Floor Statements

Mr. President I rise with my good friend Senator Carper to offer the Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act in order to streamline and strengthen the way we help our States, communities, and first responders protect our homeland.

Three years ago, the Senate spent nearly three months on the Homeland Security Act, yet the law contains virtually no guidance on how the Department is to assist State and local governments with their homeland security needs. In fact, the 187-page Homeland Security Act mentions the issue of grants to first responders in but a single paragraph. The decisions on how Federal dollars should be spent or how much money should be allocated to whom were left for another day. That day has come.

During the 108th Congress, Senator Carper and I introduced similar legislation to more than double the proportion of homeland Security funding distributed based on risk, while also helping all States achieve a baseline level of preparedness and an ability to respond. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held three hearings at which first responders, State and local officials, and Secretary Ridge all testified that the grant distribution system needs fixing. The 9/11 Commission also urged that the system be changed. It is therefore time for Congress to finally address this critical issue.

The bill that we introduce today is identical to legislation that passed the Senate by voice-vote as an amendment to the Intelligence reform bill at the end of the last Congress.

That measure was supported by Senators from big States--like Michigan and Ohio--and small States like Maine, Delaware and Connecticut. The wide breadth of support in the Senate is indicative of the fact that this bill takes a balanced approach to homeland security funding.

It recognizes that threat-based funding is a critical part of homeland security funding. It also recognizes that first responders in every State and territory stand at the front lines of securing the homeland.

This legislation will also coordinate government-wide homeland security funding by promoting one-stop-shopping for homeland security funding opportunities. It would establish an information clearinghouse to assist first responders and State and local governments in accessing homeland security grant information and other resources within the new department. This clearinghouse will improve access to homeland security grant information, coordinate technical assistance for vulnerability and threat assessments, provide information regarding homeland security best practices, and compile information regarding homeland security equipment purchased with Federal funds.

Establishment of these programs will mean first responders can spend more time training to save lives and less-time filling out paper work. The inflexible structure of past homeland security funding, along with shifting federal requirements and increasing amounts of paperwork, poses a number of challenges to State and local governments as they attempt to provide these funds to first responders.

The legislation would provide greater flexibility in the use of those unspent funds. It would give the Department of Homeland Security flexibility to allow States, via a wavier from the Secretary, to use funds from one category, such as training, for another purpose, such as purchasing equipment.

The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs will act promptly to mark-up and report this important measure to establish a streamlined, efficient, and fair method for homeland security funds to get into the hands of first responders.

Mr. President, I rise today to join Senator Jeffords and Senator Lieberman in introducing the Clean Power Act of 2005. This bill closes the loophole that has allowed the dirtiest, most polluting power plants in the Nation to escape significant pollution controls for more than 30 years.

Maine is one of the most beautiful and pristine States in the Nation. It is also one of the most environmentally responsible States in the Nation. Maine has fewer emissions of the pollutants that cause smog and acid rain than all but a handful of States. It also has one of the lowest emissions of carbon dioxide nationwide.

Unfortunately, despite the collective environmental commitment of both its citizens and industries, Maine still suffers from air pollution. Every freshwater lake, river, and stream in Maine is subject to a State mercury advisory that warns pregnant women and young children to limit consumption of fish caught in those waters. Even Acadia National Park, one of our most beautiful national parks, experiences days in which visibility is obscured by smog.

Where does all this pollution come from? A large part of it comes from a relatively small number of mostly coal-fired powerplants that exploit loopholes to escape the provisions of the Clean Air Act. Coal- fired powerplants are the single largest source of air pollution, mercury contamination, and greenhouse gas emissions in the Nation. A single coal-fired powerplant can emit more of the pollutants that cause smog and acid rain than all of the cars, factories, and businesses in Maine combined.

As the easternmost State in the Nation, Maine is downwind of almost all powerplants in the United States. Many of the pollutants emitted by these powerplants--mercury, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and carbon dioxide--end up in or over Maine. Airborne mercury falls into our lakes and streams, contaminating freshwater fish and threatening our people's health. Carbon dioxide is causing climate change that threatens to alter Maine's delicate ecological balance. Sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides come to Maine in the form of acid rain and smog that damage the health of our people and the health of our environment.

A single powerplant can emit nearly a ton of mercury in a single year. That's equivalent to incinerating over one million mercury thermometers and is enough to contaminate millions of acres of freshwater lakes. In contrast, Maine has zero powerplant emissions of mercury. This bill would reduce mercury emissions from powerplants by 90 percent.

Powerplants are also one of the largest contributors of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. In fact, powerplants account for 40 percent of our carbon dioxide emissions, which scientists believe are the primary cause of man-made global warming.

I recently had the opportunity to view firsthand some of the dramatic impacts of global warming. In August, I traveled with Senator McCain and several other Senators to the northernmost community in the world. We visited Ny-Alesund on the Norwegian island of Spitsbergen. Located at 79 deg.N, Ny-Alesund lies well north of the Arctic Circle and is much closer to the North Pole than to Oslo, the country's

capital. It has even served as a starting point for several polar expeditions.

Scientists tell us that the global climate is changing more rapidly than at any time since the beginning of civilization. They further state that the region of the globe changing most rapidly is the Arctic. The changes are remarkable and disturbing.

In the last 30 years, the Arctic has lost sea-ice cover over an area 10 times as large as the State of Maine. In the summer, the change is even more dramatic, with twice as much ice loss. The ice that remains is as much as 40% thinner than it was just a few decades ago. In addition to disappearing sea-ice, Arctic glaciers are also rapidly retreating. In Ny-Alesund, Senator McCain and I witnessed massive blocks of ice falling off glaciers that had already retreated well back from the shores where they once rested.

The Clean Power Act takes an important step in addressing global warming by reducing powerplant emissions of carbon dioxide to 2000 levels by the year 2010. Although doing so will not solve the problem of global warming, it is an important first step. In light of the rapid warming in the Arctic and the significance that this warming portends for the rest of the planet, reducing carbon dioxide emissions is a step that we can no longer afford to put off.

I am pleased that the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee will be considering clean air legislation in the 109th Congress. The Jeffords-Collins-Lieberman bill does more to reduce smog, acid rain, mercury pollution, and global warming than any other bill. Our bill provides more public health and environmental benefits than any other serious proposal, and it provides those benefits sooner.

I believe it is time to stop acid rain, free our lakes from mercury pollution, reduce global warming, and eliminate the smog that drifts in to obscure Maine skies and jeopardize our health. I look forward to working with the administration and my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to provide cleaner air.

Mr. President, I had requested 10 minutes to introduce a bill at the conclusion of the tributes.

Thank you, Mr. President. I thank my colleague from Illinois for his courtesy.

(The remarks of Ms. Collins pertaining to the submission of S. Res. 8 are printed in today's Record under ``Submitted Resolutions.'')

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the first piece of legislation that I will sponsor in the 109th Congress--a resolution calling on the Senate to strengthen the Pell grant program so that more families can afford higher education.

The Pell grant program is the single largest source of grant aid for postsecondary education funded by the Federal Government. It provides grants to students based on their level of financial need to support their studies at the institutions they have chosen to attend. For this fiscal year, the Pell program is funded at $12.8 billion and is estimated to serve more than 5.3 million students.

I am pleased to have Senator Feingold and Senator Coleman joining me in this bipartisan effort to marshal additional Federal resources for the Pell program. They each have been a leader in the effort to expand access to higher education.

Our system of higher education is in many ways the envy of the world, but its benefits have not been equally available. Unfortunately, it is still the case that one of the most determinative factors of whether students will pursue higher education is their family income. Students from families with incomes above $75,000 are more than twice as likely to attend college as students from families with incomes of less that $25,000.

Even more unsettling are studies demonstrating the negative effect of unmet financial need on college attendance for even the most academically prepared students. Among the most highly qualified high school students, those from low-income families were 43 percent less likely to attend college than their wealthier counterparts.

To help remedy these inequities, the Federal Government has wisely invested in a need-based system of student financial aid designed to help remove the economic barriers to higher education. Central to this effort over the past 30 years has been the Pell grant program. This program was designed as the cornerstone of Federal student assistance.

Unfortunately, the purchasing power of the Pell grant has been significantly eroded in recent years, forcing students to rely increasingly on loans to finance their higher education. In 1975, the maximum Pell grant covered approximately 80 percent of the costs of attending a public, 4-year institution. Today, it covers less than half of these costs, forcing students to make up the difference by taking on larger and larger amounts of debt. On average, students from the University of Maine graduate with approximately $18,000 in debt from Federal student loans alone, and this reflects national trends. As startling as this figure is, it does not include additional indebtedness that many students incur through private loans or credit card debt to finance their education.

The decline in the value of grant aid and the growing reliance on loans bring other negative consequences. The staggering amount of loans can force some students to abandon their plans to attend college altogether. According to the College Board, low-income families are significantly less willing, by almost 50 percent, to finance a college education through borrowed money than their wealthier counterparts.

That does not surprise me. Many working families in Maine are committed to living within their means. Understandably, they are extremely wary of the staggering amount of debt that is now required to finance a college education.

I also know this to be true from my experiences as a college administrator at Husson College in Maine. At Husson, 85 to 90 percent of students currently receive some sort of Federal financial aid, and approximately 60 percent of students receive Pell grants.

As Linda Conant, the financial aid director at Husson told me, ``You cannot imagine how difficult it is to sit with a family and to explain to them the amount of loans that are needed to finance a post-secondary degree. It

scares them. That is why Pell grant aid is so important for low-income families. For these families, loans don't always work, but Pell does.''

I also heard from Judy Kenney from Northern Maine about the importance of Pell grants. Judy lives in Castle Hill, not far from my home town of Caribou. Her daughter and son both were able to attend college with the help of Pell grants. As she told me, ``At the time, my husband Maylen was farming and having a rough go of it and I was a teacher and didn't make much. But the Pell grants my children received made it possible for them to graduate, one from the University of New England and one from Thomas College. Without these grants, they couldn't have finished and now they are making good wages and paying taxes!''

Judy couldn't be more right on both counts. Not only can the typical bachelor's degree recipient expect to earn about 73 percent more over a lifetime than a high school graduate, they also typically contribute 100 percent more in Federal income taxes than the average high school graduate. So this is truly a Federal investment that pays for itself over the long run.

We also know that having a well-educated workforce is crucial to our economic future and competitiveness in the global economy. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has projected that over the next 10 years, there will be significant growth in jobs requiring at least some post- secondary education. So increasingly, higher education is going to be necessary to ensure employability and to prepare Americans to participate in tomorrow's economy.

