Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. (Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.) Mr. Chairman, strong intelligence is our first line of defense in the war on terrorism. And make no…
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Mr. Chairman, strong intelligence is our first line of defense in the war on terrorism. And make no mistake, we are at war. The gruesome beheadings of Danny Pearl, Nick Berg, Paul Johnson, and yesterday's murder of 33-year-old Kim Sun Il of South Korea are stark reminders of the nature of our enemy.
Our brave men and women in the intelligence community are on the front lines fighting that enemy. They risk their lives for our freedom and they deserve our unflinching support. Yet, unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, this legislation deprives them of full support. This bill provides less than one-third of the key funding that the intelligence community has told us they need to fight the war on terrorism. Less than one-third.
I want to use my time to engage the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) in a brief dialogue on this important issue. I would like to ask my colleague directly, on my time, Mr. Chairman, does this bill provide all of the counterterrorism funding that the intelligence agencies have told our committee they need for the coming year? Yes or no.
I yield to the gentleman.
Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that response, but the classified schedule of authorizations in the majority's bill specifically states that the additional funds are only for the first quarter of the year. Well, that is woefully inadequate.
The gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer), the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson) and the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell) all proposed an amendment to fully fund counterterrorism. Let me demonstrate exactly what this full funding amendment does. The majority's bill funds only first quarter ops tempo for counterterrorism. The full funding amendment, which we hope to offer, funds a full year for counterterrorism.
The majority's bill gives the CIA 11 percent less than fiscal year 2004 funding, whereas the full funding amendment we had hoped to offer gives the CIA 5 percent more than 2004 funding. The majority's bill funds only 5 percent of the NRO's CT budget, 19 percent of NSA's CT budget, 26 percent of NGA's CT budget, and 35 percent of the CIA's CT budget. The full funding amendment funds 100 percent of these budgets.
Finally, the majority's bill provides no supplemental funding for critical CT HUMINT support functions whereas the full funding amendment provides full funding for all the HUMINT support functions.
In short, Mr. Chairman, H.R. 4548 is too weak. What is the President going to tell the American people when they learn that we are going to have a gap in counterterrorism funding next year? There could be a gap of 3 to 4 months before we pass a new supplemental. And during that gap, our Nation will be at unnecessary risk at a time when, for example, we will be having events like the presidential inauguration and the Super Bowl.
The majority has twisted itself into a pretzel trying to justify this weak bill, all the while bemoaning the harmful impact of budgeting-by- supplemental on our intelligence community's ability and our committee's ability to do robust oversight.
Jim Pavitt, the CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, gave a speech this week in which he said that, ``there is no end in sight'' to the terrorist threat we face. Terrorism is no longer a one-time emergency. It is no longer something we should scramble around to fund. It is our way of life. It is our central national security challenge. And if the White House or the majority does not understand that, then we are in serious danger.
In our committee we offered several amendments to strengthen intelligence and strengthen oversight. They were common sense measures. Yet, all of them were rejected on party line votes.
Mr. Chairman, we know terrorists are actively planning to attack us again. We know there is nuclear material out there that is unaccounted for for sale to the highest bidder. We know the next attack will be followed by the usual Washington hand-wringing about why we did not do more.
The rule under which we debate today has squandered an opportunity to do much more. We have lost an opportunity to strengthen intelligence, to strengthen congressional oversight, to retire the soon-to-be-vacant DCI position and replace it with a 21st century organization capable of integrating 15 intelligence agencies into one intelligence community and to keep full faith with the brave men and women who are on the front lines at this hour risking their lives for our freedom.
This bill is weaker, far weaker than the American people deserve.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking member on the House Committee on Armed
Services, the committee on which I was honored to serve for 6 years.
Mr. Chairman, those of us on this side of the aisle feel it is important to fund stronger intelligence in the global war on terror, and it is now my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), a dedicated member of our committee.
Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), ranking member of the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence.
(Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Chairman, I would point out to the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) that our amendments were shared in advance and our views on budgeting by supplemental have been known for years and are shared by the majority.
Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), a courageous member of our committee.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer), a dedicated member of our committee, who is ranking member on the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo).
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), a reasonably recent and very dedicated member of our committee.
Mr. Chairman, I commend the last speaker for his sincere efforts at bipartisanship.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), our rookie on the committee.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).
Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
I thank the gentlewoman for yielding. I want to assure her that I understand and fully support the general principle reflected in her point and appreciate her intention in raising this issue. I also want to assure the gentlewoman that, as this bill moves forward, we will be mindful of the issue and will try to be helpful.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Ms. Harman asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Mr. Chairman, I would point out to our last speaker that the DOD appropriations bill is a $400 billion bill, a small fraction of which is for intelligence. In my view, that is not the place for this debate about fully funding counterterrorism intelligence. The intelligence bill is where we should make our stand. And I do appreciate the gentleman from California's (Mr. Hunter) clarification, as he just said, that the additional counterterrorism funding in his bill is only for a couple of months.
That is the point we are trying to make, Mr. Chairman. We all are patriots. We all support the troops. We all support our intelligence personnel. We just think that the primary mission of the intelligence community ought to be funded in the base bill, the one we are voting on today.
Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Authorization bill represents the culmination of many months of work by our community to provide the intelligence community with the resources it needs to safeguard our national security. It also presents an opportunity to lay down important oversight markers so that we can fulfill our constitutionally mandated duty to provide oversight of the intelligence community. The Intelligence Committees were created for precisely this reason, and if we simply become a rubber stamp for the administration, then we might as well cease to exist.
At the outset, let me commend our diligent staff on both sides of the aisle for their hard work and late nights, and let me commend all members of our committee on both sides of the aisle for their focus and dedication to getting it right. Four of them, the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss), the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Burr), and the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Collins), will leave us this year, and I wish them fair winds. I also want to explain the gentleman from Florida's (Mr. Hastings) absence. Our thoughts are with him as he cares for his ailing mother.
Mr. Chairman, this debate has been very difficult, certainly for me. As everyone here knows, over five terms in Congress, I have voted for every intelligence authorization bill and every defense authorization bill, and I have often worked to try to plus-up amounts in those bills. The brave men and women of the intelligence community rely on us. Without us, they cannot do their job. I have traveled around the world and visited with them, and their bravery and courage speaks volumes about how much they love this country.
For all of these reasons, I stand here today with a heavy heart because I feel that unfortunately and needlessly, this bill could have and should have provided for stronger intelligence and stronger oversight.
I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, if I could just respond to the gentleman, and I would be happy to yield again if I have any more time if he wants to respond to what I have to say, I appreciate that comment, but mine is a bit different. I understand that we may not fully know what we need. That is why we have supplementals. But in this case we do fully know what we need. We know what the agencies in the intelligence community need for counterterrorism because they have told us, and the amendments we wish had been in order had an unclassified piece, which basically says we should fully fund counterterrorism, and a classified piece, where we carefully allocated across the intelligence community all the money these agencies have told us they need. They told us it is hard to plan for their year without knowing for sure that they will get money.
And the last point I want to make to the gentleman, and I do appreciate what he is saying, is that I do not think we will pass another supplemental until sometime after the first quarter of next year. We will be gearing up in a new Congress, and if we pass the supplemental in next March or April, as I pointed out in my earlier remarks, we may have a gap in funding counterterrorism just at the time when we have the presidential inauguration and the Super Bowl, and those are huge events were maximum counterterrorism efforts are needed.
I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I ask to control the time on this side.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I support the Goss amendment to restore the level of funding requested for NDIC, the National Drug Intelligence Center. I was concerned to learn that these funds had been cut, as have others for key satellite programs, and I am pleased that the chairman has now decided to restore the level of funding the Center needs to carry out its important counternarcotics mission. Hopefully we will address other shortfalls that some on our side have identified in the conference.
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make an additional comment about a subject the chairman raised at the end of general debate, and that was when he called additional budget authority monopoly money. I certainly share his view that we should appropriate the funds that we authorize. That is why this side wants to authorize additional funds and then hopefully to get them appropriated. I have spoken to the highest levels of this administration about my keen view that the amount of money to fully fund counterterrorism for fiscal year 2005 is not so great.
It is not a big budget buster, certainly not as big as many other requests made by this administration.
I see the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis) in the room, for whom I have high regard. It would be my hope that sometime soon, even perhaps in the defense appropriations bill that comes out of conference, we will increase the funding for counterterrorism for fiscal year 2005.
Mr. Chairman, I support the Goss amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Chairman, it has our support.
Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose this amendment, but I will control the time on this side.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I want to support the author of this amendment for his carefully crafted amendment and excellent remarks. I believe it is imperative that we maintain an effective and efficient process for designating foreign terrorist organizations and understand better the threat posed by those terrorist organizations and their links to weapons of mass destruction.
I understand, as the gentleman said, that the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on International Relations have been working on a stand-alone bill to require the Secretary of State to review designations every 4 years, not every 6, as this amendment provides.
I think this additional flexibility would be a good thing and would suggest, for example, that a bill, which I assume will be taken up at another time, should include a provision allowing the Secretary of State to remove groups from the list of foreign terrorist organizations if they renounce terrorism. This is one way of using our soft power instead of relying solely on military power to influence groups on the list. I would hope that these details and others could be worked out separately, or in the conference on this bill.
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to add that from 1999 to 2000, I served as a member of the so-called Bremer Commission on Terrorism, headed by former Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, who now serves as civil administrator in Iraq. The issue of listing groups and states as terrorist actors was something we considered carefully. In fact, we spoke out about one such state.
I think this is an excellent tool to help defeat the threats we face. I really want to commend the gentleman from California (Mr. Gallegly) for offering this improvement to our intelligence authorization bill.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I reiterate my support for this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, though I will not object, I want to be sure that the language that has not been read is consistent with the language I just reviewed.
I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I will control the time on this side; and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) not only for the amendment but for, as he said, engaging the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) in a constructive effort to improve the amendment, and I think it is a lot better. Frankly, I wish that our bill that we are considering and voting on today had engaged the minority more constructively at an earlier stage; I think it would have been a lot better.
I do support the Boehlert amendment. I fondly remember our trip, six countries, 6 days. I think the gentleman left out Sicily, so we might add 7 countries in 6 days.
I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thought our Sicily stop was outstanding, which is why I brought it up.
But I think that the improvements made to this amendment by the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) are noteworthy. What he did, as I understand it, was to insert a bit of the history here, the role of sanctions initiated by President Reagan, the role of international legal negotiations to get Libya to renounce terrorism and turn over terrorism suspects to international courts, and the role of diplomacy in previous administrations and by the British and others before the beginning of this administration. Though this administration did play a role, and I commend it, in President Qadhafi's stunning decision to do the right thing, that should be reflected, and is, in this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I will put two very important articles on this subject in the Record. One is by Dr. Flynt Leverett entitled ``Why Libya Gave Up the Bomb'' from the January 23, 2004, New York Times; and the second is a Middle East Institute Policy Brief by two former assistant Secretaries of State and former ambassadors, Martin Indyk and Edward S. Walker entitled ``What Does Libya's Disarmament Teach About Rogue States?'' dated April 7, 2004.
Finally, let me make two other points. We have seen in recent days troubling allegations that Colonel Qadhafi was himself involved in ordering assassinations of Saudi leaders. These
are, of course, press reports. But these stories remind us that the success of our policies toward Libya remain an open question, and I am sure the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) agrees with me that we need to be clear-eyed and diligent to make certain that these promises by Colonel Qadhafi are kept, and that in other respects, he does not convert to any of his old habits.
I yield to the gentleman from New York, the sponsor of the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for those comments and strongly agree with them.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me just mention that on that trip that was described, we did spend a day and evening in Baghdad. It was my second visit. We met with troops, but we also met with all of our intelligence personnel at the scene in addition to the leaders of the CPA. What is troubling about that, and I believe the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) has commented on this in another appearance, our appearance yesterday in the Committee on Rules, because the timing of our trip was February 2004. While we were in Baghdad, General Taguba was doing his investigation of prison abuse and so forth in Baghdad, and we were never told by these intelligence leaders that that investigation was ongoing. That was wrong. That diminishes our oversight, and those folks whom we support as robustly as we can need to be fully candid with our committee, especially when we are seeking them out to try to help them.
Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by saying that I support the gentleman's amendment as improved by the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos).
[From the New York Times, 23 January 2004]
Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb,
(By Flynt Leverett)
Washington.--As President Bush made clear in his State of
the Union address, he sees the striking developments in
relations with Libya as the fruit of his strategy in the war
on terrorism. The idea is that Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi's
apparent decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction was
a largely a result of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, which
thus retroactively justifies the war in Iraq and holds out
the prospect of similar progress with other states that
support terrorists, seek weapons of mass destruction and
brutalize their own people.
