Mr. Speaker, the President's request of an $87 billion supplemental appropriation on top of $79 billion already appropriated has prompted renewed debate over our military operations in Iraq, our plans for the subsequent reconstruction of…
Mr. Speaker, the President's request of an $87 billion supplemental appropriation on top of $79 billion already appropriated has prompted renewed debate over our military operations in Iraq, our plans for the subsequent reconstruction of that country, and our broader policy objectives in the Middle East.
We must take to a successful conclusion the securing of Iraq, the rebuilding of the country's economy and infrastructure, and the transition to an indigenous democratic government. We must provide our forces in Iraq the resources they need to complete their mission and to enhance their safety and security while they are performing their mission. But the Bush administration must give a full accounting of how we plan to reach these goals, how we are going to meet the costs, and how we are to enlist the necessary international support.
This afternoon, Mr. Speaker, I want to specify certain key questions and expectations that Members of Congress must bring to the consideration of the President's request.
This request is considerably overdue. For far too long the Bush administration refused to estimate the precise costs of the war as it pushed for tax cuts upon tax cuts, mainly benefitting the wealthiest Americans, and as it presided over a 2-year, $8 trillion fiscal reversal, the largest in our country's history.
But now the bill is coming due, and that stubborn fact, in addition to the critical situation on the ground in Iraq, has forced the President's hand.
That is not to say he has totally come clean. The President's request of $20 billion for reconstruction covers less than half of the projected costs. And it is bound to increase if his optimistic estimate as to oil revenues and contributions from allies do not materialize. Nor are we ever likely to hear
the President acknowledge that every dime of that $87 billion is borrowed money, adding to what was already a record Federal deficit.
How much money is $87 billion? It is three times what we spend each year on major disease research at the National Institutes of Health. It is more than double our entire post-9/11 Homeland Security budget. It amounts to $3.5 million each week throughout 2004 for each of the 435 congressional districts in our country; $3.5 million dollars each week for each district. I will leave it to colleagues to calculate what this could mean in terms of covering the uninsured or upgrading our schools or improving roads and mass transit.
So the cost of our Iraqi intervention is immense and we are reminded daily of the human cost as well. American fatalities since the President declared the combat phase concluded now number 158, more than the 139 incurred during active combat. Honest acknowledgment of these costs is essential both to assessing our Nation's course thus far and to charting our course ahead.
As it became more and more evident last winter that nothing was likely to divert the President from the course he had chosen in Iraq, I, like others, took to the House floor to raise questions that the administration had not answered, questions which were basic to any rationale for war:
``What accounting do we have of the costs and risks of military invasion? How are we to secure and maintain the support and engagement of our allies? Can Iraq be disarmed by means that do not divert us from, or otherwise compromise, equally or more urgent anti-terrorist and diplomatic objectives? Do we have a credible plan for rebuilding and governing post-war Iraq? Have we secured the necessary international cooperation ensure that this does not become a perceived U.S. occupation?''
I must say in retrospect that those were legitimate and important questions. In some areas, the administration had no answer or wrong answers, and in others they refused to level with Congress and the American people.
On one of the few instances when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld addressed the war's costs, he echoed OMB Mitch Daniels with an estimate of ``something under $50 billion.'' That was in January, and a few weeks later his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, described Iraq as ``a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.'' Such statements help us understand the fix we are in in Iraq and the pressure the administration is now facing to give an honest accounting, along with a credible plan, complete with cost and deployment estimates, going forward.
The President's $87 billion supplemental appropriations request has been accompanied by a return to the United Nations to seek the support, for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq, of the allies the administration once spurned. This appears to be, as Ron Brownstein of the Los Angeles Times termed it, a case of ``reality trumping ideology,'' based on the realization that under present policies the President does not have the means to achieve his ends in Iraq. But it does not yet amount to the mid-course correction that is called for.
The administration still has a long way to go in presenting to the American people and to our prospective allies a credible plan for securing and rebuilding Iraq. There is no time to spare, as the New York Times editorialized on September 14, ``If Mr. Bush does not demonstrate a clear and convincing strategy soon, he may face political pressure to bring home American troops under conditions that would be embarrassing for America and perilous for the Middle East.''
In the first place, Mr. Speaker, the President must provide a straightforward account of how the $79 billion already appropriated has been spent and what the newly requested $87 billion will buy. Accountability for funds thus far expended; justification for the present request; and an honest estimate of the costs yet to come.
Is the request consistent with our first priority of combatting terrorism in Afghanistan and beyond? Is it based on realistic estimates of funding from oil revenues and from allied contributions? Even if we succeed in enlisting additional allies, that will only partially ease our financial burden. Current plans, for example, are for Poland to lead a multinational force of some 19 countries in the central-southern region of Iraq. But of the estimated $240 million cost of the operation, Poland is expected to pay no more than $40 million, with the U.S. covering the rest.