Pell grants make the difference in whether students have access to higher education, and a chance to participate fully in the American dream. That is why today I am introducing a resolution calling on the Senate to begin restoring the value of the Pell grant program.

This resolution calls on the Senate to raise the Pell maximum grant award to $4,500, a $450 increase in a single year. This increase is long overdue. The maximum grant award has been essentially level-funded for 4 straight years--at $4,050 for the past 3 years and only a $50 increase in FY 2002.

During these 4 years, think of the students who might have entered college and graduated with a degree, if only they had received additional Pell grant aid. Pell grants are targeted to the neediest of students--recipients have a median family income of only $15,200. An additional $450 in Pell grant aid may very well be the deciding factor on whether these students can pursue their college dreams.

The resolution also calls on the Senate to amend the Higher Education Act to provide higher authorization levels for the Pell maximum grant that would allow for a doubling of the maximum grant to $9,000 over the next 5 years. This is an ambitious goal but a worthy one for a nation that understands the opportunities that a college education brings.

As my colleagues know, the Higher Education Act is expected to be reauthorized this year. As the Senate HELP Committee considers the reauthorization, it is my hope that this resolution will prompt a discussion about the need for the maximum grant to grow.

I know that my good friends Senator Enzi, the new chairman of the Senate HELP Committee; Senator Kennedy, the ranking member; Senator Alexander, the chairman of the new Education and Early Childhood Development Subcommittee; and his Democratic counterpart will all work hard with other committee members to produce a strong reauthorization bill. I look forward to working with them further; they are all champions of ensuring greater access to quality education for all Americans, regardless of their financial means.

The President also has recently announced his intention to include a proposal in his 2006 budget request to eliminate the Pell shortfall and to provide an increase in the maximum grant of $100 for each of the next 5 years. I commend the President for focusing on Pell grants, and I hope that we can work together to provide a more substantial increase for the maximum grant for the upcoming year. An increase of approximately $100 for each of the next 5 years will not be enough to increase the purchasing power of Pell grants and will not keep pace with inflation or rising tuition costs. For 2004-2005, the average costs of tuition and fees for a public, 4-year institution rose by over 10 percent.

I will ask unanimous consent to have a letter of support for my legislation printed in the Record. This letter is from the Student Aid Alliance, a coalition of more than 60 organizations representing students, colleges and universities. Founded by the American Council on Education and the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, the Student Aid Alliance includes members such as the American Association of Community Colleges, the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, and the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators, to name just a few. I am pleased to have their support.

Mr. President, now is the time for us to make a commitment to raising the Pell maximum award to $4,500 for the upcoming award year. The Pell grant program is the foundation of making good on the American promise of access to higher education. I hope that my colleagues will join me in supporting this resolution.

I ask unanimous consent to have the letter to which I referred printed in the Record.

Mr. President, in New England, we have an old expression: The difficult we do immediately; the impossible takes us a little longer.

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 before us today at times seemed to be an impossible goal. So it took us a little bit longer. It has been a long and arduous journey to reach this point today, but the extraordinary perseverance of the 9/11 Commission, the families of the victims of the attacks on our country, the conferees, our talented staff, our leaders, and, most of all, the President of the United States brought us to this point today.

We would not be at this historic moment without the informed, strong, and bipartisan leadership of my good friend, the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman. I am deeply grateful to him for his leadership and for working in partnership with me.

When Senator Lieberman and I were first assigned this task by our Senate leaders back in late July, we pledged to work together and to recognize that when it comes to matters of national security, there is no place for partisanship. We worked from the very beginning to forge a bipartisan bill, and I am very pleased that the conference agreement we bring before the Senate today is a bipartisan agreement. I am confident that later today it will receive a strong bipartisan vote. But it was Senator Lieberman's determination, his leadership, and his commitment to this cause that made it possible. It has been a great pleasure to work with him, and I look forward to many future collaborations.

I am also very proud of all of our colleagues on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. They worked so hard. From the very first hearing that we held in late July to the completion of the conference agreement over the weekend, they were there every step of the way. No leaders of a conference could ever have had more devoted and dedicated conferees than Senator Lieberman and I had.

We were also fortunate to be blessed with an outstanding staff. Both Senator Lieberman's staff, and my staff, headed by Michael Bopp, have worked countless hours over the last 4\1/2\ months. They sacrificed family vacations, and they have sacrificed a great deal of sleep. They have been here night and day working because they so believed in this legislation. We could not have done it without them.

On the House side, I want to thank Speaker Hastert. His chief of staff devoted hundreds of hours to assisting in these negotiations. Congressman Pete Hoekstra and Representative Jane Harman led the conferees on the House side. They did outstanding work. They were absolutely committed to the principle of crafting legislation that would make America safer and more secure.

Throughout this process, President Bush has provided outstanding leadership. I would say that without the help of the President of the United States and his Vice President, we would not be here today. Their intervention at critical points throughout the debate was absolutely essential in helping us to forge the compromises that were necessary to move this bill along.

We all owe a great debt to the members and the staff of the 9/11 Commission. I have worked very closely with the chairman and vice chairman, Gov. Tom Kean and former Representative Lee Hamilton. The work they did, their leadership, their investigations, their interviews of 1,200 people in 10 countries provided a solid foundation for the recommendations they made and for the reforms included in this bill.

I am very pleased that we have their endorsement. They said:

We believe this is a good bill and a strong bill. We

believe it will make our country safer and more secure. We

also believe that the essential elements of the Commission's

recommendations remain intact. We are of the firm view what

this conference report deserves the support of the House and

the Senate.

But, Mr. President, perhaps the greatest debt of all is owed to the families of the 9/11 victims. In their profound loss, they found courage and determination. Their knowledge has contributed greatly to our debate, and their passion constantly reminded us of why we are here and what is at stake. They never let us give up. They refused to let us fail.

I am grateful to Senator Frist and Senator Daschle for assigning our committee this important task. They showed great confidence in us, and I am pleased we did not let them down.

This legislation addresses the alarming flaws in our national intelligence structure that were so horribly and painfully exposed on that black September morning more than 3 years ago. It does what nearly a half century of studies and legislation calling for intelligence reform failed to do. It is legislation whose time has finally come.

The legislation implements the major recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We are rebuilding a structure that was designed for a different enemy in a different time, a structure that was designed for the Cold War and has not proved agile enough to deal with the threats of the 21st century.

We have transformed that structure into one with the agility needed to respond to international terrorism, rogue states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the other challenges and threats of the 21st century.

The legislation reforms the intelligence community and it gives us the tools to respond to threats of which we may not even be aware at this point.

It is fitting that this legislation comes to a final vote during the week when we pause to remember the events of December 7, 1941. Just as the National Security Act of 1947 was passed to prevent another Pearl Harbor, the Intelligence Reform Act will help us prevent another 9/11.

I am not saying that this legislation will prevent future terrorist attacks, but it will increase the capabilities of the intelligence community and help us improve the opportunity to better detect, prevent, and, if necessary, respond to attacks on our country.

The four primary components of this legislation are the creation of a director of national intelligence, the establishment of a national counterterrorism center, the creation of a civil liberties board, and strong information-sharing provisions. There are also many other provisions in this bill that improve border security, that improve transportation security, that set a new direction in our foreign policy.

This is a comprehensive approach that embodies many--indeed, most--of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

The new director of national intelligence will be a strong position with clear and effective authority to build

and execute the intelligence budget. The DNI will be a dramatic improvement over the structure we have today. For the first time, we will have, in the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell, an empowered quarterback for our intelligence team.

To illustrate why this is important, why these authorities are crucial, let us consider a passage from the 9/11 Commission Report. In late 1998, it had become apparent to CIA Director George Tenet that al- Qaida was a growing and deadly threat to the people of this country, so on December 4 of that year, he issued a memorandum that said the following:

We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this

effort, either inside CIA or the Community.

Now, that is a pretty clear, concise, direct order from the head of the intelligence community.

According to the Commission, the memorandum had virtually no impact. One reason it had so little overall effect on mobilizing the resources of the intelligence community is that the Director of the CIA, beyond the direct control of the CIA, has very little authority over the funding, the people, and the other resources in the intelligence community. This legislation will ensure that in the future, when such a clear, concise order is issued, it will mobilize and galvanize the resources we can bring to bear.

The second important key component in this bill is the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center. This will build on the good work already being done by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center created by the President through an Executive order. The NCTC will help demolish the information stovepipes that the 9/11 Commission found and it will replace them, it will turn them into conduits for information sharing across the intelligence community. The NCTC will also conduct strategic operational planning to coordinate the agencies that are planning our response to al-Qaida and the other threats to our national security.

Throughout the debate on this bill, in addition to improving the ability of the intelligence agencies to cooperate and coordinate their efforts, we have also been mindful of our troops fighting on the front lines in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both Senator Lieberman and I are privileged to serve on the Senate Armed Services Committee. I contend that our current system has not always served our troops well. It did not predict the insurgency that has cost us so many lives in Iraq. We owe it to our troops on the battlefields, as well as to our civilians at home, to improve the quality of intelligence they receive, and I believe, as does Secretary Powell, this bill will do just that.

I emphasize that nothing in this bill in any way hinders or impairs military operations or readiness. To the contrary, I believe this legislation will help improve the reliability and the quality of intelligence provided to our troops.

Another important provision of this bill would implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission by creating a civil liberties board. As we increase the power of Government to deal with the threat of terrorism, we must be mindful to preserve those freedoms that define us as Americans. We would be handing the terrorists a victory if we were to compromise the civil liberties Americans cherish. This board will help make sure we strike the right balance.

Finally, other key provisions of this bill, for which Senator Durbin deserves great credit, are provisions that will improve the sharing of information across our intelligence agencies and throughout the Federal Government. We know from the extensive review of the 9/11 Commission that various agencies throughout our Government had pieces of the puzzle that had it been assembled might have allowed them to prevent the attacks on our country on 9/11. We need to make sure we have a culture in our Government of assembling the pieces of that puzzle, of sharing information. I believe the Counterterrorism Center, the information-sharing provisions, and having a DNI will all improve and remedy that problem.

The 9/11 Commission has told us repeatedly of the valiant and talented men and women we have in our intelligence agencies, and I salute their good work. I believe today that we will be giving them the tools they need to be more effective. This legislation provides those good people with a good structure.

Time, commitment, and perseverance have brought us this far. I urge my colleagues to join us in completing the journey by giving this landmark legislation an overwhelming vote later this afternoon. This legislation will implement the most sweeping significant reforms of our intelligence community in more than 50 years. The reforms are long overdue, and they will help to make our Nation more secure.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. President, before the Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized, I have a unanimous consent request.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent Senator McCain be allocated 5 minutes of my time at some point during the debate today.

