Floor Statements

Mr. Speaker, I stand here because, earlier this week, we were confronted with the threat of Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein's firing.

On Monday, Mr. Rosenstein was summoned to the White House, with rumors swirling that he had resigned or was about to be fired. Today, he was scheduled to meet with the President. But yesterday, the President said he may not fire him. He prefers not to, but he may. And he may meet with Mr. Rosenstein or not.

Mr. Rosenstein is directly responsible for Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation into alleged links between the Russian Government and the Trump campaign, as well as other related work, now in the Southern District of New York in the National Security Division of the Department of Justice, that could have a profound effect on the integrity of elections to come.

The fear is that, if the President fires Mr. Rosenstein, a new Acting Attorney General will take steps to end the investigation by Mr. Mueller in order to protect President Trump and his associates. It is unacceptable for a law enforcement project of this magnitude to turn on the employment status of one official.

As we have all seen, President Trump has spent his Presidency undermining every effort to understand what happened during the 2016 elections. He has shown no interest in safeguarding the 2018 elections from ongoing attacks by foreign adversaries. Instead, he attacks the intelligence community; attacks the Department of Justice; attacks career civil servants; and attacks Special Counsel Mueller, complaining about what he calls a ``total witch hunt'' and calling for the Attorney General to end the investigation.

This is not a witch hunt. In a relatively short period of time, investigators have secured multiple convictions and guilty pleas from key Trump campaign personnel, including the President's campaign manager, his deputy campaign manager, his national security adviser, and others.

But President Trump and his allies in this Chamber are engaged in a broader strategy to undermine the legitimacy of any finding, guilty plea, or any conviction that may come out of the investigation. President Trump will take any opportunity to reign in, suppress, or end the Special Counsel's investigation.

We know this because President Trump has told us so. He told us that he fired the FBI Director because of the ``Russia thing.'' He is reported to have ordered the firing of Robert Mueller at least twice. He attacks his own Attorney General for quite properly recusing himself from the investigation. His surrogates compare the FBI to the Gestapo, and call for the police to raid the Justice Department.

Fortunately, as a coequal branch of government, we have a way to protect our law enforcement officers from these threats and to protect the country from this barrage of misinformation from the White House.

H.R. 5476, the Special Counsel Independence and Integrity Act, would protect the Special Counsel from being unjustly fired and would allow for the courts to review any political interference. This is bipartisan legislation that has 126 cosponsors and is identical to Republican legislation that has a number of Republican cosponsors.

The Senate counterpart to H.R. 5476 was introduced by Senators Graham, Booker, Coons, and Tillis, and passed the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 26, 2018, by a vote of 14-7.

We have been calling on the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee to bring this important legislation before the committee for a vote, but he has refused to act.

Democrats have taken the unusual step of invoking House rule XI, clause 2(c)(2) to force a markup. But other Republicans on the committee have sat on their hands and refused to join in this demand. But for three Republicans, the Judiciary Committee would be forced to consider this legislation.

We cannot wait any longer. The stakes are too great. That is why I offer this proposal.

Mr. Speaker, today I rise, along with Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security Ranking Member Zoe Lofgren, to thank Maunica Sthanki for her service to the Judiciary Committee.

Maunica has served as a counsel for the Committee since 2014. During this time, she has been a passionate and dogged advocate for women and children seeking asylum, for refugees from Syria, Africa, and other war-torn regions--indeed for all immigrants who come to America seeking a better life for themselves and their children.

For Maunica, immigration and protection of the most vulnerable is personal. While her family's story in many respects began in Uganda in the 1970s, it is an American story. In 1972, Ugandan military strongman Idi Amin issued an order expelling Asians living in the country. Her father, one of approximately 60,000 persons of Indian descent in Uganda at the time was left stateless. Her mother, who had a U.K. passport, was able to move to England. But thanks to America's generosity and a Jewish charity, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, her mother and father were able together to resettle in the United States. Like so many immigrants before them and immigrants who would come in the decades that followed, Maunica's parents came without much more than the clothes on their backs and settled in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, where Maunica would be born.

Maunica attended Baton Rouge Magnet High School, one of the Southeast's most competitive public schools, Louisiana State University, and the University of Texas School of Law. She began her career in law representing migrants and children along the border, and became a professor of clinical law at the University of the District of Columbia, imparting to others her passion for the rule of law.

Maunica began her work for the Committee in 2014 just as we were experiencing an unprecedented increase in the number of unaccompanied children arriving at our Southern border. Within days she was responsible for organizing a congressional delegation to visit with parents in detention, children and adults in crowded Border Patrol stations, and attorneys on the ground. Maunica's advocacy skills and unbending sense of justice during that summer steeled her for fights to come. She became an advocate for ending family detention and a defender of laws that ensure that children have the opportunity to apply for asylum in the United States. That these laws remain on the books is a great tribute to Maunica's commitment.

After the Paris bombings of November 13, 2015, Maunica knew immediately that the U.S. refugee program--an ocean away and with an extensive vetting process-would be subject to the same xenophobic attacks that followed 9/11 and were the very reason she became an immigration lawyer. She, again, fought to preserve asylum and refugee protections--laws that set the standard around the world and provide a safe haven to the most vulnerable irrespective of their faith, ethnicity or nationality.

In January 2016, when the first Executive Order banned travel to the United States for citizens of several Muslim-majority countries, she recognized it as what federal courts would later declare it to be--a Muslim ban so infected with racial and religious animus that it could not stand. Perhaps, again, it was personal. Maunica's husband, a man of Muslim faith, has dedicated his life's work to combating bigotry as a prosecutor with the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division.

Earlier this year, when the Trump Administration began separating children from their families, Maunica worked tirelessly to help draft the Keep Families Together Act, legislation to end family separation at the U.S. border. Her expertise made the legislation stronger, and her passion and commitment led 190 Members of Congress to cosponsor the legislation. Together, we mounted a campaign to stop the policy and reunite children with their families. Work that continues today. We thank her for her dedication and compassion to helping others.

Maunica is a vegetarian because of her faith, and as her daughter would tell you because animals are our friends, and she is also a rabid LSU football fan. She is an irrepressible spirit who has made great sacrifices to serve the Committee.

We wish Maunica Sthanki the very best in her future endeavors and thank her for her outstanding service to the Committee and our country.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I oppose H. Res. 1071 because it is nothing more than a bald-faced political stunt concocted by the majority in an attempt to stir up its political base ahead of the midterm elections. It also represents just the latest in a long and cynical line of attempts by the majority to denigrate and delegitimize our Nation's immigrant population and to erode public trust in our electoral system, all to bolster short-term political gains.

Let me start out by saying that I can't imagine someone in a foreign country deciding to emigrate to the United States in order to vote in a school board election. That is just absurd.

But the resolution also falls short on its own merits. For example, the resolution states that it is ``of paramount importance that the United States maintains the legitimacy of its elections and protects them from interference, including interference from foreign threats.''

I agree with the statement as far as it goes, but I question why the resolution makes no mention whatsoever of the greatest foreign threat of electoral interference, namely interference by Russia in an attempt to disrupt our democracy and sow chaos in our political an governmental system.

It is the consensus view of our Nation's intelligence community that Russia interfered in the 2016 Presidential election in order to help Donald Trump become President. Indeed, senior administration officials warned just last month that Russia's attempts to interfere in our electoral system are ongoing and threaten the integrity of both the upcoming midyear elections and the 2020 Presidential election.

At a minimum, the resolution should call attention to this fact. Yet, incredibly, the resolution makes absolutely no mention of it.

The resolution also disrespects States' rights, failing to mention that the Constitution allows States and localities to permit noncitizen voting in local elections, a practice that dates to the earliest days of the Republic. For example, New York City permitted noncitizen voting in local school board elections until elections in local school boards were done away with in New York City about 20 years ago.

Indeed, an earlier version of the resolution's text, obtained by the far-right Breitbart website, included the whereas clause acknowledging these facts stating: ``Whereas, the Constitution allows States and localities to grant noncitizens the right to vote in non-Federal elections.''

Yet perhaps recognizing that this was something of an admission against interest, the introduced version does not include this clause.

The fact of the matter is that local governments have permitted noncitizen voting in various local elections, school board elections, and so forth, through the entire history of the Republic. So why suddenly do we have this expression of terrible concern?

The resolution also speaks to the fact that ``voting is fundamental to a functioning democracy.'' Yet, it fails to address any of the real threats to voting rights that our citizens face.

Five years ago, the Supreme Court effectively gutted the Voting Rights Act's preclearance requirement, the act's most important enforcement mechanism, in its decision in Shelby County v. Holder. The Court reached its conclusion notwithstanding Congress' factual findings in 2006 that the act, including its preclearance provision, was still needed in the face of continuing discrimination by some States against minority voters.

In response to the Court's decision, and under Republican control, States that had been subject to the act's preclearance requirement wasted no time in pursuing voting restrictions that once again threatened to undermine the voting rights of African Americans and other racial and ethnic minority groups.

These measures included voter identification requirements, restriction or elimination of early voting or same day registration, and bans on ex-offenders from voting, all of which makes it disproportionately harder for racial and ethnic minorities to vote.

These restrictions, enacted by Republican legislatures, have probably deprived hundreds of thousands--or even several million--of our fellow citizens of the right to vote. They are the real threat to our democracy, not the few noncitizens who may vote in a school board election in some local government that has permitted it through the last 100 years.

Members have introduced various proposals to address these continuing attempts by certain States and localities to suppress voters. For example, H.R. 12, the Voter Empowerment Act,

which was introduced by Representative John Lewis and has 183 cosponsors, would reinforce the constitutional right to vote.

The bill includes, among other things, provisions to make it easier to register to vote and to prohibit and criminally punish voter suppression tactics like caging, voter intimidation, and the provision of false and deceptive voting information. The bill would also restore voting rights for nonviolent felons after they have served their sentences.

