Floor Statements

Mr. President, I rise today in support of a bill that will facilitate the sale of U.S. agricultural products abroad. I am delighted to join colleagues from both sides of the aisle in cosponsoring this bill, which will help remove potential impediments to the shipment of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba.

Cuba's geographic proximity to the U.S makes it an important market for U.S. exporters. This bill will maintain significant economic benefits not only for the farmers in my home State of Indiana, but for farmers throughout the country. Agricultural trade with Cuba is currently allowed under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, TSREEA. This legislation was enacted in the 106th Congress to provide additional markets for U.S. agricultural products and support the American farmer. I have long been an advocate of exercising care when imposing unilateral economic sanctions. Numerous studies have shown that unilateral sanctions rarely succeed and often harm the United States more than the target country. Sanctions can jeopardize billions of dollars in U.S. export earnings and hundreds of thousands of American jobs. They frequently weaken our international competitiveness by yielding to other countries those markets and opportunities that we abandon.

There have been indications that TSREEA will be interpreted in a way that may serve to impede agricultural exports to Cuba, which is contrary to the original intent of the bill. This would be a departure from current policy and undermine the benefits for U.S. farmers which the act has achieved. Groups such as the American Farm Bureau have indicated that the opening up of Cuba as a market has provided significant benefit to their members.

Without the important changes that this bill will make, the U.S. economy could be impacted, not only in agricultural exports, but also in related economic output. To prevent this occurrence and to help bolster the agricultural export industry in the U.S., I ask you to join me and the other co-sponsors in support of this important legislation.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Free Flow of Information Act of 2005. This bill was originally introduced in the House of Representatives by my friend and colleague, Congressman Mike Pence. I applaud the initiative by my colleague to address this important issue and I am pleased to have this opportunity to be the Senate sponsor.

Last year, Congress passed legislation I proposed that directed the State Department to increase and add greater focus to international initiatives to support the development of free, fair, legally protected and sustainable media in developing countries.

I am pleased to announce that the State Department and the National Endowment for Democracy have embraced this initiative and are now proceeding with implementing this initiative.

Our Founders understood that free press is a cornerstone of democracy. To embrace and implement President Bush's bold and visionary call for the spread of democracy and freedom in the world, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that foreign assistance programs focus on the development of all the institutions that help democracies work and protect basic human rights.

While we focus on those needs abroad, we cannot let those basic freedoms erode at home. The Constitution makes very clear that freedom of the press should not be infringed. A cornerstone of our society is the open market of information which can be shared through ever expanding mediums. The media serves as a conduit of information between our governments and communities across the country.

It is important that we ensure reporters certain rights and abilities to seek sources and report appropriate information without fear of intimidation or imprisonment. This includes the right to refuse to reveal confidential sources. Without such protection, many whistleblowers will refuse to step forward and reporters will be disinclined to provide our constituents with the information that they have a right to know. Promises of confidentiality are essential to the flow of information the public needs about its government.

The Free Flow of Information Act closely follows existing Department of Justice guidelines for issuing subpoenas to members of the news media. These guidelines were adopted in 1973 and have been in continuous operation for more than 30 years. The legislation codifies the conditions that must be met by the government to compel the identity of confidential sources.

I am hopeful that my colleagues will give careful consideration to the merits of this legislation. It provides an appropriate approach and careful balance to protect our freedom of information while still enabling legitimate law enforcement access to information.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Free Flow of Information Act of 2005. This bill was originally introduced in the House of Representatives by my friend and colleague, Congressman Mike Pence. I applaud the initiative by my colleague to address this important issue and I am pleased to have this opportunity to be the Senate sponsor.

Last year, Congress passed legislation I proposed that directed the State Department to increase and add greater focus to international initiatives to support the development of free, fair, legally protected and sustainable media in developing countries.

I am pleased to announce that the State Department and the National Endowment for Democracy have embraced this initiative and are now proceeding with implementing this initiative.

Our Founders understood that free press is a cornerstone of democracy. To embrace and implement President Bush's bold and visionary call for the spread of democracy and freedom in the world, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that foreign assistance programs focus on the development of all the institutions that help democracies work and protect basic human rights.

While we focus on those needs abroad, we cannot let those basic freedoms erode at home. The Constitution makes very clear that freedom of the press should not be infringed. A cornerstone of our society is the open market of information which can be shared through ever expanding mediums. The media serves as a conduit of information between our governments and communities across the country.

It is important that we ensure reporters certain rights and abilities to seek sources and report appropriate information without fear of intimidation or imprisonment. This includes the right to refuse to reveal confidential sources. Without such protection, many whistleblowers will refuse to step forward and reporters will be disinclined to provide our constituents with the information that they have a right to know. Promises of confidentiality are essential to the flow of information the public needs about its government.

The Free Flow of Information Act closely follows existing Department of Justice guidelines for issuing subpoenas to members of the news media. These guidelines were adopted in 1973 and have been in continuous operation for more than 30 years. The legislation codifies the conditions that must be met by the government to compel the identity of confidential sources.

I am hopeful that my colleagues will give careful consideration to the merits of this legislation. It provides an appropriate approach and careful balance to protect our freedom of information while still enabling legitimate law enforcement access to information.

Mr. President, I rise to again introduce a bill that will strengthen U.S. nonproliferation efforts. It is supported by the Administration and several of my colleagues. This bill represents the fourth installment of Nunn-Lugar legislation that I have offered since 1991.

In that year, Sam Nunn and I authored the Nunn-Lugar Act, which established the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. That program has provided U.S. funding and expertise to help the former Soviet Union safeguard and dismantle their enormous stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, means of delivery and related materials. In 1997, Senator Nunn and I were joined by Senator Domenici in introducing the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, which expanded Nunn-Lugar authorities in the former Soviet Union and provided WMD expertise to first responders in American cities. In 2003, Congress adopted the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which authorized the Nunn-Lugar program to operate outside the former Soviet Union to address proliferation threats. The bill that I am introducing today would strengthen the Nunn-Lugar program and provide it with greater flexibility to address emerging threats.

To date, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated or destroyed: 6,564 nuclear warheads; 568 ICBMs; 477 ICBM silos; 17 ICBM mobile missile launchers; 142 bombers; 761 nuclear air-to-surface missiles; 420 submarine missile launchers; 543 submarine launched missiles; 28 nuclear submarines; and 194 nuclear test tunnels.

The Nunn-Lugar program also facilitated the removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. After the fall of the Soviet Union, these three nations emerged as the third, fourth, and eighth largest nuclear powers in the world. Today, all three are nuclear weapons free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn- Lugar program. In addition, Nunn-Lugar is the primary tool through which the United States is working with Russian authorities to identify, safeguard and destroy Russia's massive chemical and biological warfare capacity.

These successes were never a foregone conclusion. Today, even after more than 12 years, creativity and constant vigilance are required to ensure that the Nunn-Lugar program is not encumbered by bureaucratic obstacles or undercut by political disagreements.

During Secretary Rice's confirmation hearing with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 18, 2005, I asked Dr. Rice if she and the Administration supported this legislation, to which she responded ``Yes we do.'' Secretary Rice and President Bush have long argued that there needs to be maximum flexibility granted to the Administration to execute a global, focused and timely effort to fight proliferation. In view of the Administration's strong support for this bill, I look forward to working with the Armed Services Committee to enact it.

