Madam Speaker, I thank Mr. Hoekstra for yielding. I would just like to build on something that Mr. Shadegg said. He said, in essence, that this subject is so important because it goes so much further than Iraq. And as a member of the Armed…
Madam Speaker, I thank Mr. Hoekstra for yielding.
I would just like to build on something that Mr. Shadegg said. He said, in essence, that this subject is so important because it goes so much further than Iraq. And as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I try to keep close tabs on where our soldiers and sailors and marines and airmen are deployed. And it may surprise some on the other side of the aisle, but perhaps not, to know that we have troops deployed in Southwest Asia in five countries; we have troops deployed in Europe in quite a few countries, several countries; in Central Asia we have troops in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan; in Southeast Asia we have troops deployed in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia; in South America in Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Guantanamo Bay; and in 19 countries in Africa, all in support of the war on terror.
And as Mr. Shadegg mentioned a few minutes ago, it has been clearly stated that Iraq is the first battleground chosen to make their stand and clearly stated that all of these other places where we have sent troops, not because we have extra troops to send somewhere, not because we have extra taxpayer dollars that we are trying to get rid of or spend, but because every one of those countries exhibits a piece of geography where there is a threat related to the global war on terror.
So a vote for this resolution is a vote, perhaps, of goodwill on the part of those who will eventually in a few days vote for it, but it won't end this war. It won't end the desire of the Islamists to take advantage of various situations and, as Mr. Hoekstra mentioned, achieve their goals.
And so this is a broad war. This is a war where it will be years and perhaps decades to bring to a conclusion. And the worst thing we can do is to send messages that we are not serious about carrying out our duties in defense of this generation and, as I will point out later, future generations of Americans.
Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the ranking member for yielding me this time.
I rise in opposition to the resolution that will be voted on Friday. And my statement, as clearly as I can, says why.
Mr. Speaker, I recently attended the funeral of an old friend who passed away after a wonderful, productive 90 years of life. His family and friends gathered at the church to celebrate his life and to remember his accomplishments. During World War II, he served as a member of the Army Air Corps.
Near the end of the service, two Air Force sergeants unfolded and refolded an American flag, and then caringly presented it to my friend's widow saying, ``On behalf of the President of the United States, the United States Air Force, and a grateful American people, I present this flag in honor of your husband's service to his country.''
Mr. Speaker, we survive as a nation today in large part because of the selfless service to our country by a great many Americans just like my friend. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, members of the Coast Guard, and members of the foreign service organizations have been supported by the American people and by American resources and funding.
Because we are once again involved in a war which threatens our country, we find American military personnel are again deployed to many parts of the world. Last week, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace listed the long list of countries where our forces are deployed and are present to help protect us as part of the global war on terror. Earlier tonight, I read from that list. There are 70 countries where Americans serve abroad in support of the global war on terror. We don't send them there because we want to send them off to some far off part of the world for no good reason. There are threats there, threats like al Qaeda, threats like Hezbollah, threats like the Quad groups that are funded by Iran.
This is a unique and historic struggle for a number of reasons. Chief among them is that our enemies are both state and nonstate actors. They are lethal and deadly. Fortunately, the great citizens of this country have responded. Americans have volunteered in large numbers to work, defend, and fight to protect our way of life. Yet,
today some among us would question whether we are on the right track. And I think they are on the wrong track.
As many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle know, I have devoted much of my career in Congress to studying and understanding this enemy. I must say that I believe I have developed some understanding of them, and so I would like to take a few minutes here tonight to share some thoughts and some facts about them. You simply cannot discuss or understand our situation in Iraq without first addressing some of the fundamental and important questions about the enemy.
Who is he, or who are they? How do they work to achieve their goals on the battlefield? How do they work to achieve their international objectives? What is our record against them? And what is at stake?
First of all, who are they? Members of al Qaeda and Hezbollah, the Quads forces, and other similar terrorist groups' view of the world is based on an extreme ideology, an ideology that is far more extreme than most Middle Eastern people want or support. I certainly can't speak for the citizens of the Middle East, but it seems clear to me that in the opinion of the great majority of citizens and residents of the Middle East, both Muslim and non-Muslim, that this is an extreme ideology which they feel they should reject. And they do.