Mr. President, I will be putting into the record a list of the Senate conferees because each of them contributed in extraordinary ways to this bill. I will be making comments about some of them and their particular contributions later in the debate today.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Illinois for his comments. He has been an extraordinarily active member of the Governmental Affairs Committee. He has contributed to so many different investigations. Whether it was our review of mental health services for children or the food safety investigation, he has always been front and center in the committee's deliberations, as he has been with this intelligence reform bill. We will miss very much having him as a member of the committee, but I am grateful for his past service, and we hope he will return to the committee some day.

I know that two of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee members are waiting to speak, so I will not prolong. I will talk more about my conferees, my wonderful, able group of conferees, later.

I ask unanimous consent that Senator Carper be recognized next. He has already reserved time under the time agreement; to be followed by Senator Coleman, who has already reserved time under the time agreement; to be followed by the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Roberts, who similarly has reserved time. Two out of the three of these individuals were conferees on the bill. Two of the three also are members of the Governmental Affairs Committee. Each of them has played a significant role in bringing us to where we are today, and I am grateful for their support and involvement.

That is fine.

I am happy to yield to the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee 5 additional minutes from my time. It is my understanding that the ranking member of the committee, the vice chairman of the committee, is also seeking some additional time.

In between, however, Senator Levin has set a schedule to speak. I appreciate the order amongst Members. I will also be happy to yield 5 minutes from Senator Lieberman's time to Senator Rockefeller.

Madam President, the Senator from Michigan worked so hard to craft a series of provisions that were included in this bill. Unfortunately, the conference agreement does not include many of the provisions the Senator cared most about concerning access to information by Congress in order to ensure effective congressional oversight.

I think the loss of those provisions is unfortunate. On the Senate side, they had bipartisan support. I think it reflects a historic tension between Congress and the executive branch when it comes to oversight and the inadequate sharing of information with Congress.

This has been a problem in previous administrations, and it has continued to this day. So the Senator is correct that this objection did not originate with any of the Senate conferees, either Republican or Democrat, and it did reflect the views of the executive branch. I want to make it clear that regardless of whether we have had a Democratic President or a Republican President, that tension has existed over decades.

Madam President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia for his extraordinarily generous comments. We would not be where we are today without the support of the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. He contributed greatly to the bill. He was there from the very first day, drawing on his impressive experience in intelligence and national security matters, advising Senator Lieberman and me on what should be in the bill. He was one of our most active and dedicated conferees.

I am very grateful for his support and efforts and his contributions. I realize the bill we produced is by no means a perfect bill, and I know that in the years to come, he and his colleague, Senator Roberts, will work to strengthen and improve our efforts. I thank him very much.

Madam President, it is my understanding that the Senator from West Virginia is scheduled to speak next. The Senator from Virginia is on the list for 30 minutes of time. The Senator from West Virginia is on the list for 2 hours of time. I am uncertain whether the Presiding Officer can be advised whether there is a further order beyond what I have just indicated?

Madam President, I will yield the floor. I just want to indicate that the Senator from Alaska, Mr. Stevens, is also on the list to speak for 5 minutes. I believe he wanted to follow the Senator from West Virginia. And I see that the Senator from Louisiana is also here and would like to speak for 5 minutes. So I ask that they also be put in the queue.

Mr. President, the 9/11 Commission found that the biggest impediment to ``connecting the dots'' was resistance to information sharing. As the Commission stated in its report: ``Agencies uphold a `need to know' culture of information protection rather than promoting a `need to share' culture of integration.'' I ask if the ranking member on the Governmental Affairs Committee, Senator Lieberman, would explain how this legislation addresses this finding of the Commission.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, some concerns have been expressed to us about whether the authorities under this bill might be used, or abused, to unduly limit the flow of information to the Congress, State and local governments, and the public. Nothing could be farther from our intent than to chill the appropriate and desirable dissemination of information. This bill does not grant any new authority for the DNI or the President to establish a regime of undue government secrecy. The bill properly affords the DNI authority to protect intelligence sources and methods, but this is the same authority that is currently vested in the Director of Central Intelligence. The legislation does not include any new provisions to criminalize or unduly suppress the lawful sharing of unclassified information, nor does the bill waive any existing protections of government employees who raise legitimate concerns by disclosing information to Congress or through other lawful channels.

I fully expect the DNI and the President will exercise their responsibilities under this bill in a way that fosters--not unreasonably restricts--the flow and dissemination of information to Congress, State and local officials, and the public. Certainly, if there is any indication that the authorities under this legislation are being misused to unduly stifle the flow of information and to thereby defeat the purposes of the bill, I fully expect and intend that Congress will promptly look into and remedy the situation. Congressional oversight of these issues will be fostered by the reports that are required during the implementation and operation of the Information Sharing Environment, and through the establishment of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.

Does the Senator from Connecticut agree with my assessment?

I thank both Senators for their excellent summary of the DHS reporting requirements currently in place. The intent of section 4071 is to encourage DHS to establish a simple and timely method of collecting information. I want to make clear that the intent of this provision is to ensure accurate passenger vessel information is collected and shared with the appropriate authorities in an efficient manner, so it may be compared against one consolidated database to be developed by DHS. The provision is not an entirely new requirement. It is based, in part, on current practices, but is designed to utilize one consolidated and comprehensive terrorist database that can be used to screen crew and passenger data more effectively in all transportation modes, while keeping delays to a minimum.

Mr. President, section 7102 of the conference report provides that the term ``repeated provided support for acts of international terrorism,'' as used in the Export Administration Act, shall include, but not be limited to, ``the recurring use of any part of the territory of the country as a sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist organizations.'' I ask if the ranking member on the Governmental Affairs Committee, Senator Lieberman, would clarify the addition of this criteria to the definition used in the Export Administration Act.

I thank the Senator.

driver's license and personal identification card provisions

Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Illinois to speak on one of the provisions in the conference report.

If the Senator from Illinois would yield, I would like to speak on that issue.

I want to take this opportunity to thank Senator Durbin for his leadership on this issue. He and I serve together on the Governmental Affairs Committee and we have worked hand-in-hand on identity theft issues.

I wholeheartedly agree with what the Senator has said, and I want to emphasize again how important it is for the appropriate stakeholders to have a seat at the table in developing a recommendation for minimum standards that the Department of Transportation will promulgate. I know that State officials and their representatives from the National Governors Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures have raised serious concerns about Congress imposing unfunded mandates on the States and pre-empting State laws on eligibility requirements. That is why I support the innovative approach we came up with in the Senate bill and the conference report that would allow representatives of State officials to have a real voice in the development of a recommendation for these Federal standards.

That is also why I believe it is important to emphasize that the conference report includes language ensuring that any recommendation made by the negotiated rulemaking committee include an assessment of the benefits and costs of the recommendation. The report also states that the Secretary of Transportation shall award grants to States to help them conform to the minimum standards and that each State shall receive a minimum allocation of grant monies to help offset the costs of implementing the new Federal standards.

I am happy to yield.

The Senator from New Hampshire is correct, and I would also point out that the White House has also weighed in on that issue. In its statement of administration policy, dated October 7, 2004, the White House emphasized the need for ``consultation with the states . . . to address important concerns about flexibility, privacy, and unfunded mandates.'' This conference report maintains those important aspects of the approach in the Senate bill.

I see the distinguished Senator from Connecticut is on the floor and I wonder if the ranking Democrat on the Governmental Affairs Committee, who is the expert on this issue, would be willing to engage in this dialog.

I absolutely agree with the Senator from Connecticut that the negotiated rulemaking process has to include groups that represent the interest of many interested parties, including the States, and applicants for, and holders of, driver's licenses. It is also important to note the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal entities will represent the security interests of the Federal Government in the process.

This collaborative process among all parties is essential to ensure that the final rule strikes the right balance of all the competing interests. One of the interests that should not be lost in this debate is the need for protecting privacy and civil and due process rights of all applicants for, and holders of, driver's licenses and personal identification cards. 1 believe it is crucial that the American people be assured that these new Federal standards will not encroach on their fundamental rights and that their personal information will be handled properly, respectfully, and securely.

That is why we included language in the conference report that specifically requires the agency rulemaking to include procedural safeguards for the privacy rights of applicants and holders of driver's licenses and identification cards.

I thank the Senators from New Hampshire, New Jersey, Illinois, and the distinguished ranking member for their comments, their valuable contributions to this bill, and for participating in this colloquy.

dni, nctc

Mr. President, the legislation that is before the Senate remedies the problem identified by the 9/11 Commission that there is no one in charge of the U.S intelligence community. The Commission found that the Director of Central Intelligence, DCI, has too many jobs-- namely leader of the intelligence community, principal intelligence adviser to the President, and director of the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA--to do any of them effectively. In addition, the Commission found that the DCI lacks sufficient authority to manage the Intelligence Community, including authority over funding, personnel, security, and technology.

The intelligence community is dominated by its component agencies and is organized into ``stovepipes'' that do not share information adequately among themselves and with the rest of government effectively. The DCI lacks the authority to break-down these stovepipes and transform the Intelligence Community into a 21st century enterprise.

The intelligence community needs to operate as a network in order to counter 21st century terrorist networks and other agile foes. Despite many impressive accomplishments since the 9/11 attacks, the intelligence community is unable to transform itself into a network due to its anachronistic structure and is still oriented toward fighting the bureaucratic nation-state enemies of the Cold War.

In response to the 9/11 Commission's findings, this legislation restructures the intelligence community by creating a strong Director of National Intelligence, DNI, who can lead, shape, and transform the 15 organizations of the intelligence community into a cohesive network. It creates a DNI who has the authority needed to set the course for the intelligence community and ensure that the course is followed.

It is fitting that this legislation should be completed during the week of December 7, the day on which the United States was attacked at Pearl Harbor in 1941. The National Security Act of 1947 was adopted in order to prevent another Pearl Harbor attack in the Cold War. This legislation seeks to enable the intelligence community to prevent another 9/11 attack from terrorists and other adversaries in the 21st century.

Under this legislation, the DNI has two primary responsibilities.

First, the DNI is the head of the intelligence community. In this capacity, the DNI will unify and optimize the resources of the intelligence community to serve the President, the National Security Council, and other intelligence consumers. The direct locus of the DNI's authority is the National Intelligence Program, which is the new name for the National Foreign Intelligence Program. The renaming of the program signifies that the national security threats of the 21st century straddle the foreign/domestic divide and that our Intelligence Community must have capabilities that cross this seam.

