Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague Senator Inhofe, and my other Senate colleagues in introducing the Brownfield Revitalization Act of 2003. Given the nature of this legislation-- establishing tax incentives to encourage…
Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague Senator Inhofe, and my other Senate colleagues in introducing the Brownfield Revitalization Act of 2003. Given the nature of this legislation-- establishing tax incentives to encourage cleanup of environmentally contaminated property across the country--it is appropriate that this be a joint introduction between the Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and the Ranking Member of the Senate Finance Committee. This legislation is bipartisan, but it is also bicameral. A companion bill was introduced earlier this week in the House of Representatives by Congresswoman Nancy Johnson and Congressman Xavier Becerra.
Across the United States, environmentally contaminated sites endanger public health, impede economic development, and negatively impact tax rolls. The United States has an estimated 1,000,000 such properties scattered across our inner cities and rural areas alike.
In my own State of Montana, there are well over 5,000 such sites. This may seem surprising for a state like Montana that is relatively undeveloped and pristine. But we are by no means unaffected by the scourge of environmental contamination. In addition to contamination caused by leaking underground storage tanks and contamination caused by other light industries, Montana also has been impacted by significant contamination left behind by some of the very industries that built our great state.
Contaminated sediments can be found along the Clark Fork River from Butte, MT, downstream for 140 miles to Missoula and on into Idaho--a legacy of the copper mining and smelting operations at Butte and Anaconda.
Tremolite asbestos contamination is prevalent at numerous sites around Libby, MT, including the local high school and middle school tracks--a legacy from the Zonlite Mine that began operating in the 1920s and produced 80 percent of the world's supply of vermiculite. These industries created wealth and jobs for generations of Montanans. Today, however, contamination from wood processing facilities, abandoned mines, and numerous other activities have harmed human health and the environment and continue to stifle the development of new business in Montana. These sites are well known to Montanans: Sites such as Missoula Sawmill site and the White Pine Sash site in Missoula, the Missouri River Corridor site in Great Falls, and sites in Helena, Bozeman, Billings and numerous other communities all across Montana. We can and must do more to help revitalize these important areas.
Congress has undertaken a number of initiatives to address the brownfield problem in this country. I am proud to have been able to play a leadership role in passing the Brownfields Revitalization and Reinvestment Act of 2001. That bill has helped provide new Federal funds for evaluation and remediation of brownfield sites and has helped to resolve some of the liability issues that were inhibiting remediation of these contaminated properties.
But, We must do more. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has estimated that at the current rate of cleanup, it will take 10,000 years for us to remediate all of the contaminated sites in America. The United States Environmental Protection Agency, in an analysis conducted with George Washington University, concluded that the remediation ``costs for all of the brownfields located within the United States have been estimated to exceed $650 billion,'' and that, consequently, ``it is imperative that private capital be attracted to the redevelopment of brownfields.''
Late last year, Senator Grassley and I entered a colloquy in the Congressional Record expressing our concern that certain provisions in the tax code are having the unintended consequence of discouraging investment in the remediation and redevelopment of our nation's polluted sites. In that colloquy, we pledged to get our arms around this issue and to draft legislation to correct this problem. I am pleased that we are standing here today to introduce legislation to do just that.
Let me briefly describe the basis for this bill and the means by which this legislation will dramatically accelerate the remediation of contaminated lands in America.
Today, tax-exempt investors such as university endowments, private pension funds, and charitable foundations can invest their capital in the stock market and certain real estate transactions that do not clean the environment without fear of incurring an Unrelated Business Income Tax, or UBIT, on any gains they make from their investments.
Because UBIT-sensitive entities hold over $6 trillion dollars in financial assets and routinely deploy more capital in real estate projects than any other category of investor, the unintended consequence of UBIT has been to drive our nation's biggest and most active real estate investors away from projects focused on the remediation and redevelopment of polluted properties.
This bill seeks to address this problem by allowing eligible tax- exempt entities to invest in the cleanup and redevelopment of qualified contaminated properties without incurring unrelated business income tax at the time they sell the property.
The legislation accomplishes this goal by concentrating on three basic tasks: 1. focus investment on moderately and heavily polluted properties, 2. require taxpayers to work with the State authorities and the public to ensure adequate clean up, and 3. ensure that the legislation is tightly crafted to prevent abuse.
First, this bill focuses on moderately and heavily polluted properties.
Section 198 of the tax code contains a structure under which designated state environmental agencies certify contaminated property that is eligible for special rules concerning deductions of remediation costs. This bill uses this existing structure to identify and certify contaminated sites that are eligible for inclusion within this bill. Prior to requesting certification from a state agency, the taxpayer is required to provide the agency with site characterizations, assessments and other documentation illustrating the scope and character of the pollution problem at the target site.
