Fisa Amendments Act Of 2008
Mr. Speaker, I imagine that Admiral McConnell is watching and listening, and so allow me this morning to thank all of the patriots that are stationed around the world that are the front lines of the national security and defense and…
Mr. Speaker, I imagine that Admiral McConnell is watching and listening, and so allow me this morning to thank all of the patriots that are stationed around the world that are the front lines of the national security and defense and intelligence community of this Nation. To the American people, let me say on your behalf, we thank them, for they are working every day, and they are working diligently, and they are being successful.
This rule today supporting the underlying bill should be passed, because Admiral McConnell is aware that every single tool that he has asked for, foreign-to-foreign and otherwise in terms of surveillance, is in this bill.
Interestingly enough, if you will talk to members of the law enforcement community and those who are dealing with terrorists, they will tell you that they are intercepting terrorists. They are finding terrorists every single day. I personally spoke to law enforcement who noted in one region of the country that they have intercepted three terrorists. So what we are doing today is providing the codified document to secure your civil liberties, to suggest that if the focus of your surveillance is actually an American, they have to have a court intervention, a quick court intervention.
As it relates to our telecom companies, is anyone suggesting that they are not patriots? Is anyone suggesting that they will not comply with a request by the national security community?
They will, because in this bill it indicates to them that if they get a letter that suggests that we need their help, that they are not breaking the law, that all of the laws have been in compliance certified by the AG, they get absolute immunity.
So going forward, there will be no question. If that happened in the past, they have absolute immunity. There will be no gaping hole, and the idea of avoiding retroactive immunity is a question to America. It is protecting your civil liberties. Yes, we have been secure, or we have avoided a tragedy since 9/11. It is because we have given them the tools, and now we give them better tools.
It is important to pass this legislation, because it advances the security of America. But what it says to the world is that we are not terrorized by the terrorists. We believe in security, but we believe in the civil liberties of all Americans.
The Constitution still stands.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the H. Res. 1041, Providing for Consideration of the Senate Amendment to H.R. 3773, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act. This Rule will allow us to examine the Senate Amendment and to consider the many concerns associated with this act.
We have worked as a body to resolve our issues with FISA and with those of our Senate colleagues without eviscerating the fundamental rights embodied in the Bill of Rights. Leadership has worked tirelessly to not simply reconcile the Senate language with the RESTORE Act (H.R. 3773), which we passed in the House on November 15, 2007, but leadership has also worked tirelessly to go beyond the RESTORE Act. This current FISA Reform legislation has been borne out of this tireless struggle. Let me detail some of the ways that the FISA Reform Act balances security and liberty: adopting provisions from the Senate bill that will for the first time provide statutory protections for U.S. persons overseas, that ensures surveillance of their communications are conducted through the courts; and providing a mechanism for telecommunications carriers to prove their case that they did not engage in any wrongdoing and to guarantee due process with a fair hearing in court.
Like the RESTORE Act, the FISA reform legislation provides for collection against terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, while providing prior court approval of acquisition and an on-going process of review and oversight in order to protect Americans' privacy.
The FISA Reform Act creates a bipartisan commission on Warrantless Electronic Surveillance Activities with strong investigatory powers in order to preserve the rule of law in pending and future lawsuits. This revised version of the bill reiterates FISA's exclusive control for conducting foreign intelligence surveillance, unless a specific statutory authorization for surveillance is enacted. This is an area where the House version has differed from the Senate.
Perhaps the most important distinction between the House version of the bill and the Senate's version is that the Court must approve surveillance procedures prior to the start of surveillance. Under the Senate bill, the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney
General authorize surveillance and submit procedures to the FISA Court 5 days after surveillance begins. Under the Senate bill, the FISA Court has no firm deadline for approving the procedures. The Senate bill does not go far enough in protecting the individual rights of Americans.
The FISA Reform Act requires submission to Congress and the FISA Court of ``reverse targeting'' guidelines that are to be promulgated by the NSA. Specifically, these guidelines will determine whether the ``significant purpose'' of the surveillance is to acquire communications of a specific U.S. person. In this regard, the House bill gives more teeth to the provisions in the Senate bill, which only has general prohibitions against reverse targeting and does not require the promulgation of agency guidelines addressing reverse targeting.
