Mr. President, today I join with Senators Leahy, Byrd, Jeffords, and Lieberman to introduce the Restore Freedom of Information Act, Restore FOIA, that will provide the public with access to information, while at the same time ensuring that…
Mr. President, today I join with Senators Leahy, Byrd, Jeffords, and Lieberman to introduce the Restore Freedom of Information Act, Restore FOIA, that will provide the public with access to information, while at the same time ensuring that information voluntarily submitted to the government by companies is not improperly disclosed. In order to ensure public access and limit improper disclosure, we need to reexamine some aspects of the Homeland Security Act, HSA, which was rushed through Congress last year, dropping several carefully-crafted, bipartisan measures which had been adopted by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, along the way. Dropping those measures left ambiguities in the law that need to be clarified, and today's bill is an attempt to make those clarifications and address certain problems that could otherwise result.
The issue this bill addresses is public access to information in the possession of the Homeland Security Department. Although some seem to want to shroud all homeland security efforts in secrecy, as Judge Damon Keith, writing for the U.S. Sixth Circuit of Appeals, recently warned ``Democracies die behind closed doors.'' The principles of open government and the public's right to know are cornerstones of our democracy. We cannot sacrifice those principles in the name of protecting them.
One of the reasons that I voted against the Homeland Security Act last year was because the final bill dropped a bipartisan provision, passed by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, clarifying how the new Department of Homeland Security, DHS, should comply with the Freedom of Information Act, FOIA. The final bill substituted a poorly drafted provision that could inappropriately close the door on persons seeking unclassified information from the Department related to critical infrastructure.
What is critical infrastructure? Critical infrastructure is the backbone that holds our country together and
makes it work--our roads, computer grids, telephones, pipelines, water treatment plants, utilities, and other facilities essential to a fully functioning Nation. It so happens that, in the United States, much of our critical infrastructure is controlled by private entities, often privately owned or publicly traded corporations. To strengthen existing protections for these facilities, the Federal Government asked the companies that own them to submit unclassified information about their facilities to assist the government in evaluating them, identifying possible problems, and designing stronger protections from terrorist attack, natural disasters, or other threats to homeland security.
Some companies asked to voluntarily submit this information feared that it might be improperly disclosed, and sought a new exemption from the Federal Freedom of Information Act, FOIA, to prohibit disclosure of so-called ``critical infrastructure information.'' Reporters, public interest groups, and others feared that, if this FOIA exemption were granted, companies could send important environmental and safety information to DHS under the general heading of ``critical infrastructure information'' and thereby put this information out of the public's reach. To bring these sides together, last July, Senators Bennett, Leahy and I worked out a bipartisan FOIA compromise that codified existing case law with regard to companies voluntarily submitting information. At the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee mark-up of the homeland security legislation, Senator Bennett said that the Administration supported our compromise, but the language was ultimately dropped from the final Homeland Security Act. As a result, the media, public interest groups, and others continue to fear that companies may be hiding important health and safety information that has long been public and should be public behind the mask of ``critical infrastructure.''
To rectify this situation, today we are introducing a bill that would change the existing HSA language in several important ways. First, our bill defines the key term, ``critical infrastructure,'' in a more focused way than the overly broad language in the HSA. To do that, our bill draws from language in existing case law, that has already been tested by the courts. The existing HSA language, it interpreted broadly, could expand the prohibition on disclosing critical infrastructure information to include virtually every aspect of a company's operations, denying public access to a great deal of health and safety information that the public has a right to know. If this expansive interpretation was not the intent of the bill's drafters, then they should be willing to accept our court-tested language.
A second important change that our bill would make in the existing HSA involves the issue of civil immunity for companies that violate the law. As currently worded, the HSA seems to suggest that companies which voluntarily submit to DHS critical infrastructure information indicating that the company is in violation of public health or safety regulations may gain protection from legal action in court to halt or penalize this wrongdoing, even if the information shows that the company is acting negligently. For example, the current HSA provisions could lead to the disturbing situation where DHS learns, through a critical infrastructure submission, that a company is leaking polluted sludge into a nearby waterway in violation of environmental restrictions, but is barred from going to court to stop the pollution because the law appears to prohibit the agency's use of the critical infrastructure information in a civil action. Our bill would eliminate the possibility that the HSA would provide companies with civil immunity under these circumstances.
A third key problem with the existing HSA language is that it includes a provision that could send a Federal whistleblower who discloses critical infrastructure information, even to an appropriate authority, to prison. The language is clear that if a DHS employee discloses unclassified critical infrastructure information, even when acting as a whistleblower who reveals the information to Congress in an act of conscience or patriotism, that whistleblower could wind up in jail. My colleague, Senator Leahy, describes a whistleblower who works at the FAA who blew the whistle on government collusion to coverup failures by airlines to meet tests on airline preparedness. That whistleblower could have ended up in jail had he blown the whistle under today's law. A year in jail is quite a deterrent for a Federal employee who is thinking about blowing the whistle, and we have never before threatened Federal whistleblowers with jail terms. It is a bad idea, and it is counterproductive to homeland safety.
