Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I rise in conditional opposition to S. 878. The reason I would oppose this bill is if the amendment offered by the gentleman from Idaho is passed by this body. I firmly…
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in conditional opposition to S. 878. The reason I would oppose this bill is if the amendment offered by the gentleman from Idaho is passed by this body.
I firmly believe we should pass a judgeship bill, and I supported it, Senate bill 878, as it was reported out by the House Committee on the Judiciary. The reported bill created all new Article 3 judgeships requested by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. As a result, it would provide critical assistance to many Federal district
and appeals courts currently staggering under tremendous caseloads.
As reported, S. 878 is largely noncontroversial and enjoyed bipartisan support at the House Committee on the Judiciary markup. In fact, if S. 878 were brought up on the Suspension Calendar, as it should have been, I have no doubt it would have passed on a voice vote.
Since it is so noncontroversial, we might ask ourselves why the House's valuable time must be wasted debating S. 878 under a rule. Why are we not using this valuable time to deal with the more difficult appropriations or national security bills?
The answer is that a decision has been made to turn this noncontroversial bill into campaign season cannon fodder. This noncontroversial bill comes before us on a rule in order to provide an opportunity to debate an amendment soon to be offered by the gentleman from Idaho.
The tragedy is that this tactic may result in the adoption of a highly inadvisable amendment. An adoption of this amendment, which would split the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals into three circuits, will signal the death knell for S. 878 in the Senate.
I will discuss my reasons for opposing that amendment in some detail when it is offered, but I can state at this time that if this amendment were to pass, it would be the first time in the history of our Federal judiciary that we have split a circuit against the will of the justices of that circuit.
If the amendment is adopted, S. 878 will die in the Senate. There is no question about that.
I might also point out that S. 878, as it passed out of committee, while noncontroversial, failed to include any of the new bankruptcy judges that are very important to deal with the tremendous caseload problems in our bankruptcy courts. The Committee on the Judiciary stripped out all of the bankruptcy judgeships because the majority thought that requiring the Senate to pass the bankruptcy reform bill, which also contains authorization for those same judgeships, might be leveraged in the process. I think that is a strategy that is destined to fail and it is a failure in S. 878, in that the judges so desperately needed on the bankruptcy court are not included in this bill.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren), a member of the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Woolsey).
Mr. Chairman, we have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman and I support the gentleman's amendment, but I am curious why an amendment that is being offered in order to avoid a Budget Act problem requires a waiver of the Budget Act.
Mr. Chairman, I stand up in opposition simply to state my support for the gentleman's amendment and urge its adoption.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my strong opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Idaho. This amendment has never been marked up in the Committee on the Judiciary. It comes out of right field, left field, whatever field. It has never been considered by the committee with jurisdiction over the Federal courts. In fact, the only process it received was a subcommittee hearing last year where the witnesses were split about its advisability.
Let me talk about some of the reasons why I think this body should reject this amendment.
The costs of implementing a three-way split of the Ninth Circuit are enormous and could not come at a worst time. The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts estimates start-up costs in excess of $131 million, incurring additional annual costs of over $20 million each year as a result of this split. The courts will be forced to incur these costs when they are in the midst of a budget crisis.
The Federal courts have already engaged in one round of staff cutbacks. Late last month, the administrative office announced a 2-year moratorium on 42 Federal courthouse construction projects as a result of the hard freeze on the judiciary budget. The administrative office has indicated that it may need to start cutting more staff if the budget situation remains the same.
The Ninth Circuit judges themselves are overwhelmingly opposed to splitting the circuit. In April of this year, Ninth Circuit judges voted 30 to nine
against division of the circuit. In light of this overwhelming opposition from the affected judges, a split of the Ninth Circuit would constitute an unprecedented interference with the judicial system. Congress has never split a circuit over the objections of the affected judges.
If the opposition of the judges themselves does not carry water, perhaps a long bipartisan list of other opponents will be more persuasive. California Governor Schwarzenegger, as the gentleman has acknowledged, wrote in April of 2004 expressing his strong opposition to this proposal. The American Bar Association, the California Academy of Appellate Lawyers, a group of prominent Republican and Democratic lawyers and a number of county and State bar associations all oppose this split.
