Mr. Speaker, I rise today to affirm the critical importance of our Nation's friendship with India and to add my name as a cosponsor to H.R. 5682, legislation implementing the U.S.- India Civilian Nuclear Agreement concluded earlier this…
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to affirm the critical importance of our Nation's friendship with India and to add my name as a cosponsor to H.R. 5682, legislation implementing the U.S.- India Civilian Nuclear Agreement concluded earlier this year.
Our friendship with India is among the most important bilateral relationships for our Nation's security and prosperity. The world's largest democracy, India is a vital partner in many different arenas: fighting the war on terrorism, expanding and advancing both the U.S. and Indian economies, modeling responsible democratic government to other regions of the world, addressing climate change and other key environmental challenges, and crafting a productive relationship with an emerging China, to name a few.
It is also a nation with which we share many common characteristics, making it a natural friend and ally. Both nations emerged from British rule to become flourishing democracies, each giving political voice and representation to hundreds of millions of citizens and each serving as a beacon of democratic values and human rights to the rest of the world. Both nations share a tremendous diversity of ethnicity and religion, and despite periodic setbacks, both have found sustainable and just models for drawing strength from this diversity. The United States and India have, in the last decade, forged increasingly intimate linkages economically, as India has emerged as one of the fastest growing free markets in the world. And, of course, our Nation has welcomed a large and vibrant community of Indian-Americans to our shores, a community that has immeasurably enriched the fabric of American life.
Unfortunately, our friendship with India over the last three decades has not been as strong as it should be. It is the only democracy with which our Nation had poor relations through most of the cold war. In 2000, President Clinton ushered in a new era in our bilateral relationship, becoming the first President to visit India since President Carter. But that positive momentum stalled in the early years of the Bush administration, as the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks unsettled South Asian relationships and India- Pakistan tensions increased.
The primary obstacle to a stronger relationship remains India's nuclear program. In 1974, India defied the world by conducting a nuclear weapons test, demonstrating that it had developed nuclear weapons capability outside the bounds of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. From that day forward, India has remained outside nuclear nonproliferation regimes and has faced international sanctions and lack of access to civilian nuclear materials and technology.
The price of its defiance--thirty-two years of sanctions and prohibitions--has not forced India to give up its nuclear weapons program or to make any discernible policy changes. The reality is, despite the best efforts of the international community to limit nuclear proliferation, India is and will continue to be a nuclear weapons state. Moreover, it is a stable, responsible nuclear weapons state that poses no threat to our national security. It is both unfair and unwise to continue to treat India as an international pariah. The time has come to recognize reality and adjust our outdated policies toward one of our most important allies.
The U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement, as a first step toward recalibrating our policies toward India, holds great promise for bringing our two nations closer together. Characteristically, President Bush has negotiated without adequately engaging Congress and the international community. But he has correctly recognized the need for this landmark policy shift.
The agreement itself is a greatly-needed improvement over current policies, yet the details of the agreement pose some questions and challenges for our national security. The agreement has both negative and positive features, and the American people need to be aware of the full array of consequences as we proceed.
The most critical entry on the positive side of the ledger must be the agreement's impact on our relationship with India. This improved relationship will strengthen our national security in a variety of ways, particularly by enhancing our partnership in the global war on terrorism and in our efforts to forge a productive relationship with an emerging China. Our role as a world leader in confronting several global moral crises--like poverty, hunger, and HIV/AIDS--will also be enhanced, as the improved relationship will allow the United States to bring greater attention to efforts to improve the lot of India's 600 million poor people. Indeed, the accelerated economic development anticipated as a result of expanded civilian nuclear energy production will hopefully lift millions of people out of poverty and into prosperity.
The agreement also has the potential to enhance our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation around the world. Currently, India's large nuclear program is subject to only limited safeguards. Therefore, bringing any additional part
of its nuclear program under the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards and inspections regime will be positive. Perhaps more importantly, we can reasonably hope that, upon entering the community of responsible nuclear-weapons states, India will set aside its historic resistance to nonproliferation regimes and join us in fighting nuclear proliferation around the world.
The agreement likewise could have some adverse consequences. Let us examine the facts:
Eight of India's nuclear power reactors and 9,000 kilograms of spent nuclear fuel--enough to produce more than 1,000 nuclear weapons--will not be placed under any type of international safeguards or inspections regime. India will also have the flexibility to designate any reactors built in the future as part of its military program, keeping them out of international inspections regimes.
Civilian nuclear cooperation could free India to devote more resources to its nuclear weapons program; by purchasing fissile material from the U.S. and other suppliers for its civilian reactors, India could choose to use more of its native uranium stocks for its weapons program.
The agreement could send a dangerously mixed message to other non- nuclear weapons states, namely, that they are expected not to develop a nuclear weapons program but, if they do, they could be rewarded with a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. This mixed signal is especially harmful at a time when we are confronting reckless proliferation by Iran and North Korea.
These are serious concerns that have the potential to harm our national security. They are concerns that must be addressed in some fashion before we move forward.
Examining both sides of the ledger, I come to three conclusions:
First, the American people should not be under any illusions: this agreement is a strategic trade-off involving a significant element of risk. It states that we are willing to sacrifice some progress on the nonproliferation front in order to achieve broader benefits to our national security as a result of an enhanced U.S.-India friendship and cooperation.