Both the FISA Reform Act and the Senate bill, provide for prospective liability protection for telecommunications companies that assist with lawful surveillance activities. However, the FISA Reform Act goes further by ensuring that telecommunication companies complying with the Protect America Act (PAA) have liability protection for lawful surveillance that occurred after the expiration of the PAA.
Another major difference between the bills is that the FISA Reform Act does not provide for any retroactive immunity. Instead, the FISA Reform Act provides for a process to allow district courts to review classified evidence in camera and ex parte (in front of the judge without the presence of the plaintiff). This allows the telecommunications companies to have their day in court and to assert defenses that already exist under FISA and other statutes. This process simply creates a pathway for companies to assert such defenses.
This process, which allows the Court to review information and the companies to prove their case, prevents the Executive Branch from blocking the companies from asserting their defenses under the doctrine of ``state secrets'' privilege. The FISA Reform Act permits the telecommunication companies an opportunity to defend themselves but does not create any new defenses or immunity and it does not excuse any conduct that may have been unlawful. Under the House bill, telecommunication companies can prove their innocence in court without the protection of the States immunity privilege. If these companies cannot prove that their actions were proper then they will be held accountable.
The Senate bill grants full immunity to any telecommunication company where the Attorney General certified that assistance was requested as part of the President's warrantless surveillance program. This blanket immunity goes to far, and do not support full immunity.
I believe the FISA Reform Act is better because it provides the telecommunications companies with due process and an opportunity to prove their guilt or innocence. I cannot support a case for blanket immunity and the FISA Reform Act does not allow it.
Lastly, the FISA Reform Act provides a forward looking provision that establishes a bipartisan National Commission, appointed by Congress. The Commission will investigate and report to Congress and the public about the Administration's warrantless surveillance activities.
Homeland security is not a Democratic or a Republican issue, it is not a House or Senate issue; it is an issue for all Americans--all of us need to be secure in our homes, secure in our thoughts, and secure in our communications.
I find it disturbing that our Republican colleagues will not join us to ensure that Americans are safe here and abroad. Disturbing that they do not recognize that we must protect the civil liberties of this Nation just as we protect American lives.
Mr. Speaker, in August of last year, I strongly opposed S. 1927, the so-called ``Protect America Act'' (PAA), when it came to a vote on the House floor. Had the Bush administration and the Republican-dominated 109th Congress acted more responsibly in the two preceding years, we would not have been in the position of debating legislation that had such a profoundly negative impact on the national security and on American values and civil liberties in the crush of exigent circumstances. As that regrettable episode clearly showed, it is true as the saying goes that haste makes waste.
The PAA was stampeded through the Congress in the midnight hour of the last day before the long August recess on the dubious claim that it was necessary to fill a gap in the Nation's intelligence gathering capabilities identified by Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell. In reality, it would have circumvented the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution and represented an unwarranted transfer of power from the courts to the Executive Branch and a Justice Department led at that time by an Attorney General whose reputation for candor and integrity was, to put it charitably, subject to considerable doubt.
Under the House bill, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) is indispensable and is accorded a meaningful role in ensuring compliance with the law. The bill ensures that the FISC is empowered to act as an Article III court should act, which means the court shall operate neither as a rubber-stamp nor a bottleneck. Rather, the function of the court is to validate the lawful exercise of executive power on the one hand, and to act as the guardian of individual rights and liberties on the other.
Moreover, Mr. Speaker, it is important to point out that the loudest demands for blanket immunity did not come from the telecommunications companies but from the administration, which raises the interesting question of whether the administration's real motivation is to shield from public disclosure the ways and means by which government officials may have ``persuaded'' telecommunications companies to assist in its warrantless surveillance programs.
My amendment, which was added during the markup last year, made a constructive contribution to the RESTORE Act by laying down a clear, objective criterion for the administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce in preventing reverse targeting.
``Reverse targeting'' is a concept well known to members of the Judiciary Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the minutiae of electronic surveillance; it is the practice where the Government targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to collect information on certain U.S. persons.
One of the major concerns that libertarians, as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, have with the FISA is that the temptation of national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting is often difficult to resist in the absence of strong safeguards to prevent it.
My amendment, accepted in the House Judiciary mark up, reduced any temptation to resort to reverse targeting by requiring the administration to obtain a regular, individualized FISA warrant whenever the ``real'' target of the surveillance is a person in the United States.
The amendment achieved this objective by requiring the administration to obtain a regular FISA warrant whenever a ``significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific person reasonably believed to be located in the United States.''
