Tonight, I would like to devote this hour to the foreclosure crisis that the Nation faces--and will continue to face for some time; the financial crisis; the recession that we now have that is the worst recession since the Great…
Tonight, I would like to devote this hour to the foreclosure crisis that the Nation faces--and will continue to face for some time; the financial crisis; the recession that we now have that is the worst recession since the Great Depression, precipitated by the foreclosure crisis and by the financial crisis. I want to talk about how we got where we are and what we need to do now to make sure it never happens again.
According to the financial industry, what happened was this freakish combination of macroeconomic forces that no one could have predicted. It was a perfect storm. But with a little help from the government, from the taxpayers, and a little bit of patience, we will muddle through this and we will be back to where we were just a couple of years ago; not to worry.
Columnist Paul Krugman earlier this week quoted a prominent Wall Street lawyer who was under consideration to be the Deputy Treasury Secretary, Rodgin Cohen, as saying that the Wall Street that will emerge from this will not be terribly different from the Wall Street of the recent past, and said, ``I am far from convinced that there was something inherently wrong with the system.''
Mr. Speaker, a Wall Street or a financial system that is not different from the one in the recent past that just gets us back to where we were a couple of years ago is not much of a deal for the American middle class. I don't claim that I knew that the financial crisis would happen the way it did. But I knew that the mortgages that have proven so toxic for the financial system and for the financial industry were toxic for borrowers, were toxic for homeowners. And I thought that was reason enough to do something about it.
I began working on the issue almost as soon as I was elected or entered Congress in 2003. In 2004, I introduced legislation, along with Congressman Watt, to prohibit many of the practices that led us to where we are now. And we saw--I know well what kinds of mortgages have led us to the foreclosure crisis.
Subprime mortgages went from 8 percent of all mortgages in 2003 to 28 percent in the heyday of subprime lending--the 2004 to 2006 period. More than half of the people who got subprime loans qualified for prime loans. Many others should never have gotten any loan of any kind.
There were extravagant upfront charges, costs, and fees. Ninety percent of loans had an adjustable rate, with a quick adjustment after just 2 or 3 years. The typical adjustment--the teaser rate, the initial rate was frequently above prime. It was no deal in the first place.
Then, when the adjustment set in, regardless of what interest rates were, the monthly payments would go up by 30 to 50 percent. Seventy percent of the loans had a prepayment penalty that made it almost impossible for borrowers to get out without losing a big chunk of the equity in their home.
The loans were designed to be unsustainable. They had the effect of trapping borrowers in a cycle of repeated refinancing. Every time they refinanced, having to pay points and fees and closing costs to get into the new loan and a prepayment penalty to get out of the last loan.
All that time, the industry defended all those terms, all those practices as necessary to provide credit to homeowners who would not qualify for prime loans. The terms, they said, might appear predatory to the uninformed, Members of Congress like me, the consumer groups, but they were really innovations that would make credit available to people who otherwise could not have gotten it.
Repeatedly they said this legislation, while well-intended, will just hurt the very people it's trying to help. I admit that I resented being patronized at the time. But now, looking at what really happened, I am furious at the dishonesty of it all.
Mr. Speaker, this is what really happened. This is a chart of the percentage of corporate profits in America that the financial services industry got. And it peaked during the period, the heyday of subprime lending, at more than 40 percent of all corporate profits. The terms of mortgages that appeared predatory really were predatory. The lenders did not have to include those terms in their loans.
Now, obviously, something went wrong. And I want to talk about that in a bit. But I first want to recognize my colleague. This is the majority party's hour. But in the spirit of bipartisanship, or post- partisanship, I am happy to recognize Mike Turner, my colleague from Ohio. Mr. Turner has many fine qualities. His political party is not one of them. But he represents a district, Dayton, Ohio, that has been particularly hard-hit by the foreclosure crisis.
And I want to recognize Mr. Turner to talk about what he has seen happen in Dayton.
Thank you, Mr. Turner. If you will stay a moment, I have a question or two. I know that your start in politics was in local politics, that you were the mayor of Dayton. And my observation of people who work in local politics is they can't just spout talking points. They really have got to solve problems. They don't have much choice in the matter. And I'm pleased that after more than 6 years in Congress, that hasn't worn off completely. You do still have some sense of the practical to you which I appreciate.
I said a moment ago that I would come back to what went wrong. Obviously, for more than 40 percent of all corporate profits, they are now on taxpayer life support. And what went wrong was that their economic models, their business models, assumed that property values would continue to appreciate and home values would continue to appreciate. In 2004, home values across the country appreciated by 11 percent, and they assumed--looking back, obviously foolishly--they assumed that property values would continue to go up. And what happened when property values simply stalled was they had a business model that only worked if property values continued to go up. They might go up quickly or slowly, but they would continue to go up, and they couldn't possibly, couldn't possibly go down. But when they stalled, people could not get out of their mortgage.
