary power to the Executive Branch.
The expedited rescission authority mandated by H.R. 4890 would give new weight to the President's rescission proposals. While under current law any rescission proposal can be disregarded by Congress if it has no merit, H.R. 4890 requires votes in the House and Senate. The President, or even bureaucrats within the agencies or the Office of Management and Budget, would set the legislative agenda by deciding what rescissions to include in a bill.
A President could also structure his rescission messages with more of an eye toward politics instead of good policy. For example, a President, encouraged by his political advisors, could propose rescissions that target the projects of one political party. In this event, the debate over the bill would be blatantly political and would certainly lead to legislative stonewalling by the offended party. A President could also make deals with specific Members of Congress to further his legislative agenda. He could easily threaten to cancel an item directly benefiting a particular Member's district, and then back off his threat if that Member votes in favor of the President's program. If a President is interested in trading Members' projects for their support for expanded entitlement spending, for example, overall spending would actually increase.
H.R. 4890 could also present Congress with a procedural nightmare. Each rescission bill would use up to five hours of debate time in the House and ten hours in the Senate. The President could submit up to five rescission messages for each enacted spending or tax bill, or up to ten messages for an omnibus bill. A multiple-rescission-bill scenario could easily eat up precious legislative time when the legislative calendar is already severely limited.
A Republican Congress might tend to support a Republican President's rescission proposals. However, there may not always be a Republican President in the White House. Expedited rescission authority would provide new opportunities for conflict between a White House and Congress of differing parties. The result could be a legislative deadlock manufactured by the Executive Branch.
The experience of the Line Item Veto Act under President Clinton showed how contentious the debate could become over saving a relatively small amount of money. Congress should have serious reservations over giving the Executive Branch so much sway over the funding of congressional priorities and the framework of the legislative agenda.