H.R. 2978, the Voting Rights Advancement Act, which was introduced by Representative Terry Sewell and has 192 cosponsors, is a direct response to the Supreme Court's invitation to Congress articulated in the Shelby County decision to revise section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. The bill would amend the Voting Rights Act to protect voters by requiring States with a recent history of voter discrimination to seek approval from the Department of Justice before making any changes to their electoral laws.

Finally, H.R. 5011, the Election Security Act, which was introduced by Representative Bennie Thompson and has 122 cosponsors, would designate election infrastructure as critical infrastructure and provide financial support and enhanced security for the infrastructure to carry out elections so we are not subject to foreign invasion by hackers.

These measures each address critical threats to our electoral system and the right to vote, yet none of them has received a hearing or other consideration by the House.

It is a travesty that the Republicans have chosen to spend what is likely to be the last week of session before the midterm elections to consider this purely symbolic measure. They refuse to consider bills that would actually help ensure the right to vote but will consider this purely symbolic measure, one that in itself seeks to stoke the worst kinds of sentiments in the body politic, instead of devoting time to considering and passing meaningful and substantive protections for the right to vote and to protect us from foreign interference in our electoral system. I cannot support this travesty.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), ranking member of the Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations Subcommittee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentlewoman from Texas an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Swalwell), a member of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Demings), a member of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Gutierrez), a member of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, I want to be abundantly clear that this resolution is nothing more than a political stunt steeped in hypocrisy. The resolution states that it is ``of paramount importance that the United States maintains

the legitimacy of its elections and protects them from interference, including interference from foreign threats. . . .''

Yet, the resolution does not even mention the greatest foreign threat we face: Russian interference intended to disrupt our elections and sow chaos in our political system.

The hypocrisy is breathtaking. The chairman of the House Intelligence Committee and others have worked all year to undermine and discredit the Mueller investigation into Russian interference with our 2016 election.

To add insult to injury, House Republicans have voted to block needed funding to help States secure their election systems from the ongoing Russian and other efforts to interfere in the 2018 elections, ongoing efforts that have been confirmed by senior administration officials.

In short, this resolution ignores the real threats our elections are facing and, instead, plays political games by trying to stoke the worse kinds of sentiments in the body politic, all focused on local practices that are not sudden and not new but are as old as the Republic and suddenly pose a threat. I cannot vote for this charade.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 6758, the SUCCESS Act.

This bipartisan legislation would direct the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the Small Business Administration to study the underrepresentation of women, minorities, and veterans among patent holders. It would also require the agencies to recommend legislative solutions for increasing participation by these underrepresented groups in entrepreneurship activities, and increasing the number of them who apply for and obtain patents.

The SUCCESS Act would provide an important first step toward narrowing the race and gender gap among patent holders. One study estimated that per capita GDP could grow 4.6 percent if more women and African Americans were included in the initial stages of the innovation process. It also found that exposure to innovation during childhood has an important impact on a person's desire to become an inventor. That makes it critical that young people have diverse role models in all fields of study.

The bill was strengthened, in the Judiciary Committee, by the Gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider, whose amendment added veterans to the list of underrepresented groups that will be studied. Promoting greater inclusion in the innovation ecosystem is good for our economy and good for underserved communities, and I am pleased to support the bill.

The SUCCESS Act would also extend the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's fee setting authority for eight years. Since this authority was first granted to the PTO under the America Invents Act, seven years ago, it has helped put the agency on solid financial footing, and it has enabled the PTO to continue performing the important work of protecting Americans' intellectual property.

I appreciate the leadership of Mr. Chabot and Mr. Johnson, the sponsors of this bill, and the other bipartisan cosponsors of this legislation. I want to particularly thank Ms. Velazquez, the Ranking Member of the Small Business Committee, for all that she has done to bring attention to the lack of diversity among patent holders, and to the important issues highlighted in this bill.

I look forward to continuing to work with her, and the other bill sponsors to advance not only this legislation, but also other measures to address the underrepresentation of women, minorities, and veterans within the innovation ecosystem.

I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, 17 years ago, two planes crashed into the World Trade Center in my district, killing thousands of people. A third plane slammed into the Pentagon, and a fourth plane, likely destined for the very Capitol complex in which we now stand, was brought down by a group of courageous passengers in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

As I do today, I represented Ground Zero on September 11, 2001. I was at the World Trade Center 4 hours after the towers fell. The scene was horrible: fire, smoke, debris, human remains, and twisted metal created an apocalyptic scene. Dust and debris filled the air, but even in that moment of deep despair and overwhelming horror, I saw signs of hope.

Firefighters, police, and emergency medical technicians traveled to Lower Manhattan from around the country. Steel workers, construction workers, and hundreds of other men and women rushed to the pile to help. As the last fires were extinguished, 99 days after the attack, and the last pieces of metal were removed from Ground Zero, those feelings of hope, perseverance, and solidarity remained.

In the years since the attacks, I have been grateful and inspired by how Congress has come together to help rebuild New York, and I have worked with my colleagues to support the responders, survivors, and families of the victims.

In 2010, Congress passed, and in 2015 reauthorized, the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act. More than 88,000 9/11 responders and survivors have enrolled in the program to receive healthcare and support for 9/11-related illnesses. The law has also provided over $4.3 billion in compensation to responders and survivors through the Victim Compensation Fund, a program that Congress will have to reauthorize in the coming years.

In addition to making our responders and survivors whole, Congress invested millions of dollars to help rebuild Lower Manhattan. One World Trade Center now fills the hole left in our skyline when the towers fell, and businesses shattered after the attack are reopened and thriving. In what was once the shadow of the towers, there now stands a comprehensive museum dedicated to sharing stories of September 11th and the bravery of those who risked everything to protect their fellow Americans that day.

In place of the smoking hole I saw day after day in Lower Manhattan, there now sits a somber and inspiring memorial. It is a site of remembrance and hope; a place for every American to come and reflect on what happened that September morning, and to renew our promise, never to forget the events of that day.

It is the national memorial for a national tragedy. Similarly, memorials built at the Pentagon and in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, provide places to remember and reflect, solemn reminders of the tragedy and bravery we saw on September 11th. That is why I am pleased to cosponsor legislation introduced by my colleague from New Jersey which will create a competitive grant program to provide Federal support for security operations and maintenance for 9/11 memorials.

This legislation will help ensure the memorials continue to provide sacred and inspiring spots, accessible to millions of visitors for generations to come.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the bipartisan support of the members of the Natural Resources Committee and the House leadership for bringing the bill to the floor today. I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and to achieve our shared goal of providing a memorial that allows our Nation to mourn, to reflect, and to renew our promises never to forget September 11th.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I must oppose the so-called Community Safety and Security Act. This highly flawed bill is an example of why regular order and a meaningful, deliberative process is essential to the proper crafting of legislation.

Last April, the Supreme Court, in Sessions v. Dimaya, ruled that a portion of the criminal code's definition of criminal violence is unconstitutionally vague. That was nearly 6 months ago.

The Judiciary Committee has had ample time to examine the decision, to hold hearings, to gather input from a range of stakeholders, and to carefully develop legislation through markup and regular order--but none of those things have happened.

Instead, a bill with significant ramifications for criminal law in immigration cases was introduced just last week while Members were out of town and is being rushed to the floor today without any hearings, without any markup, without any adequate opportunity for review by the public, by legal experts, or by stakeholders. So it is not a surprise that we are left with many unanswered questions and concerns about the impact of the bill.

The term ``crime of violence'' is referred to throughout the criminal code and is, for example, used to determine whether a juvenile may be prosecuted as an adult in Federal court. It also has serious implications in immigration law because a noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony, described under the Immigration and Nationality Act to include a crime of violence under this section, is deportable and would be denied the opportunity for certain discretionary relief from removal.

If we do not define this term properly, it could have significant adverse consequences. H.R. 6691 specifies a long list of offenses that would be considered crimes of violence, some of which are not currently included in the Federal criminal code. The bill further defines some of the offenses that are in the code, adding layers of confusion to the bill.

We need proper definitions. For example, the crime of fleeing is identified as a crime of violence. Now, if by fleeing you mean that, when the cop pulls you over, you hit the gas and flee at 100 miles per hour, endangering anybody on the road, that is a crime of violence. But if by fleeing it is meant that you don't pull over immediately because you are looking for a safe place to stop, well, that probably shouldn't be a crime of violence, and yet, in this bill, it seems to be.

We should carefully examine all of these offenses to determine which are appropriate to be included in this definition, and we should consider what the consequences will be for each one.

In writing for the majority in Dimaya, Justice Kagan noted that:

A host of issues respecting the definition of ``crime of

violence'' application to specific crimes divide the Federal

appellate courts.

Although Congress has the power to clarify the definition or to establish a new one, as this bill would do, it is absolutely essential that we consider carefully what offenses should be included.

Indeed, in considering a change to the definition of ``crime of violence'' for the purposes of the sentencing guidelines, the United States Sentencing Commission held a hearing and received testimony. It also sought public comments in response to proposed revisions. At a minimum, we should do the same.

Finally, I note that, even in the brief time since the bill has been introduced, a week, a broad array of advocates have expressed opposition to this bill, including the American Civil Liberties Union and Families Against Mandatory Minimums.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for the additional time.

Others opposing the bill are Asian Americans Advancing Justice, the Immigrant Justice Network, the Immigrant Defense Project, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and others. Such opposition should, at the very least, tell us that we should not be considering this legislation without thoughtful deliberation.

This bill is a perfect example of a bill whose topics should be covered, but we could do it properly instead of having a sloppily drafted bill that does things we don't know it does and doesn't do things we think it does. We must have a hearing. We should have testimony. We should carefully consider this bill, and then we should pass some version of it.