It is critically important, I believe, to focus separately on the portion of the President's of $87 billion request that is targeted to Afghanistan: $11 billion for military operations and $800 million for reconstruction. Those numbers pale in comparison to the Iraq request, and they may not be sufficient. In crucial respects, our Afghan operations offer a contrast to Iraq. Afghanistan was a war of necessity. It was directly related to the 9/11 attacks. It was endorsed and supported almost unanimously by the world community. The NATO alliance has now assumed responsibility for ongoing operations there. Yet the country is largely unsecured outside of Kabul and the top leadership of both the Taliban and al Qaeda is still at large.
Our decision to deal with the Iraqi challenge through a massive military invasion has arguably set back the broader war on terrorism, allowing the Taliban and al Qaeda to regroup. There is no place in the world where it is more important to position U.S. Special Forces than in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region where Taliban and al Qaeda forces are still operating. Our Special Forces must be fully supported, and they must not be further diverted until their mission is concluded.
The Afghan reconstruction funding will partially address such critical needs as road and school construction, irrigation projects, and training a self-sustaining Afghan security force. This aid may also help shore up some support for the embattled, pro-Western President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai. However, decades of civil war have left the nation without such basic needs as a modern electric power infrastructure, urban sanitation systems, or an advanced medical infrastructure. There is much left to do, and it will take a concerted multinational effort to meet these needs.
The administration must also explain to Congress and the public how the $87 billion, all of it deficit spending, far beyond the scale of most emergency supplemental appropriations requests, is to be paid for. In particular, is it either fair or fiscally prudent to leave in place, much less to extend, massive tax cuts for those in the highest brackets, tax cuts that have produced unprecedented annual deficits and that mock the very idea of shared sacrifice?
Secondly, the administration must deal with the question of troop strength. The supplemental appropriations request assumes American troops will remain at present levels for at least another year. We in North Carolina have particular reason to recognize the spectacular performance of our men and women in uniform during the combat phase and the valor and commitment they continue to display under trying conditions. Tens of thousands of these troops have been deployed from our State, including National Guard and Reserve units that have been subject to repeated call-ups.
By the same token, however, North Carolinians have been especially attentive to evidence of administration misjudgments as to the troop levels that would be required in post-war Iraq, to extensions in the tours of many units, and to the mismatch between what these troops have been trained for and the security and reconstruction functions that they are being called upon to perform.
Secretary Rumsfeld has offered dubious assurances, despite the continuing level of violence, that no more troops are needed; but the administration has not explained how even the present level of deployment in Iraq can be sustained. Of the Army's 33 active duty combat brigades, 16 are currently assigned to Iraq and five elsewhere overseas. Almost all of the others are needed for rotation purposes, mainly in Iraq, and for emergency standby related to North Korea. As of last week, more than 128,000 Army Guard and Reserve members, or 23 percent of the force, were mobilized in support of operations overseas and in the United States, many on yearlong tours, with thousands more to be deployed or redeployed soon.
Thirdly, what is the administration's plan for securing allied participation and how much relief can this realistically afford relative to American financial and personnel requirements? The tens of thousands of additional troops and the billions of dollars of additional funding that we need in Iraq, as well as our broader antiterrorist and peacemaking endeavors in the Middle East, will require intensive diplomatic repair work in the coming weeks. The return of Secretary Powell and of the President to the United Nations is a necessary first step toward the cooperative ties we must forge with allies ranging from Germany and France to India and Turkey and Egypt. At the same time, we must press ahead with the recruitment and training of indigenous Iraqi police and security forces and the transition to Iraqi self-rule.
Finally, we look to the President for a reaffirmation of America's commitment to Middle East peacemaking. After almost 2\1/2\ years of ill-advised disengagement from the quest for a fair and enduring settlement between Israel and its neighbors, the President has commendably joined with our ``Quartet'' partners, the European Union, the United Nations and Russia, to announce the ``Road Map'' initiative for mutual, step-by-step Israeli-Palestinian accommodations.
Recent weeks have not been auspicious for the Road Map initiative. Hamas suicide bombers have conducted devastating attacks, killing and maiming dozens of Israelis, many of them teenagers and children. The Israeli government has stepped up its targeted assassination of Hamas leaders and members and has tightened its chokehold on the occupied territories.
In fact, the two sides seemed locked in a death grip. Violent deaths since the collapse of the peace process number 858 among Israelis and 2,468 Palestinians. Who would not be moved by the story of two of the victims of the September 9 Jerusalem bombing, Dr. David Applebaum and his daughter Naava, out on an errand the night before what was to be her happy wedding day? Such wrenching stories underscore again and again the urgency of reaching a settlement that ensures security and integrity for Israel and a viable state for the Palestinians. And in the post-9/11 world, Middle East peacemaking has assumed an added dimension. ``Suicide bombing is becoming so routine'' in Israel/ Palestine, Thomas Friedman recently wrote, ``that it risks becoming embedded in contemporary culture. America must stop it. A credible peace deal is no longer a U.S. luxury: it is essential to our own homeland security. Otherwise, this suicide madness will spread, and it will be Americans who will have to learn how to live with it.''