I have devoted much time and effort to overseeing and accelerating the Nunn-Lugar program. Uncounted individuals of great dedication serving on the ground in the former Soviet Union and in our government have made this program work. Nevertheless, from the beginning, we have encountered resistance to the Nunn-Lugar concept in both the United States and Russia. In our own country, opposition often has been motivated by false perceptions that Nunn-Lugar money is foreign assistance or by beliefs that Defense Department funds should only be spent on troops, weapons, or other war-fighting capabilities. Until recently, we also faced a general disinterest in non-proliferation that made gaining support for Nunn-Lugar funding and activities an annual struggle.

The attacks of September 11 changed the political discourse on this subject. We have turned a corner--the public, the media, and political candidates are paying more attention now. In a remarkable moment in the first presidential debate last year, both President Bush and his opponent agreed that the number one national security threat facing the United States was the prospect that weapons of mass destruction would fall into the hands of terrorists.

While the Administration has noted its support for this bill, the 9/ 11 Commission also weighed in last year with another important endorsement of the Nunn-Lugar program, saying that ``Preventing the proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction] warrants a maximum effort--by strengthening counter-proliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.'' The Report went on to say that ``Nunn-Lugar . . . is now in need of expansion, improvement and resources.''

My bill would underscore the bipartisan consensus on Nunn-Lugar by streamlining and accelerating Nunn-Lugar implementation. It would grant more flexibility to the President and the Secretary of Defense to undertake proliferation projects outside the former Soviet Union. It also would eliminate Congressionally-imposed conditions on Nunn-Lugar assistance that in the past have forced the suspension of time- sensitive nonproliferation projects. The purpose of the bill is to reduce bureaucratic red tape and friction within our government that hinder effective responses to nonproliferation opportunities and emergencies.

For example, recently Albania appealed for help in destroying 16 tons of chemical agent left over from the Cold War. Last August, I visited this remote storage facility. Nunn-Lugar officials are working closely with Albanian leaders to destroy this dangerous stockpile. But this experience also is illustrative of the need to reduce bureaucratic delays. The package of documents related to the mission took some 11 weeks to be finalized and readied for President Bush. From beginning to end, the bureaucratic process to authorize dismantlement of chemical weapons in Albania took more than three months. Fortunately, the situation in Albania was not a crisis, but we may not be able to afford these timelines in future nonproliferation emergencies.

As I said when I introduced this legislation during our November session last year, I wanted to have the benefit of the Administration's views and my colleagues' input. Since then, I am pleased that Senators Domenici, Hagel, Reed, Biden, Levin, Collins, McCain and Obama have all signed on as co-sponsors. The Administration has now stated that they support this bill. I look forward to working in Congress to enact it.

Mr. President, I rise to again introduce a bill that will strengthen U.S. nonproliferation efforts. It is supported by the Administration and several of my colleagues. This bill represents the fourth installment of Nunn-Lugar legislation that I have offered since 1991.

In that year, Sam Nunn and I authored the Nunn-Lugar Act, which established the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. That program has provided U.S. funding and expertise to help the former Soviet Union safeguard and dismantle their enormous stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, means of delivery and related materials. In 1997, Senator Nunn and I were joined by Senator Domenici in introducing the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, which expanded Nunn-Lugar authorities in the former Soviet Union and provided WMD expertise to first responders in American cities. In 2003, Congress adopted the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which authorized the Nunn-Lugar program to operate outside the former Soviet Union to address proliferation threats. The bill that I am introducing today would strengthen the Nunn-Lugar program and provide it with greater flexibility to address emerging threats.

To date, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated or destroyed: 6,564 nuclear warheads; 568 ICBMs; 477 ICBM silos; 17 ICBM mobile missile launchers; 142 bombers; 761 nuclear air-to-surface missiles; 420 submarine missile launchers; 543 submarine launched missiles; 28 nuclear submarines; and 194 nuclear test tunnels.

The Nunn-Lugar program also facilitated the removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. After the fall of the Soviet Union, these three nations emerged as the third, fourth, and eighth largest nuclear powers in the world. Today, all three are nuclear weapons free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn- Lugar program. In addition, Nunn-Lugar is the primary tool through which the United States is working with Russian authorities to identify, safeguard and destroy Russia's massive chemical and biological warfare capacity.

These successes were never a foregone conclusion. Today, even after more than 12 years, creativity and constant vigilance are required to ensure that the Nunn-Lugar program is not encumbered by bureaucratic obstacles or undercut by political disagreements.

During Secretary Rice's confirmation hearing with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 18, 2005, I asked Dr. Rice if she and the Administration supported this legislation, to which she responded ``Yes we do.'' Secretary Rice and President Bush have long argued that there needs to be maximum flexibility granted to the Administration to execute a global, focused and timely effort to fight proliferation. In view of the Administration's strong support for this bill, I look forward to working with the Armed Services Committee to enact it.

I have devoted much time and effort to overseeing and accelerating the Nunn-Lugar program. Uncounted individuals of great dedication serving on the ground in the former Soviet Union and in our government have made this program work. Nevertheless, from the beginning, we have encountered resistance to the Nunn-Lugar concept in both the United States and Russia. In our own country, opposition often has been motivated by false perceptions that Nunn-Lugar money is foreign assistance or by beliefs that Defense Department funds should only be spent on troops, weapons, or other war-fighting capabilities. Until recently, we also faced a general disinterest in non-proliferation that made gaining support for Nunn-Lugar funding and activities an annual struggle.

The attacks of September 11 changed the political discourse on this subject. We have turned a corner--the public, the media, and political candidates are paying more attention now. In a remarkable moment in the first presidential debate last year, both President Bush and his opponent agreed that the number one national security threat facing the United States was the prospect that weapons of mass destruction would fall into the hands of terrorists.

While the Administration has noted its support for this bill, the 9/ 11 Commission also weighed in last year with another important endorsement of the Nunn-Lugar program, saying that ``Preventing the proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction] warrants a maximum effort--by strengthening counter-proliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.'' The Report went on to say that ``Nunn-Lugar . . . is now in need of expansion, improvement and resources.''

My bill would underscore the bipartisan consensus on Nunn-Lugar by streamlining and accelerating Nunn-Lugar implementation. It would grant more flexibility to the President and the Secretary of Defense to undertake proliferation projects outside the former Soviet Union. It also would eliminate Congressionally-imposed conditions on Nunn-Lugar assistance that in the past have forced the suspension of time- sensitive nonproliferation projects. The purpose of the bill is to reduce bureaucratic red tape and friction within our government that hinder effective responses to nonproliferation opportunities and emergencies.

For example, recently Albania appealed for help in destroying 16 tons of chemical agent left over from the Cold War. Last August, I visited this remote storage facility. Nunn-Lugar officials are working closely with Albanian leaders to destroy this dangerous stockpile. But this experience also is illustrative of the need to reduce bureaucratic delays. The package of documents related to the mission took some 11 weeks to be finalized and readied for President Bush. From beginning to end, the bureaucratic process to authorize dismantlement of chemical weapons in Albania took more than three months. Fortunately, the situation in Albania was not a crisis, but we may not be able to afford these timelines in future nonproliferation emergencies.

As I said when I introduced this legislation during our November session last year, I wanted to have the benefit of the Administration's views and my colleagues' input. Since then, I am pleased that Senators Domenici, Hagel, Reed, Biden, Levin, Collins, McCain and Obama have all signed on as co-sponsors. The Administration has now stated that they support this bill. I look forward to working in Congress to enact it.