For those reasons, I oppose passage of this version of this bill, and I ask that we take the time to examine this issue through regular order.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor the retirement of Ellen Wallach, a public servant whose faithful and diligent spirit has graced my district office throughout my tenure in Congress.

Ellen Wallach has had a long, fruitful, and deeply impactful career in casework and constituent services, first for the office of Rep. Ted Weiss from 1977 to 1993, and then for my office from 1993 onwards. Her knowledge of casework issues is encyclopedic, and she has inspired generations of young caseworkers with the care she brings to her life- changing work. In many ways, Ellen has directly performed the most important duties of any congressional office: she meets with constituents who are facing what can be profoundly challenging circumstances, and she finds a way to help them. During her 42 years working for the House of Representatives, Ellen has steadfastly assisted New Yorkers facing a slew of issues, many of them unprecedented or legally convoluted, as they navigate the immigration system, attempt to gain access to basic healthcare and housing, or work to receive the veterans' and retirement benefits to which they are entitled. Ellen also assisted in the immediate and long-term aftermath of the devastating 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, which occurred in our congressional district; she has fought for the rights of survivors, first responders, and families to receive the resources and information they needed to recover and live life to the fullest. As if that were not enough, Ellen devotes much of her free time to supporting the local arts community, to the benefit of countless children and artists in New York City. Her career has been dedicated to the people of New York in the truest sense of the word, and on behalf of my constituency, my staff, and myself, I wish Ellen a restful, joyous transition into retirement.

Ellen Wallach is a role model for those who want to dedicate their lives to benefitting others in real and lasting ways. I salute her, and I thank her for her service to the people of the United States, the State of New York and my Congressional District.

Mr. Speaker, today I am pleased to introduce the Democracy Restoration Act of 2018. This legislation will serve to clarify and, in some cases, expand the voting rights of people with felony convictions, the next logical step in restoring their full participation in civic life.

The United States remains one of the world's strictest nations when it comes to denying the right to vote to citizens convicted of crimes. An estimated 6.1 million citizens are ineligible to vote in federal elections due to their status as ex-offenders. More than four and a half million of these disqualified voters are not in prison, but are on probation, parole, or have completed their sentence. Due to differences in state laws and rates of criminal punishment, states vary widely in the practice of disenfranchisement, demonstrating a critical federal interest for uniform standards.

Clarification of the law on restoration of ex-offender voting rights is a critical next step in criminal justice reform. In 2007, President George W. Bush signed the Second Chance Act into law, signaling a bipartisan awareness of the importance of enacting policies that assist in the reintegration of ex-offenders into their communities. Recent public opinion research has also shown that a significant majority of Americans favor voting rights for people on probation or parole, who are currently supervised in their communities, as well as for individuals who have completed their sentences. This legislation both captures the bipartisan spirit of the Bush administration and is consistent with evolving public opinion on rehabilitation of ex- offenders.

From a constitutional basis, the Democracy Restoration Act is a narrowly crafted effort to expand voting rights for people with felony convictions, while protecting state prerogatives to generally establish voting qualifications. The legislation would only apply to persons who are not in prison, and would only apply to federal elections. As such, our bill is fully consistent with constitutional requirements established by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions upholding federal voting rights laws.

Since this legislation was first introduced in 2008, the Sentencing Project reports 27 states have amended felony disenfranchisement policies in an effort to reduce their restrictiveness and expand voter eligibility. These reforms have resulted in an estimated more than 800,000 citizens regaining their voting rights. Yet, despite these reforms, the overall rate of ex-offender disenfranchisement has not abated and continues to have a disproportionate impact on communities of color. Many of the state reforms still rely on lengthy waiting periods or clemency and several feature burdensome procedural hurdles that have proven difficult to navigate for persons seeking to restore their voting rights. As a result, approximately 50 percent of the entire disenfranchised population is clustered in 12 states, with Florida alone accounting for 48 percent of the post-sentence population.

Proponents of ex-offender disenfranchisement have offered few justifications for continuing the practice. In fact, the strongest empirical research suggests that prohibitions on the right to vote undermine both our voting system and the fundamental rights of people with felony convictions. A series of studies make clear that civic engagement is pivotal in the transition from incarceration and discouraging repeat offenses. Disenfranchisement laws only serve to isolate and alienate ex-offenders, creating additional obstacles in their attempt to successfully put the past behind them by fully reintegrating into society. But that is only half the story.

The current patchwork of state laws has created widespread confusion among election officials throughout the country and has served as the justification for flawed voter purges. For example, although people with misdemeanor convictions never lose the right to vote in Ohio, in 2008, 30 percent of election officials in the state responded incorrectly or expressed uncertainty about whether individuals with misdemeanor convictions could vote. A similar survey by the Nebraska ACLU in advance of the 2016 general election determined that about half of state election officials gave out the wrong information about former felons' voting rights. Given the general confusion by election officials on restoration of voting rights, many ex-offenders are hesitant to even attempt registration, depriving eligible voters of their rights. Only federal law can conclusively resolve the ambiguities in this area plaguing our voting system.

For many years, voting restoration legislation has been supported by a broad coalition of groups interested in voting and civil rights, including the NAACP, ACLU, Human Rights Watch, the Brennan Center for Justice, and the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, among many others. This coalition has expanded to include many law enforcement groups including the American Probation and Parole Association, the Association of Paroling Authorities International, and the National Black Police Association, among others, who recognize that allowing people to vote after release from prison helps rebuild ties to the community that motivate law-abiding behavior.

The denial of voting rights by many states to ex-offenders represents a vestige from a time when suffrage was denied to whole classes of our population based on race, gender, religion, national origin and property. I believe that our

nation fails not only people with felony convictions by denying them the right to vote, but the rest of our society that has struggled throughout its history to ensure that its citizenry be part of legitimate and inclusive elections. It is long overdue that these restrictions be relegated to unenlightened history.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I claim the time in opposition to H.R. 1689, the Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2017.

While I believe this bill is well intentioned, it is the wrong approach to a serious problem. It seeks to prevent abuse of eminent domain power, but its provisions could cripple the finances of State and local governments without even providing a remedy to the victims of an unjust taking.

In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court upheld the right of a municipality to use eminent domain authority to take private property and to transfer it to another private entity for a public purpose. Building on a century of precedent defining public use to include a public purpose, the Court held such a transfer did not violate the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, which provides that no person's private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

Critics of the Kelo decision believe that the Court overreached and that eminent domain should be exercised only when the taken property will be owned by the government or by a private entity operating as a public utility.

H.R. 1689 would overturn Kelo by prohibiting any State or local government that receives Federal economic development funds from using eminent domain to transfer private property to another private entity for the purpose of economic development.

The bill broadly defines economic development funds to include any Federal funds distributed to States or localities under laws designed to improve or increase their economies. Should a State or local government violate this prohibition, it is subject to the loss of all such funds for 2 years.

This draconian remedy could potentially devastate the finances of State

and local governments. Even projects unrelated to takings could lose funding, and cities could face bankruptcy simply by incorrectly guessing whether a given project would sufficiently qualify as being for a public use. The potential loss of such funding would also have a chilling effect on a government's willingness to use eminent domain to promote legitimate economic development projects.

Even if a government never takes a prohibited action, it would likely be adversely impacted by this bill. Just the potential loss of significant Federal funding may make it impossible for a government to sell municipal bonds or could require a government to pay inordinate interest rates given the possibility that it might, at some point in the future, use eminent domain improperly and thereby lose all Federal economic aid and, with it, the ability to repay the bonds.

The power of eminent domain is an extraordinary one and it should be used with great care. Historically, there are examples of States and localities abusing eminent domain for purely private gain or to favor one community at the expense of another. When used inappropriately, this power has wrecked communities for projects, resulting in little economic benefit.

When used appropriately, however, eminent domain is an important tool, making possible transportation networks, irrigation projects, and other important public works that support communities and are integral to their economic and social well-being.

Unfortunately, this bill's vague definitions may prohibit projects that have a genuine public purpose while allowing others that historically have abused eminent domain.

For example, this bill allows use of eminent domain to give property to a private party ``such as a common carrier that makes the property available for use by the general public as of right.'' That would seem to include a stadium, which is privately owned and available for use by the general public as of right.

On the other hand, communities could be barred from using eminent domain to pursue affordable housing projects if they are built using a public-private partnership, such as the HOPE VI program, which uses Federal money to encourage private development of mixed-income housing.

Yet another shortcoming of the bill is that it does not actually help an aggrieved property owner or tenant because it would not allow them to sue to stop the allegedly prohibited taking. The bill only authorizes suit after a condemnation proceeding has concluded, when it is too late.

In addition, injured persons would not be entitled to any damages other than the just compensation they got at the time of the taking. All they could get is the psychic satisfaction they may receive from bankrupting their community after the fact.

I would also point out that this bill is unnecessary, since more than 40 States have already moved aggressively to narrow their eminent domain laws in the 13 years since Kelo was decided.

Finally, H.R. 1689 undermines federalism, and it may raise constitutional concerns. Subject to the Takings Clause, local land use decisions are generally left to the judgments of State and local governments, which are in the best position to weigh local conditions and competing interests. This is the essence of federalism, and Congress should not be in the business of sitting as a national zoning board.

Also, the loss of all economic funding, even for projects that may have nothing to do with takings, is so draconian that it may amount to an unconstitutional coercion of State and local governments.

Accordingly, I oppose this bill, and I would simply make two comments to amplify on what I said.

If you want to stop improper takings, all right, but have a proper remedy. Allow the alleged victim of the improper taking to go to court, sue for an injunction to stop the improper taking, and get monetary damages, if any. That would be at least a reasonable remedy.

Instead, this bill says that you can't go to court to get an injunction; you can't get damages. All you can do is wait until after the improper taking has occurred--you already lost your property--then you can go to court; and if the court finds you are right, that it was an improper use of the eminent domain procedure, then the government will lose economic aid for 2 years. It doesn't help the plaintiff. It doesn't help the property owner. All it does is bankrupt the community. So what is the point?