Split proponents have the burden of proving the advisability of a split; and in my mind, it is a heavy burden. They both must prove that the current Ninth Circuit does not efficiently and effectively serve the interests of justice and that a split would solve more problems than it would create.
To date, the empirical evidence in support of this split is lacking. In fact, for each reason offered as a justification to split the Ninth Circuit, there is a compelling response that justifies an opposite conclusion.
Some split proponents tout the common misperception that the Supreme Court reverses the Ninth Circuit an inordinate amount of the times. Based on this perception, they claim the Ninth Circuit is either out of touch with the rest of the country or issues an unusual number of bad decisions. The evidence does not support this assertion and, in fact, may lead to the opposite conclusion.
For the past 3 years, the reversal rate of the Ninth Circuit by the U.S. Supreme Court has compared favorably with other circuits; but even if we did not like the Ninth Circuit decisions, the gentleman's amendment does not propose shooting the justices. These judges will still be sitting on circuit courts. So it does not even achieve the goal that many of its proponents, if not the gentleman himself, seek to obtain with this amendment.
There was a reason why the leadership of the majority party decided to open up this bill for this nongermane amendment and no other nongermane amendments, and I would suggest it had nothing to do with judicial efficiency or effectiveness. It had to do with politics.
It has been noted that due to the Ninth Circuit's size, panels rarely involve the same three judges. Proponents of the split argue that the shifting nature of panels leads to inconsistent opinions. However, it can be said that the shifting nature of panels contributes to the objectivity of decision-making and makes it difficult for any one bias or philosophy to predominate. Less charitably, it could be said that the very consistency of Ninth Circuit opinions, not their inconsistency, is what split advocates find objectionable.
Split proponents note that the Ninth Circuit has almost twice as many judges as the next largest Federal circuit, serves the largest population and deals with the largest number of appeals. Split proponents cite these numbers to support the contention that the Ninth Circuit is overburdened and is simply too huge to operate efficiently. However, statistics belie those contentions. They support the opposite conclusion.
These statistics show that in recent years the Ninth Circuit handled over 207 appeals per circuit judge. When compared to other circuits, these numbers put Ninth Circuit judges in the middle of the pack with regard to the number of appeals they handle annually. Ninth Circuit judges may not be the most efficient, but they are certainly not among the least.
I am sure we will also hear a bit today about the length of time, in fact, we have heard that it takes the Ninth Circuit takes to decide individual cases. The truth is that the Ninth Circuit judges are remarkably quick at deciding cases following argument or submission. It takes the Ninth Circuit 1.4 months to file a decision following arguments, as opposed to the national average of 2.1 months. For submitted cases, it takes one-half month nationally compared with two- tenths of a month in the Ninth Circuit.
Those who raise concerns about delays in case dispositions also offer no such evidence that delays are due to circuit size. In fact, vacant judgeships constitute a more likely explanation for any delays in overall case disposition. Proof for this conclusion can be drawn from the experience of the much smaller Sixth Circuit, which has a large percentage of judicial vacancies and the longest time, in excess of the Ninth Circuit by far, in case disposition among circuits. If delays in case disposition were the keystone for splitting circuits, we would start with the Sixth.
Finally, and least credibly, some split advocates accuse the Ninth Circuit of being unduly activist. These folks believe a split would somehow curb this alleged tendency, or at least inoculate the carved- out 12th and 13th from the decisions of the old Ninth Circuit.
I reject judicial activism as a sound rationale for splitting the circuits, or for any other congressional action against the courts. If judicial activism were valid grounds for restructuring the courts, we would have to reconstitute the current U.S. Supreme Court, which has displayed its own judicial activism in crafting its doctrine of State sovereign immunity. Because judicial activism exists in the eye of the beholder, it cannot be a sound basis for restructuring courts.