Mr. President, today I offer a resolution commemorating the life of the late Zurab Zhvania, former Prime Minister of the Republic of Georgia.

At the request of President Bush, I was honored to lead a delegation last weekend to represent the United States at Prime Minister Zhvania's funeral. Also representing the United States was Paul Applegarth, Millennium Challenge Corporation CEO; and Lorne Craner, President of the International Republican Institute.

Prime Minister Zhvania was a prominent leader in Georgia's Rose Revolution. He was a true reformer, lauded for his intellectual acuity, and a friend of America. I was fortunate to meet with Zhvania last December. We had an extensive discussion about Georgia's promising future and vigorous agenda to transform it into a regional model of political and economic progress.

The U.S.-Georgia relationship is strong. I am grateful to Georgia's recent decision to increase its troop level in Iraq. I am also grateful for its partnership in the War on Terror, including its troop commitment in Afghanistan and to the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. I am hopeful that our strategic relationship with Georgia will continue to grow as we face the new threats of the 21st century.

The death of Prime Minister Zhvania is a loss for Georgia, for the United States, and for the community of democratic nations. I ask my colleagues for their support of this resolution.

Mr. President, I rise to submit a resolution expressing the Sense of the Senate on promoting initiatives to develop an HIV vaccine.

On June 6, 2004, I introduced Senate Resolution 398 urging the President to promote initiatives to develop an HIV vaccine. While I am encouraged by the progress that has taken place in the months since I submitted that resolution, much remains to be done to develop an effective HIV vaccine. Because of the gravity and urgency of this issue, I am submitting my resolution.

The HIV/AIDS pandemic is unlike any disease in history and has profound implications for political stability, development, and human welfare. The sheer magnitude of the crisis is overwhelming. An estimated 40,000,000 people around the world live with HIV or AIDS, and nearly 8,500 people die every day from AIDS. Last year alone, more than 3 million people died from AIDS. Every 14 seconds, a child loses a parent to AIDS. An estimated 14,000,000 children have lost one or both parents to AIDS, and this number is expected to

increase to 25 million by 2010. According to recent projections from the World Health Organization and the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, UNAIDS, if the pandemic spreads at its current rate, there will be 45 million new infections by 2010 and nearly 70 million deaths by 2020. Sub-Saharan Africa has been hardest hit by the disease, with more than 75 percent of the people infected with HIV living in the region.

The U.S. is leading global efforts to combat the pandemic through its $15 billion Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and its commitment to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. But the human and economic toll of the HIV pandemic demands that these activities be complemented by accelerated efforts to develop an HIV vaccine. An HIV vaccine would prevent new HIV and AIDS cases, which could save millions of lives and dramatically reduce the negative social and economic consequences of the disease. Yet, HIV vaccine development is still not prominent on national or international public health agendas.

Developing an HIV vaccine is particularly challenging because HIV is one of the most complicated viruses ever identified. In addition, many private sector biotechnology companies have not invested money and expertise in the search for an HIV vaccine. Developing an HIV vaccine, therefore, is unlikely to occur without a well-coordinated and focused global research effort.

The Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise is mobilizing such an effort. The Enterprise is an alliance of the world's leading scientists and independent organizations around the world committed to accelerating the development of a preventive vaccine for HIV/AIDS. The Enterprise, like the Human Genome Project, seeks to promote a new level of coordination and information-sharing to address a complex scientific problem. In addition, the HIV Vaccine Enterprise is intended to accelerate progress by promoting international public-private collaboration.

The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, IAVI, has been instrumental in laying the groundwork for the Enterprise. The IAVI is an international organization that collaborates with developing countries, governments, and international agencies dedicated to accelerating the development of a vaccine to halt the AIDS epidemic. The IAVI, however, cannot accomplish this task alone. Here in the United States, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation have joined forces to help address the financial problems faced by small biotechnology companies. They founded BIO Ventures for Global Health to help small biotechnology companies address the problems they confront in developing new medical products for poor countries. The wider application of this model would greatly improve the development of vaccines and other medicines aimed at improving health in the developing world.

Under President Bush's leadership, the Members of the Group of Eight Industrialized Nations, G-8, during their meeting at Sea Island last June, endorsed the Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise. At the meeting, President Bush announced plans to establish a second HIV Vaccine Research and Development Center in the United States, in addition to the one already operating at the U.S. National Institutes of Health. Recently, the President announced funding for that second center, the Center for HIV/AIDS Vaccine Immunology, CHAVI, which will become a key component of the Enterprise.

I commend the President's leadership on this critically important issue. The G-8's endorsement of the Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise is a big step forward in the development of an HIV vaccine. My resolution acknowledges the President's and the G-8's actions towards this goal and urges them to continue to cooperate with other countries, particularly those hit hardest by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, to achieve this important objective.

Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Sanctions Policy Reform Act.

The fundamental purpose of my bill is to promote good governance through thoughtful deliberation on those proposals involving unilateral economic sanctions directed against other countries. My bill lays out a set of guidelines and requirements for a careful and deliberative process in both branches of government when considering new unilateral sanctions. It does not preclude the use of economic sanctions nor does it change those sanctions already in force. It is based on the principle that if we improve the quality of our policy process and public discourse, we can improve the quality of the policy itself.

Numerous studies have shown that unilateral sanctions rarely succeed and often harm the United States more than the target country. Sanctions can jeopardize billions of dollars in U.S. export earnings and hundreds of thousands of American jobs. They frequently weaken our international competitiveness by yielding to other countries those markets and opportunities that we abandon. They also can undermine our ability to provide humanitarian assistance abroad.

Unilateral sanctions often appear to be cost-free, but they have many unintended victims--the poor in the target countries, American companies, American labor, American consumers and, quite frankly, American foreign policy. Sanctions can weaken our international competitiveness, lower our global market share, abandon our established market to others and jeopardize billions in export earnings--the key to our economic growth. They may also impair our ability to provide humanitarian assistance. They sometimes anger our friends and call our international leadership into question. In many cases, unilateral sanctions are well-intentioned, but impotent, serving only to create the illusion of U.S. action. In the worst cases, unilateral sanctions are actually undermining our own interests in the world.

Unilateral sanctions do have a place in our foreign policy. There will always be situations in which the actions of other countries are so egregious or so threatening to the United States that some response by the United States, short of the use of military force, is needed and justified. In these instances, sanctions can be helpful in getting the attention of another country, in showing U.S. determination to change behaviors we find objectionable, or in stimulating a search for creative solutions to difficult foreign policy problems.

But decisions to impose them must be fully considered and debated. Too frequently, this does not happen. Unilateral sanctions are often the result of a knee-jerk impulse to take action, combined with a timid desire to avoid the risks and commitments involved in more potent foreign policy steps that have greater potential to protect American interests. We must avoid putting U.S. national security in a straight- jacket, and we must have a clear idea of the consequences of sanctions on our own security and prosperity before we enact them.

To this end, I am offering this bill to reform the U.S. sanctions decision-making process. The bill will establish procedural guidelines and informational requirements that must be met prior to the imposition of unilateral economic sanctions. For example, before imposing unilateral sanctions, Congress would be required to consider findings by executive branch officials that evaluate the impact of the proposed sanctions on American agriculture, energy requirements, and capital markets. The bill mandates that we be better informed about the prospects that our sanctions will succeed, about the economic costs to the United States, and about the sanctions' impact on other American objectives.

