Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 10. In fact, I think one of the most important parts of this legislation deals with aviation security. We have worked very hard over…
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 10. In fact, I think one of the most important parts of this legislation deals with aviation security. We have worked very hard over the past 2 years to try to come up with bipartisan solutions, things that really would make a difference. Many of those recommendations are contained in the 9/11 report.
Now, the 9/11 report is not perfect. It is put together by 10 people, and it does have some flaws in it. I want to talk about, unfortunately, the adoption and anatomy of adopting one of those flaws in the Menendez substitute which weakens the provisions of H.R. 10.
First of all, the Menendez substitute would strip vital provisions from H.R. 10. We have $60 million in mandatory funding for checkpoint explosive detection devices. Nothing is more important or no greater risk.
Actually, there are two risks. One is someone walking through a 1950s metal detector technology, metal detectors we have at our airports, with explosives strapped to themselves, and those metal detectors will not detect that. We need to deploy them now. The Menendez amendment strips that.
Second is biometric identification. We cannot tell today Mohammad Atta from Sam Hill. We need a biometric identification provision. We have a bipartisan provision, which the Menendez substitute drops from this bill.
Another potential threat is shoulder-launched missile nonproliferation programs. We have worked hard in a bipartisan fashion to eliminate that threat, and we have a four-part, well-thought-out, well-reasoned approach to dealing with that threat. Again, the Menendez substitute weakens and destroys things that we have been working on.
We have improvements in arming our pilots, one of the most effective protective measures, and secondary cockpit barriers. We paid attention to looking at those weaknesses. And also the Menendez substitute weakens international air marshal deployment.
So, again, I rise in strong support of the provisions of H.R. 10.
One of the things that I wanted to address tonight, and, unfortunately, it has even reached the presidential debates, to those uninformed candidates and some of my colleagues on this floor who continue to try to scare the traveling public to suggest that our air cargo carried in on a passenger aircraft is not screened and that we must take extreme measures and build a bureaucracy and march forward in different directions. As a result, they have put forward proposals that are not only unworkable, but would bring this Nation's economy to a grinding halt.
In fact, the facts are that we have a risk-based system in place now. Is it flawless? No. The facts are that building a larger TSA bureaucracy is not going to solve the problem. In fact, it will make the problem worse. The facts are that scaring people and running around the country and saying ``the sky is falling'' is just wrong and irresponsible.
Let us talk about the Menendez amendment and how it deals with hardened containers. Let me give you the anatomy of the development. Turn to page 393 of the report and see what the Commission recommended. Our committee has worked on these issues day and night, weekends, tirelessly, and our staff, since September 11, and even before that, on aviation security issues.
The Commission recommends, ``The TSA should require that every passenger aircraft carrying cargo must deploy at least one hardened container to carry any suspect cargo.''
That is not our recommendation. We met with these folks. Who in their right mind would allow suspect cargo on an aircraft? We have provisions already that do not allow ``suspect cargo'' on an aircraft. They also put ``one hardened container.'' What a goofy idea. ``One hardened container.''
First of all, the current law that we have a definition of and we have used again to define what we want is ``blast resistant container.'' So they just copied a recommendation without actually having it make sense.
Now, most of our aircraft that you fly on, a 737 that I fly on usually, an Airbus, regional jets that are our biggest proliferation of new aircraft, do not have aircraft containers. So what are we going to have to do, build one to put on there? They do not have containers. 737s have a container.
Think of how goofy this is. A 737, I am told, has 30 containers, so which container are we going to make blast resistant and allow suspicious cargo in violation of our current rules that do not even allow that? We are going to do ``eenie, meenie, minie, moe, in which one would the explosive cargo go?''
And I am pleased that the gentle-lady from California, Ms. Millender- McDonald, whose district includes the manufacturer of these containers, supported the testing proposal when it was unanimously approved by the Transportation Committee.
TSA is currently drafting new, comprehensive standards for air cargo security, which should be finalized in the next several weeks. TSA has in place risk based, layered air cargo security system.
These directives include key components on the Known Shipper Program, the Indirect Air Carrier Program, the Freight Assessment Program and other increased oversight initiatives.
In addition, the airline industry has taken steps to upgrade their extensive ``known shipper'' program, which is currently the basis for air cargo screening procedures.
Right now we have a risk-based security system that targets high-risk shipments for additional screening, and combines layers of security along the supply chain.
Contrary to rhetoric, the Department of Homeland Security pre-screens 100 percent of all cargo that comes into the United States and conducts 100 percent inspections of high-risk shipments.
Rushing ahead without carefully considering all the risks and all the implications of security mandates would be destructive to ongoing efforts and have far-reaching and damaging implications.
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) has warned that some mandates could ``damage their efforts to provide security in the aviation environment and ensure the smooth flow of legitimate goods and people.''
DHS has also warned that due to ``significant technology limitations,'' ``. . . there is no practical way to achieve 100 percent manual screening and inspection of all air cargo.''
Only with technology can we effectively screen air cargo. Why do we not have that technology--I ask Senator Patty Murray who in 2002 diverted R&D funds.
Therefore, given the lack of technology for screening air cargo, any mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft would require actual physical inspection of each piece of cargo placed aboard a passenger aircraft.
Now I know that my colleagues from the other side of the aisle would like this approach, because then we could hire thousands more screeners to do this work. According to the IG manual screening for weapons and explosives is the least effective means of detection.
This type of requirement would grind the transportation of air cargo to a virtual halt, or it would also result in a situation where passenger carriers would be denied the ability to transport cargo and guarantees the final nail in the bankruptcy coffin of our ailing major airlines.
Just as important, communities who rely on air cargo to receive much needed supplies, medicines, food, mail, and other necessities of life will be left high and dry.
We've spent $10 billion dollars since 9/11--just for passenger screening. And $6 billion of that on labor-costs alone--48,000 Federal screeners. All for a screening system that the DHS Inspector General reports fails to detect the most dangerous items most of the time.
We let the Fear-mongers push an unworkable deadline for baggage screening. Consequently, in our haste, we've wasted billions on ineffective, labor-intensive stand-alone and ineffective manual trace systems. If we had done it right in the first place, we would already have highly effective and highly efficient systems for passengers, baggage and cargo.
You would think that we would have learned from our mistakes--and not react in a knee jerk fashion. We need to be smarter about where we place our scarce and limited resources.
We must find the proper balance between enhancing air cargo security while ensuring that the flow of air commerce is not disrupted.
The Department of Homeland Security is doing all it can to find additional ways to enhance air cargo screening while technology catches up.
TSA budgeted about $55 million for fiscal year 2004 for research and development projects to enhance air cargo security.
Projects being funded include a pre-screening system to identify high-risk cargo, and technology and equipment to screen containerized air cargo and mail.
TSA also budgeted an additional $45 million in fiscal year 2004 for key initiatives in air cargo security oversight, including known shipper enhancements, canine explosives detection and 100 additional cargo inspectors.
And, both the House and the other body have allocated $75 million in research and development funds for air cargo security in fiscal year 2005.
Clearly air cargo security is being given much attention by both the Congress and the Administration.
Bottom line, the Department of Homeland Security is the proper entity to lead this effort and Congress should refrain from micro-managing this process.