In conclusion, we must ask ourselves whether the cure presented by this amendment would be worse than the supposed disease. The disruptions, costs, and uncertainty that would attend a split might turn it into a costly failure. Frankly, the best way for Congress to participate constructively in improving the Ninth Circuit would be to pass S. 878 without this amendment. The additional district and circuit judgeships this bill creates within the Ninth Circuit will help it get an even better handle on its caseload.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, may I get a sense of how much time each side has?
Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
Now the mask comes off. The last line of the gentleman: They are legislating from the bench; we do not like their decisions.
Believe me, my colleagues, the original proponents of this split and many of its supporters are doing this not based on judicial efficiency, but on ideology. If you want to deal with rising population, you authorize new judgeships.
The major reason in any of the variables where the Ninth Circuit has lagged is because we have not filled the vacancies that were already authorized. You can have one circuit, you can have three circuits, you can have 10 circuits, but if you do not keep up with the growing litigation requirements by authorizing and filling those judgeships, you will have greater delays. It is a very simple equation.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee), a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.
(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
Perhaps the most eloquent and forceful argument against the amendment being proposed and the split being proposed by the gentleman from Idaho came from the former chief judge of the Ninth Circuit, a Montana justice, Judge Browning, who felt very strongly that the interests of justice were not served by this particular split.
As I listened to the proponents of this amendment talk, the judges do not want it. The lawyers do not want it. They are not talking the merits. They are scared of the judges. We hear no clamor from the litigants about a split of the circuit. We hear no argument that there is some compelling public ground swell for this split. Some of my colleagues do not like this, and they want to ascribe motivations to people who disagree with them. They are afraid of the judges. They assume the judges are not going to act on what is in their interests. They are not going to lose their judgeships over this split. They believe justice is not served by this split.
I urge opposition to this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I am not challenging the constitutionality of the proponent's amendment. I am challenging the wisdom of the proponent's amendment. If we do this, we are doing something unprecedented with significant adverse budgetary consequences in a fashion that will not distribute the caseload in any sense equally, that is opposed by the judges, that is opposed by the lawyers who practice in this court and, to the extent that it is ideologically motivated, foists on our poor California Republicans a circuit that they think will not serve their interests.
So I hate to see this squabble between the Idaho and Montana Republicans and the California Republicans, but the fact is this is why, even though you have the authority to draw these lines, it may not be wise to.
I urge opposition to the amendment, and I include for the Record a letter from the highly praised Ninth Circuit judge from Montana opposing the split.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit,
Billings, MT, October 28, 2003.
Re: H.R. 2723
Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman,
Subcommittee on the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property, Washington, D.C.
Dear Chairman Smith: I am a United States Circuit Judge
with chambers in Billings, Montana. I write in opposition to
H.R. 2723. I am also authorized to state that the following
Ninth Circuit Judges whose official stations are within the
boundaries of the proposed Twelfth Circuit join me in
opposing H.R. 2723: Judge Otto R. Skopil (Portland, Oregon),
Judge Betty Binns Fletcher (Seattle, Washington), and Judge
Jerome Farris (Seattle, Washington). In addition, Judge James
R. Browning (San Francisco, California), Judge Alfred T.
Goodwin (Pasadena, California), Judge Robert Boochever
(Pasadena, California) and Judge M. Margaret McKeown (San
Diego, California), whose initial official duty stations were
within the boundaries of the proposed Twelfth Circuit
(Montana, Oregon, Alaska, and Washington, respectively), have
authorized me to register their opposition to H.R. 2723. All
of these judges maintain strong connections with their former
states of residence. In particular, Judges Goodwin and
McKeown wished me to emphasize that they spend a significant
amount of time each year in the Northwest, maintain offices
there, and retain close professional relationships with the
bar and bench in Oregon and Washington, respectively.
Sincerely,
Sidney R. Thomas.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
Madam Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
In its present form, yes.
Madam Speaker, the Committee on Rules denied me and the rule denied me the opportunity to offer a variation of this amendment in committee, even though they allowed one other nongermane amendment, which we just adopted.
