I thank the Chair, and I thank Senator Sessions, my colleague from Alabama, for the statement he made and for his leadership on this issue. I am proud to join with him and a number of Senators--Senators Bayh, McCain, Inhofe, Vitter, Kyl,…
I thank the Chair, and I thank Senator Sessions, my colleague from Alabama, for the statement he made and for his leadership on this issue. I am proud to join with him and a number of Senators--Senators Bayh, McCain, Inhofe, Vitter, Kyl, and Bennett--to introduce this amendment.
Mr. President, has the amendment actually been called up?
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment and call up amendment No. 2616.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be waived.
Mr. President, this bipartisan amendment is both a response to the administration's decision to cancel the ground-based midcourse missile defense system that was going to be in Poland and the Czech Republic and the subsequent decision of our friends and colleagues on the Appropriations Defense Subcommittee to withdraw a significant amount of money that the administration has said it still wanted to be preserved for the ground-based interceptors; that is, the interceptors that would have been launched from Poland at a missile presumably from Iran headed toward Europe, the Middle East, or particularly toward the United States.
Let me explain some background here as quickly as I can.
I was disappointed by the administrations's decision to cancel the planned deployment of this missile defense system to Poland and the Czech Republic. This system would have provided our European allies and others with a first line of defense against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that Iran already possesses and could fire at our allies in the region and in Europe. But the point I want to focus in on here is that the--I am going to call it the GMD--it is the ground-based midcourse missile defense system, the GMD for Poland and the Czech Republic would also have provided a layer of what the military missile experts call redundancy for the defense of the United States against an intercontinental ballistic missile fired from Iran at us. This is not just sort of pie-in-the-sky kind of hyperanxiety, imagination. We know that Iranians are developing long-range ballistic missiles and, as I will mention in a moment, experts predict they will have that capacity by the middle of the next decade, 2015.
The Polish-Czech system would have provided, in addition to a defense of Europe, a redundant defense of the United States. What does redundancy mean in this case? It means we have more than one line of defense to protect us. Those of us who are privileged to serve on the Armed Services Committee or Appropriations Committee and others know our military tries to build redundancy into equipment, for instance. I was up at the Sikorsky helicopter manufacturing facility in Stratford, CT, a little while ago. They are building a new model of helicopter. There are three or four levels of redundancy in that system, in that single helicopter. Why? So if one element breaks down, there are two or three other elements that will keep it going for the protection of our American military inside that helicopter.
In the same way, if an intercontinental ballistic missile is fired in 2015 toward the United States of America, we have one line of defense.
My friend from Mississippi, Senator Cochran, is here. I remember so well when he and I in the decade of the 1990s were trying to convince our colleagues to invest some money in developing a ballistic missile defense system. People said two things: No. 1, we were getting carried away with our fears and, No. 2, even if it was something to be concerned about, it was impossible to develop a ballistic missile defense system. I remember people said we are talking about trying to hit a bullet with a bullet.
Well, by God, American military, American innovation, American enterprise, American manufacturing have done it. We now have two ground-based missile defense systems, one in Alaska, one in California, to protect the American homeland from ballistic missile attack.
But we need redundancy. Just like the pilot and the crew in that Sikorsky helicopter need redundancy in that helicopter in case one of the lead systems goes, we want to know they have backup. If a missile is headed--well, probably with a nuclear weapon on it--toward the United States of America, I think we want some redundancy. We want more than one line of defense to protect our people and our country. Right now we just have that system in California and Alaska.
The ideal here, according to the people who think about this, is to have what they call a ``shoot look and shoot'' defense. A missile is fired from Iran. We gauge that it is heading toward the United States. The plan for the ground-based system in Poland and Czechoslovakia is we have our first shot at that missile heading toward us from Poland. Then we look. If we missed it, we have a second opportunity to knock it down from California or Alaska.
Unfortunately, the alternative system the administration has chosen, which has many positive aspects to it for the defense of Europe and the Middle East from Iranian short- and medium-range missiles, leaves most of the United States without that second shot at that incoming missile.
I do not have pictures with me from a report that the Congressional Budget Office did, a diagram, but the eastern part of the United States would have a redundant defense but everything pretty much west of the Mississippi would not. That is serious stuff. That is why I am disappointed by the decision that was made.
I want to explain a little more about how the administration has dealt with that concern about America's homeland and what I think we can do about it. They have proposed--there is a lot of technical language here; let's see if I can do it without confusing everybody-- that they would eventually develop--they have this SM-3 missile defense system that will be the basis of the alternative to the Polish-Czech defense, and that will be good for Europe and the Middle East. But the administration knows it leaves America without that second line of defense to a missile attack. So they are proposing to build block IIA and Block IIB interceptors as part of this so-called SM-3, advanced developments of that system which, they argue, could protect the United States of America from a long-range missile fired from Iran.
The problem is the Block IIA and IIB of this SM-3 missile do not exist. They are on paper. General Cartwright acknowledged so much in testimony to us. The ground-based interceptor that was going to go into Poland exists. It has been manufactured. It was scheduled to go into testing this year. In the proposal the administration has made, they say the SM-3 Block IIA, the first one that could possibly defend the United States, will not be available until 2018, at the earliest. The Block IIB, even more sophisticated, will be available in 2020 at the earliest.