There are other troubling provisions in the current HSA law as well, equally detrimental to the public's right to know. For example, the HSA exempts all communication of critical infrastructure information from the open meeting and other sunshine requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and places critical infrastructure information outside restrictions on ex parte contacts. The HSA also pre-empts state and local sunshine laws, an undue intrusion on the power of the States. The bill we are introducing today would strike all of these unnecessary provisions, and create in their stead a narrow FOIA exemption that balances the prohibition against improper disclosures of critical infrastructure information with the public's right to know.
Finally, I would like to include in the Record two examples of situations that could occur under the language in the HSA but would not occur under our bill. These disturbing examples were provided by Dr. Rena Steinzor, Professor at the University of Maryland School of Law, on behalf of the center for Progressive Regulation.
Case Study Number 1 is the following:
A large Midwest utility decides to replace an old coal burning electric generation unit with a new one. The new unit, much larger than the first, will produce significantly greater air pollution emissions. The company could mitigate these increases by installing additional pollution control equipment, but decides it does not wish to incur the expense. It begins construction and simultaneously reports its plans to the DHS as ``critical infrastructure information,'' so Federal security experts will know about its increased capacity to generate electricity.
A Department of Homeland Security employee, visiting the plant to consult on government purchases of power during emergency situations, notices readings on internal gauges reflecting the dramatically increased emissions. She telephones EPA to report the situation. EPA issues a Notice of Violation to the company, and threatens to bring an action for civil penalties, but is instructed to desist by DHS officials who inform EPA that the HSA prohibits disclosing the information provided to the agency in court and that DHS wants to list the company as an emergency supplier capable of providing expanded electricity production in an upcoming report to Congress. EPA drops its enforcement action, and the DHS employee not only loses her job but also is prosecuted criminally.
Case Study Number 2 is the following:
Lobbyists representing companies that provide goods and services to the Department of Homeland Security routinely submit materials describing their companies' products in glowing terms. They arrange repeated trips for government purchasing agents to exotic locations under the guise of briefing them regarding the technical aspects of the products. All of this information is designated as critical infrastructure by the companies, and is therefore protected from disclosure and oversight by the media or possibly even individual members of Congress who could see the information but not reveal it.
The Homeland Security Act was never intended to protect polluters or special interests from public scrutiny. But as these examples demonstrate, that is exactly what could happen if the current, vague language in the law is not corrected. The bill we are introducing today would make the needed corrections.
On January 17, 2003 at his confirmation hearing before the Governmental Affairs Committee, I questioned Governor Ridge about these problems with the current wording of the Homeland
Security Act. I asked him whether the HSA could have the unintended consequences of providing protections for wrongdoing while impeding access to necessary information to protect public health and safety. Governor Ridge replied: ``[T]hat certainly wasn't the intent, I am sure, of those who advocated the Freedom of Information Act exemption, to give wrongdoers protection or to protect illegal activity, and I will certainly work with you to clarify that language.'' If that was not the intent, then let us fix the vague, and potentially dangerous provisions that are in this bill.
I would also note, for the record, that many organizations have endorsed our bill including the following:
American Association of Law Libraries, American Civil Liberties Union, American Immigration Lawyers Association, American Library Association, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Americans for Democratic Action, American Society of Magazine Editors, American Society of Newspaper Editors, Arab American Institute, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Associated Press Managing Editors, Association of Research Libraries, Center for Democracy and Technology, Children's Environmental Health Network, Clean Production Network, Common Cause, Communications Workers of America, Cook Inlet Keeper, Council on American-Islamic Relations, Council on Professional Association of Federal Statistics, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Environmental Defense, Federation of American Scientists, Freedom of Information Center, Friends of the Earth, Fund for Constitutional Government, Government Accountability Project, Greenpeace, Magazine Publishers of America, Maryland Pesticide Network, National Federation of Press Women, National Newspaper Association, National Press Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, New Jersey Work Environment Council, Newsletter & Electronic Publishers Association, Newspaper Association of America, Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, OMB Watch, Pesticide Action Network, North America Powder River Basin Resource Council, Privacy Activism, Privacy Times, Project on Government Oversight, Radio- Television News Directors Association, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Sierra Club, Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, Society of Professional Journalists, Strategic Counsel on Corporate Accountability, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, University of Missouri School of Journalism, West Harlem Environmental Action Working Group on Community Right-to-Know.