Second, as I mentioned before, this could injure communities that never do an improper taking because, if I am the mayor, I may not be able to float a bond lest somebody think that maybe my successor once or twice removed may, 20 years down the line or 10 years down the line, do an improper taking. And then the Federal Government would come in, stop all economic aid, and we wouldn't be able to repay the bonds.

So this would impair the ability of States or local governments to bond for projects. It wouldn't help the victim--there may even be no victim--but it would hurt the government. It makes no sense. This is a real problem.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no,'' and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I first comment, the gentleman from Wisconsin says that we object that the penalty is too severe. We do not object that the penalty is too severe. We object that the penalty is irrelevant, that the penalty won't help the plaintiff. It won't help to prevent the misuse, number one. And number two, it could be a plot that would have the practical effect, when there is no misuse, no taking at all, of having a deleterious effect on

the community's bond rating, even when there is no taking.

If you are going to do this bill and you want to narrow the definition of a public purpose, which is the purpose of the bill, I am not sure we can do that, given the fact that the Supreme Court has decided what it is. Assuming we could do that, fine, but have an appropriate remedy, a remedy that would enable the plaintiffs to get an injunction against the taking, that would give them monetary damages, which is the way we normally do things, not a remedy that will not prevent the taking and only will damage a community, whether or not it does any improper takings. That doesn't make sense.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Raskin).

Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Speaker, I agree with the gentleman. The standard way in which someone can vindicate rights is to sue. If the local government wants to abuse the rights of a homeowner, let's say, by an improper taking, the proper way for us to help is to give them the right to sue and to get injunctive relief. Let them go into Federal court and get an injunction which says: Do not tear down the building. Do not take away title. You can't do it because this is too broad a use of taking. It is a violation of the Fifth Amendment.

This bill won't actually help that person because it gives them no rights except the right after they have lost the property. It gives them the right to go to court and not get any relief for themselves, not get the property back, not get any monetary damages, not get an injunction. It gives them the right to go into court and seek to block financial aid to the community. So they can say, ``I took revenge on the community,'' but what is the point? It doesn't help them.

I think there are such decisions, and this would seem to violate them.

Yes. The Medicaid decision said you cannot draft the local government to exercise a function for the Federal Government, which this would seem to do also.

That is exactly what it said.

I agree with the gentleman. I think the gentleman from Maryland makes a very valid point.

Mr. Speaker, for all these reasons, I oppose this bill. I would simply say: We agree there is a serious problem with abuse of eminent domain, and we agree there may very well be decent legislation that would do something about the problem.

If you are going to do it, draft legislation that really deals with the problem, that is constitutional, that will protect the small person such as Mrs. Kelo but that won't bankrupt the community in a way that is probably unconstitutional anyway.

This bill is not the solution. We could, on a bipartisan basis, work for an intelligent solution, but this is not it. Accordingly, I urge a ``no'' vote.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the defeat of this legislation, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 5954, the Anti-terrorism Clarification Act of 2018. This bipartisan bill, of which I am proud to be the lead Democratic sponsor, amends the Anti-Terrorism Act, or ATA, to make it easier for American victims of international terrorism to have their day in court, to obtain some measure of justice for their injuries, and to hold terrorists accountable for their heinous acts.

The ATA provides that U.S. nationals, or their survivors or heirs, may recover treble damages and attorney's fees and costs for any civil action arising from an injury sustained by an act of international terrorism.

H.R. 5954 seeks to minimize certain procedural obstacles that ATA plaintiffs have encountered in their attempts to obtain full relief for their injuries. For example, the ATA contains an exception for injuries caused by an ``act of war,'' which it defines, in relevant part, as including ``armed conflict between military forces of any origin.''

Unfortunately, this ambiguous statutory language has led to considerable confusion among Federal courts as to the proper scope of the act of war exception, and even as to the proper kind of analysis to apply when the armed conflict at issue involves a terrorist group such as Hamas or Hezbollah.

For example, in one case, the court found that the act of war exception prevented U.S. civilians injured by Hezbollah rocket attacks into Israel from pursuing their claims under the ATA. Yet, in another case, a different court concluded that gunshots fired into Israel by Hamas that resulted in injury to a U.S. civilian did not constitute an act of war and, therefore, was compensable.

H.R. 5954 resolves this confusion by specifying, among other things, that a foreign terrorist organization or a specially designated global terrorist, as designated by the executive branch, is not a ``military force'' and, therefore, is subject to ATA liability.

This change makes it clear that violent actions targeted at U.S. civilians by a terrorist group are acts of terrorism that could give rise to liability under the ATA. Indeed, to read the act of war exception otherwise, as some courts have done, threatens to undermine the ATA's entire purpose.

Even if victims successfully obtain a judgment under the ATA, many plaintiffs find it impossible to obtain full compensation for their injuries because there are not sufficient assets available to satisfy the judgment. This bill would address that problem as well.

Under current law, terrorism victims can reach assets blocked pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to satisfy terrorism-related court judgments. This bill would simply allow terrorism victims also to attach assets that have been blocked pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act.

The final hurdle to bringing ATA claims that this bill helps overcome is an overly narrow reading of personal jurisdiction that some courts have applied, which has prevented some victims from bringing those responsible for their injuries to justice.

Most recently, this occurred in the Second Circuit's misguided decision in Sokolow v. PLO. In Sokolow, several plaintiffs, including Morris and Eva Waldman, two of my constituents, sought relief under the ATA for injuries sustained as a result of various terrorist attacks in Israel that killed or injured U.S. citizens.

Although a district court awarded the plaintiffs $655 million in damages, the Second Circuit reversed, wrongly concluding, in my view, that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants in that case; namely, the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority. The court reasoned that the defendants' contacts, including maintaining offices in Washington and New York and the activities associated with those offices, were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction.

This bill responds to the Second Circuit's decision by deeming a party to have consented to personal jurisdiction if the party accepts foreign assistance of any kind from the United States beginning 120 days after the bill's enactment date. In the case of the PLO, or affiliated entities, it would also deem

consent if the defendant maintains an office in the U.S. jurisdiction 120 days or more after the enactment date. By undertaking one of these acts, a potential defendant is sufficiently on notice that it is consenting to personal jurisdiction in an ATA case.

My support for H.R. 5954 is part of my longstanding efforts to secure a measure of justice for terrorism victims, including leading House efforts to reauthorize the 9/11 Victims Compensation Fund. I was also the lead House Democratic sponsor of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which helped ensure that 9/11 victims and other victims of terrorism on American soil can bring their claims in court, regardless of where the foreign conduct occurred. This bill is a natural extension of those efforts.

For these reasons, I support this important bipartisan measure.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, although nothing can ever bring back the lives lost to terrorism or repair the emotional scars of the survivors, terrorism victims deserve the chance to achieve some justice through our courts. Congress' purpose in passing the ATA was to give them that chance.

I believe H.R. 5954 will help further that purpose by addressing procedural barriers that have unfairly stood in their way.

In closing, I thank Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte for his leadership on this important measure. I strongly support H.R. 5954, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this resolution is the legislative equivalent of fiddling while Rome is burning. Our President takes to the world stage to side with a hostile foreign power over his own intelligence services. Here at home he engages in government-sponsored child abuse in the form of a family separation policy that continues to terrorize children as young as 6 months.

This nonbinding resolution before us would do nothing to bring about a fair and just immigration system. In fact, it would do nothing at all. It is just a meaningless political stunt to change the subject from the international and domestic shame unleashed on us by President Trump.

The President imposed the family separation policy, and his administration never even considered how to ensure that the children would eventually reunite with their families. Now, nearly 3,000 children remain separated, and they do not know when, or even if, they will ever see their parents again. Many of these children were ripped from the arms of their mothers and fathers, and their anguish is unimaginable.

But this bill would do nothing to reverse this disastrous and cruel family separation policy. It would do nothing to ensure that parents and children are accurately tracked so that families can be reunited, and it would do nothing to address the horrendous conditions separated children are being subjected to.

For example, 14-month-old Baby M--we must use a pseudonym--was separated from his mother for 85 days at 14 months and he returned so full of dirt and lice that it appeared he had not been bathed the entire time he was in Federal custody. His mother Olivia

says that he is not the same since they were reunited, and he cries whenever he does not see her out of fear that he might be left alone again.

Mr. Speaker, this is a humanitarian crisis. We do not have the time to waste with political stunts like this bill while the moral fiber of our country is torn apart.

I will be voting ``present'' on this bill, because I have no desire to play the Republican's immoral games right now. We have much more important things to do.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren), the ranking Democrat on the Immigration and Border Security Subcommittee.

Mr. Speaker, what is disgusting is for Congress to sit idly by while children are ripped from the arms of their parents and abused.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. Jayapal).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds.

Yes, every Democrat voted against H.R. 6136, which provided for indefinite detention of entire families, among other obnoxious provisions. So did many Republicans, thank God.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the distinguished Democratic whip.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Gutierrez), the distinguished gentleman and a member of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Pocan).

Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman from Wisconsin an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Costa).

Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman from California an additional 15 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, may I ask how much time remains for each side.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Doggett).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), the distinguished Democratic leader of the House.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Perlmutter).

Mr. Speaker, we are prepared to close. I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Castro).

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this so-called resolution of insistence is being rushed to the floor as an emergency measure.

There are many emergencies facing the United States at this hour. The subject matter of this resolution is not among them.

This resolution is wrong on the facts, wrong on the law, wrong on the rules, and a dangerous precedent to set for the House of Representatives.

First, the resolution is riddled with inaccuracies. Taking this document at face value, you might think that the Department of Justice had not already sent us hundreds of thousands of documents, many of which the sponsors of this resolution delight in leaking to the public.