In addition, this sanctions policy reform bill provides for more active consultation between the Congress and the President and for Presidential waiver authority if the President determines it is in our national security interests. It also establishes an executive branch Sanctions Review Committee, which will be tasked with evaluating the effect of any proposed sanctions and providing appropriate recommendations to the President prior to the imposition of such sanctions.

The bill would have no effect on existing sanctions. It would apply only to new sanctions that are enacted after this bill became law. It also would apply only to sanctions that are unilateral and that are intended to achieve foreign policy goals. As such, it excludes trade remedies or trade sanctions imposed because of market access restrictions, unfair trade practices, or violations of U.S. commercial or trade laws.

Let me suggest a number of fundamental principles that I believe should

shape our approach to unilateral economic sanctions: unilateral economic sanctions should not be the policy of first resort (to the extent possible, other means of persuasion ought to be exhausted first); if harm is to be done or is intended, we must follow the cardinal principle that we plan to harm our adversary more than we harm ourselves; when possible, multilateral economic sanctions and international cooperation are preferable to unilateral sanctions and are more likely to succeed, even though they may be more difficult to obtain; we ought to avoid double standards and be as consistent as possible in the application of our sanctions policy; to the extent possible, we ought to avoid disproportionate harm to the civilian population (we should avoid the use of food as a weapon of foreign policy and we should permit humanitarian assistance programs to function); our foreign policy goals ought to be clear, specific and achievable within a reasonable period of time; we ought to keep to a minimum the adverse affects of our sanctions on our friends and allies; we should keep in mind that unilateral sanctions can cause adverse consequences that may be more problematic than the actions that prompted the sanctions--a regime collapse, a humanitarian disaster, a mass exodus of people, or more repression and isolation in the target country, for example; we should explore options for solving problems through dialogue, public diplomacy, and positive inducements or rewards; the President of the United States should always have options that include both sticks and carrots that can be adjusted according to circumstance and nuance (the Congress should be vigilant by ensuring that his options are consistent with Congressional intent and the law); and in those cases where we do impose sanctions unilaterally, our actions must be part of a coherent and coordinated foreign policy that is coupled with diplomacy and consistent with our international obligations and objectives.

An unexamined reliance on unilateral sanctions may be appropriate for a third-rate power whose foreign policy interests lie primarily in satisfying domestic constituencies or cultivating a self-righteous posture. But the United States is the world's only superpower. Our own prosperity and security, as well as the future of the world, depend on a vigorous and effective assertion of our international interests.

The United States should never abandon its leadership role in the world, nor forsake the basic values we cherish. We must ask, however, whether we are always able to change the actions of other countries whose behavior we find disagreeable or threatening. If we are able to influence those actions, we need to ponder how best to proceed. In my judgment, unilateral economic sanctions will not always be the best answer. But, if they are the answer, they should be structured so that they do as little harm as possible to our global interests. By improving upon our procedures and the quality and timeliness of our information when considering new sanctions, I believe U.S. foreign policy will be more effective.

Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Sanctions Policy Reform Act.

The fundamental purpose of my bill is to promote good governance through thoughtful deliberation on those proposals involving unilateral economic sanctions directed against other countries. My bill lays out a set of guidelines and requirements for a careful and deliberative process in both branches of government when considering new unilateral sanctions. It does not preclude the use of economic sanctions nor does it change those sanctions already in force. It is based on the principle that if we improve the quality of our policy process and public discourse, we can improve the quality of the policy itself.

Numerous studies have shown that unilateral sanctions rarely succeed and often harm the United States more than the target country. Sanctions can jeopardize billions of dollars in U.S. export earnings and hundreds of thousands of American jobs. They frequently weaken our international competitiveness by yielding to other countries those markets and opportunities that we abandon. They also can undermine our ability to provide humanitarian assistance abroad.

Unilateral sanctions often appear to be cost-free, but they have many unintended victims--the poor in the target countries, American companies, American labor, American consumers and, quite frankly, American foreign policy. Sanctions can weaken our international competitiveness, lower our global market share, abandon our established market to others and jeopardize billions in export earnings--the key to our economic growth. They may also impair our ability to provide humanitarian assistance. They sometimes anger our friends and call our international leadership into question. In many cases, unilateral sanctions are well-intentioned, but impotent, serving only to create the illusion of U.S. action. In the worst cases, unilateral sanctions are actually undermining our own interests in the world.

Unilateral sanctions do have a place in our foreign policy. There will always be situations in which the actions of other countries are so egregious or so threatening to the United States that some response by the United States, short of the use of military force, is needed and justified. In these instances, sanctions can be helpful in getting the attention of another country, in showing U.S. determination to change behaviors we find objectionable, or in stimulating a search for creative solutions to difficult foreign policy problems.

But decisions to impose them must be fully considered and debated. Too frequently, this does not happen. Unilateral sanctions are often the result of a knee-jerk impulse to take action, combined with a timid desire to avoid the risks and commitments involved in more potent foreign policy steps that have greater potential to protect American interests. We must avoid putting U.S. national security in a straight- jacket, and we must have a clear idea of the consequences of sanctions on our own security and prosperity before we enact them.

To this end, I am offering this bill to reform the U.S. sanctions decision-making process. The bill will establish procedural guidelines and informational requirements that must be met prior to the imposition of unilateral economic sanctions. For example, before imposing unilateral sanctions, Congress would be required to consider findings by executive branch officials that evaluate the impact of the proposed sanctions on American agriculture, energy requirements, and capital markets. The bill mandates that we be better informed about the prospects that our sanctions will succeed, about the economic costs to the United States, and about the sanctions' impact on other American objectives.

In addition, this sanctions policy reform bill provides for more active consultation between the Congress and the President and for Presidential waiver authority if the President determines it is in our national security interests. It also establishes an executive branch Sanctions Review Committee, which will be tasked with evaluating the effect of any proposed sanctions and providing appropriate recommendations to the President prior to the imposition of such sanctions.

The bill would have no effect on existing sanctions. It would apply only to new sanctions that are enacted after this bill became law. It also would apply only to sanctions that are unilateral and that are intended to achieve foreign policy goals. As such, it excludes trade remedies or trade sanctions imposed because of market access restrictions, unfair trade practices, or violations of U.S. commercial or trade laws.

Let me suggest a number of fundamental principles that I believe should

shape our approach to unilateral economic sanctions: unilateral economic sanctions should not be the policy of first resort (to the extent possible, other means of persuasion ought to be exhausted first); if harm is to be done or is intended, we must follow the cardinal principle that we plan to harm our adversary more than we harm ourselves; when possible, multilateral economic sanctions and international cooperation are preferable to unilateral sanctions and are more likely to succeed, even though they may be more difficult to obtain; we ought to avoid double standards and be as consistent as possible in the application of our sanctions policy; to the extent possible, we ought to avoid disproportionate harm to the civilian population (we should avoid the use of food as a weapon of foreign policy and we should permit humanitarian assistance programs to function); our foreign policy goals ought to be clear, specific and achievable within a reasonable period of time; we ought to keep to a minimum the adverse affects of our sanctions on our friends and allies; we should keep in mind that unilateral sanctions can cause adverse consequences that may be more problematic than the actions that prompted the sanctions--a regime collapse, a humanitarian disaster, a mass exodus of people, or more repression and isolation in the target country, for example; we should explore options for solving problems through dialogue, public diplomacy, and positive inducements or rewards; the President of the United States should always have options that include both sticks and carrots that can be adjusted according to circumstance and nuance (the Congress should be vigilant by ensuring that his options are consistent with Congressional intent and the law); and in those cases where we do impose sanctions unilaterally, our actions must be part of a coherent and coordinated foreign policy that is coupled with diplomacy and consistent with our international obligations and objectives.

