Yes. I thank the Presiding Officer. Mr. President, the nomination of Representative Porter Goss to be the next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency comes, obviously, at an absolutely critical time in our Nation's history. The…
Yes.
I thank the Presiding Officer.
Mr. President, the nomination of Representative Porter Goss to be the next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency comes, obviously, at an absolutely critical time in our Nation's history.
The documented intelligence failures prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11 and leading up to the war in Iraq have left the intelligence community's credibility bruised and their image tarnished, which none of us wants.
The community's objectivity, their independence, and their competency have been called into question. That is fair in some cases. As a result, a bipartisan call for reform has steadily grown to the point where the Congress is on the threshold of passing landmark legislation, I believe and I hope, to create a stronger, better managed intelligence community before we adjourn this year. I do not think we should stretch it out and wait. I think we should do it, and do it now.
The next Director of Central Intelligence will be the most important person for that position ever confirmed by the Senate. Our decision on who should lead the Central Intelligence Agency, and the other 14 intelligence agencies, according to the law, should not be a rubberstamp job.
The importance of this position requires a thorough examination of the nominee's record and his ability to carry out the weighty responsibilities of the job.
As I have indicated, never before in the 57-year history of the intelligence community has there been such a need for a Director of Central Intelligence with unimpeachable character, proven leadership and management experience, and strong national security credentials.
The new Director will face, in my judgment, no fewer than four major challenges: waging an unrelenting offensive clandestine campaign against al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations around the world; supporting ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; managing an intelligence community in a state of transition; and, restoring the intelligence community's lost credibility.
The next Director of Central Intelligence must be extraordinarily qualified in order to successfully carry out these and other national security tasks.
I simply say all of this to say the stakes are enormous. Perhaps most importantly, the next Director of Central Intelligence must be nonpartisan, independent, and objective. This standard is not simply this Senator's; it is what the law, the National Security Act law, requires specifically in language.
I know of no other position of importance in Government requiring that independence, objectivity, and non-partisanship as a requirement for confirmation. The very first responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence under the National Security Act--and these are the words--says that his advice to the President, the executive branch, the military, and the Congress must be timely, must be objective, and must be independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community. That is the law.
I have reviewed Representative Goss's record closely. I have gone over his writings and his speeches of the past 10 years. We have just completed two open hearings, which I thought were good hearings, in the Intelligence Committee, where Representative Goss was asked questions about his past record, his commitment to reform the intelligence community, and his ability to be forthright, objective, and independent.
Representative Goss is, without question, qualified in many respects. He is a fine person. I have been able to work with him well over the past few years--that is not one of the requirements, but it happens to be true--both in the joint congressional inquiry into 9/11, and also in House-Senate conferences. His past employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, doing extremely dangerous work, and his 7-year tenure as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, have given him both an insider's and outsider's perspective of the intelligence community. There is no doubt that he is an extremely knowledgeable person with respect to the inner workings of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other agencies he is nominated to manage.
But Representative Goss's record is troubling in other regards. I wish to speak about them. He has made a number of statements relative to intelligence matters--many in the past year--that are, in fact, highly partisan and displayed a willingness on his part to use intelligence issues as a political broadsword against members of the Democratic Party. Again, ordinarily, that is kind of routine around here, but with respect to the Director of Central Intelligence, that should not be and cannot be according to the law. When taken collectively, this list of partisan statements and actions on intelligence matters raise a serious doubt in my mind as to whether Porter Goss can be the type of nonpartisan, independent, and objective national intelligence adviser our country needs.
What is the public record of the person the President has nominated to be the next director of the CIA? Has he been independent, objective, and nonpartisan on intelligence issues, again, as required by law?
In March of this year, Representative Goss coauthored an intelligence op-ed piece entitled ``Need Intelligence? Don't ask John Kerry.'' In this political attack piece, he made a number of highly charged political allegations relating to intelligence spending. These are quotes from the Congressman:
. . . when Democrats controlled the Congress, the cuts were
deep, far-reaching, and devastating to the ability of the CIA
to do its job to keep America safe.
. . . during the Clinton years, the Intelligence Community
was given a clear message that if they failed in politically
risky operations . . . there would be no backing from the
Clinton White House or the Democratic-controlled Congress.
