Spending Control Act Of 2004
Mr. Chairman, I certainly have no objection to the gentleman's withdrawing the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. As I was just informing the House, Mr. Chairman, I have, obviously, no objection to what the…
Mr. Chairman, I certainly have no objection to the gentleman's withdrawing the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
As I was just informing the House, Mr. Chairman, I have, obviously, no objection to what the gentleman wishes to do. I understand all of his sentiments. This process needs to be fixed.
If the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) will remember, we had a conference in 1997 when we did the balanced budget agreement of 1997. Most of the budget principles, when they were affected, the subcommittee chairmen of the Committee on Appropriations came. It would be good if we could get together again, something like that, where you do have interest from all of the House, and we could sit down and I would hope in a nonpartisan way try to come up with a better process than we have right now, because the process we have now is in the ditch.
I would still have problems with the gentleman's amendment because it does not provide for the full double-edged PAYGO. It has now a provision in it that changes the fiscal year to November 1. I do not quite understand why the gentleman would want to do that.
But, nevertheless, it is a moot point now. We appreciate the gentleman's removing it from consideration. There are some ideas in there I do agree with. For example, the gentleman would tell CBO not to assume that expiring tax provisions are not going to be renewed. They are most likely going to be renewed, and that is the way the projection ought to be carried out, I think. And so I agree with a number of those provisions like that in the gentleman's proposal.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) and ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to control that time.
Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition. I should claim it before the gentleman completely commits me to the support of his amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I have no great objection to it, it is true, simply because I think CBO already does this. You get every year the economic forecast and budget outlook. You get one in January. You get the President's budget again. There will be one coming up in August. The levels of entitlement spending are there. It may not be in quite the format you anticipate here, but if you want to go back to the previous year's volume and lay out what spending was that year, you can find projected levels in the baseline. It can be done.
Mr. Chairman, I will not object to this. I will accept it. But I honestly think it is redundant to what CBO is already doing and already providing.
Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Chairman, that is an excellent idea. The three of us can sit down with CBO and our staff and come up with the information the gentleman wants, and we will not be bound by statutory language, but by a good-faith commitment to get it done.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, we have heard some eloquent statements from members of the Committee on Appropriations, largely Republican members of the Committee on Appropriations, to the effect that the President already has, as they put it, three bites at the apple. This gives the President a fourth bite, and, believe me, a big bite.
This clearly is a shift of leverage from the House and the Senate, the Congress, to the Presidency. The President would emerge from this kind of deal with much, much greater authority in dictating what the budget is going to be. You have heard it more eloquently from members of the Committee on Appropriations, what the results would be in determining priorities. This definitely would be a big shift.
Now, would it make the budget process any stronger, any more effective? My concern is, contrary to the belief that it might streamline the process by elevating the status of the budget resolution, I think it would probably prolong the process, protract the process. As a result, we would find ourselves with less time to do appropriation bills because it would take a much longer time to get the budget resolution done, because not only would we have to agree among ourselves, from party to party, we would have to agree with the White House.
There is some advantage to that, trying to bring us together; but I think there is a lot of disadvantage, and there is a lot of room for chicanery. There is a lot of room for manipulating the process if we do it, and it could result in a protracted budget process, such that every year we will be, as we are now, in the heart of the summer, trying to pass appropriation bills before the fiscal year ends.
This has been around the track a number of times. It has a certain appeal to it, until you begin considering all the ramifications and the transfer of power that it would effect, a very subtle transfer, but a real one.
I would suggest this is an idea that we should not adopt.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds to respond to that.
Mr. Chairman, I do not know what bill the gentleman is referring to, but the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Nussle) proposed this idea some time ago. I never did support this idea. I never have.
I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. Pomeroy).
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I honestly fail to see what we will accomplish, except protracting the process; what we will accomplish positively by making this concurrent resolution a joint resolution that has the effect of law. I really do not know what will be different from what we have right now, except we would have to come to some agreement with the White House much, much sooner in the year than we otherwise have to.
What is going to be different? The statutory? What would be different about it?
I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
But that is done already under existing law.
Sure. We would waive them again, put it in a bill, send it to the White House, the President would sign it.
Well, I am convinced it will prolong the process, complicate the process, and lead to less results rather than better results. It is something we can long argue about.
I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.
Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, like many of the amendments that were offered to this base bill, I have only had the chance to peruse quickly this one. This is an idea that has been around the track before. In the late 1980s, early 1990s, we were searching for ways to get our hands around the problem. This is one of the things that was proposed by several different people in several different variations.
Anyone who tried to implement this and have legislative counsel draw it in a form that would be truly enforceable ran into multiple complications. It is maddeningly complicated, as the gentleman can tell from reading the bill. The bill takes it a step further than any version of this idea I have ever read before, and it taxed all my concentration here on the House Floor to make it from the first page to the last page, and I am in a maze. I do not really know how it works.
I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, keep in mind that other body called the Senate moves in a separate orbit from this body, and somebody over there is going to have a different idea, and there is going to be an entry under a different program. When we go to conference, the conferees are going to have a different idea, and the bookkeepers around here are going to be switching credits from account to account, taking back credits as the money that was saved is now spent. The project that was going to be killed or cut is now restored, and it becomes a nightmare.
That is why this idea has had all of the longevity of a lead balloon. It has never gotten off the ground.
I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. Chairman, if one could keep the trail of it, and that is the problem.
Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, the core idea is basically an appealing idea and lots of Members around here have had the experience where they have found something that they thought could be a legitimate saving, they have offered the amendment and prevailed, only to see the money is spent somewhere else. I disagree with the gentleman when he said a little while ago, and I think it was in a moment of zealousness, that if the savings were taken out of, say, the Cleveland Rock and Roll Museum, it would have to be spent somewhere else. It does not have to be spent somewhere else; it can be saved, and this mechanism was a way on to sort of lock box money, so that it could not be used again.
But there are so many moving pieces. We have an authorization bill, an appropriation bill; a House and a Senate conference committee, and any time anybody makes any kind of change or different entry, there has to be an adjustment. This is a $2.2 trillion budget, and I think the bookkeepers, their minds would be boggled trying to keep account of this, as mine was when I was trying to read the gentleman's bill.
So I do not discredit the idea, it is just the mechanism for enforcing it and truly making it work is so complicated, I think it collapses upon itself.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, to close I yield the remaining time to the gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. Pomeroy).
Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, but I may not oppose the bill. I simply claim the time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Stenholm).
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I have actually sponsored legislation like this in the past. I have voted for it and argued for it on the House floor. When we had the vote on the line item veto, I came over here and tried to offer an alternate amendment to it and argued to the House, the other side principally, that if they would adopt this, and the Supreme Court did what I predicted they would do and held it unconstitutional, then this would be in place as the alternative. We would have it by now if that had been attempted, the bill passed. And that was not put in it.
There was a strong suspicion on my colleagues' side that if we put that in, the Senate would take out the line item veto and pass the rescission provisions. In truth, there are certain Senators who are probably laying in wait for this rescission provision already.
We did add some features to it that I would recommend for your consideration. One is when it came through the Committee on Government Reform we added a provision that would not only allow spending to be treated this way, but also targeted tax cuts. Because these targeted tax cuts are often tax expenditures and they were defined as tax cuts which had a beneficiary class, a few of them. I thought it was a good idea and a good improvement on the bill.
We bring these tax bills over here to the floor, they are not amendable. We vote on them up or down. At least on the appropriations bill, if one wants to, they have an opportunity to go after individual items. Instead, the tax bills have all kinds of provisions.
We also had some provisions in it about how you could break out for separate treatment all or certain parts of the package if one could get a petition with so many Members. This is an idea that has been around and around the track, and it is actually an idea that has been embellished and improved as it went around the track. I am not quite sure how many of those ideas there are in this particular version of it, but I recommend those for my colleagues' consideration.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Stenholm).
Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this substitute would extend the so-called PAYGO rule
through September 30, 2009, to require that both the cost of all net direct, mandatory or entitlement spending increases and all tax cuts both, this is two-edged, double-edged PAYGO, enacted during a session be fully offset. In other words, this amendment would reinstate the rules that expired two years ago, the rule that is applicable to entitlement increases, the rule that is applicable to tax cuts known as the PAYGO rule.
In addition, this amendment would set total discretionary spending limits for 2005 and 2006 equal to the levels in the Democratic budget resolution which we offered on the House floor a few months ago. There are no total funding caps for other years.
Like H.R. 4663, it specifies that annual mass transit and highway funding for each year through 2009 will be set at the levels also included in the House-passed transportation reauthorization bill, known as TEA-LU.