Second, Congress must enact this agreement because a rejection of it would set back U.S.-India relations immeasurably. For the precise reasons I have cited in stating that a strong U.S.-India relationship is critical, a weakened relationship would be disastrous.
Finally, Congress must find a way to navigate between these two realities. We must minimize the risks associated with the gamble the agreement represents while maximizing its potential for strengthening U.S.-Indian cooperation. In other words, Congress's active engagement in refining and strengthening the agreement is essential.
I rise today to cosponsor the implementing legislation accompanying the agreement because I have gained assurances that Congress will play such an active role. I am particularly encouraged by two recent developments.
First, the Bush administration and House leaders have agreed to a two-stage process in ratifying the agreement. Congress will first vote on H.R. 5682, the legislation I am cosponsoring, which will provide the President the authority to waive provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to allow civilian nuclear cooperation with India. Later, after agreements have been reached with the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Congress will vote on a specific U.S.-India bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. If our concerns are not sufficiently addressed in these three additional agreements, the second stage will allow Congress to put on the brakes.
Secondly, I am encouraged by the significant steps the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have taken to refine the legislation and fill in important details. Both Committees have signaled that they will not simply rubber-stamp the President's proposal, but that they will conduct due diligence and ensure that the legislation implementing the agreement guarantees our national security. This commitment is embodied in H.R. 5682, which represents a tremendous improvement and refinement of the draft legislation originally submitted by the President.
Mr. Speaker, I am cosponsoring this legislation to signal my belief in its importance and to aid in its forward movement. But I also want to underscore the importance of the next steps to be taken by this body. I rise today to urge my colleagues to focus upon several key considerations as we continue our consideration of the bill.
First, the final legislation must challenge India to take its commitment against nuclear testing seriously. India has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and has only pledged to withhold nuclear testing in the absence of a provocation from another nation. As the 2002 showdown between India and Pakistan demonstrated, any nuclear tests by India will have a destabilizing effect on the region and could damage our national security. The current draft allows the President to terminate the agreement if India conducts a nuclear test, and it is essential that this provision remain in the final legislation.
Second, the agreement must provide for some reasonable transparency over the use of India's native fissile material and spent nuclear fuel. As India begins to import nuclear material for use in civilian reactors, its native material stocks will become fungible, free for use in producing nuclear weapons. Its spent nuclear fuel stocks, not subject to international monitoring under the agreement, will also be available for use in nuclear weapons. Clearly, our civilian nuclear cooperation should not be used as a means for India to accelerate its nuclear weapons development. The current legislation contains a provision that will alert us if India is taking advantage of the nuclear cooperation agreement to fuel a nuclear arms race. Of course, we will depend heavily on our intelligence community to assess India's production of nuclear weapons, and we must ensure that they have the personnel and resources they require.
Third, we must strongly urge India to cease the production of fissile material explicitly for use in nuclear weapons. For over a decade, the international community has been working toward the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty that would ban the production of new fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. India's endorsement of such a treaty would significantly allay the concerns about the agreement's impact on nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Our nation should also be urging India's nuclear neighbors, Pakistan and China, to sign such a treaty in order to provide India the assurances that it can do so without endangering its national security.
Fourth, the deal must be conditioned on the conclusion of an acceptable agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The negotiations between these parties are ongoing. An acceptable outcome would have to include an acceptance by India of a permanent safeguards regime that requires the same transparency, the same access, and the same type of inspections that other countries admit under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The legislation contains some helpful provisions in this regard; however, we must remain engaged after the passage of this legislation to ensure that the negotiations meet our standards.
Finally, Congress and the Bush administration can strengthen the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement by working together to enhance and expand nuclear nonproliferation efforts in other regions of the world. Our national security depends greatly on keeping the worst weapons, nuclear weapons of mass destruction, out of the worst hands, those of fundamentalist terrorists who target our nation. Ensuring adequate protections against proliferation in the U.S.-India agreement is a key component of this priority, but it does not end there.
As we work to bring India in line with international standards for nuclear responsibility, we should also be accelerating programs that increase nuclear security elsewhere. One of the most critical programs is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program that secures loose nuclear material and technology in the former Soviet Union, where enough nuclear material to produce thousands of nuclear weapons remains unsecured. As the 9-11 Commission's Final Report rightly noted, ``the government should weigh the value of this investment against the catastrophic cost America would face should such weapons find their way to the terrorists who are so anxious to acquire them.''
Of equal importance, the administration and Congress must strengthen our dismally ineffective efforts to confront Iran and North Korea as those nations defy the world. One of this Administration's single most dangerous failures has been to allow North Korea to proliferate freely for five years without crafting any viable strategy for confronting the world's worst proliferator. And the Administration's strategy to rein in Iran has been scarcely better, allowing the situation to continue unresolved for far too long. As long as these two rogue nations freely seek nuclear weapons, weapons they could easily sell or transfer to terrorists, our nation cannot be secure.
The U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is a dramatic departure from the past. We must not enter into it with any illusions that it is without risk; however, I believe it holds the potential to make our nation and the world safer and more secure. We have the opportunity to build a strong and lasting friendship with the world's largest democracy, one of the world's fastest growing markets, and a nation from which we have remained estranged for far too long. We should not let such a tremendous opportunity pass by. At the same time, we must proceed responsibly, ensuring that we minimize the risks inherent in the agreement. I believe Congress is taking
seriously its responsibility to do so, and I look forward to working with my colleagues to craft legislation that makes our Nation stronger and forges a new era in U.S.-Indian relations.