Mr. President, during the July 4th recess, I traveled to Iraq and Jordan to evaluate the progress of Operation Iraqi Freedom. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of my trip report be entered into the Record at this point. I spent…
Mr. President, during the July 4th recess, I traveled to Iraq and Jordan to evaluate the progress of Operation Iraqi Freedom. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of my trip report be entered into the Record at this point.
I spent two days--July 5 and 6--in Iraq and the morning of
July 7 in Jordan. I believe mine was the first Congressional
delegation to overnight in Iraq since the start of the war.
It was also my fifth post-war trip to Iraq.
In Iraq, I spent a day and a half in Baghdad meeting with
U.S. Embassy and military personnel and with Members of the
Government of Iraq, including the President and Prime
Minister. Additionally, I met with numerous Sunni Arabs,
including officials of the Government, a member of the Iraqi
National Assembly, and representatives of political groups,
including some who had just been added to the Assembly's
constitutional drafting committee. I also met with the
Chairman of the constitutional drafting committee and the UN
Special Representative, whose staff is advising on the
drafting of the constitution.
I spent the remainder of the second day in Iraq in Fallujah
in the Sunni Triangle, where I was able to meet with a number
of U.S. servicemen and women, and was privileged to have
dinner with ten Marine Corps and Navy personnel from
Michigan.
Once again, I was deeply impressed by the dedication and
professionalism of our servicemen and women and with their
very high morale. I told them that the Congress and the
American people are proud of them and back them one hundred
percent, regardless of differing positions on the
Administration's policies.
One purpose of my trip was to gauge the level of the
insurgency. I found strong support for the recent assessment
of General Abizaid, the regional U.S. Commander, that the
insurgency is not weakening and that the flow of foreign
jihadists into Iraq has increased. I found no support for
Vice President Cheney's view that the insurgency is in its
``last throes.''
Another purpose of my trip was to assess the current and
potential level of participation of the Sunni Arabs in the
political and constitutional drafting processes, including
the likelihood that the Iraqi constitution would be completed
by August 15th (and therefore not needing to utilize the one
six month extension allowed under Iraqi law). I was surprised
by the optimism of most Iraqis that the constitution would be
agreed by August 15th and particularly that the Sunni Arab
participants (recently increased by 15) would likely be
supportive of the draft. If that is true, that will pave the
way for a referendum on the draft constitution on October
15th and a national election on December 15th.
If this optimism is not borne out, however, a way must be
found to bring pressure to bear on the parties to make the
reasonable compromises that will be required for agreement on
the constitution. Everyone whom I met on this trip advised
that none of the Iraqis--not just Shia and Kurd, but also
Sunni Arab--want U.S. forces to leave now. They want our
forces to be less visible and Iraqi security forces to be
more visible, but they want us to stay for now.
Given that fact and given the consensus that a political
solution is necessary if there is any prospect of defeating
the insurgency, we need to make clear to the Iraqis that if
they are unable to reach agreement on the constitution, we
will reconsider our presence in Iraq and that all options
will be on the table, including withdrawal. (The logic of
that position is that if a political settlement is essential
if there is a chance of lessening the insurgency, that
without a political settlement the insurgency is not going to
be defeated even with our presence.)
I focused on meeting with members of the Sunni Arab
community, as I believe they are the key to a successful
political process in Iraq. Most of them realize it was a
mistake for them not to have participated in the January
elections and they want to participate in the drafting of a
constitution and in the follow-on elections. At the same
time, the so-called former regime element that is fueling the
insurgency in an attempt to block a political settlement
comes from the Sunni Arab community, and too many members of
that community sympathize with and provide support for the
insurgents.
There are a number of issues that will need to be resolved
if a draft constitution is to be agreed upon by August 15th.
These include the role of Islam; the form of the government
(i.e. parliamentary or presidential); the relationship
between the national government and the provinces and the
degree to which natural resources will belong to the
provinces or the national government; and the degree of
autonomy that will reside in the regions. Since the oil
resources of Iraq are located in the Shia south and the
Kurdish north, these are issues that are extremely important
to the Sunni Arabs, whose area lacks oil resources.
The decision of the National Assembly to accept 15 Sunni
Arabs as members of the constitutional drafting committee,
despite the Sunni Arabs lack of participation in the
election, hopefully augurs well for the kind of compromises
that will need to be made by all three of the main political
factions for a draft constitution to be reached.