An unexamined reliance on unilateral sanctions may be appropriate for a third-rate power whose foreign policy interests lie primarily in satisfying domestic constituencies or cultivating a self-righteous posture. But the United States is the world's only superpower. Our own prosperity and security, as well as the future of the world, depend on a vigorous and effective assertion of our international interests.

The United States should never abandon its leadership role in the world, nor forsake the basic values we cherish. We must ask, however, whether we are always able to change the actions of other countries whose behavior we find disagreeable or threatening. If we are able to influence those actions, we need to ponder how best to proceed. In my judgment, unilateral economic sanctions will not always be the best answer. But, if they are the answer, they should be structured so that they do as little harm as possible to our global interests. By improving upon our procedures and the quality and timeliness of our information when considering new sanctions, I believe U.S. foreign policy will be more effective.

Mr. President, I am re-introducing today a bill that was on the legislative calendar of the 108th Congress when it adjourned in December. The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act is intended to build operational readiness in the civilian agencies to improve our nation's capacity to carry out post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions.

Until very recently, the concept of ``nation building'' was considered to be pejorative by many Members of Congress and government officials. The foreign policy orthodoxy of both parties was skeptical of missions that entailed long-term peacekeeping or stabilization commitments. If military force was necessary, most policymakers believed it should be used only for relatively brief periods followed by rapid withdrawal.

But experience has taught us that this approach rarely can be accommodated if we are serious about protecting our own security in an age of terrorism. We have seen how terrorists can exploit nations afflicted by lawlessness and desperate circumstances. They seek out such places to establish training camps, recruit new members, and tap into a global black market in weapons technology. If we are to deny sanctuaries to terrorists, we must be involved in post-conflict stabilization.

With this in mind, the Foreign Relations Committee took up the issue of how best to organize and prepare for post-conflict missions. Well over a year ago, we held our first bipartisan roundtable that brought together some of the best minds from inside and outside of government to consider this issue. From this process, we developed the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004. I introduced this legislation with Senators Biden and Hagel, and the Committee passed it unanimously. The purpose of our bill is to establish a more robust civilian capability to respond quickly and effectively to post-conflict situations or other complex emergencies. The bill puts the State Department at the center of the civilian reconstruction and stabilization effort, while coordination between State and Defense would continue at the NSC level.

The Defense Science Board (DSB), which recently recommended a similar strengthening of stabilization and reconstruction capacity in the Defense Department, endorsed our legislation. On January 26, I introduced S. 192, new legislation that took the DSB recommendations and provided the executive branch the necessary authorities to carry them out. It calls upon the Secretary of Defense to take immediate action to strengthen the role and capabilities of the Department of Defense for carrying out stabilization and reconstruction activities as well as to support the development of core competencies in other departments and agencies, principally the Department of State. The bill has been referred to the Senate Armed Service Committee for that Committee's consideration.

While recognizing the critical challenges that our military has undertaken with skill and courage in both Afghanistan and Iraq, we must acknowledge that certain non-security missions will be better served in the future by a more organized civilian response. Our post-conflict efforts frequently have had a higher than necessary military profile. This is not the result of a Pentagon power grab or institutional fights. Rather, the military has led post-conflict operations primarily because it is the only agency capable of mobilizing sufficient personnel and resources for these tasks. As a consequence, military resources have been stretched and deployments of military personnel have been extended beyond expectations. If we can improve the capabilities of the civilian agencies, they can take over many of the non-security missions that have burdened the military.

In re-introducing the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act'' in the 109th Congress, I am well aware of the impact it has already had on both the debate on this issue and developments to date. In fact, some initiatives contained in the legislation have moved forward without its having been enacted. My Senate colleagues on the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee agreed with the need to provide an emergency conflict response fund for stabilization and reconstruction crises. And the Commerce, Justice, State appropriators in both the Senate and the House agreed with the need to establish a new office at the State Department to take the lead in organizing our civilian efforts. Indeed, an Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization has now been organized and a highly capable coordinator named. At her confirmation hearings, Dr. Rice demonstrated detailed knowledge of the Office and its work. I am confidant that she has already embraced the Department's role as a core mission and will work to support the Office with appropriate funding and the kind of Department-wide backing and support from management that it will need to do its job.

So why continue to pursue the legislation? It is still important to seek enactment because the legislation provides a permanent basis in law for the established office as well as new authorities that the Department will need to be successful.

The Bush Administration's action on this issue demonstrates its ability to recalibrate policy and organization to address a changing world. We know that the President will continue to provide leadership in organizing the U.S. government for this mission. As demonstrated by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee vote of 19-0, and by actions taken by the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary and the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, there is significant support in the Congress for his work and for the foresight he is already demonstrating.

The new Office, headed by Carlos Pascual, is doing a government-wide inventory of the civilian assets that might be available for stabilization and reconstruction tasks. It is also pursuing an idea proposed in our bill of a Readiness Reserve to enable rapid mobilization of post-conflict stabilization personnel. It will work closely with the Secretary to assist in the coordination of policy, the preparation and management of response, and in developing cooperative arrangements with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector organizations.

I am hopeful that the Office also will develop the concept of a 250- person active duty Response Readiness Corps that is contained in the legislation. In Army terms, that is less than a small battalion of well-trained people--a modest but vigorous force-multiplier that would greatly improve our nation's stabilization capacity. This Corps would be composed of State Department and USAID employees who have the experience and technical skills to manage stabilization and reconstruction tasks in a hostile environment.

Secretary Rice has been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of enhancing standing civilian capacity to respond to post conflict situations. In answer to one of my questions during the confirmation process, she said: ``Creating a strong U.S. Government stabilization and reconstruction capacity is an Administration national security priority.''

She asserted that ``experience has shown that we must have the capacity to manage 2 to 3 stabilization and reconstruction operations concurrently. That means [we need] staff in Washington and in the field to manage and deliver quality programs.''

Dr. Rice is prepared to make the State Department an effective inter- agency leader as it should be--in post-conflict operations. I look forward to working closely with her on this effort. I consider this new mission to be one of the most important long-term defenses that the State Department can mount against future acts of terrorism.

Mr. President, I am re-introducing today a bill that was on the legislative calendar of the 108th Congress when it adjourned in December. The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act is intended to build operational readiness in the civilian agencies to improve our nation's capacity to carry out post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions.

Until very recently, the concept of ``nation building'' was considered to be pejorative by many Members of Congress and government officials. The foreign policy orthodoxy of both parties was skeptical of missions that entailed long-term peacekeeping or stabilization commitments. If military force was necessary, most policymakers believed it should be used only for relatively brief periods followed by rapid withdrawal.

But experience has taught us that this approach rarely can be accommodated if we are serious about protecting our own security in an age of terrorism. We have seen how terrorists can exploit nations afflicted by lawlessness and desperate circumstances. They seek out such places to establish training camps, recruit new members, and tap into a global black market in weapons technology. If we are to deny sanctuaries to terrorists, we must be involved in post-conflict stabilization.

