Mr. Speaker, this Member commends to his colleagues the following editorial from the May 27, 2004, Lincoln Journal Star. The editorial highlights some of the shortcomings of the Transportation Security Administration and its baggage…
Mr. Speaker, this Member commends to his colleagues the following editorial from the May 27, 2004, Lincoln Journal Star. The editorial highlights some of the shortcomings of the Transportation Security Administration and its baggage screening system. Clearly, the creation of a large, new Federal force is not necessarily the best way to address legitimate security concerns.
[From the Lincoln Journal Star, May 27, 2004]
Nuclear Plant Special Force Questionable
An alarmed Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham wants more and
tighter security at government facilities that have
radioactive material that could be fashioned into nuclear
devices.
No argument here. The dangers of lax security at such sites
are too awful to contemplate and too real to dismiss.
According to an account from The Associated Press, Abraham,
in calling earlier this month for reforms, cited poor
performance in mock security exercises and other failings--
cheating on readiness tests, lost keys--by guards from
private contractors.
Chief among Abraham's solutions to the problems he found: a
federal police force to guard the facilities and an elite
force to protect areas with the most sensitive nuclear
weapons material.
Sounds impressive, until you consider how the last special
force set up for national security has done.
That force--the hardworking men and women of the
Transportation Security Administration--still hasn't proved
that it can reliably protect the nation's commercial
airports.
To be sure, they're trying.
Since the agency started work Nov. 19, 2002, it geared up
with some 60,000 people to screen passengers and their
luggage. Congress has since limited that number to 45,000, so
the agency has raised and lowered staffing at airports here
and there to meet demand.
The agency professionals have confiscated thousands of
banned objects from often bewildered, sometimes bemused
travelers; guns and garrotes; straight razors and knitting
needles; tin snips and butter knives.
There is also little doubt the agency has thwarted
dangerous incidents long before they reached any newspaper's
front page and for that it should be honored and thanked.
But the Transportation Security Administration's still
young and still learning some hard lessons. Among them that
shake public faith;
In November, a college student secreted box cutters through
airport checkpoints and onto at least two planes. He sent an
e-mail to federal authorities saying he had put the items
aboard two specific Southwest Airlines flights. The objects
were not found until five weeks later.
In November, an Eppley Airfield baggage screener was
charged with dealing cocaine after 8 ounces of cocaine, 7
grams of crack cocaine and manufacturing equipment were found
in his Omaha home. According to the AP, between 1993 and 1997
the man was convicted of six misdemeanors including
obstructing an officer and disorderly conduct.
In October, it was reported that written tests given
potential baggage screeners never
asked applicants to show they could identify dangerous
objects inside luggage. In addition, the investigation by the
Homeland Security Department--overseer of the Transportation
Security Administration--showed that some screeners hired by
the government to check baggage for bombs were given most of
the answers to tests.
Also in October, the head of the Transportation Security
Administration acknowledged that box cutters can get through
airport checkpoints. But the chief, James Loy, blamed the
lack and sophistication of technology, not his screeners.
There may be no way to prove that creating Loy's agency was
necessary. But it is easy to prove that it has been costly.
The question is: Can Energy Secretary Abraham prove that a
new, specialized force to protect nuclear facilities will be
any more successful than the contractors already overseen by
his department's specialized bureaucracy, the National
Nuclear Security Administration?
And if that agency is incapable, will a new expensive
bureaucracy do any better?
Other federal agencies have elite forces available--the
Secret Service and FBI are but two. Could their highly
trained men and women be given another mission, supported by
their bureaucracy?
Surely the money saved could be spent on creating and
providing the technology that Abraham says is lacking for
airport screeners, technology that might well benefit the
forces protecting the nation's nuclear weapons and power
plants.