Statement On Introduced Bills And Joint Resolutions
Mr. President, today I am introducing with the cosponsorship of Senator McCain and Senator Baucus the Auditor Independence and Tax Shelters Act, a bill designed to strengthen auditor independence by prohibiting audit companies from selling…
Mr. President, today I am introducing with the cosponsorship of Senator McCain and Senator Baucus the Auditor Independence and Tax Shelters Act, a bill designed to strengthen auditor independence by prohibiting audit companies from selling tax shelter services to the publicly traded companies they audit and to the officers and directors of those companies.
Last year, Senators McCain, Baucus and I each participated in investigations conducted by our respective Committees, the Committees on Commerce, Finance, and Governmental Affairs, into corporate misconduct by Enron and other major U.S. companies, including participation in misleading accounting and tax practices. These investigations led each of us to focus on the role of accounting firms in, not only going along with publicly traded companies' using abusive tax shelters, but also selling them the very tax shelters they used to overstate their earnings on their financial statements.
In fact, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, on which I am the Ranking Minority Member, has spent the last year investigating the roles played by accounting firms and other professional organizations such as banks, investment advisors and law firms, in developing, marketing and implementing abusive tax shelters. The Finance Committee held a hearing today on this same topic.
Tax shelters have become a huge business in this country. An 1998 article in Forbes magazine--five years ago--described how tax shelter use was growing even then:
Pay attention. These letters are prime evidence of a
thriving industry that has received scant public notice: the
hustling of corporate tax shelters. These shelters are being
peddled, sometimes in cold-call pitches, to thousands of
companies. Will the shelters hold up in court? Maybe yes,
maybe no, but many schemes capitalize on the fact that
neither the tax code nor the IRS can keep up with the exotica
of modern corporate finance. Hesitant at first to
participate, respectable accounting firms, law offices and
public corporations have lately succumbed to competitive
pressures and joined the loophole frenzy.
A March 2003 article in BusinessWeek magazine states that U.S. corporations are some of the biggest players in the tax shelter game:
The federal tax rate for corporations is 35%, but few pay
that much. . . . Many have achieved the Holy Grail of
corporate finance: steadily growing profits coupled with a
dramatically shrinking tax burden. . . . [I]n the late 1990s,
the hunt for tax breaks became a much bigger business. . . .
Tax avoidance became a competitive sport, with even blue-chip
companies aggressively benchmarking their effective tax rates
against those of rivals. According to a recent Harvard
University study, U.S. companies avoided paying tax on nearly
$300 billion in income in 1998.
Recently, the New York Times reported that a consultant's report prepared for the IRS but not released to the public until now will show that ``corporate tax cheating in 2000 cost the government $14 billion to $18 billion'' in revenues during that one year alone.
Accounting firms are in the thick of the tax shelter activity, earning tens of millions of dollars in fees. According to Bowman's Accounting Report, the Big Four accounting firms, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, and Ernst & Young, brought in $5.6 billion of U.S. tax practice revenues in 2001, more than twice the tax-related revenues these companies posted in 1995. While some of these fees are the result of tax return preparation work, our Subcommittee investigation indicates that significant fees were generated by tax shelter services provided to wealthy individuals and corporations.
Increased tax shelter activity has not only led to substantial U.S. tax revenue loss, it has complicated U.S. tax enforcement efforts and undermined taxpayer confidence in the federal tax compliance system, leading the IRS to designate abusive tax shelters as an enforcement priority.
The IRS has accordingly begun a major effort to combat this form of tax avoidance. In 2002, for example, the IRS issued about 200 summonses seeking tax shelter related information from 30 accounting firms and other tax shelter promoters, and filed suit against two major accounting firms, KPMG and BDO Seidman, and two major law firms, Jenkens & Gilchrist and Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, to obtain information about their tax shelter activities. In addition, the Securities Exchange Commission and the new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board have expressed serious concerns about accounting firms that audit publicly traded companies while wearing two hats: those of the tax shelter promoter and those of the auditor auditing the same tax shelters it has promoted.
That issue is the focus of our legislation.
Auditors of publicly traded companies are supposed to be independent watchdogs charged with determining whether a company's financial statements are accurate and fairly report the company's finances. But multiple accounting scandals involving billions of dollars at companies like Enron, Tyco, Healthsouth, Aldelphia, and MCI-WorldCom have rocked investor confidence in auditors and severely damaged the reputation of the U.S. accounting profession. These accounting scandals showed again and again that our laws and financial systems were insufficient to ensure that U.S. auditors were doing their jobs.