More and more people were underwater in their mortgage. They owed more money on their house than their house was worth. They could not get out of their mortgage. They couldn't sell their house because they couldn't pay the mortgage. And property values and foreclosure were just inextricably linked. Nationwide property values have now gone down, according to some economists, by about 30 percent from their peak in 2006, I think it was.
And for most middle class families, the equity they have in their home is the bulk of their net worth. It is their life savings. And they are seeing that disappear. Even the people that have mortgages they can pay, who aren't in subprime mortgages, when their property values collapse, their home value
collapses, they see their life savings evaporate with the collapse in home values.
As you pointed out, foreclosed homes sit vacant, stigmatizing neighborhoods and killing the property values in those neighborhoods. And in many markets around the country that have been hardest hit by subprime lending and by the foreclosure crisis, half or more of the homes on the market are foreclosures. And those houses are priced to sell.
In Dayton, what has been the effect of this on home values? Well, what has been the effect of the foreclosure crisis on home values in Dayton?
You mentioned in your remarks the number of people, the 2.5 million families who have already lost their homes to foreclosure because of the subprime crisis, and you said the estimates are that many more will. The estimate that I have seen, the economists at Credit Suisse, was at 8.1 to 10.2 million families. More families will lose their homes by the end of 2012, in the next 4 years. And if that happens, if we can't do something to stop that, it is hard to imagine that anything else we do to fix the economy is going to work. That is going to be catastrophic for those families. Those families will fall out of the middle class and into poverty and probably will never climb back out. But it is going to be catastrophic for the whole economy.
One further question, though. I have talked about the relationship between home values, the collapse of home values and foreclosures; but a family that has seen their home collapse in value is not going to be in any hurry to go buy a new car or to buy anything they don't have to have. What has been the effect of the economy in Dayton generally? What has been the effect on the car dealerships and the retailers? Are you seeing an effect on the economy, the retail economy, in Dayton as a whole?
I did vote in October for the TARP, the bailout, and it was certainly a bitter pill for me, having been one of the sternest critics of the industry for the whole time I have been in Congress. I did it because I thought there were exigent circumstances that I thought the country was facing, but I said at the time that we have to reform the industry. We cannot just get back to where we were. We have to address the kinds of practices that led us to where we are.
There has been a lot of hand-wringing by the political establishment, by the political pundits, the populism--they use the word ``populism'' as if it is completely synonymous with the word ``demagoguery,'' which it is not--the populist rage at what has happened in the financial sector and the AIG bonuses.
To me, I think many Americans know the kinds of practices that have gone on. It is not just mortgages. Certainly it includes mortgages, but it is also credit card practices. Just 2 weeks ago we had legislation that we have now passed that would fundamentally reform credit card practices. Many, many Americans have had very distasteful and very expensive experiences with credit card companies that left them furious at that industry, the same industry.
Overdraft fees. Overdraft fees. They don't really affect the middle middle to upper middle class. It is more people who really are struggling. When they get to the end of the month and there
is more month than there is paycheck, they might go beyond the amount of money in the bank. The lending industry has actually designed what they call fee-harvesting software that batches the transactions, the checks, the ATM visits, the debit card purchases, that batches them in a way that maximizes the overdraft fee. And an overdraft fee is typically $35.
If someone gets to the end of the month and has $100 in their bank account and they go to the ATM and get $20, they buy something on their debit card for $20, go back to the ATM and get another $20 and make a $15 purchase with their debit card, and then another $25, and then write a $105 check, the software runs the $105 purchase through first, and charges a $35 overdraft fee on that and then a $35 fee on the $20, the $20, the $20, the $15 and the $20. Americans are furious.
And then they see the very industry that they think cheated them on their mortgage, cheated them on their credit card, cheated them with overdraft fees, they see their tax money going to help save that industry from their own bad judgment. I think it is righteous anger, and I think we need to, as you have said, we need to reform the practices that led us to where we are.
Mr. Ellison has returned.
In these hours, it is typically the case that Members are filled with praise for one another, and I wonder sometimes when I hear a Member say, I thank the gentleman for his leadership, I wonder sometimes whether he is actually thanking for him for his leadership or is just stalling to think of what to say next.
We are joined by Mr. Ellison, who has joined the Financial Services Committee. He is now in his second term, and he has been a great friend and ally on that committee and a great advocate for consumers.