With this in mind, the Foreign Relations Committee took up the issue of how best to organize and prepare for post-conflict missions. Well over a year ago, we held our first bipartisan roundtable that brought together some of the best minds from inside and outside of government to consider this issue. From this process, we developed the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004. I introduced this legislation with Senators Biden and Hagel, and the Committee passed it unanimously. The purpose of our bill is to establish a more robust civilian capability to respond quickly and effectively to post-conflict situations or other complex emergencies. The bill puts the State Department at the center of the civilian reconstruction and stabilization effort, while coordination between State and Defense would continue at the NSC level.

The Defense Science Board (DSB), which recently recommended a similar strengthening of stabilization and reconstruction capacity in the Defense Department, endorsed our legislation. On January 26, I introduced S. 192, new legislation that took the DSB recommendations and provided the executive branch the necessary authorities to carry them out. It calls upon the Secretary of Defense to take immediate action to strengthen the role and capabilities of the Department of Defense for carrying out stabilization and reconstruction activities as well as to support the development of core competencies in other departments and agencies, principally the Department of State. The bill has been referred to the Senate Armed Service Committee for that Committee's consideration.

While recognizing the critical challenges that our military has undertaken with skill and courage in both Afghanistan and Iraq, we must acknowledge that certain non-security missions will be better served in the future by a more organized civilian response. Our post-conflict efforts frequently have had a higher than necessary military profile. This is not the result of a Pentagon power grab or institutional fights. Rather, the military has led post-conflict operations primarily because it is the only agency capable of mobilizing sufficient personnel and resources for these tasks. As a consequence, military resources have been stretched and deployments of military personnel have been extended beyond expectations. If we can improve the capabilities of the civilian agencies, they can take over many of the non-security missions that have burdened the military.

In re-introducing the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act'' in the 109th Congress, I am well aware of the impact it has already had on both the debate on this issue and developments to date. In fact, some initiatives contained in the legislation have moved forward without its having been enacted. My Senate colleagues on the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee agreed with the need to provide an emergency conflict response fund for stabilization and reconstruction crises. And the Commerce, Justice, State appropriators in both the Senate and the House agreed with the need to establish a new office at the State Department to take the lead in organizing our civilian efforts. Indeed, an Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization has now been organized and a highly capable coordinator named. At her confirmation hearings, Dr. Rice demonstrated detailed knowledge of the Office and its work. I am confidant that she has already embraced the Department's role as a core mission and will work to support the Office with appropriate funding and the kind of Department-wide backing and support from management that it will need to do its job.

So why continue to pursue the legislation? It is still important to seek enactment because the legislation provides a permanent basis in law for the established office as well as new authorities that the Department will need to be successful.

The Bush Administration's action on this issue demonstrates its ability to recalibrate policy and organization to address a changing world. We know that the President will continue to provide leadership in organizing the U.S. government for this mission. As demonstrated by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee vote of 19-0, and by actions taken by the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary and the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, there is significant support in the Congress for his work and for the foresight he is already demonstrating.

The new Office, headed by Carlos Pascual, is doing a government-wide inventory of the civilian assets that might be available for stabilization and reconstruction tasks. It is also pursuing an idea proposed in our bill of a Readiness Reserve to enable rapid mobilization of post-conflict stabilization personnel. It will work closely with the Secretary to assist in the coordination of policy, the preparation and management of response, and in developing cooperative arrangements with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector organizations.

I am hopeful that the Office also will develop the concept of a 250- person active duty Response Readiness Corps that is contained in the legislation. In Army terms, that is less than a small battalion of well-trained people--a modest but vigorous force-multiplier that would greatly improve our nation's stabilization capacity. This Corps would be composed of State Department and USAID employees who have the experience and technical skills to manage stabilization and reconstruction tasks in a hostile environment.

Secretary Rice has been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of enhancing standing civilian capacity to respond to post conflict situations. In answer to one of my questions during the confirmation process, she said: ``Creating a strong U.S. Government stabilization and reconstruction capacity is an Administration national security priority.''

She asserted that ``experience has shown that we must have the capacity to manage 2 to 3 stabilization and reconstruction operations concurrently. That means [we need] staff in Washington and in the field to manage and deliver quality programs.''

Dr. Rice is prepared to make the State Department an effective inter- agency leader as it should be--in post-conflict operations. I look forward to working closely with her on this effort. I consider this new mission to be one of the most important long-term defenses that the State Department can mount against future acts of terrorism.

Mr. President, I submit today a resolution commending the Iraqi people for their participation in the election of January 30, 2005, of a 275-member Transitional National Assembly and provincial and regional governments; and encouraging further steps toward establishment of a free, democratic, secure and prosperous Iraq.

Despite the threats to voters, candidates and election workers, and the acts of violence by those seeking to prevent the voice of the majority from being heard, millions of Iraqis voted on Sunday.

For the first time in over 50 years, the Iraqi people have been given the opportunity to choose their leadership. Through this resolution, the Senate recognizes and commends this historic moment and the strides of the Iraqi people toward free and fair elections.

Mr. President, I have the pleasure and the honor to commend the nomination of Dr. Condoleezza Rice. Soon, the Senate will carry out its constitutional duty to provide advice and consent on President Bush's nominee for the office of Secretary of State. We will be participants in an historic moment that will reaffirm the Senate's role in foreign policy and underscore the brilliance of the constitutional design.

Last week, the Committee on Foreign Relations held exhaustive hearings on this nomination. Dr. Rice fielded questions on dozens of subjects for more than 10\1/2\ hours over 2 days. All 18 members of the Committee took advantage of the opportunity to ask Dr. Rice questions. At the hearings, she responded to 199 questions--129 from Democrats and 70 from Republicans. In addition, in advance of the hearings, members of the Committee submitted 191 detailed questions for the record to Dr. Rice. Members received answers to each of these questions. Thus, Dr. Rice responded to a total of 390 questions from Senators. In American history, few cabinet nominees have provided as much information or answered as many questions during the confirmation process. She demonstrated that her understanding of U.S. foreign policy is comprehensive and insightful.

Our hearings and yesterday's floor action served not only as an examination of Dr. Rice's substantial qualifications, but also as a fundamental debate on the direction of U.S. foreign policy. This debate was useful to the Senate and to the American people. Having the opportunity to question a Secretary of State nominee is a key aspect of Congressional oversight of any administration's foreign policy. Dr. Rice enthusiastically embraced this function of the hearings.

In my judgment she is extraordinarily well-qualified to become Secretary of State. Even Dr. Rice's opponents have taken the time to admire her accomplishments and her qualifications. She is a person of conviction, loyalty, integrity, and ability. As a result of her distinguished service as National Security Advisor to President Bush and her earlier assignments on the NSC, she is well known to many Members of the Senate. We have observed her energy, her expertise, and her devotion to this country. I appreciate the cooperation that she has provided to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to me personally.

I had the good fortune to visit Dr. Rice before she assumed the post of National Security Adviser. Before President George W. Bush was elected, I participated with Dr. Rice at Stanford University meetings on foreign policy hosted by former Secretary of State, George Shultz. Secretary Shultz, a close friend of many in the Senate, was an early supporter of then Governor Bush. He recognized Dr. Rice's prodigious talent and encouraged her leadership within the Bush foreign policy team. At the Stanford University meetings, Dr. Rice demonstrated analytical brilliance and broad knowledge of world affairs. During the 2000 Presidential campaign, she established a trusted relationship with Governor Bush that has carried through in her work as National Security Adviser.

