Mr. President, in a few minutes, I will send an amendment to the desk on behalf of Senator Edwards and me. About a half hour ago, Senator Edwards talked about an issue that has been one of the most serious concerns of mine and a whole host…
Mr. President, in a few minutes, I will send an amendment to the desk on behalf of Senator Edwards and me. About a half hour ago, Senator Edwards talked about an issue that has been one of the most serious concerns of mine and a whole host of Americans--about the state of our security and the threat to the American people, which they face by the potential of a terrorist attack on our Nation's chemical plants. There are literally thousands of chemical producers, refineries, and similar facilities in the United States where chemicals released by any of these plants could kill or injure tens of thousands--and, frankly, even millions--of Americans through exposure to highly toxic gases. That is why these facilities are potentially so attractive to terrorists.
Unfortunately, there are no Federal security standards for chemical facilities--none. So the private sector has been left to do as it sees appropriate on a completely voluntary basis. Far too many facilities simply have not stepped up to accept the responsibility. There are a number of private companies that have done everything ever thought to be necessary, but there are many that have been left out and keep vulnerabilities in front of the American people and are basically putting millions of Americans at risk.
I have a chart here that will show where--in red--these facilities are that put more than a million Americans at risk. There happens to be 11 in my State of New Jersey. It is a serious issue. There is one of those in the State of the Presiding Officer. But in a broad cross- section of our country, there are huge numbers of these facilities located in highly populated areas.
According to the EPA there are 123 facilities in 24 States where a chemical release could expose more than 1 million people to highly toxic chemicals.
There are 750 facilities in 39 States where chemical release can expose more than 100,000 people to these chemicals. Those are the States in yellow. There are 3,000 facilities spread across 49 of the 50 States where chemical release could expose more than 10,000 people. Frankly, these are pretty staggering numbers, and I think it represents a broad vulnerability across America.
The consequences of an attack on a chemical plant are potentially so horrific that it is hard for me to understand or accept inaction in this area. In fact, I would argue this body has been in sort of psychological denial, I guess, about this problem. If September 11 taught us anything, it taught us that America can no longer avoid thinking about the unthinkable. We have to face up to the Nation's most serious vulnerabilities. We have to focus on them, and we have to confront them head on.
Let me repeat one statistic. There are 123 chemical facilities around the Nation that, if attacked, could threaten over 1 million American lives. This is a big deal in New Jersey. To bring this home in specific terms, there are 11 facilities in my home State, and one petrochemical plant in the middle of downtown Newark and south Carney that exposes nearly 8 million people in the greater New York-New Jersey region--8 million people potentially exposed to toxic fumes if there were a terrorist attack, a criminal attack, or, by the way, even if there was a safety violation bringing about an explosion. We have had a number of those incidents in my State that have taken lives just because of safety considerations, let alone if the plants were under an attack by a terrorist or criminal activity.
These facilities pose a serious threat to public safety because they contain the kind of toxic chemicals that, if released, could cause those injuries I am talking about--chemicals such as chlorine, ammonia, hydrogen fluoride, the types of chemicals that were used to manufacture the bomb in Oklahoma City and the type of chemicals in Bhopal. There are all kinds of these chemicals in our cities, in our States, chemicals that serve very positive and important industrial functions but could instantly be transformed into weapons of mass destruction at the hands of terrorists.
This is not just my opinion. This is not an enviroview. This is not some hyped-up point of view. It has been documented and acknowledged time after time by experts and by the current administration.
Most recently, on March 18, the General Accounting Office issued a new report on the matter. GAO found that chemical facilities may be attractive targets to terrorists because of the extent of harm they could inflict. Yet, as GAO explained, there are no Federal laws requiring chemical plants to assess vulnerabilities and to take action to guard against terrorist attacks.
I am going to submit a summary of the GAO report. For those who need thoughtful and systematic information about the vulnerabilities, about what is not being done, I suggest they read the whole report. I ask unanimous consent to print a brief summary of the GAO report in the Record.