Thank you, Mr. Ellison.
I want to address a couple of other points. One that is frequently cited, argued, that the people who signed those mortgages should have known better.
Here is the reality. Economists call it asymmetry of information. In other words, one of the parties to a transaction knew what was in the documents because they wrote the documents. They had their lawyers write them. It was little print. It was legalese. There was a lot of it.
And most Americans who may feel smug that they didn't sign a subprime loan have probably gotten burned on a credit card, and they know what credit card contracts are like. And they know that the bank wrote the credit card contract and they didn't have any say in what was in that contract, and they know that it was complicated and it was designed to trap them and had little trip wires and whatever else.
But the same was true of mortgages. The Federal Trade Commission actually quizzed both prime and subprime borrowers, people who got good mortgages and people who got the toxic mortgages right after closing, right after they signed the documents, and it was an open book test with their documents in front of them. They quizzed them on what the terms of their mortgages were, and almost nobody knew what they were signing.
A half could not identify the total amount of the loan. A third could not identify what the interest rate was. That was with the documents in front of them. Two-thirds did not know there was a prepayment penalty if they had one, and 90 percent did not know the total up-front cost. Up-front cost is where predation lives.
That was what predatory lending was all about.
And in addition to that, most borrowers, particularly subprime borrowers--70 percent of the subprime borrowers got a mortgage broker. They thought mortgage brokers presented themselves as a mortgage professional. Now they tell Congress that they should be regulated like a used car salesman--which is actually unfair to used car salesmen because there are some consumer protections in selling a used car. But they said they should simply be a salesman. It should be buyer beware; that there should be no particular protections. They shouldn't be treated like a lawyer or someone else who has a fiduciary duty--I think a point that you made in committee.
Brokers were being paid not just by the borrower, but by the lender. And the worse the loan was for them, the more the lender paid the broker. Now, most Americans, when they hear that, just think that's crooked.
Yes. It was one of the documents, it was one of many documents that the borrowers signed. And guess who handed them that document and explained to them what they were signing? The broker. And if the borrower asked, what is this I'm signing? What the broker would say is, well, this just means that the lender is paying part of my fee, saving you money.
So, yes, there was a disclosure. Was it an effective disclosure, was it a disclosure that really told consumers what was going on? No, it was not.
Yes. It was a nondisclosure disclosure.
This is actually a rate sheet. This is from a lender that is now long out of business, but this is how mortgage rates were set. Across the top it shows the loan to value, what percentage--it might be 95 percent--and a credit score, how well a consumer or borrower paid their bills, what they had earned for themselves. Their reputation also factored in. The industry used to call that ``character'' as one of their considerations in lending.
And so on this sheet, a 95 percent loan, a loan where the borrower only had 5 percent and the borrower had a credit score between 640 and 659 would pay 7.55 percent interest. But over here, there is the payment that the lender made to the broker called the yield spread premium. And it says, if the borrower signed a mortgage that was a half a point higher interest rate than they qualified for based upon their loan to value and their credit score, the interest rate that they earned by how well they paid their bills, the lender would pay the broker 1 percent of the loan. That was called a yield spread premium.
Now, I think most Americans hearing this can't believe that this was ever legal. It's still legal. The bill we passed last week would prohibit this, would end it. But this means that even those borrowers who are trying as hard as they could, knowing that they were entering into a complicated and important transaction to buy a home or to borrow money against their home, who would try to get a professional voice, someone to be on their side, someone who would understand it and would lead the borrower through it and find the best loan for the borrower, their trust is being betrayed. Now, if our bill passes, we will have finally ended this. But those who feel smug and say, well, they should have known better, the odds were so stacked against them, they never had a chance.
Yes.
Let's see. I think three or four--four.
I could on one hand, yes.
Quite possibly 10 or 15; I mean, a successful broker.
And that's what they told the borrowers. This is my business----
Yes. There was an information asymmetry, which worked very badly for the borrower, for anyone who is on the short end of that information deficit, that information gap.
Some of our colleagues make that argument frequently. It is an explanation for the crisis that the lending industry loves. They welcome that explanation.
Here is the reality: As long as home prices were appreciating, they didn't have to pay attention to whether borrowers could really pay it back or not because the house would appreciate in value. The borrower, if they couldn't pay back the loan, they certainly weren't going to allow it to be foreclosed, they would sell it.