The language used in my amendment, ``significant purpose,'' is a term of art that has long been a staple of FISA jurisprudence and thus is well known and readily applied by the agencies, legal practitioners, and the FISA Court. Thus, the Jackson-Lee Amendment provided a clearer, more objective, criterion for the administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce to prevent the practice of reverse targeting without a warrant, which all of us can agree should not be permitted.
Mr. Speaker, nothing in the Act or the amendments to the Act should require the Government to obtain a FISA order for every overseas target on the off chance that they might pick up a call into or from the United States. Rather, what should be required, is a FISA order only where there is a particular, known person in the United States at the other end of the foreign target's calls in whom the Government has a significant interest such that a significant purpose of the surveillance has become to acquire that person's communications.
The acquisition of communications will happen over time and the Government will have the time to get an order while continuing its surveillance. It is the national security interest to require the Government to obtain an order at that point, so that it can lawfully acquire all of the target person's communications rather than continuing to listen to only some of them.
We are living in a time of economic crisis and acts of unfettered terrorism. Former President Franklin Delano Roosevelt said that ``our national determination to keep free of foreign wars and foreign entanglements cannot prevent us from feeling deep concern when ideals and principles that we have cherished are challenged.''
Like former President Roosevelt, we must secure our Nation from foreign entanglements but at the same time we must continue to champion the fundamental freedoms of all Americans regardless of whether the surveillance occurs in the United States or abroad.
It is very important to me; and it should be very important to Members of this body that we require what should be required in all cases--a warrant any time there is surveillance of a United States citizen.
In short, the Senate amendment to the House amendment makes a good bill even better. For this reason alone, civil libertarians should enthusiastically embrace the amended H.R. 3773.
The Bush administration would like the American people to believe that Democrats do not want to protect America. My Republican colleagues echo this false claim in both the chambers of Congress by questioning our patriotism. But I remind them that tyrannical behavior often questions the motivations of those seeking to protect civil liberties.
Let us not fall prey to false proclamations of an administration that takes our Bill of Rights and lays it to the side when they feel like it. Security must go hand-in-hand with liberty. Oppression of some for the alleged security of others is not the example this great Nation should set.
As I wrote in the Politico, ``the best way to win the war on terror is to remain true to our democratic traditions. If it retains its democratic character, no nation and no loose confederation of international villains will defeat the United States in the pursuit of its vital interests.''
Thus, the way forward to victory in the war on terror is for the United States to redouble its commitment to the Bill of Rights and the democratic values which every American will risk his or her life to defend. It is only by preserving our attachment to these cherished values that America will remain forever the home of the free, the land of the brave, and the country we love.
Mr. Speaker, FISA has served the Nation well for nearly 30 years, placing electronic surveillance inside the United States for foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence purposes on a sound legal footing, and I am far from persuaded that it needs to be jettisoned.
I continue to insist upon individual warrants, based on probable cause, when surveillance is directed at people in the United States. The Attorney General must still be required to submit procedures for international surveillance to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for approval, but the FISA Court should not be allowed to issue a basket warrant without making individual determinations about foreign surveillance.
In all candor, Mr. Speaker, I must restate my firm conviction that when it comes to the track record of this President's warrantless surveillance programs, there is still not enough on the public record about the nature and effectiveness of those programs, or the trustworthiness of this administration, to indicate that they require a blank check from Congress.
The Bush administration did not comply with its legal obligation under the National Security Act of 1947 to keep the Intelligence Committees ``fully and currently informed'' of U.S. intelligence activities. Congress cannot continue to rely upon incomplete information from the Bush administration or upon erroneous revelations leaked through the media. Instead Congress must conduct a full and complete inquiry into electronic surveillance in the United States and related domestic activities of the NSA, both those that occur within the United States and abroad.
The inquiry must not be limited to the legal questions. It must include the operational details of each program of intelligence surveillance within the United States, including:
(1) Who the NSA is targeting;
(2) How it identifies its targets;
(3) The information the program collects and disseminates; and most important;
(4) Whether the program advances national security interests without unduly compromising the privacy rights of the American people.
Given the unprecedented amount of information Americans now transmit electronically and the post-9/11 loosening of regulations governing information sharing, the risk of intercepting and disseminating the communications of ordinary Americans is vastly increased, requiring more precise--not looser--standards, closer oversight, new mechanisms for minimization, and limits on retention of inadvertently intercepted communications.
Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to Join me In a vote of support for H. Res. 1041, the Rule providing for FISA Amendments Act. I yield back the balance of my time.
Having heard all of the answers to all of the questions that have been raised by the opposition, knowing that full justice, civil liberties and the protection is in this bill, I rise in support of the underlying bill.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Senate Amendment to H.R. 3773, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). This body has worked diligently with our colleagues in the Senate to ensure that the civil liberties of American citizens are appropriately addressed.
We have worked to not simply reconcile the Senate language with the RESTORE Act (H.R. 3773) which we passed in the House on November 15, 2007, but to go beyond the RESTORE Act as part of FISA Reform legislation by: Adopting provisions from the Senate bill that will for the first time provide statutory protections for U.S. persons overseas, that ensures surveillance of their communications are conducted through the courts; and Providing a mechanism for telecommunications carriers to prove their case that they did not engage in any wrongdoing and to guarantee due process with a fair hearing in court.
Like the RESTORE Act, the FISA reform legislation provides for collection against terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, while providing prior court approval of acquisition and an on-going process of review and oversight in order to protect Americans' privacy.
The revised House bill creates a bipartisan commission on Warrantless Electronic Surveillance Activities with strong investigatory powers in order to preserve the rule of law in pending and future lawsuits. This revised version of the bill continues to reiterate FISA's exclusive control for conducting foreign intelligence surveillance, and requires explicit statutory authorization for any means outside of FISA. This is an area where the House version has differed from the Senate.
Homeland security is not a Democratic or a Republican issue, it is not a House or Senate issue; it is an issue for all Americans--all of us need to be secure in our homes, secure in our thoughts, and secure in our communications.
I find it disturbing that our Republican colleagues will not join us to ensure that Americans are safe here and abroad. Disturbing that they do not recognize that we must protect the civil liberties of this nation just as we protect American lives.
Mr. Speaker, in August of this year, I strongly opposed S. 1927, the so-called ``Protect America Act'' (PAA) when it came to a vote on the House floor. Had the Bush Administration and the Republican-dominated 109th Congress acted more responsibly in the two preceding years, we would not have been in the position of debating legislation that had such a profoundly negative impact on the national security and on American values and civil liberties in the crush of exigent circumstances. As that regrettable episode clearly showed, it is true as the saying goes that haste makes waste.
The PAA was stampeded through the Congress in the midnight hour of the last day before the long August recess on the dubious claim that it was necessary to fill a gap in the nation's intelligence gathering capabilities identified by Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell. In reality it would have eviscerated the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution and represented an unwarranted transfer of power from the courts to the Executive Branch and a Justice Department led at that time by an Attorney General whose reputation for candor and integrity was, to put it charitably, subject to considerable doubt.
Under the House bill, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, FISC is indispensable and is accorded a meaningful role in ensuring compliance with the law. The bill ensures that the FISC is empowered to act as an Article III court should act, which means the court shall operate neither as a rubber-stamp nor a bottleneck. Rather, the function of the court is to validate the lawful exercise of executive power on the one hand, and to act as the guardian of individual rights and liberties on the other.
Moreover, Mr. Speaker, it is important to point out that the loudest demands for blanket immunity did not come from the telecommunications companies but from the administration, which raises the interesting question of whether the administration's real motivation is to shield from public disclosure the ways and means by which government officials may have ``persuaded'' telecommunications companies to assist in its warrantless surveillance programs. I call my colleagues' attention to an article published in the Washington Post in which it is reported that Joseph Nacchio, the former CEO of Qwest, alleges that his company was denied NSA contracts after he declined in a February 27, 2001 meeting at Fort Meade with National Security Agency, NSA, representatives to give the NSA customer calling records.
To give a detailed illustration of just how superior the RESTORE Act is to the ill-considered and hastily enacted Protect America Act, I wish to take a few moments to discuss an important improvement in the bill that was adopted in the full Judiciary Committee markup.
My amendment, which was added during the markup, made a constructive contribution to the RESTORE Act by laying down a clear, objective criterion for the administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce in preventing reverse targeting.
``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the Government targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to collect information on certain U.S. persons.
One of the major concerns that libertarians and classical conservatives, as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, have with the PAA is that the understandable temptation of national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be difficult to resist in the absence of strong safeguards in the PAA to prevent it.