Although the successful drafting of a constitution, with
the active participation of the Sunni Arab community, is very
important and may help create an environment within which the
insurgency can be dramatically reduced, it will not
automatically achieve that result. The Sunni Arabs with whom
we met, although from different groups, complained of the
extended detention of their brethren, the perceived focus of
raids by Coalition and Iraqi security forces on their
community, the forced unemployment of hundreds of thousands
of Sunni Arabs fired in the de-Baathification process and
denied the pensions to which they contributed. They expressed
a preference for the U.S. military to leave the cities and to
locate on bases removed from populated areas, and the need
for at least a rough estimate as to when Coalition forces
will be withdrawn.
I explored in depth the training and equipping of Iraqi
security forces. It is clear that a great deal of time was
wasted during the existence of the Coalition Provisional
Authority or CPA. While it appears that progress is being
made now, it is moving slowly and will take quite some time
before Iraqis will be capable of dealing with the insurgency
on their own.
In his recent speech to the nation on Iraq, President Bush
said, with respect to the training and equipping of Iraqi
security forces, that ``as Iraqis stand up, we will stand
down.'' General Casey, the overall commander on the ground in
Iraq, acknowledged to me that he is working on a plan whereby
units of the Iraqi security forces would first partner with
Coalition military units and gradually take the lead in
military operations, then will assume control in selected
provinces, and gradually assume control more broadly until
they ultimately can control the entire country. Part of that
plan provides for Coalition forces to be reduced as Iraqi
security forces become more and more capable.
I also spoke to General Casey and to Iraqi officials about
the need for greater progress in the review of Iraqis
detained by Coalition or Iraqi forces and the need to either
release or try them. While some progress has been made in
this area, it has been too slow in coming and much more must
be done and done quickly.
In Jordan, I was pleased to be able to meet with King
Abdullah. King Abdullah had just finished presiding over the
closing session of a three day International Islamic
Conference that he had organized. This visionary and
critically important Conference was attended by top Muslim
authorities from around the globe. It was aimed at finding
common principles among various Muslim schools of thought and
isolating and deligitimatizing those who preach violence in
the name of Islam.
Two things need to happen within the next 40 days to
improve chances of a successful outcome in Iraq.
A draft of the Iraqi constitution needs to be agreed and
sent to the National Assembly by the constitutional committee
no later than August 15--the timetable the Iraqis have set
for themselves. All of the people with whom I spoke--whether
Sunni, Shia, or Kurd--agree that that date should and can be
met.
There also needs to be a more detailed road map for drawing
down U.S. forces. General Casey, commander of the multi-
national forces in Iraq, has said that it should be possible
for a fairly significant reduction in U.S. force levels in
the first few months of next year. But what is so far missing
are the decision criteria for determining when that reduction
can begin so that presidential rhetoric and statements of
intent are turned into a credible and reassuring roadmap for
Iraqis taking ownership of the risks and responsibility for
their own security and survival.
After much prodding by Congress, the Administration has
finally created and implemented a capability assessment
system for determining the readiness of Iraqi military and
police units to conduct counter-insurgency operations--
whether alongside of Coalition units, or in the lead but with
Coalition support, or independently. Now there must be a
detailed plan, mutually agreed to by the Coalition and
Iraqis, with measurable benchmarks to determine progress, and
with a reasonable estimate of the time required to reach
those benchmarks. Only in this way can we know the
approximate number of Iraqi units that need to be capable
of counterinsurgency operations so that coalition units
can first withdraw from cities and other visible locations
and begin a withdrawal from the country as a whole.
It is essential that such a plan be promptly agreed to and
implemented, and its outline publicly announced, so as to
provide reassurance to the American public which is
expressing growing concern about simply being told we need to
``stay the course'' in Iraq, and to the Iraqi public which
needs to see that U.S. forces will not be in their country
indefinitely. Both publics must see that the President's
statement that ``as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down''
is not just a bumper sticker slogan.
Secretary Rice has said that we will be in Iraq as long as
we are needed. Without adopting and implementing a measured
and credible plan, coalition forces could be ``needed'' for
an indeterminate time. Without such a plan, Iraqis may never
assume the
responsibility for taking back their country from the
insurgents and taking the risks and making the compromises
necessary to chart their own destiny.
Finally, while I was surprised by the high level of
optimism about the August 15 date being met for agreement on
a draft Iraqi constitution, I was given a sobering assessment
about the current and future strength of the insurgency.
Even if the timetable for adopting a constitution is met,
and even if a plan is agreed upon for phasing in capable
Iraqi military forces to take over responsibility for
security so U.S. forces in Iraq can simultaneously be
reduced, there is still great uncertainty that the insurgency
will be eliminated or lessened in the near term.
But, while taking those steps doesn't guarantee success,
they could help change the dynamic in Iraq and provide the
only way a poorly thought through and mistake ridden U.S.
policy in Iraq can still reach a successful
conclusion.