I asked those very questions of a spokesman for the industry at a hearing just last year to Robert Story, who was vice chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association. I asked if the cost of foreclosure is actually recoverable by the lender out of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. So if there is equity in the home, the lender recovers the cost; is that correct? He said, okay, as long as there is equity in the home, it really isn't an economic problem for the lender, that's right. He said, that's correct, but most people who have equity in their homes don't go into foreclosure because they can sell their home because they have equity in their home and they can reduce the price. As long as home prices continued to appreciate, there was no way they were going to lose money even if a borrower couldn't pay back the mortgage.
And I asked that at some point, too, when we had the questions in committee again and again about predatory borrowing, people who are committing fraud. I asked Sheila Bair, the Chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Company, I asked on April 9, 2007, If lenders were really getting half of all
loans, subprime loans, without full income verification, do any of you--I was speaking to a panel of witnesses--really think that no one buying those loans really had a clue that there was a problem? And Sheila Bair said, I don't think they looked. It's amazing to me; investors who are holding the ultimate risk in the loans, and I don't think they looked. I don't think the rating agencies looked. It's one of the breakdowns of the system that we have. Market discipline was not there, nobody was looking.
But I asked the panel after she said that, I said, Does anyone here think that the masters of the universe on Wall Street who bought those loans were really being played for chumps by middle class families who were borrowing from them? And John Dugan, the Comptroller of the Currency, said, I think there was a belief that income was no longer predictive of people paying the loans back, and you could rely on the history of house prices going up. And so they ignored it. And I think that proved to be a very dangerous decline in underwriting standards.
Well, no kidding. And we've had story after story about how lax the underwriting standards were, about how little they did really to make sure that the borrowers could pay the loans back because it didn't matter.
The New York Times ran an article on WaMu, Washington Mutual, one of the leading subprime lenders. And they quoted an appraiser who worked with WaMu who said, If you were alive, they would give you a loan. Actually, I think if you were dead, they would still give you a loan.
There were memos to the originators of loans from WaMu saying, A thin file is a good file. Don't ask too many questions. There was an article in the press in just the last week or two about a similar memo that JPMorgan Chase sent out to everyone who was originating mortgages, Don't ask questions. If you don't want to know the answer, if it might disqualify someone for the loan, just don't ask. They weren't worried about people paying the loans back. Now, that was catastrophic for the borrower because the borrower was going to lose the equity in their home if they had to sell their home. And once you've gotten yourself into the middle class by buying a home, and God forbid you lose it to foreclosure, but even if you had to sell it because you can't pay the mortgage, you really are falling out of the middle class.
Some have argued that we haven't done anything about borrower fraud. We don't have to do anything about borrower fraud. There is already the law of fraud that if the lender was really duped by the borrower, they could sue the borrower, but they would have to show that they actually reasonably relied upon what the borrower told them. They weren't relying on what the borrower told them; they were asking to be lied to. And in most cases, the broker filled it out and just gave it to the borrower to sign.
Liar loans, yes. Sometimes they're called ``Alt A,'' that was Alternative A, that was the polite name, but they were also called liar loans.
I do want to talk about where we go from here. The bill that the House has passed does reach a lot of the practices that have led us to where we are. It does limit the upfront cost, which is where the predators really made their living was by soaking borrowers at the front end, as Mr. Turner talked about, what they made came out of the equity in the borrower's home. It was lost in the loan documents, but it was in the lending industry's pocket by that point.
It requires disclosures that are actually understandable. It requires standard forms that are actually developed by the banking regulators. They are designed to be understood, not disclosures designed by the industry that are designed not to be understood. It prohibits this compensation system that rewards brokers for betraying the trust of borrowers.
It requires that the lending industry not make loans to people who don't have a reasonable ability to pay it back. It requires brokers to present borrowers with a set of options that are reasonably suitable to the borrower's needs. If we had that bill in effect 5 years ago, we would not have the crisis we have now.
Now, there has been a lot more contributing to the crisis now than just subprime loans or even alternative loans, option arms, and all the rest, the exotic products--exotic mortgages is what Alan Greenspan called them. It has gone well beyond that now. But this is what precipitated it, this is what got it started. This was the match that started the newspapers, that started the kindling that started the hard wood. This is what started the fire of mortgage lending.
But we have to go beyond this.
Again, let me go back to this chart of the financial industry profits as a share of U.S. business profits. It peaked during the subprime heyday at more than 40 percent of all profits. This is when the lending industry is saying, you know, we have to do these things to make credit available to people. If you rein in what we're doing, we just won't be able to make credit available to people, and you are going to hurt the very people you are trying to help. No. They were making a killing.
This is gone now. This is in addition. This is after all the vulgar compensation that we've heard about. In addition to CEO compensation up and down the line, the financial industry pays very well. Compensation in the financial industry was almost twice of what Americans generally got. But this money is now gone. In the words of the country music song, ``It's in the bank in someone else's name.'' And now we're dealing with the fallout after this.