This amendment, I believe, addresses a serious problem in the current structure of the Federal procedures. If an
outside party complains that a Federal judge has engaged in misconduct, that party has a right to have the presiding judge entertain his complaint. If it is the district court, it is the chief judge of the district that that judge sits in; if it is the appellate court, it is the presiding judge of the circuit; and if it is the Supreme Court, it is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
If the presiding judge or the chief judge does not resolve that, the complainant is entitled to a three-judge panel. That is for misconduct.
But for recusals based on an apparent conflict of interest, asking a judge to step aside and not hear a particular case, there is absolutely no process other than the judge himself who is being alleged to have not been appropriately sitting on that case because of conflicts of interest or apparent conflicts of interest; that judge gets to decide for himself. That system is not right.
What this amendment would do in order to be germane and apply as a pilot project, and Chief Justice Rehnquist himself highlighted this statutory anomaly to several U.S. Senators; these Senators had expressed concern that Justice Scalia did not recuse himself from a case in which Vice President Cheney was a named litigant. While this case was pending, Justice Scalia had taken a duck-hunting trip with the Vice President. Not only did they hunt together for several days, but Justice Scalia also traveled with the Vice President aboard Air Force 2.
In a public document explaining his refusal to recuse himself from a case involving his hunting buddy, Justice Scalia wrote that he did not believe ``his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.'' In commenting on Justice Scalia's decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote to the Senators, ``There is no formal procedure for a court review of a decision of a Justice in such a case.''
While I believe that my notions of the propriety of Justice Scalia's refusal to recuse himself are not important, the opinion of the American people is important. The efficacy of our court system depends entirely on the perception that the courts will administer justice impartially. If the courts lose the trust of the people, they lose their only real power.
Reasonably or not, fairly or not, many folks around this country did question whether Justice Scalia could be impartial in a case involving a hunting buddy. It is clear that Justice Scalia's declaration of impartiality did not itself put these questions to rest. To the extent these questions persist, our court system suffers.
This motion to recommit in the new circuits established so that the motion will be in order will establish a process by which the Federal courts can design a procedure where refusals by the judge to recuse himself can be heard by other judges, thereby getting rid of the problem of the appearance of conflict of interest.
I want to make it very clear. I am not coming to the conclusion that Justice Scalia had a conflict of interest; I am coming to the opinion and the conclusion which I believe strongly that someone other than Justice Scalia should be able to make this decision, just like someone other than an accused justice should be able to make the decision about whether or not there has been judicial misconduct.
We are leaving full authority to the Federal courts to design that process, but the notion that there is some appeal, some procedure, some process by which a challenge to the fairness and impartiality of a judge will be heard by someone other than the judge is a necessity.
I urge the adoption of this motion.
Unlike the judicial misconduct statute, the recusal statute currently provides no opportunity to appeal a judge's refusal to recuse himself. My amendment would have simply brought the procedures for addressing recusal and misconduct decisions into line with one another.
Chief Justice Rehnquist himself highlighted this statutory anomaly in a letter to several U.S. Senators. These Senators had expressed concern that Justice Scalia did not recuse himself from a case in which Vice President Cheney was a named litigant. While this case was pending, Justice Scalia had taken a duck-hunting trip with the Vice President. Not only did they hunt together for several days, but Justice Scalia also traveled with the Vice President aboard Air Force Two.
In a public document explaining his refusal to recuse himself from a case involving his hunting buddy, Justice Scalia wrote that he did not believe ``his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.'' In commenting on Justice Scalia's decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that, ``There is no formal procedure for a Court review of a decision of a Justice in an individual case.''
What I believe about the propriety of Justice Scalia's refusal to recuse himself is unimportant. What is important, however, is the opinion of the American people. The efficacy of our court system depends entirely on the perception that the courts will administer justice impartially. If the courts lose the trust of the people, they lose their only real power.
Reasonably or not, many folks around the country did question whether Justice Scalia could be impartial in a case involving a hunting buddy. It is clear that Justice Scalia's declaration of impartiality did not, itself, put these questions to rest. To the extent these questions persist, our court system suffers.
Madam Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.