Let me try to explain through a quote what worries me about that. Earlier this year, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee, the then-commander of our European Command, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Bantz Craddock, stated this:
By 2015 Iran may also deploy an intercontinental ballistic
missile capable of reaching all of Europe and parts of the
United States.
I know that is not a hard prediction, but that is the range that most people in the intelligence community, the military community, give, that sometime in the middle of the next decade, maybe a little later, the Iranians will have a long-range ballistic missile that can hit the United States of America.
Look, they can do better than that and may surprise us. We have been surprised before by the ballistic missile capabilities of our adversaries. The North Korean Taepodong test of 1998 comes to mind, of course, an unfortunate instance in which the North Korean Government tested a long-range missile 7 days after our intelligence community concluded that North Korea was another 3 years away from having that capability.
One of the reasons the administration has given for this change to the SM-3 defense is that it provides a quicker, better defense for Europe and the Middle East to short- and medium-range missiles, and the administration concludes the Iranians are making more progress more quickly on those
two, short- and medium-range missiles, than we thought they would. If they are making progress on the short- and medium-range missiles more quickly than we thought they would, they might also make progress more quickly on the long-range missile that could hit the United States of America.
Here is what I am worried about. I understand these are not exact numbers. By 2015, according to General Craddock, Iran may have a long- range ballistic missile that could hit the United States of America. At the earliest the SM-3 Block IIA missile, to give some protection, second line of defense to that missile, will not be available until 2018 at the earliest. Remember, this is now a paper missile. It has not been built, let alone tested. You have 3 years there, and probably more, where there will be a ballistic missile defense gap in which Iran could fire at us and only have to get by the ground-based missile defense systems in Alaska and California.
I think the administration, as testimony went on, understood our concern about that. In fact, when the Secretary of Defense Gates and General Cartwright rolled out the administration's new architecture for missile defense, canceling the Polish-Czech program and going to the new system, one of the points General Cartwright emphasized was that the administration would continue to develop the two-stage ground-based interceptor, the one that was supposed to go in Poland. He continued:
Those tests are funded, and will continue, so we will have
two ways to address this threat.
The following week Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee and she also expressed a commitment to continue to develop this two-stage ground-based interceptor. Presumably the thought is it could be located at another site in Europe or perhaps somewhere on the east coast of the United States of America, to give that second line of defense to our entire country.
Secretary Flournoy said when they were discussing the canceling of the European missile defense program, Secretary Gates ``had to be convinced of a couple of things.'' Those are her words, namely that ``we could still''--I am quoting Secretary Flournoy--Secretary Gates wanted to know that:
we could still defend the United States homeland should an
Iranian ICBM threat develop earlier than what was predicted
[and] that we should have technical options should the
development of later Blocks . . . of SM-3 missile, either
fail or be delayed.
That is exactly what we have been talking about.
In response to these requirements, Secretary Gates told his staff-- again I quote Secretary Flournoy:
we are going to continue the development of the 2-stage
ground-based interceptor as a technological hedge--
against the failure to adequately develop these alternative long- range systems, the missile defense systems against an Iranian threat.
Here is the problem. Despite this administration's statements of support for continued development and testing of the two-stage ground- based interceptor, the Defense appropriations bill before us has reduced funding for that program by $151 million.
I gather the Department of Defense has already appealed this reduction, arguing that it would force the cancellation or postponement of a pair of two-stage GBI tests soon, and that losing this funding could render the entire ground-based mid-course defense system less effective.
Now comes the amendment Senator Sessions and I and our cosponsors have offered, which would restore the funding by allowing the Missile Defense Agency to access no less than $50 million and up to the original $151 million of funds provided in fiscal year 2009-2010 Defense Appropriations Act for a long-range missile defense system and use those funds to support the continued development and testing of the two-stage ground-based interceptor. The amendment would also fence funding for the two-stage program to protect it from being reprogrammed and require a report detailing specific options for how the two-stage GBI can be used to enhance the defense of the United States against the emerging threat of Iranian long-range missiles.
Bottom line, this acknowledges on my part the disappointment at the decision the administration has made. It doesn't try to turn it around, but says OK, under the new administration program we are going to do at least as good, maybe a little better, at protecting Europe and the Middle East, but we are going to do worse at protecting the United States of America from a long-range missile, which the Iranians particularly are working so hard to develop. So let's at least keep testing this missile we have got, the ground-based interceptor, as a hedge so we are ready in case these other alternatives don't work, to put it in the ground in Europe or perhaps in the east coast of the United States to give the American people the two lines of defense they deserve against an Iranian long-range missile, and thereby to close what will now be a ballistic missile defense gap for the United States of America that will otherwise develop in the middle of the next decade and go on, in my opinion, for at least 3 years.
Again, I thank Senator Sessions. It is always a pleasure to work with him. This is complicated stuff. But it is the heart of our national security in the next decade. I hope my colleagues will support our amendment.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I am pleased to say to my friend from Alabama that the leadership, the manager of the bill, Senator Inouye, has agreed, if we modify the amendment as we had agreed to modify it to say: Not less than $50 million, and up to the $151 million could be available for research, development, test, and evaluation of the two- stage ground-based interceptor missile, that the committee would accept our amendment by voice vote--if that is OK with my friend from Alabama.
I am glad to do that. But at the moment, I ask unanimous consent that we modify our amendment with the changes that I believe are at the desk at this time.
I thank the Chair and suggest the absence of a quorum.