It also relies heavily on the March 22 subpoena issued by Chairman Goodlatte, a subpoena that was not issued in compliance with House rules, and that, according to past House counselors with whom we have consulted, likely cannot be enforced.

Second, this resolution is premised on a demand for documents to which Congress is not entitled and which the Justice Department cannot give.

To be clear, I firmly believe that when the House Judiciary Committee asks the executive branch for information, our committee is entitled to that information in almost every case. But we are not entitled to information that goes to the core of an ongoing criminal investigation.

This prohibition is both a matter of constitutional law, as it falls to the executive branch to enforce the law, and a matter of basic fairness. It is wrong to inject politics into criminal proceedings.

I suspect that the sponsors of this resolution already know this. They are asking for documents that they know they will probably never receive, and they likely view this impossible request as a win-win proposition.

If they somehow bully the Department of Justice into turning over materials that go to the core of Special Counsel Mueller's investigation, that information could be and probably would be shared with the subject of the investigation, namely, President Trump. Indeed, Mayor Giuliani has hinted exactly that. Based on past precedent, that information would next be shared with anybody watching FOX News.

If they do not pry these documents from the Department, they will use that fact to further smear the special counsel, the Deputy Attorney General, and anyone else investigating the President. They have even suggested impeaching the Deputy Attorney General, a proposal that is both without historical precedent and patently ridiculous.

The real purpose of this resolution, and of this whole attempt, is to cast aspersions, is to defame the special prosecutor, the special counsel, and the people associated with him, the Deputy Attorney General.

Finally, voting on this resolution today sets a dangerous precedent. The majority will, in effect, have shown the American people that pure politics is more important than the facts and more important than the law. And for what?

You can force this fight with the leadership of the Department of Justice. You can demand documents that the Department cannot give us, and to which we are not entitled. You can attack the character of lifelong public servants like Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and Special Counsel Mueller. You can burn bridges with your colleagues to speed this resolution to the floor. But you cannot stop the special counsel's investigation.

Before Members vote today, we must ask: When the special counsel's work is complete, when the enormity of what he has found has been laid bare, how will the American people judge the House's actions here today?

I urge my colleagues to oppose this reckless, dangerous measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), the distinguished ranking member of the Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations Subcommittee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentlewoman from Texas an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, before I yield further time, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 970, which is before us now, includes a reference to a document unilaterally issued by the House Judiciary Committee on March 22, 2018. It is my understanding that the issuance of this purported subpoena is defective because it did not comply with committee rules providing that:

At least two business days before issuing any subpoena, the Chair shall consult with the Ranking Member, and the Chair shall provide a full copy of the proposed subpoena.

While, in this instance, the chairman did provide me, as ranking member, with a copy of a proposed subpoena on March 19, the document the chairman issued on March 22 was substantively and materially different from the document that was shared on March 19, in abrogation of committee rules.

My parliamentary inquiry is whether these circumstances would have any bearing on consideration of this resolution, H. Res. 970, and, absent that, whether the defective nature would have any bearing on any future attempts by the House to enforce the supposed subpoena?

Could the Chair repeat that last sentence? I couldn't hear.

Mr. Speaker, in that case I will include in the Record a copy of a letter that I sent to the chair dated June 21, 2018, detailing the facts and background concerning the defective nature of the subpoena purportedly issued on March 22.

House of Representatives,

Committee on the Judiciary,

Washington, DC, June 21, 2018.

Hon. Bob Goodlatte,

Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, D.C.

Dear Chairman Goodlatte: I am writing to inform you that

the subpoena you issued to the Department of Justice on March

22, 2018 does not comply with Committee rules and is

therefore not a valid subpoena under the Rules of the House.

On March 22, 2018, you issued a subpoena to the Department

of Justice ``seeking documents related to [the Majority's]

ongoing investigation regarding charging decisions in the

investigation surrounding former Secretary Clinton's private

email server in 2016.'' House Republicans have repeatedly

accused Department officials of failing to comply with this

subpoena--and even threatened some of those officials with

contempt of Congress and impeachment proceedings.

As you know, if you choose to issue a subpoena

unilaterally--instead of putting the proposed subpoena to a

vote of the Committee--our rules require you to ``consult''

with me in advance. Specifically:

At least two business days before issuing any subpoena

pursuant to subsection (a), the Chair shall consult with the

Ranking Member regarding the authorization and issuance of

such subpoena, and the Chair shall provide a full copy of the

proposed subpoena, including any proposed document schedule,

at that time.

As we discussed on at least one other occasion, our

``consultation'' is not complete--and the subpoena may not

issue--until you have transmitted a full copy of the subpoena

to my office.

On March 19, 2018, we met to discuss a subpoena for

documents related to the Department of Justice's handling of

the Clinton investigation. At that time, you provided me with

a document that describes 14 different categories of

information sought from the Department and the FBI. I have

enclosed a copy of this document for your convenience.

The subpoena you issued on March 22 is substantively and

materially different from the document you shared with me on

March 19. The subpoena requests nine categories of

information, not 14. It is also significantly different in

scope than the document you shared with me at our meeting.

Our Committee rules prevent the Majority from making

substantive changes to a proposed subpoena without

appropriate notice to the Minority. Because you did not

provide me with a copy of the subpoena that actually issued,

the subpoena that you eventually issued would be

unenforceable as a matter of law.

Although you certainly have the option to issue another

unilateral subpoena to cure this defect, I would urge you to

consider a more bipartisan response. As you know, we recently

changed our rules to give the Chairman the option of issuing

a subpoena without first putting the proposal to a vote of

the Committee. We agreed to this change based largely on your

guarantee that you would only use the unilateral subpoena

power ``during periods of recess'' or in ``extraordinary

circumstances.'' This Congress, you have proposed to issue a

unilateral subpoena on three occasions. I have objected each

time, on the grounds that the circumstances did not meet your

own standard and that the full Committee should have an

opportunity to debate the wisdom of using our time and

resources in this manner. I am similarly concerned about your

refusal to include Democrats in discussions of what documents

the Committee should request and which individuals should be

interviewed and when meeting with Department of Justice

officials to negotiate how they will respond to Committee

requests.

On a broader level, I hope that this defective subpoena

will give the Majority an opportunity to reassess its

priorities. I believe that other work should take precedence

over this largely unproductive investigation. Foreign

adversaries continue to threaten our elections, the President

has created an immigration crisis at our borders, gun

violence plagues our schools and our homes, and the Trump

Administration continues to disregard even the most basic

ethics rules. Surely any one of these topics, each one

squarely within the Committee's jurisdiction, is more

important than the unending hunt for Hillary Clinton's email.

Sincerely,

Jerrold Nadler.

Enclosures.

House of Representatives,

Committee on the Judiciary,

Washington, DC, March 22, 2018.

Hon. Rod J. Rosenstein,

Deputy Attorney General,

U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Rosenstein: Four months have passed since Chairman

Gowdy and I, along

with Representatives Jordan, Meadows, Buck, and Ratcliffe,

wrote you seeking documents related to our ongoing

investigation regarding charging decisions in the

investigation surrounding former Secretary Clinton's private

email server in 2016. To date, the Department has only

produced a fraction of the documents that have been

requested. In addition, in early February, I wrote the

Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation seeking

documents related to potential abuses of the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act. No documents have been

provided to the Committee in response to this request.

Given the Department's ongoing delays in producing these

documents, I am left with no choice but to issue the enclosed

subpoena to compel production of these documents.

Moreover, since our requests for documents related to the

Clinton email server investigation were made, it has come to

light that the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility

recommended the dismissal of former FBI Deputy Director

Andrew McCabe. This recommendation appears to be based, at

least in part, on events related to the investigation

surrounding former Secretary Clinton's private email server.

Accordingly, the subpoena additionally covers all documents

and communications relied upon by FBI's Office of

Professional Responsibility in reaching its decision to

recommend the dismissal of former Deputy Director McCabe.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this important

matter. If any part of the production has been designated as

classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526, please contact

Committee majority staff so that arrangements may be made to

ensure that the documents are handled appropriately within

the House.

Sincerely,

Bob Goodlatte,

Chairman.

Enclosure.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TH28JN18.001

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TH28JN18.002

Schedule

In accordance with the attached instructions for responding

to Judiciary Committee document requests, you are required to

produce the following documents in unredacted form:

1. All documents and communications provided to or obtained

by the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector

General (OIG) regarding the FBI's decision-making with

respect to the FBI's investigation of former Secretary

Clinton's private email server;

2. Documents sufficient to show the names, titles, and

business addresses of all personnel who participated in

deliberations concerning the decision whether to charge

Clinton. In lieu of documents, you may provide a list of the

requested information;

3. The document referenced by James Rybicki during his

January 18, 2018 interview with the Committee referring or

relating to court cases or judicial decisions used in

considering, justifying, or communicating possible charges

against, or decisions not to charge, Clinton;

4. All documents and communications relied upon by FBI's

Office of Professional Responsibility in reaching its

decision to recommend the dismissal of former FBI Deputy

Director Andrew McCabe;

5. All documents and communications with the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Court (``FISC'') referring or

relating to any Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

(``FISA'') applications associated with Carter Page or

individuals on President Trump's 2016 presidential campaign

or part of the Trump administration;

6. All documents and communications referring or relating

to FISC hearings and deliberations, including any court

transcripts, related to any FISA applications associated with

Carter Page or the Trump campaign or Trump administration;

7. All documents and communications referring or relating

to internal Department of Justice or FBI management requests

to review, scrub, report on, or analyze any reporting of FISA

collection involving, or coverage mentioning, the Trump

campaign or Trump administration;

8. All documents and communications referring or relating

to defensive briefings provided by the Department of Justice

or FBI to the 2016 presidential campaigns of Clinton or

President Trump; and,

9. All documents and communications referring or relating

to proposed, recommended, or actual FISA coverage on the

Clinton Foundation or persons associated or in communication

with the Clinton Foundation.