But look at what it was back in the fifties and the sixties when our economy was doing pretty well. We had a manufacturing base. The middle class was doing well. Their lives were improving. Their economic conditions were improving. They were making just ordinary profits of, you know, 10 to 15 percent, not more than 40 percent.
The financial industry wants to go from where we are, which is that they're on taxpayer life support. But they want to go back to this. This is not what we need to go back to.
Mr. Ellison, I know that you also support the legislation that Mr. Delahunt and I have introduced. I actually lost a coin flip. It's Delahunt/Miller instead of Miller/Delahunt. But in addition to what we've done to get at mortgage lending practices and credit card practices to create a regulator whose only job is to look at financial products, consumer financial products and look at those up front to see if they're fair to the consumer and prohibit those that aren't.
In addition to Mr. Ellison, there are several prominent supporters of this proposal. Joseph Stiglitz, a professor of economics at Columbia who's won the Nobel Prize.
Elizabeth Warren. Robert Shiller who is a professor of economics at Yale, widely published, well regarded, seen as a likely future winner of the Nobel Prize. He probably has an economics status that the golfing world has, the best golfer never to have won a major, and I hope that that status or that reputation for Professor Shiller does not have the same career consequences as that reputation in golf has.
But Elizabeth Warren, as you point out, a professor of law at Harvard, is probably the best known and most vocal advocate for it. And she compares it to a toaster. That a manufacturer of a toaster--you know, a consumer doesn't know what's on the insides of a toaster. And if a toaster manufacturer is just trying to make the most money that they can--she made these arguments just earlier this week on the Charlie Rose show--take out the insulation from the toaster, and the toaster has maybe a one in five chance of catching fire. It's more profitable for the manufacturer of the toaster. They would make more money, though the Consumer Product Safety Commission is at least supposed to keep them from doing that kind of thing. Why is there not a regulator who looks in the same way at financial products? That is Elizabeth Warren's analogy, and that probably rings true with a lot of people.
But in my late and unlamented law career, I did some insurance regulatory work, and I can't tell you how different insurance is from lending. Insurance
has been regulated because there have been abuses in the past. Before an insurer can offer a policy, the insurance commissions in the various States approve the policy form. What are you insuring against? Do you have little tricks in there that you aren't really insuring people against what they think they're getting? What is the likelihood that there is really going to be a loss? And is the premium right? Is the premium right? Is it not too high so it gouges consumers? And is it not too low so that insurance companies might make a quick profit but not have the money to pay claims when claims come due? And that happened in the past. That's why we have that regulation, and that's what's happened now.
The financial industry has made a huge profit, huge profit. More than 40 percent of all corporate profits by these consumer lending practices. But now that the consumers can't pay their credit card bills and can't pay their mortgages, they're stuck.
The American people are not deadbeats. They're stuck. They are working hard. And if anything goes wrong in their life, if they lose their job or someone in the family gets sick or if they go through a divorce, they really don't have much room to play. And they've got to be able to borrow money.
But the industry made a killing, and now they're getting bailed out. I don't want to go through a cycle of making a killing and getting bailed out, making a killing and getting bailed out.
Let's have a set of regulations in place that provides the American people the kinds of financial services, the kinds of financial products that really meet their needs and doesn't produce this kind of profit, that really produces the kind of profits we had back in the manufacturing days, back when the lives of ordinary Americans and the middle class was improved.
Thank you, Mr. Ellison, for participating.
We have covered a great many topics that I wanted to cover. There are many more that we have not. The arguments that the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 caused our financial crisis in 2008.
Actually, the Federal Reserve Board's statistics show that 6 percent of subprime loans were by lenders who were subject to the Community Reinvestment Act--not all lenders were, or just those with federally insured deposits--and were in the neighborhoods where the Community Reinvestment Act encourages savings. And all the evidence says that that 6 percent perform better than others.
So it is not that that is exaggerated. It is completely untrue. There is no truth to that argument at all.
If we had longer, we could talk about the role of Freddie and Fannie. Certainly they are blameworthy. They acted badly, but they did not lead the financial industry into this crisis, as has frequently been charged.
What led the industry into this crisis was the pursuit of profits and not an honest living but a killing. Not an honest living by providing services to people who needed it, credit to people who needed it on reasonable terms but a killing by cheating people. And we can't go back to that.
What we need to do now is not just climb out of where we are but try to restore what we had before. We need to reform the industry and the consumer lending practices.
Mr. Speaker, I don't think I have much time to yield back, but I do yield back the balance of my time.