Mr. Speaker, this Member commends to his colleagues two editorials on North Korea. First, this Member hopes his colleagues will review the October 20, 2003, editorial from the New York Times in which the newspaper finally is willing to…
Mr. Speaker, this Member commends to his colleagues two editorials on North Korea.
First, this Member hopes his colleagues will review the October 20, 2003, editorial from the New York Times in which the newspaper finally is willing to call the acts in which North Korea has been engaged ``blackmail.'' Indeed, for many years, this term has accurately described the conduct of the previous Kim II Sung regime and now the Kim Jong II regime.
An agreement by the United States, Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan that there would be no attack on North Korea ``in exchange for its commitment to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs'' is a sufficient quid pro quo as long as North Korea's acceptance of this proposed agreement is not tied to economic aid. This Member feels very strongly that the United States cannot fall into a cycle of extortion again.
Second, this Member commends the editorial which was published in the October 21, 2003, Los Angeles Times. As the editorial correctly notes, North Korea poses a regional threat and therefore its neighbors--China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan--must be included in all efforts to craft and verify agreements whereby North Korea will dismantle its nuclear weapons program.
[From the New York Times, Oct. 21, 2003]
Trying Diplomacy on North Korea
President Bush is now taking a wiser and more sophisticated
approach to the crisis caused by North Korea's reckless
pursuit of nuclear weapons. In a proposal whose details are
still being refined, Washington and four other nations would
guarantee not to attack the North in exchange for its
commitment to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.
This proposal makes an eventual peaceful, diplomatic
solution to this extremely dangerous problem somewhat more
likely. Just how likely is impossible to tell because there
is no assurance that North Korea's highly unpredictable
leaders will agree to disarm. If the North does spurn this
reasonable offer, Washington will find it easier to persuade
Asian nations to support more coercive steps, like
international economic sanctions.
North Korea's nuclear programs are particularly alarming
because the nation has a long history of selling advanced
weapons to all who will pay for them, including other rogue
states and perhaps terrorists. Yet in the past year, as the
North has raced ahead with reprocessing plutonium into bomb
fuel, Washington has handicapped its own efforts to achieve a
diplomatic solution by refusing to specify what America would
be willing to do if the North firmly committed to giving up
its nuclear weapons ambitions in ways outsiders could
reliably verify.
The White House had insisted that specifying any such quid
pro quo would be giving in to North Korean nuclear blackmail.
Blackmail is a fair description of North Korea's behavior.
But in a situation in which everyone agrees that military
action against the North would have catastrophic consequences
for hundreds of thousands of innocent South Koreans and
Japanese, Washington's principled stand poorly served
American interests.
With this proposal, Mr. Bush is now making a serious effort
to revive negotiations and is personally seeking the support
of his fellow leaders at the Asia-Pacific summit meeting in
Bangkok. All four of the nations that would join Washington
in the proposed security guarantee--China, Japan, Russia and
South Korea--are represented there. Washington's new approach
deserves strong support from each of them.
In offering security guarantees to the North, Mr. Bush
wisely overruled hawkish administration officials who
preferred moving directly toward coercive economic and
military steps. This initiative comes less than a week after
the administration's skilled diplomacy won unanimous backing
for a United Nations Security Council resolution on Iraq that
broadly endorsed Washington's policies there. Diplomacy is an
important tool for advancing America's national security. It
is good to see it.
[From the Los Angeles Times, Oct. 21, 2003]
Correct Nuclear Strategy
President Bush's announced willingness to take part in a
joint guarantee not to attack North Korea is an important
maneuver in getting Pyongyang to end its nuclear weapons
program. Even if Kim Jong Il's regime refuses to accept
anything short of a full-fledged treaty, Bush's more
conciliatory approach should win needed diplomatic support
from China and South Korea.
Bush took advantage of the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation summit in Bangkok to discuss North Korea's
nuclear ambitions with Presidents Hu Jintao of China and Roh
Moo Hyun of South Korea. In August, both countries joined the
U.S., Japan and Russia to present a united front, urging
North Korea to end its atomic weapons development. The U.S.
is correct to enlist the assistance of North Korea's
neighbors; nuclear proliferation is a regional threat, not an
issue of concern only to Pyongyang and Washington.
When North Korea resisted further talks, China and South
Korea urged Washington to try to woo the North back to the
table by providing written, not just oral, assurance that it
would not attack. Bush offered to take that extra step,
although he correctly ruled out a formal treaty. Pyongyang's
refusal to abide by its 1994 agreement with the U.S. to
freeze its nuclear weapons program in exchange for energy
supplies and economic aid raises doubts it would live up to a
treaty. North Korea first should be required to show
international inspectors that it is not reprocessing
plutonium and enriching uranium.
One administration official said the U.S. was willing to
sign an agreement saying it had no ``hostile intent'' if
North Korea demonstrated that it was making ``verifiable
progress'' in dismantling its weapons program. That's an
important change from administration insistence that
Pyongyang end the program before getting any economic help.
The North considered such an ultimatum unacceptable, but it
might end the program in stages if it saw rewards at each
step.
North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty last year and keeps saying it is reprocessing
plutonium from 8,000 fuel rods. That may be bluff and
bluster, but if true it would produce enough fuel for perhaps
20 nuclear weapons. Monday, it fired a conventional missile
into the Sea of Japan in a test timed to coincide with the
Bangkok summit, though not with Bush's initiative. Pyongyang
has sold missiles to other nations; because it is desperately
poor and periodically racked by famine, there is no reason to
believe it would refrain from selling weapons-grade nuclear
material.
China provides most of North Korea's food and oil supplies
and has been instrumental in arranging six-nation talks. It
should point to Washington's flexibility as it pressures
North Korea to resume talks and give up nuclear weapons in
exchange for security and aid.