My amendment reduces even further any such temptation to resort to reverse targeting by requiring the administration to obtain a regular, individualized FISA warrant whenever the ``real'' target of the surveillance is a person in the United States.
The amendment achieves this objective by requiring the administration to obtain a regular FISA warrant whenever a ``significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific person reasonably believed to be located in the United States.'' The current language in the bill provides that a warrant be obtained only when the Government ``seeks to conduct electronic surveillance'' of a person reasonably believed to be located in the United States.
It was far from clear how the operative language ``seeks to'' is to be interpreted. In contrast, the language used in my amendment, ``significant purpose,'' is a term of art that has long been a staple of FISA jurisprudence and thus is well known and readily applied by the agencies, legal practitioners, and the FISA Court. Thus, the Jackson Lee Amendment provides a clearer, more objective, criterion for the administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce to prevent the practice of reverse targeting without a warrant, which all of us can agree should not be permitted.
Mr. Speaker, nothing in the Act or the amendments to the Act should require the Government to obtain a FISA order for every overseas target on the off chance that they might pick up a call into or from the United States. Rather, what should be required, is a FISA order only where there is a particular, known person in the United States at the other end of the foreign target's calls in whom the Government has a significant interest such that a significant purpose of the surveillance has become to acquire that person's communications.
This will usually happen over time and the Government will have the time to get an order while continuing its surveillance. It is the national security interest to require it to obtain an order at that point, so that it can lawfully acquire all of the target person's communications rather than continuing to listen to only some of them.
It is very important to me, and it should be very important to Members of this body that we require what should be required in all cases--a warrant anytime there is surveillance of a United States citizen.
In short, the Senate amendment to the House version makes a good bill even better. For this reason alone, civil libertarians should enthusiastically embrace H.R. 3773.
Nearly two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville, who remains the most astute student of American democracy, observed that the reason democracies invariably prevail in any martial conflict is because democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that are indispensable to martial success: initiative, innovation, resourcefulness, and courage.
As I wrote in the Politico, ``the best way to win the war on terror is to remain true to our democratic traditions. If it retains its democratic character, no nation and no loose confederation of international villains will defeat the United States in the pursuit of its vital interests.''
Thus, the way forward to victory in the war on terror is for the United States country to redouble its commitment to the Bill of Rights and the democratic values which every American will risk his or her life to defend. It is only by preserving our attachment to these cherished values that America will remain forever the home of the free, the land of the brave, and the country we love.
Mr. Speaker, FISA has served the Nation well for nearly 30 years, placing electronic surveillance inside the United States for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes on a sound legal footing, and I am far from persuaded that it needs to be jettisoned.
However, I know that FISA as it is run currently attempts to circumvent the Bill of Rights and the civil liberties of the American people. I continue to insist upon individual warrants, based on probable cause, when surveillance is directed at people in the United States. The Attorney General must still be required to submit procedures for international surveillance to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for approval, but the FISA Court should not be allowed to issue a ``basket warrant'' without making individual determinations about foreign surveillance.
In all candor, Mr. Speaker, I must restate my firm conviction that when it comes to the track record of this President's warrantless surveillance programs, there is still not enough on the public record about the nature and effectiveness of those programs, or the trustworthiness of this administration, to indicate that they require a blank check from Congress.
The Bush administration did not comply with its legal obligation under the National Security Act of 1947 to keep the Intelligence Committees ``fully and currently informed'' of U.S. intelligence activities. Congress cannot continue to rely on incomplete information from the Bush administration or revelations in the media. It must conduct a full and complete inquiry into electronic surveillance in the United States and related domestic activities of the NSA, both those that occur within FISA and those that occur outside FISA.
The inquiry must not be limited to the legal questions. It must include the operational details of each program of intelligence surveillance within the United States, including: (1) who the NSA is targeting; (2) how it identifies its targets; (3) the information the program collects and disseminates; and most important, (4) whether the program advances national security interests without unduly compromising the privacy rights of the American people.
Given the unprecedented amount of information Americans now transmit electronically and the post-9/11 loosening of regulations governing information sharing, the risk of intercepting and disseminating the communications of ordinary Americans is vastly increased, requiring more precise--not looser--standards, closer oversight, new mechanisms for minimization, and limits on retention of inadvertently intercepted communications.
Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to join me in a vote of support for the FISA Amendments Act, H.R. 3773, as it seeks to balance our Nation's securities and our civil liberties.