Second, the DNI is the principal intelligence adviser to the President. Accordingly, the DNI, not the CIA Director, will be responsible for briefing the President, including the President's daily brief. As the President's principal intelligence adviser, the DNI will rely on the National Counterterrorism Center and the National Counter Proliferation Center; additional National Intelligence Centers established by the DNI, which will have primary responsibility for analysis of particular topics or matters; the National Intelligence Council; and all of the analysts who reside within the various agencies of the Intelligence Community.

Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut explain the National Intelligence Centers and their purpose?

I thank the Senator and concur with his description of the centers.

This bill provides the DNI with significant new authorities regarding such areas as determining the National Intelligence Program budget and executing its appropriation, transferring funds and personnel, and reprogramming funds. I would like to summarize some of these critical authorities.

Under this bill, the DNI will have sole authority to ``develop and determine'' an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program based on the budget proposals provided by the heads of the agencies and organizations of the intelligence community as well as these agencies' and organizations' respective department heads. The word ``determine'' in the legislation means that the DNI is the decisionmaker regarding the budget and does not share

this authority with any department head. The DNI is to produce a consolidated annual budget for the National Intelligence Program, which ensures the integration of the agencies and entities within the intelligence community.

The heads of such agencies and organizations within the intelligence community must provide directly to the DNI such other information as the DNI requests for the purpose of determining the budget. Thus, the DNI will have direct access to information from such agencies as the National Security Agency in the budget-build process and so be able to understand the needs of each component of the Intelligence Community when determining the annual consolidated national intelligence budget. The department heads may not interpose themselves between the DNI and the heads of agencies and organizations within the intelligence community.

Whereas the DCI today effectively only has a role in the execution of the CIA budget, the DNI will ``ensure the effective execution'' of the entire National Intelligence Program appropriation across the intelligence community. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, OMB, for instance, must apportion National Intelligence Program funds--whether for the CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI, National Security Agency, or any other element of the intelligence community--at the DNI's ``exclusive direction.'' The DNI's ``exclusive direction'' is intended to extend to apportionment plans as well, which delineate how appropriated funds will flow from the U.S. Treasury to the agencies and entities of the intelligence community. The DNI is further responsible for managing the National Intelligence Program appropriation by ``directing the allotment or allocation'' of such appropriation through the heads of departments containing elements of the intelligence community. Department comptrollers must then allot, allocate, reprogram, or transfer those funds ``in an expeditious manner.''

In order to ensure that the National Intelligence Program budget is executed in accordance with the DNI's direction, the DNI will ``monitor the implementation and execution'' of the appropriation, including by audits and evaluations. A department, agency, or entity has no authority to refuse or obstruct DNI-mandated audits. If department comptrollers act in a manner inconsistent with the DNI's directions, then the DNI shall report such action to the President and to Congress within 15 days. I expect that the DNI will need to create a chief financial officer with comptroller-like responsibilities to implement these authorities.

Some observers have raised concerns regarding whether departmental comptrollers are able to `tax' the National Intelligence Program appropriation channeled through their departments in order to pay for fact-of-life costs such as increased fuel costs. The legislation precludes any reprogramming or transfer of funds from the National Intelligence Program without the DNI's consent. In addition, apportionment plans--in which any `taxes' would have to be reflected-- are to be prepared at the DNI's exclusive direction. Accordingly, under this legislation, comptrollers are not authorized to exact such `taxes' unilaterally. Congressionally mandated cuts will also be implemented through the apportionment process, which will occur at the exclusive direction of the DNI.

We have worked closely with White House, OMB, and the National Security Council staff in developing this budget language, and all agree that this language will provide the new DNI with the full budget authority needed to manage the national intelligence budget and appropriation effectively.

The new DNI will also have significantly expanded authorities to transfer personnel and funds. After OMB's approval and congressional notification, the DNI may transfer personnel from one element of the intelligence community to another for not more than 2 years as long as the transfer is for a higher priority intelligence activity and supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency. Most significantly, while personnel transfers must be made in accordance with procedures developed by the DNI and department heads, those department heads will no longer have the right to object to such transfers--as they do under current law. Finally, the DNI is also provided additional authorities to transfer a limited number of personnel upon the establishment of the Office of the DNI and each time a new National Intelligence Center is created.

As I mentioned, National Intelligence Program funds may not be transferred or reprogrammed without the DNI's approval except in accordance with procedures prescribed by the DNI. All transfers and reprogrammings must be for a higher priority intelligence activity; must support an emergent need, improve program effectiveness, or increase efficiency; and may not involve funds from the CIA Reserve for Contingencies or a DNI Reserve for Contingencies. Most importantly, the DNI will not require concurrence for such transfers or reprogrammings from affected department heads as long as they are less than $150 million and 5 percent of a department's National Intelligence Program funds and do not terminate an acquisition program. Thus, the DNI will have unilateral authority to transfer or reprogram a significant National Intelligence Program funds, subject to OMB approval and congressional notification. Permit me to take a moment to mention the DNI Reserve for Contingencies. I believe that creation of this reserve is important to permit the DNI to meet special circumstances that arise.

The DNI is also responsible for overseeing the coordination of the intelligence community's liaison with foreign intelligence and security services to avoid having each agency of the intelligence community pursue an individualistic approach. The DNI will create common policies and strategy among the various entities in the intelligence community to ensure maximum returns from foreign liaison relationships. In implementing the DNI's strategy, the CIA will coordinate foreign liaison ``on the ground'' in foreign countries.

The DNI should be in the chain of command involving the conduct of covert action and will be responsible and accountable to the President for such conduct by the intelligence community, including their funding. The DNI would be undercut if the President interacted directly with the CIA Director--who is the DNI's subordinate--or any other element of the Intelligence Community directly regarding covert action. Instead, this legislation envisions that the President will give orders regarding covert action directly to the DNI, who will then task the CIA and other agencies of the Intelligence community as appropriate.

I thank the Senator and agree with his statements. I previously discussed the purpose of the Office of the DNI, which is to house entities such as the centers which integrate and unify the efforts of the various intelligence agencies to accomplish intelligence missions. The legislation authorizes the DNI to create new entities within the Office of the DNI to respond to new challenges, such as new centers and ad hoc groups.

The legislation also authorizes the DNI to coordinate the performance by elements of the intelligence community of services of common concern that can be more efficiently accomplished in a consolidated manner. For example, there may be information technology services, security services, and personnel services that are being performed in duplicative or competitive manner by various entities across the intelligence community and that the DNI believes would be more efficiently performed--such as by exploiting economies of scale, or preventing discrepancies between agencies--when done in consolidated manner. The DNI may select one entity within the intelligence community to perform those services for the community. The DNI may also create a new entity within the Office of the DNI to perform such services. I expect that the DNI will exercise this authority in order to streamline the intelligence community, reduce discrepancies across agencies, and save resources that can be devoted to producing better intelligence.

I want to highlight two other DNI authorities. Current law precludes the DCI from directing, managing, or undertaking electronic surveillance or physical searches under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA unless otherwise authorized by statute or executive order. This legislation also precludes the DNI from directing or undertaking such operations. As the legislation makes clear, the role of the Department of Justice and the Attorney General under FISA are unaffected by this legislation. However, this legislation does delete a restriction that now precludes the DNI from managing FISA collection. This change should better ensure that national intelligence collected under FISA is used efficiently and effectively for national purposes.

Current law also makes the CIA the manager of all human intelligence operations. The legislation changes that formulation, authorizing the CIA to manage human intelligence operations abroad. The intent of the legislation is not to have human intelligence operations split among the CIA, the FBI, and elements of other agencies with no one in charge. Instead, it is the DNI who is in charge. Of course, the DNI should not be spending his or her day managing human intelligence operations. Instead, the DNI should delegate his or her authority to an official within the intelligence community, when appropriate.

Indeed, the issue of delegation is critical. This legislation centralizes authority in the DNI in order to clarify responsibility, authority, and accountability for the intelligence community. However, the intent of this legislation is not that the DNI should retain all authority himself or herself. Like any good CEO, the DNI should delegate and decentralize. This legislation centralizes authority so that the DNI can build a network--with information, resources, and personnel flowing freely across the agencies of the intelligence community--that operates in a decentralized, fast, and flexible manner. For example, the DNI should delegate authority to the heads of the National Intelligence Centers so that they can utilize capabilities throughout the intelligence community to accomplish intelligence missions.

Included in this legislation is very strong tasking authority for the DNI. Under current law, the DCI has authority to task assets across the intelligence community to collect information. Pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947 as amended, the DCI controls the tasking of national intelligence assets. Section 403-3 of Title 50, United States Code, states explicitly that the DCI ``determine[s] collection priorities, and resolve[s] conflicts in collection priorities levied on national collection assets.'' The President's latest Executive Order 13355 on the issue is even stronger: It gives the DCI authority to ``manage collection tasking.'' This language is interpreted in practice that the DCI decides whether a satellite is to be positioned over North Korea or Iraq. Of course, the DCI consults closely with the Secretary of Defense--but the DCI is the final decision-maker. And there is no evidence that the military has been dissatisfied in recent conflicts with the supply of intelligence from national collection assets.

The legislation's provision regarding tasking authority merely sharpens current law by making the DNI's authority to task collection and analysis explicit. In this way, the bill essentially codifies current practice.

The DNI's tasking authority will be critical to the DNI's success. The 9/11 Commission envisioned a strong, empowered DNI, with more--not less--authority to control the collection and analysis of intelligence information. The Commission cites specifically the DCI's limited ability ``to influence how . . . technical resources are allocated and used'' as a problem. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 409. In a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on August 17, 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld spoke of the need to rebuild the intelligence community ``along 21st century lines.'' According to Secretary Rumsfeld, this reorganization includes ``a national intelligence director with authority for tasking collection assets across the government.''

This legislation includes a provision that the Senator from Connecticut and I drafted requiring that the President issue guidelines to ensure the effective implementation and execution within the Executive branch of the authorities granted to the DNI under this legislation, in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of department heads. The interaction among the DNI, department heads, and heads of agencies and entities within the intelligence community is critical and must be as smooth and efficient as possible. These guidelines will be important for ensuring such seamless interaction.

This provision does not authorize the President or department heads to override the DNI's authority as contained in this legislation. This legislation has carefully crafted authorities for the DNI--including budget, transfer, tasking, et cetera--that give the DNI sufficient authority to manage the Intelligence Community. This provision is not intended and should not in practice trump or undermine in any way the DNI's authorities contained in the legislation.