Mr. Chairman, in the 1980s and 1990s, as we have struggled with deficits and as the effects of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings fizzled out, various rules, some of which have been surfaced on the House floor tonight, were proposed and tried. Two, however, emerged as meritorious and were included in what became the Budget Enforcement Act of 1991. It was a spin-off from the Bush Budget Summit in the year 1990. These were the disciplinary tools to implement the Bush Budget Summit Agreement, which really has not gotten the credit it is due for laying the foundation for what we accomplished in the 1990s. Neither have these rules gotten the full credit of their due, but they got a nice accolade from a source who admitted that he was a cynic, if not a skeptic, at that time, Chairman Alan Greenspan of the Federal Reserve.
He told our committee, the Committee on the Budget, just a few weeks ago when we asked him about the renewal of these rules, if he thought from his observation as an outside observer of the budget that these were worthwhile tools. He said, you know, I was a skeptic. I did not think they would work. I thought they were diversionary tactic, but I have been proven wrong. They were remarkably effective.
And when we questioned him and asked him, he said, I would reinstate both rules, both the discretionary spending caps, and I would reinstate the pay-as-you-go rule, which provides that if you want to have a tax cut when you have got a deficit, then you have to make it deficit neutral; you have to have an offset. You either cut entitlement spending one place in the budget, or you increase revenues as an offset in another place.
And by the same token, if you want to enhance an entitlement, you have got to identify a revenue stream to pay for it, or you have to have a commensurate cut and another entitlement program elsewhere in the budget so that in all respects, they are deficit neutral at the end of the session.
These two rules, the PAYGO rule, the double-edged PAYGO rule and the statutory spending caps on discretionary spending, are the heart and soul of this particular substitute that I am offering here. This cuts to the very core.
Rather than go through all of these convoluted rules, let us go back to two rules that work. Let us be pragmatic. Let us pick from the past experience that we have had those rules that contributed the most to our success in the 1990s, and after all, we moved the budget from a $290 deficit to a $236 surplus in six fiscal years, and these two rules helped us do it.
They have both expired now. We could do a world of good for the budget process, for the budget, for the deficit, by reinstating these two rules, and really, it is all we need to do that and fixing realistically discretionary spending caps.
Let me say, we proposed 5 years of spending caps. The chairman has reduced his effort to just 2 years. In an effort to get something that he could possibly pass over there, he went with two years. I really do not think we have effective discretionary spending limits unless we have longer terms than that. So we have a 5-year spending limitation on discretionary spending, and I should acknowledge that we have set this a bit above current service, a bit above the CBO baseline. Why did we do that? Because we fully accommodated the President's defense request, nondefense discretionary, and our cap is pretty close to baseline, pretty close to current services, just a bit over.
Total discretionary is somewhat more in excess of the CBO baseline because we followed the President's defense members. We put in the $50 billion this year for the Iraq and Afghanistan and supplemental expenses. That is realistic, and there is one rule that we learned in the 1990s we should apply here, too. It applies to the 1997 budget which was uniquely successful when we set the statutory caps on discretionary spending at a very, very tight and unrealistic level.
When we got to the ideas, we fudged on them substantially and that is primarily because partly because we set them too tight to start with. Here, we have set them realistically. We have got two rules that work. They have proved their worth.
The chairman of the Federal Reserve says I do not see why you would not reinstate them and make the PAYGO rule in particular applicable to tax cuts as well as entitlement increases. I submit to the House, if we want to do something tonight, if we want some concrete, valuable outcome for all of our efforts, these two things would do a world of good, and we could leave here feeling that we had done something good for the budget and something successful tonight.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Could the Chair please advise me how much time I have?
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 6 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, once again what we are trying to do here is to cut through all the rhetoric, go through all of these complicated rules, sometimes convoluted rules, and come up with two basic rules, two pragmatic rules that have proven themselves over a period of 10 years to work and work well. Indeed, they were part of the success we enjoyed in the 1990s when we moved the budget from a deficit of $290 billion in 1992 to a surplus of $236 billion in the year 2000.
First of all, we would impose a statutory cap on discretionary spending at a level that we think is realistic. And what do we mean by that? We take current services, basically treading water, with inflationary adjustment, and we add to it the Bush defense budget. But we want to make a point here, and that is this is the totality of domestic nonhomeland discretionary spending in the budget. This is one- sixth of the budget. Wipe it all out, you do not have an FBI, you do not have a court system, you do not have a Park Service, you do not have highways; but you still have a deficit, notwithstanding the fact you have wiped the whole thing out.