However, by linking shifts in Libya's behavior to the Iraq
war, the president misrepresents the real lessons of the
Libyan case. This confusion undermines our chances of getting
countries like Iran and Syria to follow Libya's lead.
The roots of the recent progress with Libya go back not to
the eve of the Iraq war, but to the Bush administration's
first year in office. Indeed, to be fair, some credit should
even be given to the second Clinton administration. Tired of
international isolation and economic sanctions, the Libyans
decided in the late 1990s to seek normalized relations with
the United States, and held secret discussions with Clinton
administration officials to convey that message. The Clinton
White House made clear that no movement toward better
relations was possible until Libya met its responsibilities
stemming from the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.
These discussions, along with mediation by the Saudi
ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan,
produced a breakthrough: Libya turned over two intelligence
officers implicated in the Pan Am 103 attack to the
Netherlands for trial by a Scottish court, and in 1999
Washington acquiesced to the suspension of United Nations
sanctions against Libya.
Then, in the spring of 2001, when I was a member of the
State Department's policy planning staff, the Bush
administration picked up on those discussions and induced the
Libyans to meet their remaining Lockerbie obligations. With
our British colleagues, we presented the Libyans with a
``script'' indicating what they needed to do and say to
satisfy our requirements on compensating the families of the
Pan Am 103 victims and accepting responsibility for the
actions of the Libyan intelligence officers implicated in the
case.
We also put an explicit quid pro quo on the table: if Libya
met the conditions we laid out, the United States and Britain
would allow United Nations sanctions to be lifted
permanently. This script became the basis for three-party
negotiations to resolve the Lockerbie issue.
By early 2003, after a Scottish appeals court upheld the
conviction of one of the Libyan intelligence officers, it was
evident that our approach would bear fruit. Indeed,
Washington allowed the United Nations sanctions against Libya
to be removed last summer after Libya reached a compensation
agreement with the Pan Am 103 families and accepted
responsibility for its officials' actions.
But during these two years of talks, American negotiators
consistently told the Libyans that resolving the Lockerbie
situation would lead to no more than elimination of United
Nations sanctions. To get out from under the separate United
States sanctions, Libya would have to address other concerns,
particularly regarding its programs in weapons of mass
destruction.
This is the content in which Libyan officials approached
the United States and Britain last spring to discuss
dismantling Libya's weapons program. The Iraq war, which
had not yet started, was not the driving force behind
Libya's move. Rather, Libya was willing to deal because of
credible diplomatic representations by the United States
over the years, which convinced the Libyans that doing so
was critical to achieving their strategic and domestic
goals. Just as with Lockerbie, an explicit quid pro quo
was offered: American officials indicated that a
verifiable dismantling of Libya's weapons projects would
lead the removal of our own sanctions, perhaps by the end
of this year.
The lesson is incontrovertible: to persuade a rogue regime
to get out of the terrorism business and give up its weapons
of mass destruction, we must not only apply pressure but also
make clear the potential benefits of cooperation.
Unfortunately, the Bush administration has refused to take
this approach with other rogue regimes, notably Iran and
Syria. Until the president is willing to employ carrots as
well as sticks, he will make little headway in changing
Iranian or Syrian behavior.
The president's lack of initiative on this point is
especially disappointing because, in the diplomatic aftermath
of the Sept. 11 attacks, the administration has a singular
opportunity to effect strategic realignments by both Iran and
Syria. Well-placed Iranians, including more pragmatic
elements of Iran's conservative camp, have indicated through
diplomatic channels and to former officials (including
myself) their interest in a ``grand bargain'' with the United
States. Basically, Tehran would trade off its ties to
terrorist groups and pursuit of nuclear weapons for security
guarantees, a lifting of sanctions and normalized relations
with Washington.
Likewise, senior Syrian officials--including President
Bashar al-Assad himself, in a conversation in Damascus last
week--have told me that they want a better strategic
understanding with the United States. To achieve this,
however, Washington needs to be willing to spell out what
Syria would get in return for giving up its ties to
terrorists and its chemical weapons and ballistic missiles.
As Mr. Assad told me, Syria is ``a state, not a charity''--if
it gives up something, it must know what it will gain in
return.
