Politicizing The Senate Intelligence Committee
Mr. President, I first compliment the distinguished chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senator from Kansas, not only for the remarks he just made, but for the way he led this committee during very difficult times,…
Mr. President, I first compliment the distinguished chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senator from Kansas, not only for the remarks he just made, but for the way he led this committee during very difficult times, as has been mentioned before.
I regret he has been criticized for the very acts of comity which are required of a chairman in a position such as this for trying his best to accommodate the members of the minority, trying his best to be as open and as broad as he could possibly be in approaching the issues that have been brought to his attention by members of the minority, even criticized, I have seen, in his own hometown press, his own press in Kansas for being too soft in dealing with the members of the Democratic Party in this matter.
It is his job to bend over backwards, to make the Intelligence Committee work in a nonpartisan fashion. I didn't say ``bipartisan,'' I said ``nonpartisan'' because that is the way this committee was set up 25 years ago: to be a place where politics could not intrude.
I don't know how many people are aware of where the Intelligence Committee works. It works in an area that is secure. That is the phrase. There are special physical arrangements in the construction of this area in which the committee works. It is literally a vault that you walk into, totally closed off from the rest of the world, obviously because we don't want any electronic surveillance or other means of intercepting what is said within the confines of this secure area.
It could also be a metaphor for its location in this very political city because there is a lot of politics in Washington, DC. We all understand that.
This is a special place where politics is not to intrude. It is literally an island in this political sea that is supposed to be out of bounds for politics.
The chairman has done a great job of trying his best to get all of the information he can from the intelligence community, from the administration, from any other source that would be useful to the committee's work, and to bend over backwards, as the memorandum itself notes, for the members of the minority. I take my hat off to him for that and suggest that he should not be criticized for it; he should be praised for it.
He, too, has made the point that there is a point beyond which one just cannot go. When it appears that the
other side has attempted to take advantage of your goodwill, as the chairman has done, he has got to say that is it; no more; this committee is not going to be used for partisan political purposes. That is what he should do, and I applaud him for that effort.
I also appreciate the comments of the distinguished majority leader in bringing this to the full body as he has done, to raise the critical questions and to simply ask for those responsible to step forward and acknowledge their responsibility and identify for whom this memorandum was written; for the responsible people, including the leadership of the Democratic minority, and certainly the leadership of the committee, to disavow the contents of the memo, the plan that has been written, and to make a public apology to the distinguished chairman of the committee.
I think those are very reasonable requests and, frankly, too many hours have passed since the first calls for disavowal. Yet the memorandum remains not disavowed.
I would like to take just a moment to try and explain why some of us feel so strongly about this. I served on this committee for 8 years. There is a rule that a Senator can only serve for 8 years because we never want this to become a politicized committee. We never want it to be a source where power is gathered around people who maintain their position. This is supposed to be a place where a Senator comes in, gets expertise, serves time, and then moves on. I had the honor and privilege of serving for 8 years.
One of the things that always stuck with me was the fact that it was not bipartisan, it was nonpartisan. The staff was selected primarily from the intelligence community, people who were experts in matters of intelligence. When I first came in, I said I had a member of my staff who used to be with the Intelligence Committee. He has the top clearances, and I would like to have him on staff to help me on this committee. Bob Kerrey, the former Senator from Nebraska and distinguished former chairman referred to by Senator Roberts, made the point at the time: No, we cannot do that because we do not want there to be any suggestion that there is influence in the committee from the private staff of individual Senators. This is professional intelligence community staff, and if it ever were thought to be otherwise, we would never get the cooperation of the intelligence community providing us with secrets that are the most significant, important secrets of our Nation.
Our committee staff of the Select Committee on Intelligence has the complete knowledge of the most significant, serious secrets of this country. They have to be above reproach. Think for a moment what would happen if it were perceived that they were political staff just like all the other committees. There is nothing wrong with political staff, but we all understand they have a substantive and a political dimension to the work that they do. We all operate within that understanding. But here, think about what a Senator could do knowing all of these secrets if they decided to use them for partisan political advantage.
I can state unequivocally that I could have gone out and criticized the Clinton administration with things I knew, and people on the committee today could probably go out and criticize the current administration for things that they know. It would be very hard to respond to that because the only response is to use similarly classified information to respond.
We cannot get into that game. No one would share information with the intelligence committee if they felt that it could be used for political purposes. Indeed, what foreign country or other sources would be willing to provide information to our intelligence community with the understanding that it might go right to a partisan political committee of the Congress? It could not be done.
I was interested to go to Great Britain and visit with Parliamentarians who only recently obtained oversight, like the Intelligence Committee oversight of the United States, over intelligence activities of the executive branch of their government. Now, understand they are a parliamentary form of government so the distinction is not nearly as bright as it is in the United States, but they sought advice from us as to how they could best do oversight of this important intelligence function.
They were interested in how we were able to get these deep dark secrets of our country into the legislative branch of government when in the past they had always been the sole province of the intelligence community and the executive branch. One of the explanations was because we were trusted. We were not a partisan committee like the other committees.