The enormously complex job before Dr. Rice will require all of her talents and experience. American credibility in the world, progress in the war on terrorism, and our relationships with our allies will be greatly affected by the Secretary of State's leadership and the effectiveness of the State Department in the coming years. We recognize the deep personal commitment necessary to undertake this difficult assignment, and we are grateful that a leader of her stature is willing to step forward.

Opponents of the nomination have focused primarily on individual statements made by the nominee during her tenure as National Security Adviser. I simply observe that Dr. Rice has spent 4 years in one of the most intense crucibles of leadership imaginable. The scrutiny that National Security Advisers must live under is unrelenting, and their responsibility for foreign policy outcomes often is exceeded only by the President, who makes the final decision. Dr. Rice has been in the arena making tough decisions and answering tough questions on a daily basis for 4 years. I do not remember any National Security Adviser who did not have bruises to show for stepping into this arena. The attachment of controversies to a National Security Adviser is inevitable. Even as Senators scrutinize Dr. Rice's record, we must not fail to recognize the level of sacrifice, courage, and discipline that is required to be National Security Adviser. Her proven fortitude in meeting these challenges and in sustaining herself physically and mentally through the pressures of responsibility is impressive.

Dr. Rice is not just a survivor. Even under intense pressure, she has performed her duties successfully with thoughtfulness, fairness, and magnanimity. These are exactly the qualities that we want in our top diplomat. And these qualities already have produced results. Dr. Rice has contributed to numerous policy successes in the Bush administration. These successes have involved issues as diverse as our non-proliferation policies, our campaign against global AIDS, and reform of our post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction mechanisms. Befitting the role of National Security Adviser, she has not been in the limelight claiming credit for successes. Instead, she has performed without ego, while preserving the trust of the President. This close relationship will serve her well at the State Department.

The Secretary of State serves as the President's top foreign policy advisor, as our Nation's most visible emissary to the rest of the world, and as manager of one of the most important Departments in our Government. Any one of these jobs would be a challenge for even the most talented public servant. The Secretary of State, at this critical time in our history, must excel in all three roles.

From my own conversations with Dr. Rice, I am confident that she understands that the President's foreign policy can be enhanced in the second term by a closer working relationship with Congress. In moving to head the State Department, she understands that much of this communication will depend on her. Last week's hearings were an excellent start. Her attitude throughout these arduous hearings was always accommodating and always respectful of the Senate's Constitutional role in the nomination process. From the beginning she made clear her desire to have a wide-ranging discussion of U.S. foreign policy and to take all the questions that members wanted to ask.

If confirmed, it will be her duty to use the foundation of these hearings to build a consistent bridge of communication to the Congress. As legislators, we have equal responsibility in this process. We have the responsibility of educating ourselves about national security issues, even when they are not the top issues in headlines or polls. We have the responsibility to maintain good foreign affairs law, even when taking care of this duty yields little credit back home. We have the responsibility to ensure that our first impulse in foreign affairs is one of bipartisanship. And we have the responsibility to speak plainly when we disagree with the administration, but to avoid inflammatory rhetoric that is designed merely to create partisan advantage or settle partisan scores.

We have the opportunity with the beginning of a new presidential term to enhance the constructive role of Congress in foreign policy. We have made an excellent start during the past week. I thank all 19 Senators who participated in the Foreign Relations Committee hearings and all 22 Senators who have joined in the floor debate. I urge Members to vote in favor of the nomination of Dr. Rice to be Secretary of State.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask that the quorum count equally against both sides of the aisle.

Will the Chair please recognize Senator Domenici.

Mr. President, how much time remains on both sides at this stage?

There is 14 minutes and 1 minute?

Mr. President, my understanding is the majority leader is en route to the floor. He had responsibilities in the House of Representatives for a period of time. The distinguished Democratic leader is on the floor. It is his desire to wait until the majority leader is present, and both, as I understand, will make final comments, if necessary using leader time. Therefore, Mr. President, I will speak at this point, utilizing the time allotted to our side with a final argument.

Mr. President, I appreciated, as did the Senator from New Mexico, the comments of our distinguished colleague from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman, when he discussed really the long debate we have had with regard to the conduct of the war in Iraq, of the conduct of the war against terrorism, which involves Iraq. Clearly, Senator Lieberman is accurate when he points out that essentially we have had many disagreements about the prewar planning, the problems of the dislocation of all of the Iraqi security forces, the great dilemmas we have had as we approach now the elections and the fledgling democracy we hope Iraqis will be able to fashion as they formulate a constitution and elect the officials of their country.

The security situation remains extremely precarious for American troops and those who are with us in Iraq attempting to help Iraqis provide security for their villages and for their countryside. There are clearly differences of opinion as to how well all of these activities have been conducted, but I think, in recognition of how very difficult it has been for decisionmakers, a general consensus is that the batting average has been good, even if not perfect. But Senator Lieberman made the point that now, at this particular moment, as we vote today to confirm a Secretary of State, we are a united group in this Senate on the need for success in Iraq.

There should be no doubt on the part of all who are about to cast their ballots in Iraq and take the chances that are posed when they are threatened really with loss of life for their willingness to exercise a franchise, it should be clear we are united back here.

This is not a fractious group, I hope, today that gives any sustenance of hope to the insurgents, to those who are attempting to formulate disaster in the Middle East that the face of America is not a united face.

I make this point because the person we are about to confirm as Secretary of State will be, aside from the President of the United States, the most prominent spokesperson, the most prominent diplomat making the case for the United States of America and for each of us on this Senate floor as proud Americans. And it is very important, now that we have had a full discussion of arguments on deficiencies, things we must do better, institutions we must improve, simply to note how important it is to the world to have confidence we know what we are doing and that we are prepared at least to continually discuss this in the same candid way we have done, but then to come together and say this is our President, this is our Secretary of State, this is our policy.

I am very hopeful that the vote for Dr. Rice will be a very strong vote. I do not depreciate for a moment the right or desire of those who may have a heartfelt need to say no. That is a great privilege we all exercise. But a lot is at stake today in saying yes, and saying yes together in as large a number as we can muster when the roll is called is important because this is a person who will be Secretary of State, and this is a vote that will be memorable. It is not in any way a trivial pursuit or time of fractious odds or a time to be spoilers. This is for our country at a time to be the very best we can be as Senators.

I have reiterated the record of our hearings and I have appreciated very much the cooperation and, beyond that, the friendship of the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden, because the both of us have shared from time to time with witnesses who have come before our committee considerable anxieties about the policies they were pursuing or some they were not pursuing, or questions we were raising we felt they perhaps had not been raising and that they should. By my best count, in the last 2 years, we have had 23 hearings on Iraq. That is a lot of quality time devoted by good administration witnesses and other experts, as well as by Senators, as I mentioned, in the long hearings we had with Dr. Rice, and in the almost 200 questions raised before the hearing and another 200 during the hearing. This is a lot of questioning, a lot of information, a big record. So we took this seriously, all 18 of us, plus Senator Feinstein of California, who introduced Dr. Rice to the committee

to begin with. Senators have taken it very seriously on the floor.

