Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, I would like to address for a few moments the bill that is now on the floor, H.R. 3108, dealing with pension funding for defined benefit…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I would like to address for a few moments the bill that is now on the floor, H.R. 3108, dealing with pension funding for defined benefit pension plans. The House passed this bill. In the House version of the bill, what it does is it mainly changes the interest rate assumptions that plans are required to use when figuring their actuarial liability for their pension plans and for their annuitants in their plans.
The House bill mainly addresses the situation that has arisen by virtue of the 30-year Government bond being done away with. A few years ago, the Treasury Department made the decision that it would no longer issue 30-year Treasury bonds and the interest rate for 30-year Treasury bonds had historically been what was used in calculating the liabilities for defined benefit pension plans. Now that there are fewer and fewer 30-year Government bonds in circulation, the interest rates for those bonds have gone down, and, of course, interest rates have been very low in general for the last couple of years.
So industries in sectors where defined benefit pension plans are common have come to Washington, asking for some relief in the way they calculate their unfunded liabilities, or their liabilities, and they have asked for the replacement of the 30-year Treasury bond with a benchmark that is, instead, made up of the yield of high-grade corporate bonds. By going to that different reference point, plans ultimately will have to put less money in their pension plans because they can assume a higher rate of return if they are using 30-year corporate debt or high-grade corporate debt as opposed to 30-year Treasury bonds.
In fact, right now companies in America, absent any legislation, would have to put about $170 billion into their defined benefit pension plans next year. If the interest rate relief alone in H.R. 3108 is passed, that will cut about 25 percent off the required payments that all companies with defined benefit pension plans will be required to make into their plans over the next 2 years. So the relief in this bill as it passed the House--and the only relief in the House bill is the interest rate relief--if that relief passes, it would cut about $40 billion per year off the amount that companies have to put into their defined benefit pension plans. Over 2 years, the life of the bill, it would cut $80 billion off of the required payments.
What has happened in the Senate is somewhat disappointing, to me. I could see the public policy rationale for changing the interest rate benchmark that companies use, now that we have done away with the 30- year Treasury bond. I can see the argument for coming up with a different reference. I can see the argument for changing the assumptions that would allow plans to put less money into their pension plans. But the Senate is going way beyond that. In addition to giving the interest rate relief that the House passed, the Senate now is on the verge of passing amendments that would provide special relief for airlines and steel companies.
The airlines and the steel companies would get further reductions in the amounts they have to pay into their pension plans. This is very troubling because airlines and steel companies, as we all know, tend to have the most woefully underfunded pensions of all industry in America. Obviously, they are asking for permission to dig their hole even deeper.
In addition, the Senate amendment that will be offered this week has a sweetheart provision for Greyhound Bus Company. I don't know why Greyhound Bus Company is singled out for this special treatment of all the companies in America, but it certainly must have some powerful friends here on Capitol Hill.
Also getting a sweetheart deal is CNF Trucking, which apparently gets some sort of relief in this bill and some limitation on liability that it might have to a former subsidiary that it spun off a couple of years ago.
So there are a couple of sweetheart deals, not just for some chosen industries, the airlines and steel companies, but also some rifle shots that would be put in here for two special companies, Greyhound and CNF Trucking.
In addition, and perhaps most discouraging, is that the Senate amendment will, in effect, go way beyond just the steel and the airline industries and allow all companies that have underfunded pension plans to go through a political process in applying for a waiver from their required contributions to their pension plans. All companies would be able to go to the Treasury Department and request a waiver.
If this provision becomes law, you can just imagine right before the election all the industrial companies in the Upper Midwest, in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Wisconsin, and so forth, all those industrial companies in States that are critical for the upcoming election, they will all be going to the administration, asking for this special waiver from the Treasury Department. They will be making political threats at the same time, that if the administration doesn't give them this relief, they may just support someone else for President. It sets a very bad precedent because now there is a waiver process. But it is an apolitical one, and one for which you have to apply with the Internal Revenue Service and also with the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
As I said, if it were merely adopting the interest rate relief, we would be granting a 25-percent reduction in the
required contribution of all companies in toto in America to their defined benefit pension plans. We are going way beyond that. In the Senate amendment, we are threatening to grant them an additional about $17 billion a year, at least in reductions in required amounts going into pension funds.
There is also a provision in the Senate amendment in the managers' package that will allow all multiemployer pension plans--those are union-run plans which span employers--from having to make their full contributions.
All of these reductions in required contributions into the pension plans wouldn't be so troublesome but for one fact: In allowing these companies to dig the hole deeper for themselves, it is more likely that they will ultimately default on their pension obligations and turn those obligations over to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to take advantage of the Government guarantee. It wouldn't be so offensive if it were freezing the Government guarantees. But we are not.