The legislation maintains its focus on moderately and heavily contaminated properties by requiring taxpayers to expend on remediation of each site the greater of $550,000 or 12 percent of the fair market value of the site, assessed as though the site were not contaminated. These remediation thresholds have intentionally been set higher than he typical range of costs reported to the Environmental Protection Agency to clean up brownfield sites nationwide. By establishing such high remediation thresholds, the legislation excludes incidentally or trivially contaminated property and focuses new capital investment on those sites most in need of additional assistance.
Second, this bill requires taxpayers to work with affected states and the public to ensure adequate clean up.
In addition to requiring high levels of remediation expenditures on each site, the legislation contains numerous other safeguards designed to ensure that remediation of each site is performed to state specifications and with full public involvement.
Similar to the front-end certification that is required to classify properties as truly contaminated, the legislation requires the taxpayer to obtain a tail-end certification from the state agency indicating that the site has been cleaned up and is no longer considered a brownfield. Prior to applying for this certification, the taxpayer must provide the State agency with sufficient information and documentation to allow the state agency to make this determination. In particular, the taxpayer must certify and provide documentation that: there are no longer hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants on the property that are complicating the redevelopment or reuse of the site, environmental remediation is complete or substantially complete in conformance with all applicable federal, state and local environmental laws and regulations, the property is suitable for more economically productive or environmentally beneficial uses than at the time of acquisition, if additional activities are required to complete remediation, sufficient financial assurances and institutional controls are in place to complete the remediation in as short a time as possible, and the public was notified and given the opportunity to comment on the remedial actions taken to clean up the property and, if necessary, on any longer-term remediation activities.
The provisions in this legislation are designed to create substantive thresholds that the tax-exempt entity must meet in order to qualify for the exemption from UBIT. This legislation does not alter the complex web of existing federal, state or local environmental laws, regulations or standards.
Third, this bill ensures that the legislation is tightly crafted to prevent abuse.
It is worth noting that this legislation has been drafted to contain numerous safeguards to prevent abuse of this program. The anti-abuse examples include the following. The taxpayer cannot be the party that has caused the pollution and cannot be otherwise related to the polluter. Also, all transactions, purchase of the property, sale of the property, expenditure of remediation funds, etc., must be arms-length transactions with parties unrelated to the taxpayer. Further, the taxpayer is not allowed to count any Federal funds, e.g. grants, etc., or other types of government payments and benefits toward and required remediation thresholds. There are also restrictions on how the taxpayer may treat costs across multiple properties, requiring that an election be made specifying when and which properties are considered for such purposes; this is intended to prevent cherry-picking among different properties once the election has been made. Moreover, the legislation contains special restrictions addressing the use of the legislation's provisions by partnerships and other pass-through entities including requiring that all partnerships under the bill be fractions-rule compliant.
Because this legislation is narrowly crafted, and because tax-exempt entities are not currently investing in these sites, and thus are not paying UBIT, the Joint Committee on Taxation has concluded that this legislation will actually generate revenue for the Federal treasury during the first three years after enactment and that it will cost $10 million over five years and $192 million over ten years.
Further, because the legislation will accelerate cleanup of brownfield sites, create jobs, stimulate the economy, reduce blight and public health concerns, and because the bill has an acceptable fiscal impact, this legislative approach has been endorsed by Environmental Defense, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Taxpayers Union, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors, as well as numerous local, state and regional organizations and municipalities.
Passage of this bill will dramatically increase the speed at which our country's contaminated properties are remediated and brought back into productive taxable use. This narrowly crafted legislation will create jobs, increase tax revenues, and protect the environment--all accomplished without creating new government programs or regulations and all at a minimal cost to the Federal treasury.
I am pleased to be introducing this legislation with my colleague from Oklahoma. I look forward to working together to enact this legislation into law.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Tax Shelter Transparency and Enforcement Act. I am pleased to be joined by my good friend, the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Chairman Grassley.
He and I introduced similar legislation in the last Congress. And, just this year, the Finance Committee approved this legislation as part of the CARE Act, the energy bill, the Jobs and Growth Act, and the Jumpstart Our Business Strength Act.
But why do we need this legislation? It has been more than 2 years since the collapse of Enron.
Since then, numerous other corporate scandals have come to light, thousands of employees have lost their jobs and pension savings, and the after-shock has yet to settle down in the stock market.
But there is one thing that has not happened. This Congress has failed to send to the President one single piece of tax legislation designed to shut down the kinds of abusive tax shelters we saw Enron use and that we know many others use.
Every day that we fail to address this scandal, honest taxpayers pay the bill.
A recent study commissioned by the IRS estimated that abusive corporate tax shelters alone cost honest taxpayers from $14 billion to $18 billion each year. That means up to $180 billion over ten years.