And then Representative Goss targeted Senator Kerry, who he claims ``was leading the way to make deep and devastating cuts in the intelligence community's budget'' and ``was leading efforts in Congress to dismantle the Nation's intelligence capabilities.'' Severe criticism. A few months later, in a June 23, 2004 statement on the floor of the House, Representative Goss claimed that ``the Democratic Party did not support the Intelligence Community.'' And in the same June floor debate, he offered the following justification for his claim:
My comment is that when there was opposition to
intelligence and, year after year, efforts to cut the
intelligence budget, they did come from the Democratic side
through the period of the 1990s.
I have gone back over the record and determined that Representative Goss's election year claims mischaracterize the intelligence record of both the Democratic Party and Senator Kerry, in my judgment. He also failed to point out his own record as a member, and eventual chairman, of the House Intelligence Committee during this time. Had he stated the intelligence record factually, it would have taken the sting out of his political attacks and created an entirely different picture than the one he painted.
It is true that during the first two years of the Clinton administration, the intelligence budgets declined. That is true. This was a period of deep cuts in almost all areas of Government, as we tried to grapple with the legacy of the previous 12 years of uncontrolled deficits. Over the next 6 years, however, the Clinton administration's budget increased every single year for intelligence. During that 6-year period, fiscal years 1996 to 2001, Republicans controlled both Houses of Congress, and the Congress cut the President's request in 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2001. In 1999, the Republican-controlled Congress initially cut the intelligence budget, but then passed a large one-time supplemental appropriation.
In fiscal year 2001, the Republican-controlled Congress returned to its pattern of cutting intelligence funding. After the 9/11 attacks, Congress once again passed emergency supplemental funding. By that point, the Democrats had a majority of the Senate--briefly.
Representative Goss voted for every Intelligence authorization bill and every Defense appropriation bill during this period. So he must have thought that the so-called underfunding President Clinton was requesting was acceptable.
Now, I want to look at exactly what Senator Kerry proposed in 1994, and I want to contrast that with a bill, H.R. 1923, introduced by Representative Solomon that had as its first cosponsor Congressman Goss.
In 1994, Senator Kerry introduced a bill to cut the deficit by $45 billion over 5 years--at a time when Congress was searching for ways to undo the 12 years of uncontrolled deficits under the Reagan and Bush administrations. Senator Kerry's proposal would have rescinded $1 billion from the 1994 Intelligence appropriations and then increased intelligence spending over the next 4 years by the inflation rate. Representative Goss's proposal in 1995 would have cut not less than 4 percent of the personnel from all intelligence agencies in each of the following 5 years. After the initial cut in 1994, Senator Kerry's proposal would have provided significantly more funding for intelligence than was appropriated by the Congress controlled by the Republicans, beginning with the fiscal year 1996 budget.
Representative Goss's proposal, on the other hand, would have resulted in dramatically lower intelligence funding and, in fact John Kerry's proposal would have resulted in $8.8 billion more for intelligence than Congressman Goss's lead-cosponsored bill.
And worse, all of the cuts Representative Goss proposed in 1995 would have been achieved by firing 20 percent, by law, of America's intelligence officers at the very time the terrorist threat from al- Qaida was growing. In fact, had the Congress followed the Goss plan, the intelligence community would have had tens of thousands fewer intelligence officers in the year 2000: fewer intelligence collectors in the CIA, NSA, and elsewhere; fewer intelligence analysts across the community; fewer intelligence officers in the military service; and fewer counterterrorism officers in the FBI.
The Goss plan would have made, using his own words, in fact, ``deep and devastating cuts in the intelligence community budget.'' But this year, an election year, Representative Goss chose to level that charge against the Democratic Party as a whole and Senator John Kerry by name. Why? When asked at the nomination hearing to reconcile these facts with his charge that it was the Democrats who did not support intelligence, Representative Goss simply said, ``The record is the record,'' about four or five times. He also refused to admit that his accusations might have been in error.
When asked whether anyone from the White House or the President's reelection campaign asked him to write the March editorial and to give the June floor statement against John Kerry, he said he couldn't recall.
Representative Goss's unwillingness to be forthright in his answers on this matter were troubling to me and a number of my colleagues on the committee. His dismissive answers to tough, but as I said repeatedly, I thought fair questions lacked candor.