There is a no hold harmless provision in this legislation. There are no reforms of pension funding trying to get tough on the companies that have considerably underfunded their pension plans. We are just allowing them to skip required payments into their pension plans. We are allowing the government guarantees to stay in place.
What is more, we are allowing the companies with underfunded plans to continue sweetening the benefits for their workers and raising their own pension liabilities while those pension liabilities are all guaranteed by the Federal Government.
I know pension funding is something that perhaps makes the eyes of the press glaze over. Not many members of the public understand the importance of this. This is a very roundabout way of transferring liabilities to taxpayers. It is not easy for people to understand. But if I were to make an analogy that the average American could understand about what we are doing here, imagine that you have someone who is behind in their credit card payments. Imagine that you said to that person, you are behind in making your payments on the credit card. You are only making the minimum payment. You are trying to make a minimum payment due each month. You have this huge balance. It is going to take years and years to pay off this deficit of what you owe the credit card company or the bank. Imagine if this person were to have their minimum payments lowered. Imagine that when they are already just barely making the minimum payments, you say: OK, we will even lower your minimum payment.
We are doing that here. But in addition, we are going beyond that. We are telling the credit card holder while you are lowering your minimum payments and digging the hole deeper so that you are likely never to get out of debt, we are going to go out and allow you to continue spending and add more to your credit card. Can you imagine a credit card company telling anybody that? That wouldn't be a way to advise a distressed consumer to try to get out of debt.
We are doing that and more here today in the Senate. We are not only allowing these companies to quit making their required payments into their pension plans, but we are allowing them to continue spending. We are allowing them, specifically if they are 60-percent funded, to keep sweetening the pension benefits for their employees and digging the hole deeper. That would be not only allowing the credit card holder to keep spending but encouraging the credit card holder to go out while they are behind in the payments on this one credit card and get some more credit cards and run up balances on those credit cards.
Obviously, if we pass this legislation we are going to make it hopeless for some companies ever to recover and to fulfill the promises they have made to their pension participants.
Right now, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation--the Government corporation that guarantees pension benefits of people in defined pension plans--is in the worst financial condition of its entire history. It has at least a $11.2 billion deficit. Pension plans in America are now thought to be underfunded by at least $350 billion. This legislation would allow that collective underfunding in defined benefit pension plans in America to grow considerably.
The House was much more responsible. It only passed the change in interest rate assumptions. It passed the separate version of the bill that had the interest rate change, plus some relief for airlines. The Senate is poised to go much further. I am troubled by that. The administration has issued a threat to veto the legislation.
I refer to a letter. This is a Statement of Administration Policy that was issued on January 22. I ask unanimous consent that Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 3108 be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, a couple of days ago, Elaine Chao, Secretary of the Department of Labor; John Snow, Secretary of the Treasury; and Don Evans, the Secretary of the Department of Commerce, the three board members of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, wrote a letter to our majority leader, Bill Frist, which asks that the Senate not go beyond amending the interest rate changes that were passed by the House. They said they would oppose it and recommend that the President veto any legislation that would further exacerbate the systemic underfunding of defined benefit pension plans in America.
I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, I think the Washington Post editorial page had a very good editorial on this issue this morning. They dealt with the irresponsibility of allowing companies with underfunded pension plans to dig the hole deeper. They also talked about how it is troubling that in Washington there are always incentives for Members of the House and Senate to do what is wrong, to cater to the special interests--in this case, the airlines, the steel companies. This is a situation in which the airlines and the steel companies and their managers have conspired with their union members to come to Congress and allow dispensation which allows the companies to put less money into their pension plans. And no one in those companies cares because the pension plans are guaranteed by the taxpayers. So you have the labor unions and you have the managers coming here to Washington lobbying for this relief.
We have gone far beyond just the airline and steel companies. Apparently, in the Senate bill every company in America would be eligible to ask the Secretary of Treasury for a waiver from its pension contributions.
Allow me to read this editorial from this morning's Washington Post. It is called ``Pension Perniciousness.''
Monday, January 26, 2004, by the Washington Post:
Not for the first time, Congress has muscled up to an
important problem, taken a good long look at it and resolved
to make it worse. The problem is the vast hole in the
nation's corporate pension schemes, and the perverse rules
that helped create them. Congress's solution, championed in
the Senate by an alliance of Sens. Charles E. Grassley (R-
Iowa), Judd Gregg (R-N.H.), Max Baucus (D-Mont.) and Edward
M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), is to reward the hole-diggers with what
amounts to a $16 billion loan from taxpayers.