Well, this memorandum and the conduct of the staff in this particular case begins the process of destroying that credibility and that trust and thus eliminating any prospect that this committee can operate in a successful way in its oversight function. That is why this is such a big deal.
I mentioned former Senator Kerrey. I would also mention former chairmen of the committee, Senators Specter and Shelby, both of whom spoke to this issue a couple of days ago and recounted how in their experience they had never seen anything like this during their time as chairman and noted that they could not possibly function as a committee if there were a perception that the committee was being used for political purposes.
I might note one other thing just as an aside. I wrote additional views, along with the distinguished chairman of the committee, today to the report that the Intelligence Committee issued at the end of last year about the events leading up to September 11, 2001. One of the reasons that those other views are not as eloquent as I would have liked them to have been is that we had to draft them very quickly, after the report was done, after we knew what its conclusions were. We were able to read through it, and the Senator from Kansas and I noted that we did not totally agree with everything--more precisely, there were other things that we thought should have been said in that report, and we hastily put together our additional views and got them attached to the report. I hope they are helpful for people who read that report and our additional views.
We did not come to a conclusion before that report was done, before the committee's work was done, that no matter what that report said, we were going to attach additional views and be critical of the report. We could not have done that because we did not know what it was going to say.
That is what this memorandum suggests is the plan of these Democrat staffers, that irrespective of what the report says the Senator from Kansas will oversee the issuance of in the next few weeks, they plan to attach additional views castigating the majority. I will quote that in just a second. That is a misuse of the process and that is the kind of thing that we are talking about.
I would just finally note in this regard, the report that the committee is working on now is the second of three major reports. First, the committee put out the report at the end of last year. Then there is the followup report that is being done right now on the intelligence leading up to September 11 and leading up to the conflict in Iraq, and finally the Kean commission, which is also going to be issuing a report on the same subject. So all three investigations overlap in one way or another to ask the question about the adequacy of our intelligence pre-September 11 and pre-Iraqi war. It is not as if this subject has not gotten a lot of attention.
The public might be a little confused about what this memorandum actually says. I just wanted to note finally what this memorandum says. It begins by saying:
We have carefully reviewed our options under the rules and
believe we have identified the best approach. Our plan is as
follows.
So this is not a recitation of options. This is a statement that they reviewed the options and this is what they came up with: The plan, ``our plan is as follows.'' It clearly is written for someone who understands fully what the idea was.
Our options for what? It would have to be options for something that the recipient of the memo already understood. It says:
First, pull the majority along as far as we can.
That is the distinguished chairman of the committee.
Pull the majority along as far as we can on issues that may
lead to major new disclosures regarding improper or
questionable conduct by administration officials.
In other words, a fishing expedition. Let us see how long we can string this out and maybe we will get lucky and come up with something. In fact, they say it right here: `` . . . We don't know what we will find,'' and then there is a parenthesis at the end of this paragraph that I find very interesting. ``Note: we can verbally mention some of the intriguing leads we are pursuing.''
No, you cannot, not under the committee rules. It is absolutely forbidden.
What is in that committee is confidential. You cannot verbally mention some of the intriguing leads that ``we are pursuing.''
Second:
Assiduously prepare Democratic ``additional views . . .''
That would be appropriate if the report is already done, but what does it say?
. . . to attach to any interim or final reports the committee
may release.
In other words, it doesn't matter what the committee says. We'll write these views ahead of time and attach them.
. . . we intend to take full advantage of it,
it said.
Our additional views will also, among other things,
castigate the majority for seeking to limit the scope of the
inquiry.
The majority has not done anything yet but, by golly they are going to be castigated for this.
Third:
Prepare to launch an independent investigation when it
becomes clear we have exhausted the opportunity to usefully
collaborate with the majority.
I like that phrase. I think that reveals a malevolent intent here. Then:
. . . we can pull the trigger on an independent
investigation. . . . The best time to do so will probably be
next year. . . .
They then talk about the advantages or disadvantages of doing it at that time. They note that:
We could [under the second view here] attract more coverage
and have greater credibility in that context than one in
which we simply launch an independent investigation based on
principled but vague notions regarding the ``use'' of
intelligence.
It concludes:
. . . we have an important role to play in revealing the
misleading--if not flagrantly dishonest methods and motives--
of the senior administration officials who made the case for
a unilateral, preemptive war. The approach outlined above
seems to offer the best prospect for exposing the
administration's dubious motives and methods.
This is political. This is staffers who have already prejudged. They cannot believe President Bush. There must be bad, dishonest motives. It is their mantra, and I think they think it is their duty to expose and blame the Bush administration. Yes, it is political, but in their view it is a higher calling. Bush must be exposed, so any method is acceptable, so the end justifies the means even if it risks destroying the intelligence committee.
These staffers should know better because they are senior staffers, presumably. That is the kind of people who get hired on this committee. But it is wrong to put partisan politics above national security and certainly the members of the committee know better. That is why the majority leader is absolutely correct in calling upon them to disavow this memorandum, which puts partisan politics ahead of national security.