One reason the Bush administration was able to take a more
constructive course with Libya was that the White House,
uncharacteristically, sidelined the administration's
neoconservative wing--which strongly opposes any offer of
carrots to state sponsors of terrorism, even when carrots
could help end such problematic behavior--when crucial
decisions were made. The initial approach on the Lockerbie
case was approved by an informal coalition made up of
Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, and
Secretary of State Colin Powell. Likewise, in the lead up to
the negotiations involving Libyan weapons of mass
destruction, the neoconservatives at the Pentagon and in the
shop of Under Secretary of State John Bolton were left out of
the loop.
Perhaps a coalition among members of the State Department's
bureau of Near Eastern affairs and the National Security
Council's more pragmatic elements can chart a similar course
involving Iran and Syria. However, until the administration
learns the real lessons of the Libyan precedent, policy
toward other rogue regimes is likely to remain stuck in the
mind of ideology.
Flynn Leverett, a visiting fellow with the Saban Center for
Middle East Politics at the Brookings Institution, was senior
director for Middle Eastern affairs at the National Security
Council from 2002 to 2003.
Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I will control the time on our side.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I will support the amendment, though I wish it had included a clear statement about the importance of U.S. obligations to adhere to international laws, conventions and treatises to prevent torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment of human beings.
Mr. Chairman, one of the most troubling aspects of this whole detainee issue, besides the absolutely reprehensible abuse of prisoners, is the all-out assault on the rule of law that is clearly revealed in legal memos that seem to justify abuse and even torture of detainees.
None of us is naive here, and as a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I strongly believe in the importance of interrogations and understand that interrogations can yield information that protect thousands or millions of Americans. We have to interrogate prisoners, but over the many years of our country's history, we have always done those interrogations consistent with the rule of law, and only recently have some very troubling memoranda surfaced at the highest levels of the Justice Department and the Defense Department that raise questions and that actually assert that the President of the United States in his role as commander in chief could actually be above the law.
I thought, Mr. Chairman, that we had defeated that idea at Runnymede centuries and centuries ago and that our country was built on a foundation of the rule of law, and I worry, Mr. Chairman, that if we do not observe the rule of law, not only do we undercut our moral authority, but we endanger our troops who might be treated just the way some of our people are treating other troops.
Now, let me add quickly that the beheading of Americans and other nationals is absolutely outrageous, and nowhere do I think that behavior is consistent with even rational or humane behavior. It is abhorrent and appalling, and I strongly condemn it.
But in conclusion, I think it is important that we support this amendment, but I think it is also important that as we do support this amendment, we think about the fact that the rule of law must always apply as we treat detainees and proceed with the important work of interrogations.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman from Texas that I appreciate his comments welcoming my comments. That, again, is in the spirit of bipartisanship. We all do better when we are bipartisan.
I would just also make a comment to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). I certainly agree that a lot of material is in our committee spaces, but we will consider an amendment later this afternoon on this subject of the committee's ability to oversee the detainee problem. Some of us remain skeptical that our committee has gotten all the material we need and certainly skeptical that we have gotten adequate candid testimony from administration officials.
I would also point out to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) that while we were in Baghdad, we should have been told about some issues directly relevant to our jurisdiction, such as this issue of ghosting of detainees as described by General Taguba in his report, and that is the placing of detainees without revealing their numbers or their identity in prisons so that, as I understand it, the International Red Cross and other outside observers would not be aware of their existence. This is a serious issue directly relevant to our jurisdiction. I believe that it was known to those we met with in Baghdad and they should have informed us; at least that is my personal opinion.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), another member of our committee to comment on the Johnson amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I see no additional speakers on our side. I support the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment, and I will control the time on our side.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Let me just say to the sponsor of the amendment that all of us in this House, on a bipartisan basis, recognize and respect and honor the heroism and sacrifice of the men and women in the intelligence community. I have spoken to it two or three times already today. That is not the issue. The issue is additional language in this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), our rookie.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to agree with the comments of the last speaker and commend his service as part of the Central Intelligence Agency. He brings great expertise to this House, and I as one Member value it enormously.
He may not know that the Bremer Commission on which I served recommended that the Deutch Guidelines not apply in the case of recruitment of terrorist spies. We, too, found that, though well- intended, and I believe they were well-intended, those guidelines inhibited the aggressive recruitment of people who had the qualifications to penetrate the worst terrorist organizations, which we need them to do. Yes, these are unsavory characters, and yes, we need them, provided that they are reasonably vetted so that we know that they are reliable, but nonetheless, yes, we need them. I do not want to be heard to be ambivalent about this at all.