The simultaneous steps that the Road Map envisions are politically difficult and vulnerable to sabotage. The Israeli government, reluctant to challenge the settlers in any case, is doubly so when the likely reward is another horrific bombing by Hamas, whose structure of terror remains intact. As for the Palestinians, they feel they are being asked to risk a civil war by taking on militant groups by force without assurances that settlements will actually be removed from Palestinian territory or statehood achieved. That is why American leadership is absolutely essential, to help ensure that both sides in fact comply with the road map and that the process is steadied against the predictable attempts at sabotage by the enemies of peace.
If the process remains stalled and the violence continues, American leaders may need to think outside the Road-Map ``box'' in terms of putting a peace plan on the table proactively. What is not even thinkable is for our government again to disengage and to let that death grip tighten.
Mr. Speaker, we are at a critical juncture in the war on terrorism and in our Nation's engagement in the Middle East. We must push ahead with the reconstruction and democratization of Afghanistan and Iraq, preventing either a return to tyranny or a collapse into violence that would allow forces deadly to our country's vital interests to take root.
That is what the supplemental appropriations requested by the President must help underwrite, and that is why I expect that most of us in this body are likely in due course to support something close to the requested amount. But while Congress was willing to provide a blank check in the past, it does not seem likely to do so now. We must have an accounting of the administration's strategy going forward, its timetables and objectives, its costs and personnel requirements, how our allies will share in its obligation, and how past mistakes will be corrected or avoided. The committees of the Congress must schedule sufficient hearings to allow administration officials to make their case and to allow Members to question them fully.
The need for mid-course correction raises serious issues, yet unresolved, about the path to war that the President chose. We will no doubt debate these questions for years to come, and we cannot allow them to paralyze us now. But if we are to correct our course and go forward successfully, we must confront the flawed premises and the failed diplomacy that set the terms of the Iraqi invasion. In closing, I want to underscore the importance of one of these pieces of unfinished business, not merely to clear the air but also to clarify what Congress and the American people must demand of this administration or of any administration in the future. I am referring to the intelligence and to the interpretations of intelligence on which the decision to invade Iraq was based.
We are all aware, Mr. Speaker, of the perils of 20/20 hindsight. And on some questions, most notably Iraq's possession of chemical and biological weapons, even hindsight is still unclear. Iraq possessed and used such weapons in the past. Yet after 5 months, no stockpiles have been found. U.S. weapons inspector David Kay is soon expected to make an interim report to Congress on the Iraqis weapons program. By all reports, he will suggest that Saddam may have intended to produce weapons when and if U.N. inspectors left Iraq. However, intent does not constitute an imminent threat. While Mr. Kay has work left to do, he has yet to uncover the threat that we expected.
Regarding Iraq's development of deployable nuclear weapons and the tenuous linkage between al Qaeda and the Iraqi government, we are not simply talking about 20/20 hindsight. We are talking about evidence that Members of this body knew, or should have known, to be shaky as early as the October congressional vote authorizing the use of force and certainly in the winter months leading up to the invasion.
The President and administration officials continue to obfuscate the Iraqi-al Qaeda link, which now may become a self-fulfilling prophecy as Iraq becomes a magnet for terrorist operatives from around the region. As for the claims by the President, the Vice President, and others that Iraq was attempting to reconstitute its nuclear program, we have the testimony of retired foreign service officer Joseph Wilson, who was dispatched to Niger in early 2002 to investigate reported sales of uranium ore to Iraq. ``Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war,'' Wilson wrote, ``I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat.''
The House and Senate Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence are currently conducting investigations which we are assured will focus not only on the prewar performance of U.S. intelligence agencies but also on how the White House used intelligence information to make the case for war. These investigations must be thorough and objective, following the facts wherever they lead. We commend these colleagues for the hard work they have done thus far. They know we are counting on them for a conscientious and comprehensive job. If this investigation takes a partisan turn, or if there is any hint of pressure to protect the administration, sentiment may well shift toward an inquiry by an independent commission of the sort the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman) has proposed. We must never conclude, despite the undisputed fact that Saddam Hussein was a blood-soaked tyrant, and that both the Iraqis and the world are better off with him gone--we still must never conclude that the credibility of the reasons that our government gave to the American people
and to our potential allies for going to war do not matter. These reasons, which centered on the grave threat posed by Iraq's weapons program, do matter. If they are found to have been based on fallacious or manipulated evidence, the blow to our international credibility and to the integrity of the discourse on which our democracy depends will be profound.
Mr. Speaker, there will be many calls for national unity and resolve as we consider the President's $87 billion request and contemplate the long, hard road ahead. I will join in those calls, for the challenges confronting our country transcend political divisions and the differences we have had in the past. But the administration needs to understand its end of the bargain, for in a democracy, where power is shared between the executive and legislative branches of government, critical decisions must not be taken in an atmosphere of deception or political intimidation or stealth. Going forward, we must hold one another accountable for the clear-eyed development of a strategy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, planning carefully and realistically, dealing truthfully with costs and risks, and working cooperatively with allies who share our values and goals. This is the mid-course correction, indeed the new beginning, that we need to signal and to achieve as we consider the request the President has made of this Congress and of the people we represent.