I was left with doubt that as Director of Central Intelligence, he would have a forceful and independent voice on intelligence assessments that do not necessarily support a political agenda, if there is one, of the current President.
There are other instances where Representative Goss, as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, played the partisan blame game. It is against the law for the Director of the CIA to
be involved in such. That was then. He is being confirmed now. Does this man's life change completely after 15 years from partisanship to total nonpartisanship?
In 1999, when it was disclosed that the Chinese espionage efforts against our Department of Energy weapons laboratories may have resulted in loss of sensitive nuclear weapons design information, a counter- investigation was begun, eventually resulting in charges being brought against Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee.
Representative Goss repeatedly laid the blame for this espionage activity on the Clinton administration's failure to protect national security. In the final days of the 2000 Presidential election campaign, Representative Goss took to the House floor and stated:
We have in the Clinton-Gore administration seen a cultural
disdain for security.
Again, Representative Goss's statements on important intelligence issues mischaracterized the record in the attempt to score political points.
The Cox Commission, which Porter Goss served on as vice chairman, found that the security problems at the Department of Energy weapons laboratories predated the Clinton administration and that the Chinese espionage collection program against the weapons lab began in the 1970s.
The Cox Commission report also noted it was the Clinton administration that issued Presidential Decision Directive 61 requiring the Department of Energy to improve counterintelligence programs.
Evidently, mentioning these points was not helpful to Representative Goss when he was making sweeping statements about ``a cultural disdain for security,'' which is highly offensive to me as a Democrat who is vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and I think all Republicans and all Democrats care desperately, seriously about what happens in intelligence.
In the rush to assign partisan blame, Representative Goss ignored the record. In a number of other statements, Representative Goss erroneously singled out the Clinton administration and congressional Democrats for cutting human intelligence programs in the 1990s that, in turn, he said, limited the intelligence community's ability to carry out its mission.
Yet it was Representative Goss himself who said in 1998 that human intelligence collection programs needed to be cut by the time the 1990s began. His comment specifically was:
I am convinced that the U.S. clandestine service, the CIA
Directorate of Operations was in the mid to late 1980s too
large.
When the identity of Valerie Plame, an intelligence officer with the CIA whose clandestine identity is protected by law from unauthorized disclosure, was leaked and published by columnist Robert Novak, Representative Goss was asked whether the disclosure warranted investigation. His response was stunning. He said:
Someone sends me a blue dress and some DNA, I'll have an
investigation.
The whole basis for the law protecting the identity of covered intelligence community employees from being disclosed is to protect the lives of American intelligence officials that are endangered if their true identity is known to our adversaries.
As a former CIA case officer and chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Representative Goss knows this. For him to make such a statement, with its clearly implied shot at President Clinton, was wrong, inappropriate, and insensitive to the gravity of the matter. I hope Representative Goss, if confirmed by the Senate to lead the CIA, will have a more serious attitude toward the outing of CIA employees undercover.
When Richard Clarke, the coordinator for counterterrorism for the National Security Council from 1993 to October 2001, provided testimony to the 9/11 Commission that was clearly damaging to Bush administration claims, Representative Goss, and others, questioned his integrity and claimed he may have lied before the joint congressional inquiry in closed session, vowing to declassify his testimony to prove it.
These claims were never substantiated, and when the National Security Council forwarded to Chairman Goss, as requested, a declassified version of Richard Clarke's testimony on June 25, nearly 3 months ago, he took no action to publicly release it so that allegations of perjury and the like could be laid to rest.
While the Senate voted to support the creation of the independent National 9/11 Commission, which eventually became the Commission led by Governor Tom Kean and Representative Lee Hamilton, Representative Goss opposed the measure on the House floor.
When the Senate and House Intelligence Committees met in the fall of 2002 to conference this issue, he continued to oppose the creation of an independent 9/11 Commission stating that the issue would be decided ``above my pay grade.''
When the Senate Intelligence Committee undertook an investigation into the use of intelligence--not the collection, analysis, and production of intelligence, but when you hand it to policymakers--the use of intelligence by the administration officials prior to the war as part of our broader Iraq intelligence inquiry, Representative Goss made disparaging comments about two Democratic Senators in particular who, like many others in this body, are profoundly concerned about the veracity of public statements made about the U.S. intelligence agency, calling them ``two old attack dogs gumming their way through artificial outrage about something they should know a lot more about and be more responsible about.''