In response, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. A primary purpose of that law was to strengthen auditor independence and restore investor confidence in U.S. financial statements. Among other measures, it established the new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to strengthen auditing standards, investigate and discipline auditor wrongdoing, and oversee auditing practices to ensure adequate financial statement reviews. While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a landmark piece of legislation--replacing decades of self-policing in the accounting industry with independent oversight--a number of reform issues remain unresolved.
One key, longstanding issue that continues to compromise auditor independence is the role played by accounting firms in developing and selling tax shelters to public companies they audit.
As part of their review of public company financial statements, auditors are supposed to review the company's tax practices to ensure that the company is not understating its tax liability and overstating its earnings. But in some cases, the same accounting firm is also pitching tax shelters to that client, many of which rely on aggressive and novel interpretations of tax law. If a company buys one of these tax shelters from its accounting firm, the unacceptable result is that the accounting firm can then turn around and audit the company's financial statements and, in effect, audit its own work, a situation that strikes at the heart of auditor independence.
In some cases, the accounting firm may have even negotiated ``success fees'' which are contingent upon a tax shelter's success in reducing a client's tax burden. In such cases, accounting firms will audit tax transactions in which they have a direct financial interest, creating a conflict of interest between the firm's income and auditing responsibilities, and making it highly unlikely that questions will be raised about a tax shelter that the firm itself sold to its client.
Similar conflicts may arise when accounting firms offer tax shelter services to the officers and directors of the companies they audit. One case extensively discussed in the media involves a major accounting firm which not only audited Sprint Corporation, a publicly traded company, but also sold tax shelters to the Sprint CEO and other Sprint executives. These tax shelters supposedly eliminated taxes owed on millions of dollars in personal compensation from stock options given by Sprint to its executives. When the value of the stock options later fell,
the accounting firm apparently analyzed strategies that could have lowered the individuals' taxes but increased the company's taxes, pitting the individual against the company, with the same accountant on both sides of the equation. Sprint eventually fired several of the executives and recently announced it was also changing auditors. In addition, Sprint has instituted a new policy barring its auditor from providing any financial services to its executives.
Investors, our markets, and the American public deserve better. The legislation we are introducing today would end these auditor conflicts by prohibiting auditors from providing tax shelter services to both the publicly traded companies they audit and to those companies' officers and directors. In addition, the bill would codify four common-sense principles of auditor independence that would assist public companies in analyzing what services may compromise auditor independence.
Our bill would build upon the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which took the first step last year to address the conflict of interest problems that arise when accounting firms provide tax services to the companies they audit. Seeking to limit a wide range of possible conflicts of interest, the Act broadly prohibited auditors from providing any tax service to an audit client without first obtaining the approval of the audit committee of the company's board of directors.
The SEC took the next step when it proposed regulations to implement the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The SEC issued a draft proposal that essentially would have prohibited auditors from selling any tax shelters to their audit clients. The draft SEC proposal also contained the four principles that would have helped company audit committees evaluate whether other tax services proffered by auditors would impair auditor independence. Unfortunately, under heavy lobbying pressure from accounting firms in the tax shelter business, the SEC dropped both of these important provisions from the final regulation.
So we need to legislate. Our bill would, first, prohibit accounting firms that audit publicly held companies in the United States from providing tax shelter services either to the companies they audit or to the companies' officers and directors. The bill defines tax shelter services by referring to existing law, using language in an existing definition of tax shelters in section 6111(d) of the tax code. The bill would prohibit auditors from providing to their audit clients those services related to designing, promoting or executing tax transactions which have tax avoidance or evasion as a significant purpose and which generate fees for the auditing firm exceeding $100,000. It is intended that questions about whether particular tax-related services fall within this definition would be resolved by corporate audit committees when asked by their accounting firm to approve the company's paying for the particular services. The audit committee could consult with the IRS, SEC, or other experts in reaching its decision.
If an audit committee were to approve tax shelter services that should have been barred, the bill does not provide new penalties or enforcement authority, but makes use of the existing oversight authority of the SEC and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to enforce compliance with federal law. That means, for example, if an audit committee were to allow its auditor to provide prohibited tax shelter services, the SEC or Public Company Accounting Oversight Board could use their existing oversight authority to require the company to ``cease and desist'' paying for the services or to prohibit the accounting firm from providing the services. If appropriate, the SEC could also order the public company, the accounting firm, or both, to pay a monetary penalty for violating the tax shelter services prohibition.