In my opening comments, I mentioned that at least 22 Senators spoke yesterday and many spoke at length, with very sincere tributes to Dr. Rice. Some of the Senators had very sincere questions about where we are going and what we ought to be doing. But those preliminaries are over. We come now to the moment of decision, and I hope and pray that the vote will be a strong one for a candidate who in fact can be a champion for us. Her entire life story, which has been touched upon, but only barely--and perhaps this is a tribute to our next Secretary of State, that we did not dwell on biography, although it is a dramatic one out of Birmingham, AL. We did not dwell on racial background or on the fact that a lady is going to be Secretary of State. We did not get into many of the divisive arguments we often have as to where somebody comes from and what their background is.

Dr. Rice was taken seriously from the beginning of the hearings and throughout this debate as a world statesperson who knows a great deal, who is extraordinarily intelligent and dedicated to this country and extraordinarily courageous in speaking out as she has.

I add all this simply to say that I am hopeful Senators will vote for Dr. Rice when we vote soon.

I will yield the floor in the hopes that our leader and the distinguished minority leader will have an opportunity to make comments before the Chair calls for the roll.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, the Chair has noted we have 5 minutes. We are hopeful of seeing our leader.

I will yield back our time and then the leaders may proceed.

The bill I am introducing today seeks to enhance United States effectiveness in dealing with countries that are either emerging from civil strife and conflict or threatened with instability. It calls for the creation of certain fundamental capabilities within the Government, and the Pentagon in particular, that are critical to success in what has come to be called stabilization and reconstruction operations. These capabilities include the training and equipping of sufficient numbers of civilian and military personnel for such activities, as well as the development of a new guiding principle--one that designates stabilization and reconstruction as a prime Defense Department mission with the same priority as combat operations.

Often these missions will occur at the end of major combat operations. We have learned from recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq that the

United States will encounter significant challenges in seeking to ensure stability, democracy, and a productive economy in nations affected by conflict.

While United States Armed Forces are extremely capable of effectively projecting military force and prevailing on the battlefield, achieving United States objectives also requires successful stabilization and reconstruction operations after major fighting has ceased. Without success in the aftermath of large-scale hostilities, the United States hard-won military victories will be at risk. To achieve this success, the armed forces and civilian agencies of the United States Government must have the capabilities to support stabilization and reconstruction and to undertake effective planning and preparation well before the outbreak of hostilities.

There are many cases, as well, when timely intervention to stabilize a threatening situation can head off the need for a major combat operation. This legislation envisions that the same capabilities created to stabilize a post-conflict situation may also be used to prevent conflict in the first place, thus achieving United States objectives more effectively with less loss of life and less potential risk to our relations with other countries.

Much as the military component of a conflict requires extensive planning and training, we must also be well-prepared and trained for stabilization and reconstruction operations. To be fully effective in such operations, the United States needs to have Federal Government personnel deployed continuously abroad for years-long tours of duty so that they become familiar with the local scene and can earn the trust of indigenous people. The active component of the Armed Forces cannot meet all of these requirements. Personnel from other Federal agencies, reserve component forces, contractors, United States allies and coalition partners, and indigenous personnel must help.

This bill complements legislation I introduced last year, S. 2127, which calls for creation of a stabilization and reconstruction capability within the State Department. I am pleased the State Department created a new office for such activities. This bill is the important next step. It calls upon the President to issue a directive to develop an intensive planning process for stabilization and reconstruction activities, as well as the establishment of joint interagency task forces composed of senior Government executives and military officers to ensure coordination and integration of the activities of military and civilian personnel in a particular country or area of interest.

In addition, the bill calls upon the Secretary of Defense to take immediate action to strengthen the role and capabilities of the Department of Defense for carrying out stabilization and reconstruction activities as well as to support the development of core competencies in planning in other departments and agencies, principally the Department of State. It further calls for the Secretary of Defense to take certain actions to ensure that stabilization and reconstruction becomes a core competency of general purpose forces through training, leader development, doctrine development and the use of other force readiness tools.

I recognize that the subject matter of this bill is extremely broad in scope, and that it properly falls within the purview of other committees in addition to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. However, I believe that the only way the United States will achieve long-term success in stabilization and reconstruction operations is if all resources of the United States Government are brought to bear on the country or area of concern. It is for that reason that I am introducing this bill, and I hope that my colleagues in this body, in particular Senators Warner and Levin, will agree to take a major role in examining the merits of those aspects of this bill that fall within their jurisdiction and expertise.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of this bill be printed in the Record.

The bill I am introducing today seeks to enhance United States effectiveness in dealing with countries that are either emerging from civil strife and conflict or threatened with instability. It calls for the creation of certain fundamental capabilities within the Government, and the Pentagon in particular, that are critical to success in what has come to be called stabilization and reconstruction operations. These capabilities include the training and equipping of sufficient numbers of civilian and military personnel for such activities, as well as the development of a new guiding principle--one that designates stabilization and reconstruction as a prime Defense Department mission with the same priority as combat operations.

Often these missions will occur at the end of major combat operations. We have learned from recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq that the

United States will encounter significant challenges in seeking to ensure stability, democracy, and a productive economy in nations affected by conflict.

While United States Armed Forces are extremely capable of effectively projecting military force and prevailing on the battlefield, achieving United States objectives also requires successful stabilization and reconstruction operations after major fighting has ceased. Without success in the aftermath of large-scale hostilities, the United States hard-won military victories will be at risk. To achieve this success, the armed forces and civilian agencies of the United States Government must have the capabilities to support stabilization and reconstruction and to undertake effective planning and preparation well before the outbreak of hostilities.

There are many cases, as well, when timely intervention to stabilize a threatening situation can head off the need for a major combat operation. This legislation envisions that the same capabilities created to stabilize a post-conflict situation may also be used to prevent conflict in the first place, thus achieving United States objectives more effectively with less loss of life and less potential risk to our relations with other countries.

Much as the military component of a conflict requires extensive planning and training, we must also be well-prepared and trained for stabilization and reconstruction operations. To be fully effective in such operations, the United States needs to have Federal Government personnel deployed continuously abroad for years-long tours of duty so that they become familiar with the local scene and can earn the trust of indigenous people. The active component of the Armed Forces cannot meet all of these requirements. Personnel from other Federal agencies, reserve component forces, contractors, United States allies and coalition partners, and indigenous personnel must help.

This bill complements legislation I introduced last year, S. 2127, which calls for creation of a stabilization and reconstruction capability within the State Department. I am pleased the State Department created a new office for such activities. This bill is the important next step. It calls upon the President to issue a directive to develop an intensive planning process for stabilization and reconstruction activities, as well as the establishment of joint interagency task forces composed of senior Government executives and military officers to ensure coordination and integration of the activities of military and civilian personnel in a particular country or area of interest.

In addition, the bill calls upon the Secretary of Defense to take immediate action to strengthen the role and capabilities of the Department of Defense for carrying out stabilization and reconstruction activities as well as to support the development of core competencies in planning in other departments and agencies, principally the Department of State. It further calls for the Secretary of Defense to take certain actions to ensure that stabilization and reconstruction becomes a core competency of general purpose forces through training, leader development, doctrine development and the use of other force readiness tools.

I recognize that the subject matter of this bill is extremely broad in scope, and that it properly falls within the purview of other committees in addition to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. However, I believe that the only way the United States will achieve long-term success in stabilization and reconstruction operations is if all resources of the United States Government are brought to bear on the country or area of concern. It is for that reason that I am introducing this bill, and I hope that my colleagues in this body, in particular Senators Warner and Levin, will agree to take a major role in examining the merits of those aspects of this bill that fall within their jurisdiction and expertise.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of this bill be printed in the Record.