Responding to Judiciary Committee Document Requests

In responding to the document request, please apply the

instructions and definitions set forth below:

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Cohen), the ranking member of the Constitution and Civil Justice Subcommittee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Johnson), the ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Raskin), the vice ranking member of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), the distinguished ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the gentleman from California.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), the distinguished Democratic leader of the House.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to close. I am not going to repeat what I said before. I will summarize.

The request being made here is for information that the Department of Justice cannot provide because it relates to an ongoing criminal investigation and because some of it would identify informants. The motive is probably simply to politically embarrass the Department and provide a means of embarrassing and defaming the special prosecutor and the people associated with him in the Department.

I will read from a letter that the Deputy Attorney General sent to Senator Grassley and the Speaker of the House yesterday.

He quotes the following: ``Throughout American history, wise legislators have worked with Department officials to limit oversight requests in order to respect the Department's duty to protect national security, preserve personal privacy, and insulate investigations from the appearance of interference. For instance, the Department sent a letter to a House committee chair in 2000 describing the Department's policies on responding to congressional oversight requests. The letter explains:''--I am now quoting from the 2000 letter--``Such inquiries inescapably create the risk that the public and the courts will perceive political and congressional influence over law enforcement and litigation decisions. Such inquiries also often seek records and other information that our responsibilities for these matters preclude us from disclosing.''

That is the end of the quote from the 2000 letter.

``The letter quotes President Ronald Reagan, who wrote that a `tradition of accommodation should continue as the primary means of resolving conflicts between the branches.' Regardless of whether an interbranch information request is made by letter or subpoena, the relationship between the branches gives rise to `an implicit constitutional mandate,' to `reach an accommodation short of full-scale confrontation.'''--quote from President Reagan.

``It must not be the case that the Department is required to risk damage to reputations, put cases and lives at risk, and invite political interference by opening sensitive files to congressional staff without restriction.''--from the letter from Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein.

That is exactly what these requests would do. They would risk damage to reputations, put cases and lives at risk--already two people, two informants, have had their identities outed--and invite political interference by opening sensitive files to congressional staff without restriction.

We ought to let the special counsel complete his work without hindrance. We ought to see whatever the special counsel finds, react to it as appropriate, and perhaps hold hearings into the findings when we see them. All we know about the special counsel so far--unlike all the allegations against him and his investigation, it is a witch hunt, it is this, and it is that. All we really know is that there are 20 indictments, five guilty pleas, and we know what he has pleaded in court.

There have been leaks, so you can't really say anything about the investigation other than, in this time period, they have already gotten 20 indictments, five guilty pleas, including from some of the closest people to the President in his administration and in his campaign. We will see where it goes from there.

These requests are an attempt to sabotage the investigation, and we should not go along with it.

U.S. Department of Justice,

Office of the Deputy Attorney General,

Washington, DC, June 27, 2018.

Hon. Charles Grassley,

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

Dear Chairman Grassley: Thank you for your letter of May

17, 2018, and for meeting with me last Thursday, along with

Ranking Member Feinstein. I appreciate your commitment to

allow the Special Counsel investigation ``to follow the facts

wherever they lead without any improper outside

interference.''

I know that you and Ranking Member Feinstein share my

commitment to protecting the integrity of federal

investigations. Agents and prosecutors must base each

decision on neutral standards and credible evidence. As we

seek to do in all cases, the Department of Justice will

complete the Special Counsel investigation as promptly as is

feasible. When the investigation is finished, I anticipate

that any objective and nonpartisan review will conclude that

the Department consistently sought to make reasonable

decisions and to comply with applicable laws, regulations,

policies, and practices.

Legal, ethical, and policy obligations often prevent

prosecutors from responding to criticism. As Attorney General

Robert Jackson observed in 1940, prosecutors have a duty ``to

face any temporary criticism'' and ``maintain a

dispassionate, disinterested, and impartial enforcement of

the law.'' The Inspector General's report addresses the

consequences of trying to preempt criticism by disregarding

principles that prohibit public statements, leaks to the

media, and improper disclosures to the Congress about

criminal investigations. Department officials must defend

those principles in order to ensure that all investigations

remain independent of partisan politics. We do not compete to

win the hourly news cycle.

Special Counsel Appointment and Authority

Your May 17 letter asks a series of questions concerning

the scope of the Special Counsel's authority. The current

Special Counsel differs from an ``independent counsel'' and

some previous ``special counsels,'' because Special Counsel

Mueller was appointed by the Department of Justice and

remains subject to ongoing supervision.

The Attorney General retains the general authority to

designate or name individuals as ``special counsels'' to

conduct investigations or prosecutions of particular matters

or individuals on behalf of the United States. Under

regulations issued by the Attorney General in 1999, the

Attorney General may appoint a ``special counsel'' from

outside of the Department of Justice who acts as a special

employee of the Department of Justice under the direction of

the Attorney General. The Attorney General, however, may also

appoint an individual as a special counsel, and may invest

that individual with a greater degree of independence and

autonomy to conduct investigations and prosecutions,

regardless of any ``special counsel'' regulations, as

Attorneys General did in 1973, 1994, and 2003.

What a prosecutor is called--including ``independent'' or

``special''--is a separate question from whether that

prosecutor is subject to supervision by the Attorney General.

Under the terms of his appointment, both by statute and by

regulation, Special Counsel Mueller remains accountable like

every other subordinate Department official.

Special Counsels have been appointed for a variety of

matters throughout history. For example, Attorney General

William Barr appointed three Special Counsels from outside

the Department of Justice during his 14-month tenure: (1)

Nicholas Bua to investigate an array of allegations related

to the ``Inslaw Affair,'' on November 7, 1991; (2) Malcolm

Wilkey to investigate the House Bank controversy, on March

20, 1992; and (3) Frederick Lacey to investigate the Bush

Administration's handling of a bank fraud case involving

loans to Iraq, on October 17, 1992.

Attorney General Janet Reno appointed Robert Fiske as a

Special Counsel to investigate the Whitewater land deal and

other matters on January 20, 1994. Mr. Fiske explained that

the appointment order was ``deliberately drafted broadly . .

. to give me total authority to look into all appropriate

matters relating to the events . . . .'' For example, Mr.

Fiske investigated a suicide in order to determine whether it

might involve a crime related to his investigation--it did

not--and prosecuted a fraud case with no obvious connection

to Whitewater. Federal agents and prosecutors already were

investigating crimes when Mr. Fiske was appointed, but the

appointment order did not mention the crimes. When asked

about supervision of Mr. Fiske, Attorney General Reno said,

``I do not expect him to report to me, . . . and I do not

expect to monitor him.'' That is not true of Special Counsel

Mueller.

Then-Deputy Attorney General James Comey took a different

approach in 2003, when he invoked his authority as Acting

Attorney General to appoint Patrick Fitzgerald as a special

prosecutor to investigate the Valerie Plame matter. Mr. Comey

did not make that appointment under the Department's Special

Counsel regulation. Instead, he delegated to the special

prosecutor ``all the authority of the Attorney General . . .

independent of the supervision or control of any officer of

the Department.'' Mr. Comey followed up with a letter

reinforcing that his delegation was ``plenary.'' That is not

true of Special Counsel Mueller's appointment.

The Ethics in Government Act allowed several statutory

Independent Counsels to be appointed in the absence of

probable cause that a crime had occurred, and some of those

appointments were not publicized. Even under the Act, when

prosecutors were under much less supervision than Special

Counsels are under the Department's regulation, Congress did

not interfere in the investigations. The statute required the

Independent Counsel to submit an annual report to the

Congress, but it allowed him to ``omit any matter that in the

judgment of the independent counsel should be kept

confidential.''

Because the Attorney General's authority over Independent

Counsels was limited, the judicial orders appointing them

were a principal way to cabin their jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, appointments often were made with ``a broadly

worded charter.'' For example, the appointment order for

Whitewater Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr gave him

authority to investigate ``whether any individuals or

entities have committed a violation of any federal criminal

law . . . relating in any way to James B. McDougal's,

President William Jefferson Clinton's, or Mrs. Hillary Rodham

Clinton's relationships with Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan

Assn., Whitewater Development Corp., or Capital Management

Services Inc.'' McDougal owned and managed Madison Guaranty,

so that charter provided vast discretion to investigate

essentially any crime committed by any person that involved

the savings and loan association. The Independent Counsel

identified other unrelated matters of investigative interest,

and he obtained orders from the court expanding his mandate,

including ``Travelgate,'' ``Filegate,'' and the Lewinsky

matter. The Attorney General did not supervise or control the

Independent Counsel's decisions about which crimes and

subjects to investigate within his broad mandates, or which

persons to prosecute.

When the Independent Counsel statute expired, the

Department adopted the current Special Counsel regulation as

an internal policy concerning the appointment and management

of Special Counsels. The regulation provides for

congressional notification when an appointment is made and

when it concludes. At the conclusion of the investigation, it

requires notification to Congress of instances when the

Attorney General concluded that a proposed action by the

Special Counsel should not be pursued. The regulation

contemplates ongoing consultation with Department components

and continuing oversight by the Attorney General (or the

Acting Attorney General), who remains accountable as in all

other cases handled by the Department of Justice. The

regulation achieves the objective of conducting an

independent investigation while following normal Department

policies, including supervision by a Senate-confirmed

officer.

There is no statutory requirement to identify criminal

violations before appointing a Special Counsel from outside

the Department, and there is no requirement to publicize

suspected violations in the appointment order under the

Special Counsel regulation. Only one previous Special Counsel

was appointed under the current regulation: John Danforth, to

investigate the Waco matter, on September 9, 1999. As with

Special Counsel Mueller, Mr. Danforth's appointment order did

not publicly specify a crime or identify anyone as a subject.