In addition, the legislation amends the Secretary of Defense's authority to implement the DNI's decisions regarding the National Intelligence Program, contained in section 105(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 as amended, to ensure that the Secretary of Defense does not interact with the Intelligence Community in a way that is inconsistent with the DNI's authorities. This provision is another example of Congress's intent to create a strong

DNI with sufficient authority to manage and be accountable for the Intelligence Community, including those elements within the Department of Defense.

Some observers have raised concerns that this legislation will impede the flow of intelligence to the warfighter. I believe that nothing is further from the truth. The warfighter will benefit from far-reaching intelligence reorganization that creates a DNI with significant authorities. The DNI will have the power to force the various Defense and non-Defense intelligence entities to work together seamlessly, creating a more accurate intelligence product that can be shared more quickly than today. The DNI would also be a single point of contact for the military--and the military would know whom to hold responsible if intelligence from national assets is inadequate. The DNI inevitably will prioritize the warfighter's need for intelligence, subject to the direction of the President as to overall intelligence priorities.

I thank the Senator from Connecticut and agree with his statements. Mr. President, I wonder if my distinguished colleague from Connecticut would be kind enough to describe the National Counterterrorism Center provision in our bill.

I thank my colleague and agree with his statements. The new DNI will not need to create a staff from scratch to manage the intelligence community. Today, the DCI relies on the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, DDCI/CM, and that official's staff to coordinate the activities of the intelligence community. This professional staff already has substantial experience that will be invaluable to the DNI in managing the intelligence community. This legislation supplants the DDCI/CM but transfers the official's staff as the DNI considers appropriate to the Office of the DNI. The DNI can then build on this staff as necessary to implement the DNI's new authorities.

Finally, I would like to describe the implementation of this legislation. The legislation does not permit the current DCI to become the DNI without going through the Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation process for the DNI position. This legislation gives the DNI different authorities and responsibilities than the DCI has today. As such, the Senate will need to provide advice and consent to the President's selection for the DNI.

Title I of the intelligence reform legislation takes effect not later than six months after the Act's enactment. The legislation envisions that the President will decide upon the effective date for title I and may effectuate parts of title I at different times within that 6-month period. For example, the President could decide that all or parts of title I become effective upon the confirmation of the DNI. Until such time as the President determines--but in no event later than six months after enactment--the DCI will remain head of the intelligence community and the DDCI/CM and the various assistant DCIs will continue to report to him. The legislation requires that the President submit an implementation report to Congress not later than 180 days after the act's effective date, but it is desirable that this report be submitted as soon as possible.

Some provisions in title I explicitly state that they are effective on the act's date of enactment, namely the transfer of the TTIC or its successor to the NCTC and the transfer of the staff of the DDCI/CM to the Office of the DNI as appropriate. The NCTC has already been created by Executive order, absorbing the TTIC. With respect to the staff of the DDCI/CM, that staff does not cease to exist upon the act's enactment but rather becomes available for transfer to the Office of the DNI after the Office of the DNI is established.

This legislation requires the DNI to take various actions within 180 days of the act's enactment, including submitting a report to Congress concerning operational coordination between the CIA and the Defense Department, assigning an individual or entity to be responsible for analytic integrity, and identifying an individual to serve as an ombudsman. The DNI also shall prescribe regulations and other directives not later than one year after the act's enactment. Thus we hope that the President will move speedily to nominate an individual to serve as the DNI. The threats arrayed against the United States do not afford us a grace period.

information sharing

I agree wholeheartedly with my colleague about the importance of these information sharing provisions. I also want to emphasize that the ISE is not some mammoth new database. Indeed, it is not just technology, but rather represents a combination of technologies and policies designed to facilitate the appropriate sharing of terrorism information.

Section 1016 includes a list of attributes the ISE is required to have. These include such things as facilitating the sharing of information among those who have differing levels of access or clearance or different capacities to make use of the information--i.e., providing information from the beginning in its most shareable form, so that the maximum number of individuals can access the information in at least some meaningful form at its earliest point of consumability-- while having additional details available to those who are granted appropriate access; in this way, the right information gets to the right consumer at the right time. It also includes building on existing systems where possible, rather than creating whole new, and potentially overlapping, systems, and employs an information access management approach that controls access to the data rather than just systems and networks without sacrificing security. And it includes incorporating protections for individuals' privacy and civil liberties from the very beginning--both in the policies of the environment and in technologies and processes to ensure that the policies are adhered to.

In addition to the step-by-step development process my colleague has described, I would also note that the other key means by which the legislation seeks to ensure the successful implementation of the ISE is through the appointment of a program manager. Not later than 120 days after enactment of the legislation, the President is required to designate an individual who is to be responsible for information sharing across the Federal Government. By placing a single individual in charge of the development of the ISE, the legislation seeks to ensure the accountability and focus necessary to accomplish this critically important task.

Although the President has discretion to determine whom to designate as program manager, it is essential, and required by subsection 1016(f)(1), that the program manager have and exercise government-wide authority; the ISE will involve the sharing of terrorism-related information from across the government, including from entities outside the intelligence community--whether bioterror information from the Centers for Disease Control or relevant border information from Customs and immigration offices at the Department of Homeland Security--so that the program manager will be someone with responsibilities that cut across the Federal Government as well. Although the DNI is, and will continue to be, responsible for setting information sharing standards throughout the intelligence community (a responsibility expressly recognized in subsection 1016(e)(10)(A)), it is not our intent that the DNI also assume the further responsibilities of program manager. We expect and intend that whomever is designated as program manager will have the development of the ISE as their sole or primary responsibility, and we believe that it is desirable that the individual have management expertise in enterprise architecture, information sharing and interoperability.

The legislation provides that the program manager is to serve for 2 years, during the initial development of the ISE, to ensure that the project gets off to a sound start. As part of the implementation plan to be submitted to Congress after one year, the program manager is to recommend a future management structure for the ISE, including a recommendation as to whether the position of program manager should continue. During this two-year start up period, the program manager will be assisted in his or her efforts by an Information System Council established by the legislation and based on the existing Information System Council established by the President through executive order. The council, made up of representatives from agencies participating in the ISE, will not only advise the President and the program manager, but also, among other things, provide a means of coordinating among the various agencies participating in the ISE, helping to resolve interagency disputes that may arise. In performing its duties, the council is to consider input from those outside the Federal Government as well--including state, local, and tribal officials and those in the private sector who are potential participants in the ISE or who have relevant policy or technical expertise.

I also note the legislation provides that the individual agencies that possess terrorism information or otherwise participate in the ISE are to fully

cooperate in the development of the ISE. The cooperation of all relevant agencies is critical to the success of this government-wide information sharing effort, and agencies can expect Congressional oversight to ensure that they are planning for, and fully contributing to, the construction of the ISE.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board

Specifically, the board established in the bill is to be made up of five members, who are to be appointed by, and serve at the pleasure of, the President. Two of the five members--the chairman and vice-chairman--are also required to be Senate-confirmed. To help ensure an independent and effective board, all of the members are to come from outside the federal government and are expected to be people of stature, selected on the basis of their achievements, experience and independence. All of the members of the board are expected to devote significant time to this important endeavor, and the chairman may be appointed to a full-time position; given the broad responsibilities of the board, we believe that having a full-time chairman though not required would usually be the wisest course.

The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight board's purpose is to ensure that privacy and civil liberties concerns are appropriately considered in the implementation of all laws, regulations, and policies that are related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism. The board is empowered to carry out its mission in two equally important ways. First, the board is to advise policy makers at the front end, to ensure that when executive branch officials are proposing, making or implementing policy, they appropriately consider and protect privacy and civil liberties. Second, the board is to conduct oversight, by investigating and reviewing government actions at the back end, reviewing the implementation of particular government policies to see whether the government is acting with appropriate respect for privacy and civil liberties and adhering to applicable rules. Further, the bill provides the board with the tools it will need to carry out its functions.

I thank my colleague for his clear explanation. Just as important to the other authorities provided to the board is ensuring some transparency of the activities of the board. Transparency helps to give confidence to the American people that the protection of their civil liberties and privacy is being addressed as we take actions to further protect our Nation from terrorism. To that end, the board is to report to Congress at least annually on its activities, and may do so more frequently, as would be expected should the board complete an important investigation or otherwise make findings or recommendations of which Congress would wish to be apprised. The bill requires that the board's reports to Congress be unclassified to the greatest extent possible, in order to facilitate public discussion of the board's activities; where it is necessary to include classified information in the reports, it is to be included in a separate classified annex. Whether and when to release reports directly to the public or to otherwise engage in activities that directly involve and inform

the public is left to the discretion of the board, but we believe that given the public importance of the issues entrusted to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, openness is called for and will ultimately foster public trust that the government is appropriately protecting privacy and civil liberties as it continues to vigorously fight the war on terror.

Also intended to foster this public trust is the fact that, while the board is exempted from the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act because, as a permanent, ongoing entity, it does not fit comfortably into the mold of the usual subjects of that act, the board is expressly subject to the Freedom of Information Act, like any other agency.

I would like to thank my friend for working with me on these very important provisions. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, during his joint address to Congress, the President called on all Americans to ``uphold the values of America and remember why so many have come here. We're in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them.'' Indeed, as we improve government to better secure our Nation against future attacks, we must at the same time protect those American values that define our free society. These freedoms and values are what define us as Americans and what defines our Nation. Since the inception of our Nation, there has been much sacrifice in order for us to have the freedoms we enjoy today. These liberties are what have been entrusted to us to protect. That is why, as we protect our Nation from future terrorist attacks, we also must ensure that we do no trample on the very values that the terrorists seek to destroy.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a list of my staff members who worked so hard on this bill over so many months be printed in the Record at this point.

Mr. President, I also want to list the conferees on this bill. Contrary, perhaps, to the implications of what we have just heard, this was an extraordinarily open conference, where Democrats and Republicans negotiated side by side in every single meeting. It was a bipartisan effort.

Senators Lott, Roberts, Voinovich, Coleman, Sununu, DeWine, Levin, Rockefeller, Durbin, Graham of Florida, and Senator Lautenberg were the Senate conferees on this important bill. I thank each of them personally for how hard they worked. Each of them contributed greatly to the final product, and I am very grateful for their support.

I wish to also respond to the concept that somehow this issue was rushed. The fact is there have been numerous reports and commissions that have urged intelligence reform going back to 1954. Over and over again, problems were identified in our intelligence structure, even as our country became more vulnerable to asymmetric threats, such as terrorist groups.

The 9/11 Commission, which did, in my view, an outstanding job, reviewed more than 2.5 million pages of documents, interviewed more than 1,200 individuals, held 19 days of hearings, and took public testimony from 160 witnesses. Congress held 44 hearings on the 9/11 Commission's report and recommendations.