Simply put, this abuse of our tax laws has got to stop.
Abusive tax shelters are wide-spread--and not new.
As early as 1995, the Clinton Administration undertook a comprehensive, multi-faceted effort to tackle the problem of corporate tax shelters. This included legislative proposals to halt the
sale and marketing of shelters. Regulatory action to clamp down on illicit activity. And steps to better identify and pursue abusive transactions.
The current Administration has added to the list of identified tax shelters and supported legislative proposals to ensure greater disclosure.
This is not--and should not be--a partisan issue.
The proliferation of abusive tax shelters hurts the entire tax system. Specifically, it places a greater tax burden on those Americans who are honestly and patriotically paying their fair share of taxes-- whether they are republican, democrat, or independent.
These shelters undermine the confidence of the American people in the fairness of the tax system. Abusive tax shelters place honest corporate competitors at a disadvantage.
And shutting down these abuses presents a great opportunity for Congress to restore fairness in the system.
We should do no less.
Let me take a few moments to discuss the nature of these tax shelters. Why they are wrong. And how purportedly reputable companies and professional advisors are participating in a disturbing race to the bottom.
First, what are these tax shelters?
Let me give you just one example of a tax shelter.
On October 20th, the Finance Committee held a hearing on tax shelters. This hearing was a follow-up to a hearing earlier this year to review the Committee's investigative report on the collapse of Enron.
At our hearing last month, we heard how some American corporations are purportedly buying and then leasing bridges, dams, subway systems, and other infrastructure through corporate tax shelters.
It's like the old line: If you think these tax shelter transactions are legitimate--or what Congress intended--have I got a bridge to sell you.
A former leasing industry executive, who testified before the Finance Committee, described complex transactions where U.S. companies make a single payment to a municipality to lease a bridge or other public infrastructure. These companies then lease the infrastructure back to the city. All along, the company takes a deduction on its U.S. taxes for the depreciation of the high valued asset.
The companies never pay any real lease payments to the cities. And the cities never pay any lease payments to the companies. The cities never risk losing control of the bridge, dam, or subway system.
But the companies--who include major banks and Fortune 500 companies--take millions and millions of dollars in deductions for what is essentially a paper transaction. And the American taxpayer is left holding the bill.
The witness testified: ``[M]uch of the old and new infrastructure throughout Europe has been leased to, and leased back from, American corporations.''
In essence, in these transactions, the American people, through their tax dollars, are providing these companies a subsidy, part of which the companies pocket, and part of which they transfer to these cities.
As Yale law school Professor Michael Graetz once said, a tax shelter is a ``deal done by very smart people, that, absent tax considerations, would be very stupid.''
This is nothing more than an unwarranted tax subsidy to U.S. companies courtesy of honest taxpayers. It is simply wrong. It rewards a transaction with no real economic substance.
This has got to stop. And it is up to Congress and the President to put an end to this kind of abuse.
So how did this tax shelter industry develop?
If there is one thing that we should have learned from the Enron scandal, it is the pervasive role of lawyers and accountants.
Why did some of the country's leading professional firms devote so much effort to spinning reported earnings out of nothing? And what does that say about the erosion of ethical standards for accountants and lawyers?
In 1908, the American Bar Association adopted its first code of ethics.
The preamble to their Model Rules states that a lawyer serves his client, but is also ``an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.''
It also states that a lawyer should ``further the public's understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority.''
In 1946, the Executive Director of the American Institute of Accountants--the predecessor to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants--stated that:
The very existence of the accounting profession depends on
public confidence in the determination of certified public
accountants to safeguard the public interest. This confidence
can be maintained only by evidence of both technical
competence and moral obligation. One item of evidence is
promulgation and enforcement of rules of professional
conduct.
So, why did the legal and accounting profession fail to follow their own principles. And, why did they fail to police themselves?
Part of the problem stems from the 1990s practices of investment bankers and venture capitalists--taking a piece of the deal or a piece of the upside performance. This behavior spread into almost every public company.
And, following their clients, accountants and lawyers also began adopting these practices. Add to this an enormous pressure on company executives to hit revenue and earnings targets on a quarterly basis.
Amidst this obsession with short-term results, no one was left to look after the company's long-term survival.
At the same time, lawyers and accountants faced their own profit pressures as their compensation was tied to their ``book of business'' and their success in cross-selling different services to their clients.
These cultural conflicts presented a threat to professional values.
For auditing firms, traditional professional values mean attesting to investors and lenders that the company's financial statements are properly prepared and reflect all material issues.
The business culture, however, encouraged the auditor to serve company executives--not only to refrain from pushing back, but also to affirmatively help them achieve their personal goals.