Mr. President, in addition to this GAO assessment, they recommended the Department of Homeland Security and EPA, working together, develop a strategy, including a legislative proposal, to address the threats of attacks on chemical plants. I listed the highlights of their report which has a recommendation that there is a need for legislation in this area. There is a need now to protect the American people against chemical plant risks. The GAO report was released on March 18 of this year.
To continue with the acknowledgment that this is real, only a month earlier, the Department of Homeland Security, when it raised the Nation's alert to code orange, sounded the alarm about the threat facing chemical facilities. In its bulletin it sent out to State and local officials, the Department stated:
Al-Qaida operatives also may attempt to launch conventional
attacks against U.S. nuclear/chemical-industrial
infrastructure to cause contamination, disruption, and
terror. Based on information, nuclear powerplants and
industrial chemical plants remain viable targets.
That is from the Department of Homeland Security to all State and local officials: ``Chemical plants remain viable targets,'' and we have not done anything. It is time to recognize that there is broad recognition by the administration and by those who study this issue that it is time to act. That was on February 12 of this year.
Let me go back to October 6 of last year. On that day, Homeland Security Secretary Ridge and EPA Administrator Whitman had a letter published in the Washington Post. They stated in that letter:
The Bush administration is committed to reducing the
vulnerability of America's chemical facilities to terrorist
attack and is working to enact bipartisan legislation that
would require such facilities to address their
vulnerabilities.
They go on to say that while there have been good steps taken by private industry, there are over 15,000 chemical facilities nationwide that contain large quantities of hazardous chemicals, and they must be required to take steps that mimic industry leaders in this area.
That letter was from Secretary Ridge and EPA Administrator Whitman last October. I ask, Has the administration proposed such bipartisan legislation? Have they proposed any legislation? Have they issued any regulations to address the threat facing chemical plants? Have they even proposed any such regulations? Have they done anything--anything at all--to meaningfully address the security threats facing chemical plants? I think the fair answer is no to each and every one of those questions.
Periodically, we have seen press reports that the administration may be working on some type of proposal, and I commend that effort. I hope they will. But so far, they have shown no willingness to work on a bipartisan basis. I have sent letter after letter, question after question, made phone call after phone call, trying to enter into a negotiation, not only with the
administration, but the other side of the aisle, on this issue.
The bottom line is, a year and a half after the attacks of September 11, there still has not been a serious response with regard to what we are doing here.
In fact, the Nation has known about this problem for a very long time. The Department of Justice issued a report on this matter a year and a half before September 11. Let me read a brief excerpt from a summary of that report which was issued on April 18, 2000:
We have concluded the risk of terrorists attempting in the
foreseeable future to cause an industrial chemical release is
both real and credible.
Again, April 18, 2000:
Terrorists or other criminals are likely to view the
potential of chemical release from an industrial facility as
a relatively attractive means of achieving these goals.
That report was issued before September 11. Its conclusion has been echoed by other Government agencies and in private studies with regard to vulnerabilities in our infrastructure.
I will not relate them all, but the warnings have been repetitive, from the Hart-Rudman Commission to the Department of Homeland Security on February 12 when they issued their code orange alert.
While some companies may well be doing an outstanding job in securing their facilities, many are not. Simply relying on voluntary standards just is not working, and if we are going to protect America from the threat of terrorist attacks on chemical facilities, we need to do more. That is why in October 2001 I introduced the Chemical Security Act. That is why I worked with Senators on both sides of the aisle to move the legislation through the Environment and Public Works Committee. Ultimately, the committee approved the legislation on a rollcall vote of 19 to 0. Not a single Senator voted no--not a single Senator.
The amendment I am offering today, along with my good friend, the distinguished Senator from North Carolina, Mr. Edwards, is based on the legislation that was approved by the committee on a 19-to-0 vote. However, we have made a few changes in good faith to make it more acceptable to industry and to win broader support.
The legislation requires the Department of Homeland Security and EPA to do three things: First, the Department has to identify high-priority chemical facilities, those that potentially put a large number of people at risk.
Second, they must require those high-priority facilities to assess their vulnerabilities to develop and implement plans to improve security and use safer technologies.
Third, these assessments and plans would have to be submitted for review by the Department of Homeland Security. The changes could be required if deficiencies are identified. That is the amendment in a nutshell. It is a simple, commonsense approach that would establish standards and ensure some balance at this time.