The extremists are groups of individuals who do not believe in any form of secular government, and will go to seemingly any lengths to sabotage others who try to establish secular or representative free types of governments. Their tactics run the gamut from sermonizing to mistreatment to capture, torture, and death, often by beheading. Their leaders are male and assign subservient roles to females. Their ideology holds that members of society, both Middle Eastern society and otherwise, who do not share their same radical beliefs are assigned to a subservient role or simply eliminated. They are members of organizations who state openly and repeatedly, ``Death to the non- believers, death to America.'' They say it every day. This, in short, is what they are about.
Perhaps there are some of us here in Congress who don't take these people seriously. I do. And I am glad Franklin Roosevelt took Hitler and his people seriously as well. It is much the same.
Twenty years ago, while on my second trip to Israel, it was 1987 to be exact, I came across an article about Hamas. In 1987, I had never heard of them before; they were a brand-new group. So while I was there, I asked about them. And I learned much about Hamas, but also about other groups that we hear about today, groups like Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad, other groups that existed at the time. And I will always remember getting back on that airplane to come home. I thought, ``Today these people are a huge problem in the Middle East, and I bet it won't be long until they are a huge problem in the U.S.'' They are today.
The second thing I would like to talk a little bit about is how they work to achieve their goals on the battlefield. It is kind of unique, certainly unique in history. Their radical ideology breeds an unconventional strategy of violence, and they are not to be underestimated. This is the method to their violence:
They have recognized that it is difficult or impossible for them to achieve their goals through conventional warfare strategies and techniques. They have instituted as a substitute a four-stage process that replaces traditional warfare, at least traditional warfare as we know it in the West. Their strategy is well laid out and planned; it is called insurgency. Four steps.
First, they work quietly to gain the support of the population through social, charitable, and ideological groups and organizations, schools, hospitals, charities. They gain the support of the people.
Second, now that they have developed some strength in organization, they begin to develop strength in unconventional warfare capabilities. Unconventional warfare capabilities, terrorism, if you will, until their ability exists to severely harass their enemy, usually the superior legitimate force, the government of whatever country they happen to be operating in. This is often the traditional or newly created government, just like the one that we are dealing with in Iraq. And in this way, they build popular support through unconventional warfare successes as well as through charities.
Step three. They develop the ability to reconsider the danger of counterattack posed by the stronger legitimate force or government, and the ability to fade away temporarily into the population until the pressure is off so they can come back and fight again, all the time getting stronger, all the time carrying out their work through the charities and the schools and the hospitals, and the terrorist acts against their enemy.
Finally, the fourth step, they develop it over time, the conventional capabilities that are necessary to be used against the stronger traditional force with the objective of defeating the legitimate government.
If that sounds familiar, it should, because it is exactly what is happening in Iraq. This is the traditional four-step insurgency process first used in China by Mao in the 1920s, and in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s.
Studying this concept, one can apply it to various theaters around the world in the global war on terror and identify various stages in various theaters in many places in the world. I believe, for example, Hezbollah in Lebanon has worked its way nearly to the fourth stage of the insurgency process. Other groups like al Qaeda in Iraq are following the same course elsewhere.
The third thing I would like to talk about a little bit is how they work to achieve superiority strategically internationally. Let's look at the process, the process that fosters the doubt that some citizens in the U.S. have today. That is why we are here tonight. Some people doubt our capabilities. And this is the type of thinking that brings us here tonight. This is the doubt that fuels the desire to disengage, to pretend that the danger doesn't exist, to discuss, as we are here today or tonight, solutions to limit our success and move toward disengagement.
The enemy has demonstrated a strong understanding and some success internationally in developing this unconventional strategy of warfare. It has evolved something like this:
In the early 19th century, armies met each other on the battlefield, frontline to frontline. We all remember looking at those old movies of wars in the 19th century. Warriors were trained in techniques aimed at defeating their foe's frontlines so as to prevail on the battlefield. There was little thought, planning, or training given to reaching beyond the frontlines in battle, much less to strike directly at central governments. Today, this strategy of warfare is called first- generation warfare.
Then, during the 20th century, specifically during World War I and World War II, two new generations of warfare evolved. During World War I, armies were trained to carry out tactics not only against frontlines but also against logistical supply lines. The intent was to damage the enemy's ability by reaching back beyond the battlefield frontline. This is called second-generation warfare.
World War II brought about third-generation warfare by using tactics to reach even further behind the lines to attack the industrial production facilities of the enemy's central governments.
Finally, the most recent evolution, strategic and tactical execution of warfare, designed as fourth-generation warfare. The goal, to destroy the determination of the enemy's decisionmakers to continue the fight.
