Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, over the last year and a half, the Science and Technology Committee's Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, which I chair,…
Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, over the last year and a half, the Science and Technology Committee's Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, which I chair, has been reviewing the work of the Office of the Inspector General of NASA and a related investigation of the NASA IG by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency's Integrity Committee, the procedure actually for investigating IGs themselves.
I appreciate Mr. Towns and Mr. Cooper, knowing my interest in this issue, including me very graciously in discussions of this legislation, and I commend them for their work on this legislation.
The purpose of this amendment is to smooth the transition between the old law and the new and to make sure that we do not disrupt some of the work of IGs that is now going well in our effort to get in place reforms to improve the work of IGs.
I fully support the goal of this legislation to make sure that Inspectors General are independent, that they can act without fear of political reprisal, and to accomplish that by establishing a set term. This amendment accomplishes other purposes perfectly consistent with that overall goal of the legislation.
First, it establishes the same qualifications for the selection of Inspectors General of the designated Federal agencies that are not subject to confirmation by the other body. There is no reason that there should be any different qualifications, and this brings the qualifications for those Inspectors General into line with the qualifications of those confirmed by the other body.
Second, the amendment expands the goals for removal of the Inspectors General, with criteria that the Inspectors General themselves, the IGs themselves, have agreed to should be the basis for removal, and would not undermine their independence by being a threat to their independence; so, removal for improper grounds. The additional grounds, and these are in the regulations now, the rules now: knowing violation of the law, rule or regulation; gross mismanagement; gross waste of funds; and abuse of authority. Those criteria for removal do increase the President's flexibility to get out of office inept or abusive Inspectors General.
Third, the amendment incorporates several provisions of two executive orders pertaining to the work of IGs, executive orders 12805 and 12993, which would no longer be in effect under this legislation, to maintain certain policies and procedures that are working well and make sure that there is not a gap when there are no procedures in place and to make sure that we will not have to recreate those procedures under the new legislation. It also directs the new council, the new Inspectors General council, to incorporate as much of the established policies that are working well as possible into the new rules. Again, those rules are developed by the IGs themselves over the years. They work very well. They do not need to be disrupted.
Fourth, the transparency of the Integrity Committee's investigations, the work of inspecting the Inspectors General themselves, the investigations into the investigators, has been a problem. This amendment would require the council to submit to Congress a report of their work in inspecting the work, to investigating the work of Inspectors General.
Finally, the amendment requires the office of OMB, the Office of Management and Budget, OMB, to continue to provide the Inspectors General council with the administrative support that the PCIE now has.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Towns).
Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment would require the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to appoint a committee of Inspectors General to review the integrity, the experience, the reputation, all of the qualifications of anyone the President appoints to serve as an Inspector General and to provide a report of that evaluation to the other body, to the relevant committee of the other body, before any confirmation hearings. It provides a similar procedure for agency heads who appoint Inspectors General without confirmation by the other body.
The amendment does not create any new bureaucracy. It uses an existing office or an office that will exist under this legislation. The evaluation of that committee is not binding in any way. It simply is an unbiased, informed evaluation that would be helpful to the other body in their consideration of confirmation of anyone appointed as an Inspector General to serve as an Inspector General, just as the American Bar Association's evaluations on the qualifications of judicial nominees are helpful in confirmation.
Mr. Chairman, most Presidential appointments are policy positions for which loyalty to the President is a proper consideration. In fact, it is a necessity. It is a requirement. And the other body has traditionally deferred to the President's judgment in confirmation. If the President wants to appoint a political operative, if he wants to appoint some political poohbah's worthless, otherwise unemployable brother-in-law, the other body usually goes along so the President can have his own people in policy positions.
As the debate on this bill has made very clear, Inspectors General are not jobs like that. Inspectors General are not the President's people. They are to be watchdogs who report both to the agency head and to Congress. They are not the President's people. IGs are not the President's people. They are our people, too. Congress needs to rely on the work of IGs in our oversight duties. IGs are Congress's people as much as they are the President's people.
The statute says now that IGs should be objective and independent and they are to be appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration or investigation. In other words, Mr. Chairman, IGs can't just be some poohbah's worthless brother-in-law.
This amendment provides the other body with an informed evaluation of the integrity and qualifications of any potential IG to assure that IGs are up to the job, they understand what their job is, they are to identify waste, fraud, abuse or general inefficiency, and report to the agency head and to Congress without fear or favor. IGs must report with rigorous honesty even if their reports cause political embarrassment; especially when their reports cause political embarrassment.
This amendment will return to an earlier tradition of consulting well-regarded IGs before an appointment of an IG for suggestions of who would be good for that job.
Mr. Chairman, we have departed from that tradition, to our detriment. This amendment will return us to that tradition.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.