Special Counsel Mueller's Appointment and Delegated Authority

I determined that the appointment of Special Counsel

Mueller to take charge of criminal matters that were already

under investigation by federal agents and prosecutors was

warranted under the Special Counsel regulation. The

appointment order mentions 28 C.F.R. 600.4 to 600.10 because

they bear on the authority and duties of the Special Counsel.

The public order did not identify the crimes or subjects

because such publicity would be wrong and unfair, just as it

would have been wrong and unfair to reveal that information

prior to Special Counsel's appointment, and just as it would

be wrong and unfair in other cases handled by a U.S. Attorney

or Assistant Attorney General.

So long as the Attorney General or the Acting Attorney

General remains accountable, there is federal statutory and

regulatory authority to assign matters to a Special Counsel,

just as the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General

(even when the Attorney General is not recused) have

authority to assign matters to an Acting U.S. Attorney or any

other Department official. The U.S. District Court for the

District of Columbia recognized as much in its opinion in

Manafort v. United States.

When Special Counsel Mueller was appointed, he received

comprehensive briefings about the relevant allegations and

documents that described them in considerable detail, as with

previous special counsel appointments. Some of the FBI agents

who were investigating those matters continued to do so. The

Department assigned a team of career and non-career officials

to provide supervision and assist the Acting Attorney General

in determining which leads should be handled by the Special

Counsel and which by other Department prosecutors, and to

review any proposed indictments in conjunction with

Department components that ordinarily would review them.

The regulation states that the Special Counsel has the

powers and authority of a

U.S. Attorney (who may or may not be Senate-confirmed) and

must follow Department policies and procedures. Under those

policies and procedures, the Department should reveal

information about a criminal investigation only when it is

necessary to assist the criminal investigation or to protect

public safety.

In August 2017, Special Counsel Mueller received a written

internal memorandum from the Acting Attorney General. The

memorandum eliminated the ability of any subject, target, or

defendant to argue that the Special Counsel lacked delegated

authority under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 515 to represent the United

States. The names of the subjects were already in Department

files, but we did not publicly disclose them because to do so

would violate the Department's confidentiality policies.

Many of the questions raised in your letter concern the

distinction between a counterintelligence investigation and a

criminal investigation. The primary goal of a

counterintelligence investigation is to protect against

national security threats by, among other things, collecting

intelligence information and disrupting foreign influence

operations. The goal of a criminal investigation is to

determine whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute a

criminal suspect in federal court. There was a ``wall''

between the two prior to September 11, 2001. There is no

longer a wall, but agents and prosecutors are mindful that

counterintelligence investigations may be broader than any

criminal prosecutions that they generate.

The public announcement of the Special Counsel's

appointment purposefully included no details beyond what

Director Comey had disclosed at a public House Permanent

Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on March 20, 2017.

Director Comey revealed that:

the FBI, as part of our counterintelligence mission, is

investigating the Russian government's efforts to interfere

in the 2016 presidential election, and that includes

investigating the nature of any links between individuals

associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian

government, and whether there was any coordination between

the campaign and Russia's efforts. As with any

counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an

assessment of whether any crimes were committed. Because it

is an open, ongoing investigation, and is classified, I

cannot say more about what we are doing and whose conduct we

are examining. At the request of congressional leaders, we

have taken the extraordinary step . . . of briefing this

Congress's leaders, including the leaders of this Committee,

in a classified setting, in detail about the investigation.

As is now publicly known, the Department of Justice and the

FBI were conducting several investigations with potential

relevance to Russian interference in the 2016 election when

Special Counsel Mueller was appointed in May 2017. The public

order explained that the Special Counsel will ``ensure a full

and thorough investigation of the Russian government's

efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election.''

Special Counsel Mueller is authorized to investigate

potential criminal offenses. Counterintelligence

investigations involving any current or future Russian

election interference are not the Special Counsel's

responsibility.

Congressional Oversight Requests

Department of Justice and FBI personnel are working

diligently and in good faith to provide an unprecedented

level of congressional access to information that members of

Congress believe may be relevant. Our responses to the many

related and overlapping congressional inquiries are

consistent with longstanding best practices. We respond as

quickly as possible to the inquiries and accommodate requests

when possible. We cannot fulfill requests that would

compromise the independence and integrity of investigations,

jeopardize intelligence sources and methods, or create the

appearance of political interference. We need to follow the

rules.

In 2016 and 2017, then-Director Comey made disclosures to

the public and to Congress that he has acknowledged would not

have been appropriate under regular order. He maintains that

his 2016 statements to the public and to the Congress about

the Hillary Clinton email investigation were justified by

unique circumstances comparable to a ``500-year flood.'' He

further believes that his 2017 disclosures about the

investigation of alleged links between the Russian government

agents who interfered in the election and persons associated

with the Trump campaign were an ``extraordinary step''

justified by ``unusual circumstances.''

It is important for the Department of Justice to follow

established policies and procedures, especially when the

stakes are high. It may seem tempting to depart from

Department policies and traditions in an effort to deflect

short-term criticism, but such deviations ultimately may

cause a loss of public confidence in the even-handed

administration of justice. We should be most on guard when we

believe that our own uncomfortable present circumstances

justify ignoring timeless principles respected by our

predecessors. I urge you and your colleagues to support us in

following the rules.

At my confirmation hearing, I promised that Department

employees would conduct ourselves ``with deep respect for the

institution and employees of the Department of Justice, with

acute understanding of our role in the constitutional

structure, and with profound appreciation of our weighty

responsibilities. My commitment to the Department's

longstanding traditions carries with it an obligation to

ensure that we keep pending law enforcement matters separate

from the sphere of politics and that there be no perception

that our law enforcement decisions are influenced by partisan

politics or pressure from legislators.

Regardless of political affiliation, thoughtful former

Department leaders recognize that departures from our

confidentiality policies pose an extraordinary threat to the

Department's independence and integrity. Former Deputy

Attorneys General Larry Thompson and Jamie Gorelick explained

that the Department of Justice ``operates under long-standing

and well-established traditions limiting disclosure of

ongoing investigations to the public and even to Congress. .

. . These traditions protect the integrity of the department.

. . .'' Violating those policies and disclosing information

about criminal investigations constitutes ``real-time, raw-

take transparency taken to its illogical limit, a kind of

reality TV of federal criminal investigation'' that is

``antithetical to the interests of justice.''

Punishing wrongdoers through judicial proceedings is only

one part of the Department's mission. We also have a duty to

prevent the disclosure of information that would unfairly

tarnish people who are not charged with crimes. In 1941,

Attorney General Robert Jackson explained that disclosing

information about federal investigations to Congress could

cause ``the grossest kind of injustice to innocent

individuals,'' and create ``serious prejudice to the future

usefulness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.'' It is

useful to quote at length from the Attorney General's letter:

[W]e have made extraordinary efforts to see that the

results of counterespionage activities and intelligence

activities of this Department involving those elements are

kept within the fewest possible hands. A catalogue of persons

under investigation or suspicion, and what we know about

them, would be of inestimable service to foreign agencies;

and information which could be so used cannot be too closely

guarded.

Moreover, disclosure of the reports would be of serious

prejudice to the future usefulness of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. As you probably know, much of this information

is given in confidence and can only be obtained upon pledge

not to disclose its sources. A disclosure of the sources

would embarrass informants--sometimes in their employment,

sometimes in their social relations, and in extreme cases

might even endanger their lives. We regard the keeping of

faith with confidential informants as an indispensable

condition of future efficiency.

Disclosure of information contained in the reports might

also be the grossest kind of injustice to innocent

individuals. Investigative reports include leads and

suspicions, and sometimes even the statements of malicious or

misinformed people. Even though later and more complete

reports exonerate the individuals, the use of particular or

selected reports might constitute the grossest injustice, and

we all know that a correction never catches up with an

accusation.

In concluding that the public interest does not permit

general access to Federal Bureau of Investigation reports for

information by the many congressional committees who from

time to time ask it, I am following the conclusions reached

by a long line of distinguished predecessors in this office

who have uniformly taken the same view. . . .

Since the beginning of the Government, the executive branch

has from time to time been confronted with the unpleasant

duty of declining to furnish to the Congress and to the

courts information which it has acquired and which is

necessary to it in the administration of statutes.

Attorney General Jackson's letter mentioned that the

pending congressional request was ``one of the many made by

congressional committees.'' He understood the profoundly

harmful consequences of proceeding down a road that would

empower congressional members and staffers to choose which

federal investigations should be publicized.

Congressional leaders respected Attorney General Jackson's

obligation to do the job he swore an oath to perform--``well

and faithfully execute the duties of the office'' --by

preserving the independence of federal law enforcement and

protecting it from political influence. President Eisenhower

later agreed, finding that ``it is essential to the

successful working of our system that the persons entrusted

with power in any of the three great branches of government

shall not encroach upon the authority confided to the

others.''

Requiring the Department of Justice to disclose details

about criminal investigations would constitute a dangerous

departure from important principles. Criminal prosecutions

should be relatively transparent--because the public should

know the grounds for finding a citizen guilty of criminal

offenses and imposing punishment--but criminal investigations

emphatically are not supposed to be transparent. In fact,

disclosing uncharged allegations against American citizens

without a law-enforcement need is considered to be a

violation of a prosecutor's trust. As stated in the

Department's Principles of Federal Prosecution:

In all public filings and proceedings, federal prosecutors

should remain sensitive to the privacy and reputation

interests of uncharged third-parties. In the context of

public plea and sentencing proceedings, this

means that, in the absence of some significant justification,

it is not appropriate to identify (either by name or

unnecessarily-specific description), or cause a defendant to

identify, a third-party wrongdoer unless that party has been

officially charged with the misconduct at issue. In the

unusual instance where identification of an uncharged third-

party wrongdoer during a plea or sentencing hearing is

justified, the express approval of the United States Attorney

and the appropriate Assistant Attorney General should be

obtained prior to the hearing absent exigent circumstances. .