If you look back over the last 4 years, what is the source of this spending that everybody is decrying tonight? What you find is it certainly is not domestic nonhomeland security; 383, 382, 383. Now, Mr. Bush said he would like to cut it down to $376 billion. Well and good. This is one of the reasons the appropriators are out here tonight. They are struggling with the attainment of that goal. That saves $7 billion on a deficit that is estimated at over $400 billion next year. That is how much blood you can squeeze out of this turnip.
Where then have the cost increases come from? This chart tells it all. These bar charts show 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and they show that 90 to 95 percent of the increase in spending in those four fiscal years occurred in defense, homeland security, and the response to 9/11, not in what we call domestic nondefense discretionary spending. Therefore, the cap will have an effect, but not a great effect.
Basically, what we have done is we have capped nondefense discretionary spending at a current services level. We provided, as I said, realistically for the Bush defense budget for the other half of discretionary spending in the cap we have set.
Complicated chart. It says one thing in particular. When Bush came to office, when the President came to office several years ago, the Bush defense budget, the defense budget for the next 10 years was $3.6 trillion. Today, by our calculation, it is more like $5 trillion. We have seen defense spending go up over that time frame by $1.4 trillion.
And what about revenues? This is where the Bush administration told us revenues would go if we had tax cuts as we did in 2001, 2002 and 2003; that they would follow this blue dotted line. They have not followed the blue dotted line. They have taken a precipitous decline downward over this period of time from over $1 trillion to less than $800 billion in a period of about 3 or 4 fiscal years.
So if you want to solve the problem, you have to get to the source of the problem. You have to go to the budget and look at where the problem exists, and you cannot rule out revenues and expect to resolve a $521 billion estimate. That was the last official estimate we got from OMB of a deficit for this year.
That is why we have, number one, spending caps on discretionary spending at realistic levels that accommodate for defense. Get real. We are not going to be reining in those accounts by any substantial amount in the near future, given our obligations that are still being worked out.
And, secondly, we have acknowledged that revenues are a significant part of the problem. Indeed, when we resolved the problem of the deficit in the 1990s, and CBO looked back on it, they said 48 percent of your success was due to the fact that you were able to enhance revenues, 52 percent was due to the fact you curbed spending. Those two together produced the phenomenal results we enjoyed in the 1950s.
Here it is right here. It can be done. The Clinton administration came to office and outlays were 22 percent of GDP. When he left office, outlays had been reduced to about 18 percent of GDP. Revenues were about 17 to 18 percent of GDP. They were taken up over 20 percent of GDP. And there is the measure of the success in the Clinton administration right there, the $200 billion surplus we have been talking about.
And here is what happened with the Bush administration. Revenues have plummeted and spending outlays have gone up. But outlays are still below historic norms. Revenues, however, are pretty close to historic levels. Income taxes, as a percent of GDP, are about where they were in 1950.
So you have to do all these things to have a successful budget process package, and that is why we suggest to you we have got before you now in this substitute a package of two simple and basic rules which we say to you pragmatically worked, worked phenomenally well, and ought to be reinstated so we can tackle this difficult problem and approach it and try to begin working down the deficit.
I would suggest to the House that this would be the simplest way and the best way to resolve this whole debate. Adopt this substitute and wrap it up by reinstating the PAYGO rule with a double edge applicable to tax cuts and spending increases alike.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. Pomeroy).
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), the minority leader.
Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
For those who have voted against the previous amendments dealing with automatic extension of continuing resolutions, dealing with expedited rescission, for various other reasons they should be aware that this budget reincorporates all of those other provisions which they found onerous and objectionable in the past and would instate them in a bigger bill.
The chief feature of this bill which is objectionable is the effort it makes to put a cap on entitlement spending. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, if enacted, this particular provision would trigger the most severe budget cuts in modern history, calculation by which it would require entitlement cuts of $1.8 trillion over the next 10 years.
There are a couple of things to be aware of. When they say they are capping entitlement, they are capping not only entitlements like Medicare, Medicaid; they are also capping interest on the national debt. So one can have a result that certain Members would seek to have a large tax cut and succeed, which would increase the deficit and, therefore, increase the national debt and result in higher interest payments. And those interest payments would then have to be accommodated within the cap that will be imposed on entitlement spending.