The Governmental Affairs Committee, which I am honored to chair, alone held 8 days of hearings and marked up this legislation for 2 full days. We were on the Senate floor for nearly 2 weeks. We considered hundreds of amendments to this bill. The conference on the bill lasted nearly 2 months and received a great deal of attention.

I note that we have made substantive changes to only two provisions in the conference report since November 20 when the conference agreement almost came to the Senate floor.

The November 20 language was widely circulated. It included being provided to the staff of the distinguished senior Senator from West Virginia.

I assert that this was an extraordinarily inclusive process, and all the Members of the Senate have had ample time to review the conference report since, with just two exceptions, which have been highly publicized. It is the same language, for the most part, except for technical changes, as we reported it on November 20.

I wanted to make those points. I know there are other Members desiring

to speak. I will yield the floor, but I reserve the remainder of my time.

Finally, Mr. President, I note that the Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Sununu, wishes to speak in favor of the conference report. I am prepared to yield him some of my time, but I am not certain how much time I have remaining. If I could be informed by the Presiding Officer as to how much time I have remaining, that would be helpful.

I will yield at the appropriate time 5 of my remaining minutes to the Senator from New Hampshire. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I do want to clarify apart from this issue that I believe there was an informal--I thought we had made it formal--understanding that Senator Stevens would follow Senator Byrd's remarks, and Senator Warner would follow Senator Stevens' remarks. But all the Senator from Florida is trying to do--and I very much appreciate his endorsement of the bill--is to yield back the remainder of Senator Byrd's time at the request of Senator Byrd.

Mr. President, let me make a brief comment in response to the recent discussion on the chain of command language.

First, I am very pleased we were able to reach agreement with the chairman of the House and Senate Armed Services Committee on this language. Since I did not see the documents that the chairman put into the Record, I state very clearly for the record that nothing in the final language in this bill in any way weakened the authority of the new National Intelligence Director.

In fact, the Director of National Intelligence will have significant budgetary and other authorities and that makes sense. We do not want to create just another layer of bureaucracy. We do not want to create a figurehead. We want to empower this individual with the authority to be able to marshal the resources to counter the very serious threats we face both today and in the future.

In my judgment, nothing in this bill has ever hindered military operations or readiness, but I am pleased we were able to draft some additional language that has provided some comfort to those who were concerned.

All Members have our first priority to the brave men and women who are fighting on the front lines of freedom. That is why this bill was very carefully drafted to keep tactical and joint military intelligence programs under the exclusive control of the Pentagon but to make sure those national assets which serve multiple customers--including the President's National Security Council, our covert agents in the CIA, as well as our military--to ensure that those assets are controlled by the Director of National Intelligence just as today they are controlled by the Director of the CIA in his role as head of the intelligence community.

I am told by those who have worked entire careers with the CIA that the Department of Defense has always been very happy with the relationship that allows a priorities committee to work out and resolve any conflicts in the use of these national assets. Certainly, this language and this bill as a whole, the reorganization as a whole, will improve the quality of intelligence that is provided to our troops, as well as making civilians at home safer. That is our goal. That is what this legislation achieves.

Mr. President, the Senator from Arizona has arrived. He has been a stalwart proponent of reform. He has worked very closely with Senator Lieberman and me. I am very grateful for his leadership and support.

Mr. President, we are on the verge of voting on historic legislation, landmark legislation that will reform our intelligence structure to allow us to better fight the war against terrorism and to counter future security threats. We will be taking a structure that is characterized by stovepipes, by a lack of sharing of information, that was so indicated in the 9/11 Commission Report as being a major cause of intelligence failures. The 9/11 Commission, over and over again, described the good people in our Government straining against structures that did not allow them to communicate effectively vital information; thus, no one assembled the pieces of the puzzle that might have allowed us to detect the hijackers' plot against our country.

We have reorganized the intelligence agencies into a new structure where one person clearly will be accountable and responsible. The new Director of National Intelligence will be able to marshall the resources we need to counter the threat to our citizens. We have a National Counterterrorism Center, a National Counterproliferation Center designed to bring together analysts from all the agencies so they can pool their talents, analyze the intelligence, and produce better informed reports.

This legislation will help make America more secure, and that is what this entire debate is all about. As my colleague, Senator Lieberman, has eloquently stated: The status quo failed us. Our bill may not be perfect. As the Presiding Officer indicated, no bill is. But it represents an enormous improvement over the status quo.

We cannot turn away from the intelligence failures that have cost the lives of thousands of American citizens. We have to act. I am very proud that the Senate today will approve historic legislation that will make our country more secure.

Mr. President, I know Senator Frist plans to come down and speak right before the vote, and he has arrived on cue. I do want to take this opportunity to request the yeas and nays.

I thank all of my colleagues for their help and support.

I ask unanimous consent floor privileges be extended to Deborah Barger, a CMA detailee in my office, for the duration of today's consideration of S. 2845.

I ask unanimous consent that the staff members of the Senate Intelligence Committee be given floor privileges during consideration of the intelligence reform conference report.

Mr. President, Don Nickles first came to the Senate in 1980 as a young man of 31 with a vision. He now leaves us, 24 years later, with a record we all can envy and a reputation we all should emulate. There are a lot of words that can be used to describe this man. Perhaps these five describe him best: ``As good as his word.''

In his eloquent eulogy to Ronald Reagan this summer, Don said that those who came to Washington after the watershed election of 1980, ``considered ourselves part of the soldiers in the field trying to get an agenda done to expand freedom.''

There is no more noble an agenda than the expansion of freedom, and he has been a devoted soldier to that cause. He has been a strong advocate for our Armed Forces, dedicated to the defense of our Nation and to the expansion of liberty around the world.

He has been equally devoted to the freedom that comes from responsible, less intrusive and more accountable government. He is a champion of effective economic-growth policies, and of tax reform that encourages investment and helps build strong families and communities. Don Nickles has always been of the side of the American people. His tenure as chairman of the Budget Committee will long be held up as a model of effective leadership, a cooperative spirit wedded to rock- solid principles.

Don comes from a small State and from a background in small business. That we have not always agreed on every issue is insignificant. What does matter is the values we share and the friendship that is the result.

Don is much more than just an especially effective legislator and a very good friend. When Oklahoma City was struck by a heinous act of terrorism in 1995, he was there for the people of his State, offering comfort and support. The rebuilding, both material and spiritual, would not have been so quickly and thoroughly accomplished without the strength of Don Nickles.

He came here as a young man and, despite the passage of 24 years, leaves as a young man. And, I might add, as a pretty fast man. In the New York Marathon last weekend, Oklahoma's senior senator finished in the top half of a field of more than 36,000 runners. If there was a caucus for Senators able to run more than 26 miles in less than 4\1/2\ hours, I believe it would be the smallest in the history of the republic.

Thank you, Senator Don Nickles, for your service to this institution and to this country. Whatever path the future sets before you, I know you will be at the front of the pack.

ernest hollings

Mr. President, as I was listening to the Senator from Nevada, it brought back memories of the night when he started reading from a book he wrote. I think it was about, if I remember correctly, Searchlight, NV. I was listening that evening to him, and much to my surprise, I actually got caught up in the story of Searchlight, NV. It was delightfully told, and although the Senator was clearly killing time that evening, I learned a lot about his upbringing and his talent in telling a story.

This afternoon, I feel we have once again seen his talent in telling a story. I think it is unfortunate that the Senator from Nevada is personalizing this debate. This debate has nothing to do with the Senator from Maine. The authority over homeland security could have been given to a brandnew committee or some other committee.

What is important to me is that we try to address the recommendation made by the 9/11 Commission. I want to read that recommendation because it is very clear, it is very straightforward. It says:

Congress should create a single, principal point of

oversight and review for homeland security.

It goes on to say:

Congress does have the obligation to choose one in the

House and one in the Senate. . . .

It certainly says the congressional leaders are best able to judge which committee should have jurisdiction over this Department and its duties, but it makes very clear that it should be a single committee, and we have not come close to doing this.

I admire the Senator from Nevada. He was extremely helpful to me when I was managing the intelligence reform bill over 10 days' time. I looked to him often for advice. I admire his experience and his knowledge, but the recommendation is very clear. It says ``a single, principal point of oversight.'' It says ``choose one.'' It does not say which one. It did not have to be Governmental Affairs. It could have been a new committee. It could have been some other committee. But it says ``choose one,'' and we did not choose one. This plan does not even come close to choosing one.

We know that between the House and the Senate, the Department has to report to some 88 committees and subcommittees. Here in the Senate, I think it is around 26 committees and subcommittees. We reduced those by maybe one or two. We still have the Judiciary Committee with significant jurisdiction. We still have the Commerce Committee with jurisdiction over the two largest agencies within the Department of Homeland Security--the Transportation Security Agency and the Coast Guard. You can make a case that the Coast Guard has a lot of nonhomeland security functions, but certainly the homeland security functions of the Coast Guard should have been transferred to the new committee. And certainly the TSA, the largest agency within the Department of Homeland Security with 51,000 employees, should have been transferred.

Under the proposal of the Senator from Nevada and the Senator from Kentucky, certain responsibilities were transferred from the Judiciary Committee, but those have been reversed in the course of this debate. In fact, the first amendment on the floor had to do with a Customs responsibility that had been transferred, and before either the Senator from Maine or the Senator from Connecticut were even given the courtesy of a phone call about that amendment, it was adopted by the managers of the bill. They immediately transferred away from the new committee some jurisdiction. Then they went on to suggest the adoption of other amendments as well.

My point is this: This jurisdiction does not have to come to Governmental Affairs, but what it should go to is a single committee. We should not pretend we are fulfilling the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission--the very specific recommendation of the 9/11 Commission-- that Congress should vest this responsibility in a single committee because we have not come close to that.

That is the issue. The issue is not whether Governmental Affairs is the right committee. The issue is not whether Governmental Affairs has other jurisdiction. The issue is, are we going to try to follow the recommendation--the very strong recommendation--of the 9/11 Commission to consolidate oversight of the Department within one congressional committee. Are we going to follow the advice--no, the plea--of Secretary Tom Ridge that we consolidate jurisdiction so he and his top officials do not have to be constantly racing up to the Hill to testify rather than concentrating on the security of our country, because that is what this is about.

This is not about turf battles--this should not be about turf battles. This should not be about power plays. This should not be about power grabs. It is about how we can best improve congressional oversight over a department that is critical to the security of this

country, and that is the Department of Homeland Security.