What makes this particular criticism curious is Representative Goss's lack of action on the issue of pre-war intelligence. Despite assurances over a year ago that the House Intelligence Committee was evaluating the intelligence community's performance on Iraq since the end of the gulf war, Chairman Goss failed to issue the promised report on the failures and mistakes leading up to the war.
Chairman Roberts and I, in a thoroughly bipartisan fashion, did so in a 17-to-0 vote. I think we are both proud of that, and justifiably so, along with our colleagues on the committee. The House produced nothing. They produced press releases, but nothing else.
When both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee, as committees with shared jurisdiction, began holding difficult but necessary oversight hearings into the improper treatment and interrogation of prisoners in Iraq, Representative Goss viewed our actions with disdain, saying:
I am not comfortable with what the Senate is doing . . . I
do honestly question whether or not they have balance over
there on this issue . . . We've got a circus in the Senate,
which is always the likely place to look for this circus.
Porter Goss chose to denigrate the Senate's investigation, while the House chose to largely ignore the matter and not ask the tough questions about what happened inside Abu Ghraib prison and at other detention facilities in Iraq or elsewhere.
All too often, Representative Goss's statements and actions as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee seemed designed to protect the administration by avoiding contentious issues which could be embarrassing to the administration and placing blame on Democrats for shortcomings in the intelligence community.
Not surprisingly, one thing missing from Representative Goss's records is any public statements on intelligence critical of Members of his own party or the administration. During his nomination hearing, Representative Goss assured the committee that these partisan inclinations of the past would not prevent him from carrying out his duties as Director of Central Intelligence. He said he understood the Director must be an independent adviser to the President and the Congress, beyond reproach and beyond the reach of politics.
While I appreciate his testimony and commitment to being a nonpartisan Director of Intelligence, I cannot say with absolute certainty that he will be exactly that. I must vote on his record. I cannot vote on his promise, and I do not think the Senate should. His record is his record. He said it.
The truth is, Chairman Goss and I have a very good working relationship, one that I expect will continue and improve in the future. We had a good exchange in recent days, even during difficult nomination hearings. In contrast to those who wish to gloss over this issue, Porter Goss himself understands exactly the dilemma that I and
many of my colleagues face with this nomination. He knows this is one of only a handful of positions in the entire U.S. Government that requires by law nonpartisanship and objectivity, and in this case the demand is all the greater because it is about our national security.
Porter Goss openly acknowledged in his testimony before the committee this week that he has at times approached national security issues with excessive partisanship, and he expressed regret about that. And I respect that. I believe Porter Goss knows that in essence, on this whole question of independence, he is asking us to take it on faith, so to speak, that he can make a clean break from the last 10 to 20 years of his political career.
I hope he is right. I very much want him to be right about that, but at end of the day I do not think taking it on faith is enough for this vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee when it comes to such a critical position of Director of Central Intelligence. It does not meet the legal standard, and it does not meet my obligation, in my judgment, as vice chairman.
These are troubled times for the intelligence community in our country. In so many ways, we are still recovering from the tragedy of 9/11. We are grappling with the tragic impact of flawed and exaggerated intelligence leading up to the war in Iraq, and we are struggling still to understand the truth about what is happening in the world.
Just yesterday, our President surprised and shocked many of us by dismissing outright the highest level of consensus view of the intelligence community when he said they were ``just guessing'' about the gravity of the situation in Iraq.
In light of all of this, I believe I owe it to the men and women of the intelligence community to send a clear and strong signal about the paramount importance of independence and objectivity. It needs to be said not only in words but in action. So I will vote against the nomination of Porter Goss to be the next DCI.
I sincerely hope Porter Goss will prove my vote wrong, and I told him that. In fact, I intend to work with him in order to help him prove me wrong. But based on his record of partisanship, based on the dictates of the law, and based on my own strong conviction against mixing politics and intelligence at the CIA, I must vote no.
I yield the floor.
I yield such time as he may consume to the Senator from Oregon.
I yield such time as the Senator from New Jersey wishes to express his views. I yield him that amount of time.