The legislation would further reduce potential conflicts by codifying four principles of auditor independence that public company audit committees would be required to apply when determining what non-audit services an auditor can provide. These principles have been repeatedly cited in SEC efforts to strengthen auditor independence and were also cited during debate on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. They provide that auditor independence is compromised when auditors: 1. audit their own work; 2. perform management functions for their clients; 3. act as advocates on behalf of their clients; or 4. act as promoters of their clients' stock or other financial interests.
To better ensure auditor independence, our bill would require audit committees to apply these four principles when considering what services, not otherwise prohibited, an auditor may provide to their company. If an audit committee were to find that the proposed auditor service would reasonably result in a violation of one of the above principles, the audit committee would have to disallow the proffered service.
Experts in the financial and accounting industries agree that auditors should not be permitted to provide tax shelter services to their audit clients. In January of this year, The Conference Board's blue-ribbon Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise, co- chaired by John Snow before he became Secretary of the Treasury, concluded the following:
[P]ublic accounting firms should limit their services to
their clients to performing audits and to providing closely
related services that do not put the auditor in an advocacy
position, such as novel and debatable tax strategies and
products that involve income tax shelters and extensive off-
shore partnerships or affiliates. . . . The Commission
believes that any work performed by the company's outside
auditors [should] be closely related to the audit. Auditors'
development and recommendations of new tax strategies for
their clients is not closely related to the audit, and, in
our opinion, removes focus from their audit work and poses a
potential conflict of interest. Furthermore, the development
and recommendations of these strategies have often been
accompanied by ``success fees.'' In turn these strategies, if
implemented, were often then subject to an audit by the firm.
This practice, in our opinion, is highly undesirable. The
firm's need for impartiality in conduct of the audit is in
direct conflict with the financial incentives to provide tax
strategies which themselves must be audited.
William McDonough, Chairman of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, has indicated that the Board is also considering whether to ban auditors from providing tax shelter services to their audit clients and will be closely monitoring how accounting firms audit a company's tax liabilities and any company use of tax shelters. In testimony before the Finance Committee earlier today, Mr. McDonough stated:
While the SEC made clear that it did not consider
conventional tax compliance and planning to be a threat to
auditor independence, it distinguished such traditional
services from the marketing of novel, tax-driven, financial
products, which the SEC noted raise some serious issues. . .
. [T]he AICPA has also suggested that ``advice on tax
strategies having no business purpose other than tax
avoidance is an appropriate dividing line for activities that
should be prohibited to auditing firms registered under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.'' Thus, there appears to be consensus
that auditors ought not to be selling abusive tax shelters to
audit clients.
In an unrelated Wall Street Journal interview, Mr. McDonough was described as saying that ``[w]hat he finds problematic is `very creative tax work' . . . . `There is no way you can do that and claim to be independent,' he said.''
The Sarbanes-Oxley Task Force formed by the American Bar Association's Section of Taxation, has also expressed support for barring auditors from providing tax shelter services to their audit clients. In a comment letter supporting the proposed ban in the SEC regulations on auditor independence, the Task Force wrote:
We believe that tax shelter products raise particular
auditor independence concerns. Companies purchasing tax
shelter products are exposed to a variety of risks over and
above the calculation of tax liability. An accounting firm
that markets a tax shelter product to a registrant should be
prohibited from conducting the audit of the registrant
because it cannot be expected to fairly evaluate the risks
inherent in the tax shelter product.
Our legislation has been endorsed by a number of public interest groups working to strengthen auditor integrity, renew investor and consumer confidence in the financial statements of U.S. publicly traded companies, and curb abusive tax shelters. The Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Consumer Action, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, and Common Cause have stated in a letter of endorsement: ``Passage of this bill is one of the most important steps Congress could take to ensure that last
year's corporate reform efforts have their intended effect of restoring real independence to the 'independent' audit and, with it, a reasonable level of reliability to public companies' financial disclosures.''
Our bill's reforms are straightforward. Auditors should not audit their own work, including evaluating a tax shelter that the auditor itself sold to its audit client. Auditors should not sell personal tax shelters to the officers and directors of its audit clients, due to the conflicts of interest that can arise. Publicly traded companies ought to have explicit guidance to help them avoid auditor conflicts of interest, and the best guidance we can give them is the four auditor independence principles that have long guided SEC and Congressional action in this area.
Together, a ban on auditors providing tax shelter services to their audit clients and a codification of the four auditor independence principles to guide public companies away from auditor conflicts of interest could go a long way to restoring the confidence of investors in the U.S. auditing profession, financial reporting system, and capital markets. I urge my colleagues to support this common-sense and much-needed legislation.
I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the bill be printed in the Record.