. . In other less predictable contexts, federal prosecutors

should strive to avoid unnecessary public references to

wrongdoing by uncharged third-parties. With respect to bills

of particulars that identify unindicted co-conspirators,

prosecutors generally should seek leave to file such

documents under seal. Prosecutors shall comply, however, with

any court order directing the public filing of a bill of

particulars.

As a series of cases makes clear, there is ordinarily ``no

legitimate governmental interest served'' by the government's

public allegation of wrongdoing by an uncharged party, and

this is true ``[r]egardless of what criminal charges may . .

. b[e] contemplated by the Assistant United States Attorney

against the [third-party] for the future.'' In re Smith, 656

F.2d 1101, 1106-07 (5th Cir. 1981). Courts have applied this

reasoning to preclude the public identification of unindicted

third-party wrongdoers in plea hearings, sentencing

memoranda, and other government pleadings. . . .

In most cases, any legitimate governmental interest in

referring to uncharged third-party wrongdoers can be advanced

through means other than those condemned in this line of

cases. For example, in those cases where the offense to which

a defendant is pleading guilty requires as an element that a

third-party have a particular status (e.g., 18 U.S.C.

203(a)(2)), the third-party can usually be referred to

generically (``a Member of Congress''), rather than

identified specifically (``Senator X''), at the defendant's

plea hearing. Similarly, when the defendant engaged in joint

criminal conduct with others, generic references (``another

individual'') to the uncharged third-party wrongdoers can be

used when describing the factual basis for the defendant's

guilty plea.

Even when we file federal charges, Department policy

strongly counsels us not to implicate by name any person who

is not officially charged with misconduct.

The recent Inspector General report emphasizes the solemn

duty of federal law enforcement officials to defend the

confidentiality of federal investigations. I hope you and

your colleagues in the Senate and House will support us in

restoring those principles. The Department of Justice must

not proceed along the unhappy road to being perceived as a

partisan actor, deciding what information to reveal and what

information to conceal based on the expected impact on the

personal or political interests of its temporary leaders and

congressional allies.

The current investigation of election interference is

important, but there are also thousands of other important

investigations pending in the Department of Justice and the

FBI. Every investigation is important to the persons whose

reputations may be irreparably damaged or whose careers may

be permanently disrupted. No matter who an investigation

involves--an ordinary citizen, a local or state politician, a

campaign official, a foreign agent, or an officer of the

federal legislative, executive, or judicial branch--agents

and prosecutors are obligated to protect its confidentiality

and preserve the Department's independence from political

influence.

Throughout American history, wise legislators have worked

with Department officials to limit oversight requests in

order to respect the Department's duty to protect national

security, preserve personal privacy, and insulate

investigations from the appearance of interference. For

instance, the Department sent a letter to a House committee

chair in 2000, describing the Department's policies on

responding to congressional oversight requests. The letter

explains:

Such inquiries inescapably create the risk that the public

and the courts will perceive undue political and

Congressional influence over law enforcement and litigation

decisions. Such inquiries also often seek records and other

information that our responsibilities for these matters

preclude us from disclosing.

The letter quotes President Ronald Reagan, who wrote that a

``tradition of accommodation should continue as the primary

means of resolving conflicts between the Branches.''

Regardless of whether an inter-branch information request is

made by letter or subpoena, the relationship between the

branches gives rise to ``an implicit constitutional

mandate,'' to ``reach an accommodation short of full-scale

confrontation.'' It must not be the case that the Department

is required to risk damage to reputations, put cases and

lives at risk, and invite political interference by opening

sensitive files to congressional staff without restriction.

Tension between Congress's oversight interests and the

Department's solemn responsibility to protect law enforcement

information is unavoidable. In 1989, then-Assistant Attorney

General William Barr wrote that misunderstandings often arise

because congressional investigations, by their nature, are

usually adversarial and unbounded by the rules of evidence.

In another 1989 opinion, the Department's Office of Legal

Counsel explained that ``the executive branch has . . .

consistently refused to provide confidential information'' to

``congressional committees with respect to open cases.''

Sometimes there is a strong temptation to seek short-term

benefit at the cost of long-term values. But departures from

Department traditions contribute to a loss of public

confidence. We can build public confidence if we stick to the

principle that the prosecutor is ``the servant of the law,

the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor

innocence suffer.''

Approval of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Applications

Finally, you asked whether I delegated approval authority

under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Such

approval authority is not delegable beyond the approving

officials designated in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

Act. FISA affidavits are written and sworn under oath by

career federal agents who verify that they are true and

correct. They are reviewed by investigative agency

supervisors and attorneys, and by Department of Justice

attorneys and supervisors. Before filing, they must be

approved by an intelligence agency leader, usually the FBI

Director, and by either the Attorney General, the Deputy

Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney General for the

National Security Division. In every case, the ultimate

decision on whether to allow surveillance is made by a

federal judge who independently determines whether the

evidence provided under oath by the federal agent meets the

requisite legal standard.

Conclusion

I hope that you find this information helpful. I regret

that the many duties of my office preclude me from responding

personally to every congressional inquiry. I am deeply

grateful to have the support of a talented and dedicated team

that understands our obligation to work cooperatively with

the Congress to protect the American people and preserve the

rule of law.

Sincerely,

Rod J. Rosenstein.

Deputy Attorney General.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I think I made the case clear. I think Mr. Zeldin has added nothing to the debate that I have to refute.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to recognize Wilsar Johnson for her dedicated service to the House of Representatives. As the Judiciary Committee's Democratic Digital Director, she kept us current through extensive social media engagement, creative branding, and storytelling.

Wilsar is a first generation Sierra Leonean-American immigrant and is also a proud recipient of the Diversity Visa Lottery program. Wilsar spent her formative years in Camden, New Jersey, and is a graduate of Georgian Court University.

As the Judiciary Committee's Democratic Digital Director, she kept us current through extensive social media engagement, creative branding and storytelling. She oversaw the minority's social media platforms and multimedia portfolio, including video production, live broadcasts, graphic design and photography. Wilsar is a founding Member of the first ever Congressional Democratic Digital Communications Staff Association, where she provides coaching and professional development to other Hill staff.

In addition to the Judiciary Committee, Wilsar has served in the offices of Representatives Karen Bass of California, Rush Holt of New Jersey, and Bonnie Watson Coleman of New Jersey.

Wilsar's charismatic attitude and dedication have made her an integral member of our team. I thank her for her service and wish her the best of luck as she starts a new journey in the upper body.

Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly oppose H.R. 4760.

This legislation is nothing more than a wish-list of the far right anti-immigrant fringe. It would do nothing to solve the real problems plaguing our immigration system, while causing untold suffering for millions of people.

The world has watched President Trump create a family separation crisis out of thin air. I personally met with fathers whose children had been ripped from their arms, who have no idea when, or if, they will ever see their children again.

One father I spoke to was promised he would be kept with his young child, only to have officers enter his room in the middle of the night and forcibly take away his young daughter.

We have all seen the anguished faces of the parents separated from their children, and listened to the desperate cries of sobbing children screaming for their parents. This is government-sponsored child abuse.

This bill does absolutely nothing to solve the crisis. The President, after falsely claiming that he had no choice but to enact this cruel and brutal policy, now says he will end it, proving that he and his administration were lying all along. But it is not clear that yesterday's executive order immediately ends family separation. It also puts our country on a dangerous path to prolonged detention for parents and children.

The Keeping Families Together Act, which I introduced this week, along with virtually every Democratic Member, would actually prevent children from being separated from their parents, except in extraordinary circumstances.

We could vote on that legislation today. But instead, we have this bill before us now. This bill turns all undocumented immigrants into criminals. It takes particular aim at families, children, workers, businesses, public safety, and our fundamental values as a nation, all at once. It is almost impressive how many bad ideas have been crammed into one comprehensive package.

For example, it eliminates most visa categories that promote family reunification, as well as the diversity visa program, which provides residents of many countries the only method of immigrating to the United States. It removes critical protections for unaccompanied children, and it does away with other important safeguards for children traveling with their parents.

It would decimate the agriculture community by requiring employers to use the E-Verify employment verification system without fixing the underlying immigration system. And it would undercut American workers by importing guestworkers at drastically depressed wages.

It would also undermine our asylum system, breaking with our proud tradition of being a beacon of hope and freedom for the oppressed.

In exchange for all these harsh, anti-immigrant provisions, it offers the most minimal protections to Dreamers, creating a renewable temporary status with no path to citizenship, leaving them in perpetual limbo, and unable to become full members of society in the only country they have ever known.

This is an act of extortion we cannot abide. This bill fails to repair our broken immigration system and, indeed, in many ways, makes it even worse, and all without substantially helping the Dreamers.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to reject this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren), the distinguished ranking member of the Immigration Subcommittee.

Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Gutierrez).

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Ellison).

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Correa).

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Michigan (Mrs. Lawrence).

Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), the ranking member of the Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations Subcommittee.

Madam Speaker, I yield the gentlewoman from Texas an additional 30 seconds.

Madam Speaker, how much time is remaining, please?

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Judy Chu).

Madam Speaker, this afternoon, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce sent an alert to Members of Congress that says the cuts to legal immigration in this bill are bad news for States.

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Takano).

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Al Green).

Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren), the ranking member of the Immigration and Border Security Subcommittee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from California.

Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, this bill is a harsh anti-immigrant package that fails to provide a pathway to citizenship for Dreamers and that fails to end family separation, while slashing legal immigration, crippling our agriculture industry, criminalizing undocumented immigrants, undermining public safety, and removing critical protection for families and children, all in one monstrous bill.

Mr. Speaker, there is no justification for anyone voting for this bill. I urge my colleagues to oppose this legislation, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.