Last year, after my legislation was approved unanimously in committee, some in industry expressed concerns. Industry opposition ultimately killed the bill, kept it from even coming up for debate on this floor. Opposition to the bill was largely based on two points, both of which I am going to try to address, with changes from what came out of committee.
First, opponents argued that the responsibility for overseeing chemical security should rest with the Department of Homeland Security rather than the Environmental Protection Agency. I proposed giving the responsibility to EPA for a reason. They have the expertise on chemical plants. They have the expertise on dealing with these highly toxic chemicals. Under the Clean Air Act, they already have a requirement to oversee. They have the expertise. DHS does not.
On the other hand, I recognized from the start that the EPA did not have the expertise to evaluate security arrangements. So we originally asked the Department of Justice back in October of 2001--we have subsequently changed that to the Department of Homeland Security--and now we have put the Department of Homeland Security as the lead agency in charge of what has been requested by those in industry because they wanted security to be the primary element. So we have responded.
Having said that, I also acknowledge that in spite of EPA's expertise, the latter was necessary. So in an effort to broaden support for our proposal, we continue to modify and we reflect others' concerns.
The second concern raised by industrial lobbyists about the bill, again unanimously approved by the EPW Committee, focused on the bill's provision to require businesses to shift to safer technologies, to the extent practical.
I will take a moment to explain why this provision was included and why it is so important. It is not just enough to put barbed wire on high fences around the place when some attacks could come over those walls--planes and other things--which we have begun to understand can happen post-September 11. We know no matter how high we build those walls a committed terrorist can get to those facilities, and it becomes important to make sure the facilities are as safe as they possibly can be without putting companies out of business. To truly protect the public, we need to do more. We need to take steps to build in better inherent technology.
I have seen a great example of that in Washington, DC, as I think Senator Edwards mentioned, at the Blue Plains Sewage Treatment Plant. Prior to September 11, they were storing chlorine and sulfur dioxide in car trains just across the river. Both are volatile, dangerous chemicals. If those tanks were attacked, a poisonous cloud could have been over Washington, DC. It would have been one of those places where roughly a million people could have been exposed--certainly hundreds of thousands, including the Capitol and the White House.
Business recognized this was a risk and did something about it. In fact, we should be quite proud of business taking an initiative on a voluntary basis to address this problem. They changed from chlorine to sodium hypochlorite, which is a strong version of bleach but much safer, less volatile. It is going to cost 25 to 50 cents a year for those who drink water in the District, but I think it is a small price to pay to bring about the kind of safety considerations that the public and the community would expect. It sounds like a bargain to me.
To the extent practical, we need to find ways to move away from dangerous and toxic chemicals to other chemicals or other processes that protect and make the processes safer. I understand it is an expensive process. So what I have done in this amendment, as opposed to in the original bill, is I have offered economic incentives and economic support to those companies that transform to safer technologies. For those businesses that need help, I have put $50 million into this bill to make that process better. So we have a second element that really has tried to accommodate some of the concerns that people had in this regard and how onerous it might be.
We have a problem. We have some obvious steps to deal with it and we have tried to get the private sector to move in a direction that will enhance both the security and bring about safer technologies that will protect people.
So that is it. I think it is an extremely important initiative that needs to be taken in the context of the homeland security efforts that are included in this supplemental. I hope people will take this seriously, as Senator Edwards, Senator Jeffords and others have, as 19 Senators in EPW did when we voted on this after much review and discussion.
I am eager to work with the administration. I am eager to work with those on the other side of the aisle to make sure we have an initiative to protect our chemical plants, which is really about protecting the American people. I hope we can move to this goal. This should be one of the No. 1 steps we have in this process.
I send the amendment to the desk on behalf of myself and Senator Edwards and ask for its immediate consideration.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Again, I urge my colleagues, before we have a chance to vote on this amendment in the coming days, to sit down and look at this in a serious minded way, knowing that we have addressed some of the problems and that we can move forward to have a positive embracing of real steps to protect the American people from exposure we have to chemical plants.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered in order notwithstanding rule XVI.