A few years ago, our committee found that those guidelines had not been rescinded; and on a bipartisan basis, we directed that the DCI rescind them and replace them, and that was done at our direction. That was one of our impressive bipartisan actions, and so I would just point out that, while the language of this amendment commending our people in the field who take risk on our behalf is excellent, the problem we are having on this side is with the findings that very narrowly focus on a very few years of history.
The history is longer, and let me say in the spirit of bipartisanship that we all got it wrong after the Cold War. We all thought the world would be more peaceful. We all thought there would be a peace dividend. That is why the 41st President, President Bush, began to draw down both the Defense and Intelligence budgets, anticipating a more peaceful world, which obviously did not come to pass.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, how much more time do we have?
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I would just point out to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) that the findings section of this amendment claims there was a funding reduction in the Intelligence budget of 11 percent between 1993 and 1995. This narrow period matches a period when President Clinton was in office and Democrats still controlled the Congress.
But the decline commenced in the first Bush administration, in 1990, as the Soviet empire was collapsing. And the trend continued through the 6-year period of Republican control of Congress until 9-11.
It is good that we have increased the budget. I hope everyone in this House supports those increases. Certainly those of us on this side of the debate are talking about full funding of counterterrorism, because it turns out that the world was not more peaceful after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The world was more dangerous, and all of us underestimated the lethality of the threats we faced.
In hindsight, we all, over three administrations, should have done a lot more. In foresight, hopefully together on a bipartisan basis, we will.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, how much time is remaining on our side?
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), a member of our committee.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I do not think we have any further speakers on this amendment, but I would like to enter into a dialogue with the amendment's sponsor to suggest to him that we might agree by unanimous consent that the sense of Congress in his resolution be the entire resolution.
We strike the findings, because our side feels that they are not complete and that some of them may be misleading. And that, as I said, on a bipartisan basis we all were wrong in 1990 when the wall came down and we expected a more peaceful world.
Would the gentleman be amenable to striking the findings and having his resolution be the Sense of Congress, as he has drafted it, which I would predict would be adopted unanimously?
I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
Well, reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I am disappointed in that answer only because I think there is plenty of blame to go around over three or four administrations and findings that made that clear, I think, would be more helpful.
Let me reiterate my strong view, and the view of everyone that I can imagine on our side, that we support the men and women of the intelligence community. That is something I have said over and over and over again in our committee briefings, hearings, and travels. Everywhere we go around the globe, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and I and others have traveled to places like Pyongyang, and Baghdad and Kabul and Libya and elsewhere. We have always thanked the men and women of the intelligence community with whom we have met.
I wish that this would have been drafted on a bipartisan basis with what we would view as a fairer statement of findings over a longer period of time. I think that that would do more honor to the capable men and women who are now in harm's way. So I regrettably urge a ``no'' vote on this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and commend him for this amendment and rise in support.
I do agree with Chairman Goss that our committee is already studying these issues. I also agree with Chairman Goss that these are touchy issues because we certainly want to communicate our strong support for the Government of Pakistan which has, after all, been an ally of ours in this very, very difficult global war on terror and which continues to take major risks on our behalf. So, yes, that is true.
On the other hand, I believe it is important to run to ground key questions, including the breadth and scope of the proliferation headed by A.Q. Khan, the number of customers, the degree of cooperation with other rogue states, and whether at any level there was complicity of the Pakistani Government. These are tough questions, and I think that what is requested in this amendment, which is a report on these questions, will certainly burden the agencies. Yes, it will. On the other hand, it will give us some answers that we need.
On balance, I think it is commendable that we focus additional attention on the damage done with respect to proliferation around the world by A.Q. Khan and his network and we recognize that there is a place, I think the place is now, in our consideration of these issues to get the clear answers we deserve.
I support this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose the amendment, but I will control the time on this side.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, as a strong supporter of congressional oversight, I believe that information should be readily available to those congressional committees of jurisdiction conducting investigations, including investigations of the U.N. oil-for-food program. Therefore, I am happy to support the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut and feel it is very constructive.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), a member of our committee.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
As I have stated earlier and others on our side have stated, we support this amendment. We think congressional oversight matters. Committees can make a big difference, and on a bipartisan basis we think this amendment should be supported by the whole House.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.