The Senator from Nevada referred to the Senator from Connecticut. Perhaps he missed some of the debate yesterday. He is extremely attentive to the floor, but at times did step out. The Senator from Connecticut could not have made clearer yesterday his disappointment with this resolution, and he argued against the amendments that even the modest transfers provided in the Reid-McConnell resolution.

The staff of the Senator from Connecticut has told me they are certain the Senator from Connecticut would want me, since he is not able to be here today, to make very clear to his colleagues in the Senate that he shares, indeed he mirrors, my concerns.

The Senator from Connecticut has worked very hard to make sure the major recommendations of the 9/11 Commission are implemented, and that is not what we are doing here.

At best, we are taking a very modest step forward, but let's not pretend that we are in any way implementing the recommendations for a single congressional committee in the Senate to have jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. President, if we are going to create jurisdiction in one committee for homeland security, let's do it. Let's not pretend that we are doing it. Let's not do it in name only. As a result of the proposal put before the Senate with its exclusions and the amendment adopted this morning, as the Senator from Arizona indicated, the homeland security committee would have exclusive jurisdiction over less than 38 percent of the Department's budget.

It would have exclusive jurisdiction over fewer than 8 percent of the Department's employees. That is 13,000 employees out of 175,000 employees. There are more amendments filed that would take still more agencies away from the committee's jurisdiction.

The Senator is correct.

No.

The fact is that Congress has held 312 hearings over the past 2 years on homeland security. The Department has conducted 2,200 briefings. There are 25 Senate committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security. This is an intolerable situation for the Department. It is why the Department and the President are pleading with us to consolidate all of the Department under one authorizing committee.

They would testify all over. They testified before 88-- --

Well, that is a good question. I have had hearings. Other hearings have been held. Twenty-five Senate committees and subcommittees have a claim over DHS. It is why Secretary Ridge called up in desperation and said: Please give us some relief from this. This is intolerable. We are supposed to be running the Department. Instead, we are constantly testifying.

Mr. President, I want to clarify the issue. It is not just TSA and the homeland security functions of the Coast Guard that are not transferred to the new homeland security committee. It is the immigration functions of the bureaus of Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Citizenship and Immigration Services stay now in the Judiciary Committee. Certain functions of the bureaus of Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement stay in Finance. So I think if we add in all of the exclusions, then we get to the percentages that I quoted.

I say to my colleagues, my point is this: Are we going to do this or not? If we are not going to consolidate all of the functions of the Department of Homeland Security under one authorizing committee, as they are under one appropriations subcommittee, appropriately so, then let us not pretend that we are.

I would be happy to yield.

The primary role of the Coast Guard today is port security. It has in some ways taken away from its many other important functions in fisheries enforcement and regulation, for example.

The Coast Guard would remain in the Commerce Committee.

The point is this: The administration has called for this consolidation. Let us either do it or not do it, but let us not pretend we are doing it by changing the name of a committee but only transferring to its exclusive jurisdiction 38 percent of the budget and 8 percent of the people.

If some of the pending amendments are approved, such as one to no longer have the Secret Service transferred, then we are just going to end up with jurisdiction over Tom Ridge's personal staff. That is about what is going to be left.

The Senator is correct. The underlying resolution as amended this morning now leaves the vast majority of the homeland security jurisdiction in committees other than in the new homeland security committee. I think that is a mistake. I think, if we are going to take that route, then we have not done the consolidation that the administration has called for.

Perhaps that is the will of this body. I understand these issues are difficult, that committees think they have a special relationship with these agencies. But let's not pretend we are consolidating agencies to parallel the consolidation that we undertook when we created the Department of Homeland Security.

The Senator is correct. That is the effect of the underlying resolution.

Amendment No. 4000 To Amendment No. 3981

Mr. President, the issue before us is really very straightforward. Do we want to reorganize the Senate to consolidate jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security within one committee or don't we? What we should not do is to pretend we are consolidating jurisdiction in one committee, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission, and as strongly endorsed by the administration and Secretary Ridge. If we are going to consolidate authority, then let's do it. If we are going to try to address the problem of 25 different Senate committees and subcommittees having a claim on the new Department, requiring testimony from officials in the Department, if we want to continue on that route, then let us not pretend we are undergoing significant reform.

Moreover, the Secret Service has responsibilities ranging from investigations of Presidential threats to protection at major events that go to the heart of the Department of Homeland Security's mission. The Secret Service is a vital part of the mission of securing the homeland. That is why it was moved into the Department of Homeland Security, and that is why if we are going to mirror the Department, it

should be under the jurisdiction of whatever committee is given responsibility for homeland security.

There are functions of the Secret Service that clearly fit with the core mission of the Department of Homeland Security. Indeed, at a hearing shortly before passage of the legislation setting up the new Department of Homeland Security, the Director of the Secret Service testified, explaining why it was important to include the Secret Service in the new Department. He stated:

Our core philosophy mirrors that of the new Department of

Homeland Security. Like our agency, the new department will

be prepared to respond to incidents and infiltration. Our

common goal is to anticipate and prepare through robust

threat assessments and analyses of intelligence information

that is made available to us.

He also stated:

Beyond our protective responsibilities, the Secret Service

is a major contributor to other aspects of our homeland

security.

He concluded his testimony by stating:

It is clear the Department of Homeland Security will be

built on the pillars of prevention and protection. These are

the very words found throughout our strategic plan. They

define the mission and the culture of the United States

Secret Service.

I know that the Secret Service enforces certain criminal laws, and it has a good relationship with the Judiciary Committee. However, the fact is, it is part of the Department of Homeland Security. If we are going to have a committee responsible for the Department of Homeland Security, we should do that. We should not exclude key agencies. Otherwise, we are defeating the whole purpose of creating new jurisdiction and trying to consolidate oversight and responsibility for the Department of Homeland Security.

I yield the floor.

I have yielded the floor.

Mr. President, the Senator from Vermont raised a rhetorical question, or at least I think it was a rhetorical question. He said, Should we put the Office of the Attorney General under the jurisdiction of the Governmental Affairs Committee? Of course, the answer to that is obviously no, because the Office of the Attorney General is not part of the Department of Homeland Security.

The issue before us is really straightforward and simple. Do we want to follow the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and Secretary Ridge and the rest of the administration and have a single authorizing committee in the House and the Senate with responsibility for the Department of Homeland Security, not responsibility for 38 percent of the Department of Homeland Security, not responsibility for 8 percent of the employees of the Department of Homeland Security? No, there isn't a recommendation to have agencies that are not part of the Department added to the jurisdiction.

The idea is to have a single authorizing committee in the House and the Senate to mirror the agencies that are in the Department of Homeland Security, to consolidate jurisdiction between the House and Senate, which is spread over 88 committees and subcommittees; so that the officials of the Department don't have to answer to so many congressional overseers that they are prevented from devoting as much attention as they need to to do their duties. That is what this debate is about.

Could we be informed as to the topic?

I thank the Senator for the explanation.

Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Alaska. I then hope we can proceed to four pending amendments of the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. President, I thank the senior Senator from Alaska for working with Senator Lieberman and me to resolve these three amendments. I very much appreciate the good-faith suggestions that were made on both sides, and I am grateful to him for working with us to address his concerns.

I think we have come up with very good suggestions, and I am pleased that the amendments have been adopted.

Mr. President, how much time does the Senator need? I believe 30 minutes has been reserved for

Senator Warner and Senator Levin of the hour and a half of debate that was available this morning.

Mr. President, I do intend to speak, so we need to reserve time. I am also concerned that the two Senators who specifically requested time have not had an opportunity to speak.

Mr. President, I have no objection.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia for his comments.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order for the Senator from Arizona and the Senator from Georgia to each have 2 minutes to discuss their amendment.

Mr. President, I thank the two Senators. I understand their concern. This issue is going to be the subject of much discussion, I am sure, in the Senate-House conference. I very much appreciate the issues they have raised. I take them seriously, and I appreciate their cooperation in withdrawing the amendment. I thank my colleagues.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we proceed to the consideration of the Roberts amendment, No. 3742, as modified.

Mr. President, I thank Senator Roberts for offering this amendment. As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, his expertise and advice on this bill have been invaluable. As he indicates, this preserves a requirement in section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 that funds appropriated for an intelligence activity must also be specifically authorized before being obligated or expended.

It is my understanding that other committees with interest in this matter have been consulted and there is no objection. I will ask for the yeas and nays.

Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Madam President, for the information of my colleagues, I am going to ask unanimous consent that we go to Senator Leahy's amendment No. 3945. I anticipate that being accepted on a voice vote. Therefore, there will be no further rollcalls until 2 o'clock, for the information of my colleagues.

Madam President, I would be glad to amend the request to make it 2:15. I ask unanimous consent that be the order.

Madam President, I appreciate the Senator from Vermont working with Senator Lieberman and me. His amendment would require the Attorney General to submit annual reports to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees on the number of translators employed or contracted for by the FBI and other components of the Department of Justice, the needs of the FBI for translation services, a description of the implementation of quality control procedures, among other provisions.

As we know, there is a serious backlog of translation in the FBI, and this sends a very strong message that Congress is going to be carefully monitoring the progress of this program.

I urge support for the amendment.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, I very much appreciate the fact that the Senator from Iowa has worked with us on it. The revised amendment, unlike the original, is one I support and I, too, urge adoption of the modified amendment.

I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed to the consideration of Levin amendment No. 3809, as modified.

Madam President, I call up a second-degree amendment to that amendment. The second degree is numbered 3962. I ask unanimous consent that it be considered.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Madam President, I am going to have Senator Levin first discuss this issue, and then Senator Lieberman and I will respond.

Madam President, the Collins-Lieberman bill grants the national intelligence director the authority to transfer personnel within the national intelligence program to meet higher priorities. This is extremely important authority because we want to make sure the NID can, for example, staff up the National Counterterrorism Center with individuals from a variety of agencies, including military personnel who may be at the Defense Intelligence Agency, for example.

But the compromise that we have reached addresses two important concerns. One, it puts a 3-year limit on the length of time for this personnel. That is important because we don't want to disrupt the military careers of individuals who are temporarily transferred. Second, it makes clear that we are talking about slots, or billets, and not individual members of the military.

In other words, the NID cannot say: I want ``Colonel Murkowski'' to go to the National Counterterrorism Center. Instead, the NID would say: I want a linguist to go to the National Counterterrorism Center, or describe what the slot may be.

I think this is a good compromise on this issue, and it leaves intact the strong authority of the national intelligence director, while addressing the legitimate concerns raised by Senator Levin.

Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Judiciary Committee be discharged from further consideration of S. 2796 and that the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be read a third time and passed, that the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the bill be printed in the Record.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 744, H.R. 1417.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment that is at the desk be agreed to, the committee-reported substitute, as amended, be agreed to, the bill, as amended, be read a third time and passed, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, en bloc, and that any statements relating to the bill be printed in the Record.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 754, S. 1134.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the substitute amendment that is at the desk be agreed to, the committee- reported amendment, as amended, be agreed to, the bill, as amended, be read a third time and passed, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, en bloc, and that any statements relating to the bill be printed in the Record.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, first, I thank the distinguished chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee for working so closely with Mr. Lieberman and me on this very important issue to set forth a process for determining what intelligence assets belong in the NIP, the national intelligence program, versus the joint military intelligence program and the tactical program.

The Collins-Lieberman bill gives the national intelligence director strong budgetary authority over the national intelligence program. Senator Lieberman and I envision that his program will be composed of the intelligence assets that serve national purposes, meaning those that pertain to the interests of more than one department.

In the long run, I strongly believe the budgets for the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office should be wholly within the national intelligence program.

Currently, these agencies have split budgets, and the heads of these agencies tell us that leads to a great deal of administrative inefficiency. Now, it is possible that some intelligence assets from the Department of Defense's Joint Military Intelligence Program may ultimately be moved to the national intelligence program, but, of course, military intelligence assets that principally serve joint or tactical military needs should stay within the Department of Defense, and I think the language is very clear on this point.

Through this amendment, we have tried to address concerns that both Senators have raised. I think the compromise language does address and alleviate those concerns. The reviews that are underway will help us better define the parts of the intelligence budget that will be completed within 1 year after the effective date, in one case 60 days, in the case that Senator Levin is concerned with the three activities in the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The reviews mandated in this compromise amendment will provide a rational process for determining which assets belong in the national intelligence program and which do not. I very much appreciate the cooperation of our colleagues, and I do urge adoption of the amendment.

Mr. President, the yeas and nays had been ordered. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the yeas and nays on this amendment be vitiated and that we have a voice vote.

Mr. President, I thank the senior Senator from Alaska for his cooperation and his many helpful suggestions for improving this bill. I have great affection and respect for the senior Senator. I very much appreciate the fact that he is going to support this bill on final passage. That means a great deal to me and will certainly assist us. I look forward to continuing to consult with him as we move through the conference process, and I will tell the senior Senator from Alaska that I am very relieved today to see that he is not wearing his ``Incredible Hulk'' tie but, rather, a very restrained tie from some national museum, I believe. I know that bodes well for the day ending well. Again, I thank the Senator. I very much enjoy working with him.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be dispensed with.

Mr. President, of all the testimony presented to the Committee on Governmental Affairs during our eight hearings on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission perhaps none was more powerful than that of Mary Fetchet. Her son, Brad, died in the World Trade Center on September 11. Here are a few of her words.

She said:

When American lives are at stake, indifference or inertia

is unacceptable. When critical reforms are implemented to

make our country safer, I will know that neither Brad's life

nor the lives of nearly 3,000 others who perished on

September 11 were lost in vain.

Throughout this debate it has been the families of the victims of 9/ 11 who have reminded us of why we are here and why these reforms are so important.

In passing the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004--as I believe we will later this afternoon--the Senate will reject indifference and inertia. We will endure critical reforms to make our country safer. We will declare that the lives lost to terrorism were not lost in vain. The action we take in their memory will benefit people of good will in this country and throughout the world today and for many years to come.

This legislation will make the most sweeping changes in our intelligence structures in more than 50 years. It is the result of enormous effort. The issues are complex and many. The timetable was tight, but the stakes were so high and the times so dangerous that we simply could not delay this urgent task. Now we are on the threshold of getting the job done and getting it done right.

I am deeply grateful to my good friend Senator Lieberman. This legislation would not have been possible without his tireless effort and his bipartisan spirit. From the moment we were first assigned the task of developing this legislation on July 22nd, our fellow members of the Governmental Affairs Committee dug in with energy and intellect. I am grateful to the Presiding Officer as one of the committee

members for his contributions. It was an August recess we will never forget.

We are very grateful to the leaders of the Senate. Senator Frist and Senator Daschle had the confidence in our committee that they felt they could charge us with this enormous and critical undertaking.

Our whips, Senator Reid and Senator McConnell, have also been very helpful. Senator Reid has been a constant presence in the Chamber throughout this debate.

We could not have accomplished all that we did without our dedicated staff, led by Michael Bopp and Joyce Rechtschaffen. We have worked so closely with them. We have worked arm in arm. They have literally worked day and night to produce this bill. I am so proud of their extraordinary efforts.

Our staffs were supplemented by hard-working detailees from the CIA, the DIA, and other agencies, as well as by members of the Commission staff who, rather than going back to their previous jobs and lives, worked with us on the committee to help give the benefit of their expertise. Without the efforts of all these staff members we never could have gotten the job done. I am very grateful to all of them.

This legislation, however, is not merely the result of months of extraordinary effort by our committee or of the expert and insightful testimony we heard from more than two dozen witnesses at eight hearings. Rather, it builds upon a rock-solid foundation laid by the 9/ 11 Commission and the investigation that it conducted over 20 months, including 19 days of hearings with 160 witnesses. I thank all Commission members for all of their extraordinary effort.

The need for reform in our intelligence system was not, however, suddenly revealed in hearings spurred by one catastrophic failure 3 years ago. The failures that led to that day are numerous and reach back many years. They were overlooked in terrorist attack after terrorist attack for more than a decade. The call for reform was made in studies, commission reports, and legislation going back half a century. It is a call we can no longer ignore.

Our committee was guided by clear principles. An intelligence community designed for the Cold War must be transformed into one designed to win the war against global terrorism and future national security threats. The new structure must build upon the strengths of the old and recognize the considerable improvements made since September 11.

The unique experience, expertise, and viewpoints of the 15 agencies that comprise our intelligence community are assets that must be preserved. The barriers to information sharing, cooperation, and coordination within the community, what the 9/11 Commission calls stovepipes, must be demolished. In their place must come a structure with the agility the times and the threats demand--not another layer of bureaucracy.

We were determined, in crafting this new structure, that we not infringe upon the freedoms that define us as Americans. The legislation that came out of our committee by a unanimous vote adhered to these important principles and it has been strengthened by the vigorous debate we have had in the Senate during the past week. The debate has not merely been vigorous but also highly informed. Throughout these proceedings, it has been clear the commitment that drove our committee to act is shared by the full Senate. From the authorities of the national intelligence director to the structure of our transformed intelligence community to the protection of civil liberties, many critical issues have been raised, debated, and resolved. I particularly thank the members of the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Appropriations Committee, particularly their chairs and ranking members. Their knowledge and their input have been invaluable.

Many important issues have been raised and will be resolved as this transformation continues. One of the most remarkable aspects of this debate has been the widespread recognition that intelligence reform is not a single act but an ongoing process.

The fundamental obligation of government is to protect its citizens and those protections must evolve to meet new threats. This legislation brings about much-needed reforms and it creates an environment in which this ongoing process can continue.

I began these remarks with a quote from a mother who has suffered the worst loss any parent can endure. She turned her loss into positive advocacy. It is Senator Byrd, however, who inspires me to end these remarks with a quote from the Constitution.

To form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure

domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote

the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to

ourselves and our Posterity . . .

The opening lines of our Constitution provide, in some ways, a job description of America's Government that is a miracle of clarity as well as an awesome challenge. Rarely does one piece of legislation encompass all of its elements or do we have the opportunity to do so in a way that clearly demonstrates the spirit that animates it. This is one of those rare times. Let us do what the times demand. Let us act to approve this legislation this afternoon and by doing so make our country safer.

Yes.

Amendment No. 3915, As Modified

Mr. President, I thank Senator Leahy for working with Senator Lieberman and me on his amendment. It requires two reports related to watch lists: one on the criteria for listing a name on the Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated watch list, and another on the effect of the ``automatic selectee'' and ``no-fly'' lists on privacy and civil liberties.

We worked with him to incorporate some modifications that make the amendment acceptable to the two managers and incorporate some recommendations from the administration.

I am well aware of some of the problems with the watch list. A constituent of mine from Camden, ME, a retired physician, has the misfortune to have a name that is identical to a name that is on the watch list. Every time he flies, he encounters great difficulties. I believe the Senator's amendment will help to address that.

It is important to ensure we are safe and that those who want to do us harm do not have access to aircraft. But at the same time we want to make sure that law-abiding travelers are not impeded from conducting their travels simply because they have the misfortune to share a name with someone on the watch list.

The process required by the Senator, I think, will be helpful. I urge adoption of the amendment.

I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, again, I thank Senator Leahy for modifying his amendment to address concerns that the manager raised. I have no objection to the modified amendment, and I urge its adoption.

I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 3913 Withdrawn

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Vermont for his cooperation on that last issue. As I have explained to my colleagues, the bill strikes a very delicate balance on the civil liberties board's power, and there were amendments to strengthen it as well as amendments to weaken it. I appreciate my colleagues' cooperation on both sides of the aisle. I am sure there will be more discussion of this issue as we go along.

I thank the Senator from Vermont and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, reserving the right to object, will the Senator from Michigan inform me whether her statement is going to be germane to the bill as is required in the postcloture situation?

Mr. President, I will not object because I am aware that the Senator could speak for up to an hour under the cloture rules, although I remind the Senator that she could not speak on the subject about which she appears to be ready to speak. But in the interest of moving forward, and since there have been others today who have also spoken as in morning business, I will not object. I do think it is unfortunate, however.

(The remarks of Mrs. Stabenow are printed in today's Record under ``Morning Business.'')

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I know of no further debate on the leader's amendment. The modification has been sent to the desk. Mr. President, this is the Frist amendment No. 3895, as further modified.

I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. President, I have a series of cleared amendments at the desk. Some of them are modifications of previously submitted amendments. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the amendments be considered en bloc, modified as necessary, agreed to en bloc, with the motions to reconsider laid upon the table.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Frist amendment No. 3896 be considered at this point.

Mr. President, I know of no further debate on this amendment.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I very much appreciate the cooperation of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. We have incorporated many of his suggestions into the bill. I appreciate his advice.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify amendment No. 3807, with the changes at the desk, notwithstanding its prior adoption.

Mr. President, Senator Lieberman and I have a series of cleared amendments at the desk. Some of these are modifications of previously submitted amendments. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the amendments be considered en bloc, modified as necessary, agreed to en bloc, with the motions to reconsider laid upon the table.

Mr. President, I thank everyone who has worked so hard on this bill, particularly my colleague and partner, Senator Lieberman.

I believe we are ready to move to third reading.

I ask for the yeas and nays.