Take also the level at which the cap is set and how it treats the Medicare program. The cost of the new Medicare drug benefit enacted last year to real spending occurs until the year 2006. The cap will be set at 2005 spending levels. So there will be a substantial amount of additional spending for Medicare which will have to be recouped from cuts in entitlements like Medicare.
This bill is full of anomalies that could have disastrous effect upon the programs in this country upon which people depend.
I will come back and explain further why this bill should be defeated soundly.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. Pomeroy).
Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 seconds to the gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. Pomeroy).
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I want to correct the record. Earlier I said that the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities had done an analysis of this proposal and found that it would cut entitlement programs like Medicare and Medicare and TRICARE for Life by $1.8 trillion over the next 10 years. They have done a revised study. It was correct. They have revised that study and their revised study shows that the cut will only be $1.551 trillion. That is in entitlement programs. It comes out of child nutrition, its comes out of TRICARE for Life, it comes out of veterans benefits. Across the board people will be hurt.
I did not mention earlier the discretionary spending. Discretionary spending in the Hensarling proposal would increase each year at 2.1 percent a year. At the end of the 10-year period of time, because they take it out of the full 10-year time frame, this substitute would limit discretionary spending to $220 billion below what the President has recommended. And one of the reasons we do not have a budget right now is we are still struggling with the numbers the President has prepared, trying to bring it within the framework of what he has recommended.
So this would have severe consequences; and it would have severe consequences upon, in the words of the AARP, the health and economic security of millions of vulnerable Americans.
Finally, to remind everyone, if you voted against the automatic continuing resolution, if you voted against the joint budget resolution making the budget resolution a law signed by the President, if you are opposed to biennial budgeting, if you voted against expedited rescission, this bill reinstates all of those, and is an additional reason to oppose it.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, the Kirk substitute is Hensarling light, just as objectionable for most of the same reasons, only less so.
He just put up his sign over there which said it would save $445 billion and which could be spent on Medicare and Social Security. That is the estimated savings produced by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) just said they are wrong, and yet he was holding up a sign indicating that the savings that he would accomplish are just what they indicated they would be.
So he saves $445 billion for Medicare but he gets it by taking $175 billion out of Medicaid, $50 billion out of Federal civil service retirement and disability, $28 billion out of military retirement, $22 billion out of veterans' benefits, on down the list. That is how that $445 billion adds up. He limits the safety net programs to 2 percent. It is true, he picks out some programs that are sensitive, we might call them safety net programs, and he provides they will not be cut more than 2 percent, another difference between him and the gentleman from Texas.
But this provision means that other programs are not deemed to be sensitive and they include child care payments, price supports, farm price supports, crop insurance, TRICARE military health benefits, among others; these face unlimited cuts, larger cuts because the other programs are shielded. These cuts could reach 43 percent by 2014 based on current projections according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
So this particular substitute is just as bad, only not in dollar terms quite as great, it is just as flawed, has just as many anomalies in it, and for the same reason should be rejected by everyone in this House.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. Pomeroy).
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
My good friend, the gentleman from Illinois, comes to the floor and he acknowledges, he touts this amendment as requiring cuts that equal $445 billion over the next 10 years in entitlement programs, except for Social Security and Medicare, but they come out of Medicaid and Federal civil service retirement and military retirement and family support and TRICARE for life.
The list goes on and on. He acknowledges that these programs will be cut by $445 billion. But he holds up the sign and says, but look, this money can be used to shore up Medicare and Social Security. But I defy you to read this substitute and find in it one line, one word, anything that will say that these savings must go to Social Security or Medicare. More likely than not, they will be used to offset tax cuts, maybe to offset the deficit but unlikely they will go to Social Security and Medicare. So what we have here is an across-the-board entitlement cap proposal that by the author's own acknowledgment will cut key programs by a substantial amount. It does protect some, limiting the cuts to 2 percent. But by limiting the cuts in some to 2 percent, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities makes it clear that this provision means that other programs, child care payments, farm price supports, crop insurance, TRICARE military benefits, face unlimited cuts that could reach 43 percent by 2014.
Unless you want to vote for this kind of Draconian budget, vote against the Kirk amendment.
Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.