About one in five private-sector workers has a ``defined-
benefit'' pension, the sort in which an employer guarantees a
certain pension to its workers when they retire. To pay for
these future benefits, employers are supposed to put
sufficient money into a pension fund; the problem is they
often don't. The gap between money put aside and money needed
in the underfunded pension plans comes to an enormous $350
billion. When companies go bust, the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp., the government-backed entity that insures pensions,
gets saddled with plans that are in deficit. As a result, the
PBGC itself has a deficit of $11.2 billion, which taxpayers
may have to plug eventually. As more companies go bust, more
of the $350 billion problem out there in the private sector
will land on taxpayers' shoulders.
Why do companies run these pension deficits? Because
regulations perversely encourage them to do so. If a firm
gives workers a pay raise, it will have to pay for that
immediately; if it gives them an increase in their pension,
accounting rules allow it to defer the cost into the future.
This deferral is especially tempting for cash-strapped
companies--which often means ones with a strong chance of
going bust. Bethlehem Steel, for example, upped its pension
promises and declared bankruptcy three years later. Wobbly
companies that underfund their pensions would pay extra
insurance premiums if the insurer were a private company. But
the PBGC's rules do not allow it to price risk properly,
adding a further incentive for shaky companies to hitch a
free ride with the others.
There is, as Congress is demonstrating, no political
constituency for fixing this problem. Weak companies with
underfunded pensions lobby lawmakers for permission to
continue their imprudence; labor leaders from those same
firms lobby lawmakers in the same direction; nobody is on the
other side. In the deal currently being cooked up, a group of
hard-pressed companies led by the steel industry and the
airlines will be given a special break for two years; if any
of these firms goes bust in the meantime, the public will end
up shouldering the deficits, which is why the congressional
measure amounts to a taxpayer loan.
Yet taxpayer support for people in defined-benefit pension
plans is a perverse notion. Fully one in two private-sector
workers has no company pension plan whatever. Why should the
less fortunate bail out the lucky ones?
That was the editorial from this morning's Washington Post. It accurately summed up the imprudence of the bill that the Senate will be considering this week. Ideally, it would be great if the Senate did not pass such an irresponsible bill. Obviously, as the Washington Post points out, when you have labor leaders and CEOs of airlines and steel companies lobbying together, conspiring together to stick a liability of theirs off on the taxpayers, I fear they are probably going to win.
My hope, however, is that the House, which has been more responsible on this issue, and the White House, which is opposed to the vast expansion of underfunded liabilities that would be engendered by this legislation--my hope is that the White House and the House will prevail upon the conference committee to pass something more responsible than the legislation currently before the Senate.
One final point. The Washington Post editorial referred to this case of Bethlehem Steel and the editorial talked about how Bethlehem Steel was sweetening its pension benefits for the 3 years prior to its going into bankruptcy; then it just handed the pension plan and all its liabilities off on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and, by extension, the taxpayers.
That brings up another issue. Some people think the pension funding rules are too severe for companies in America and that we ask too much of companies in the ERISA law where we require them to fund their pension plans as well as possible. But it turns out that--I held a hearing on this issue over the summer and what I found was very troubling--the current rules are exceedingly lax. The law, ERISA, which was passed in 1974, requires defined benefit plans to be 90 percent funded. If they are not 90 percent funded, they have to make extra catchup payments. But that 90 percent funding level is referred to in ERISA as ``current liability.'' It turns out that the definition of current liability is not an actuarial definition. It is not the definition of how much would actually be owed to pay the benefits that have been promised. It turns out that the definition of current liability is actually a political definition.
To illustrate this, the Bethlehem Steel case probably is the best example of how woefully inadequate the current pension funding rules are. In its last filing with the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Bethlehem Steel claimed it was 84 percent funded on a current liability basis. That was Bethlehem Steel's last filing. Then they filed for bankruptcy and handed their pension plan over to the PBGC. It turns out that Bethlehem Steel's pension plan was not 84 percent funded; it was only 45 percent funded as a percentage of how much the PBGC actually had to pay, to pay the benefits that had been promised.
That example shows how the pension funding laws of this country are already woefully lax. We are allowing companies to make promises to employees that they have no hope of ever fulfilling, promises which risk that the taxpayers will ultimately have to pay
these pensions. This legislation the Senate is considering this week will make this lax funding of pensions in this country far more lax. It will do a lot of long-term damage.
I hope my colleagues in the Senate will think carefully about this notwithstanding the political pressures they will have from airline executives and from labor union leaders.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.