Today's decisionmakers are the citizens of Europe and the rest of the West, including, of course, the United States and the decisionmakers of the United States Congress. Unconventional tools have been used by al Qaeda through fourth-generation warfare and other groups to convince the decisionmakers to discontinue the effort. Unconventional tools such as the Western media, terrorist acts such as those on 9/11, and unconventional warfare such as killing Shiia citizens, Sunni citizens and coalition military participants with IEDs and car and truck bombs.
Through the media, every one of these acts which is reported has an effect and carries a message intentionally to discourage decisionmakers,
and that is precisely the plan. That is precisely why we are having this debate tonight.
That brings us to the debate today. Often American decisionmakers have been convinced through fourth-generation warfare used by al Qaeda and used by other groups, Shiia militias, Sunni insurgents, to convince some here to vote to discontinue necessary efforts in one of the central theaters of the global war on terror, Iraq, and hence convince us not to provide the level of national security so important to the citizens and children and future generations of the United States of America.
Fourth, let me talk about understanding the consequences of withdrawal and our record. Withdrawal under fire is unacceptable and history is replete with examples of harmful consequences in doing so. Lebanon and Somalia are two examples where we presently face increased threats to our national security as a result of previously ill-timed withdrawals.
As a result of the U.S. withdrawal in Lebanon, for example, after the Marine barracks bombing in 1983, the country, Lebanon, even today remains a terrorist hotbed. The withdrawal strengthened Hezbollah. It contributed to years of civil war in Lebanon. It diminished U.S. prestige in the region and influence throughout much of the world.
The lingering question: Could the U.S. have prevented the rise of Hezbollah and the influence of Tehran with sustained engagement in Lebanon? We will never know.
In 1993, we withdrew our forces from Somalia after a failed military operation in Mogadishu. A decade later an Islamic militia with ties to al Qaeda has controlled that country and is responsible for destabilizing the entire Horn of Africa. We didn't know it at the time. We decided to withdraw. It was a mistake. This radical movement briefly shows signs of regaining lost ground in Somalia, even today.
At the very least, Somalia remains a dangerous, ungoverned place, and the lingering question, could the United States have prevented the spread of radicalism in the Horn of Africa with a sustained engagement in Somalia, but we withdrew.
Further evidence of failure to respond to terrorism emboldened al Qaeda. In 1993, the World Trade Center was bombed. No response. In 1996, Khobar Towers were bombed. No response. In 1998, the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania took place. No response. In 2000, the attack on the USS Cole took place. No response.
Result? September 11. We are not alone. The Soviet Union and Israel both paid heavy prices for implementing a precipitous withdrawal on two separate occasions. The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 and left behind the conditions of anarchy and warlordism, which ultimately led to the rise of the Taliban and provided safe haven for al Qaeda.
Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 resulted in an empowered Hezbollah, weakened Lebanese moderates failed to keep peace. The best example was Hezbollah's naked aggression this past summer in delivering unbelievable attacks against Israel's civilian population. As one commentator has put it, this is from Victor Hanson in the National Review Online, December 1, 2006, ``By not responding to a decade of prior attacks in East Africa, New York, Saudi Arabia and Yemen and withdrawing precipitously from Lebanon and Mogadishu, we gave the fatal impression that terrorists could strike the U.S. with near impunity.'' That is what we are talking about doing now in Iraq.
The lesson here is obvious. We must remain engaged until we complete our mission. Finally, what is at stake? It is clear that al Qaeda and other groups constitute a serious threat to the citizens of the U.S. for this generation and, even more importantly, for the future generations. Our enemies have demonstrated significant success in carrying out activities to the detriment of the citizens of the U.S.
They have successfully attacked numerous targets overseas, mostly with explosives, and have used missiles known as jumbo jets to attack New York City and Pennsylvania and at the Pentagon, and they have used explosives in terror operations in Afghanistan, and even more successfully in Iraq to pit the minority Sunni population against the Shiia. They fueled the insurgency and have cost Sunni, Shiia, as well as the lives of U.S. soldiers.
Our choices may be difficult. It is not easy to be at war. It is even harder to stay at war, but it is clearly proven by history that we must not abandon the missions in the war on terror nor in the Iraqi theater. We have seen the results of the precipitous withdrawals. It would be unconscionable to vote and to do other than to support the administration's plan.
I yield to the gentleman