Furthermore, audit services themselves became more and more of a low- profit business, as audit firms battled each other to gain the inside audit position--which could help them market high-profit services. The big money was in selling tax-engineered products.
Finally, the private interests of the accounting professional and the corporate executive converged on one kind of activity that has proved particularly toxic--the proprietary financial maneuver that boosted reported earnings. That means, manipulate the bottom line of the financial statements.
Such maneuvers satisfied the executives' need to feed the markets and keep stock prices afloat.
They also satisfied the accountant's need for generating large profits for their firm and for their own bonus formula.
Similarly, for law firms, the traditional professional values are associated with loyalty to the client and advocacy of the client's interests within the bounds of the law.
Yet, loyalty to the corporate client and attention to corporate risks came to be sorely tested in many instances.
A company executive could well be more interested in getting a deal done--and getting the legal opinion needed to support the accounting analysis--than in gaining an accurate understanding of the legal merits of the issue and the associated risks to the company.
A law firm might even have its own stake in getting the deal done-- because of a bonus or contingency fee associated with completing the deal--or because of having assisted a promoter in developing the deal.
In many accounting and tax schemes, executives simply did not want a frank assessment of legal merits and risks.
Instead, what they sought was a professional opinion that would justify hiding the true nature of a transaction from readers of financial reports and tax returns.
This was not legal advice on the merits--it was advice that was needed to justify hiding the ball.
Clearly, some accounting firms and law firms have abandoned ethics for the big dollar bonus.
As an extreme example, there were many people in the Arthur Andersen
Houston office who knew about the destruction of Enron documents. Not one appears to have realized that what they were doing was terribly wrong. Apparently, not one of these professionals even thought to check with anyone elsewhere in the firm about whether or not what they were doing was wrong.
Professional firms also have been all too willing to let themselves be compartmentalized. This way, they could say ``That wasn't my job'' when things went wrong.
Consider the case of prominent law firms that provided tax opinions for investment banks and other promoters to use in selling tax shelter products.
These opinions described the consequences of complicated tax maneuvers--based on the assumption that the future tax shelter purchaser would have a valid business purpose. And on the assumption that the transaction would not be tweaked further to reduce financial risk to almost nothing.
It may have been true that these firms were asked to provide advice based on those implausible assumptions. But that does not justify allowing the firm's professional reputation to be used to market tax shelters. The lawyers simply must have known that no purchaser could realistically be expected to supply the critical assumed facts.
The Enron case of using tax shelters to generate phantom financial earnings also seems to reflect a cycle of ``That wasn't my job'' role- playing.
The tax lawyers found a business purpose for the transaction because it generated financial earnings.
The accountants found financial earnings because the transaction promised future tax reductions. It all seems a bit circular.
And it all assumes that creating misleading earnings reports is in the real business interest of the corporation. Again, the professionals appear to have lost track of who their real client was.
Now, what do we need to do about this?
Congress and Federal regulators started to address these issues with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
For example, Sarbanes-Oxley calls for lawyers practicing before the SEC to report evidence of securities violations ``up the chain'' of their corporate clients--ultimately to corporate boards.
And the Act calls for auditors to report directly to the corporate board's audit committee. And, provide a number of safeguards to assure that audit committees have the independence and autonomy needed to represent corporate interests and not personal interests.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also addresses auditor independence in ways that respond to the business pressures that I described earlier.
Audit partners cannot be compensated based on cross-selling. Audit personnel must be rotated periodically. And a one-year cooling off period is required in the case of individuals moving between employment at an audit firm and employment at an audit client.
Public companies are prohibited from obtaining certain non-audit services from their auditor, and all other non-audit services require prior approval of the board's audit committee.
But these changes just nibble at the edges of the bigger problem. We have to reign in these lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers who are out there manipulating the tax code to come up with tax shelter schemes.
The tax shelter legislation that Chairman Grassley and I introduce today goes to the heart of the tax schemes problem.
For example, the bill ensures that transactions are done for legitimate business purposes. That means that transactions must have economic substance and are not done merely to avoid taxes.
It makes it explicit that achieving a particular kind of financial accounting treatment does not provide the needed ``business purpose'' to satisfy tax requirements.
The bill also provides for stiff penalties that are needed to back up Treasury's new shelter disclosure requirements.
As a Treasury official pointed out, ``[I]f a promoter is comfortable with selling a transaction. If a practitioner is comfortable with advising that the transaction is proper. And if a taxpayer is comfortable with entering into that transaction. Then they should all be comfortable with the IRS knowing about the transaction.''
Our bill also broadens the IRS's ability to enjoin tax shelter promoters and allows the agency to impose monetary penalties--in addition to suspension or disbarment--on disreputable tax advisors or their firms.
And more may be needed, from both government and the private sector.
For one thing, we need to also pass Senator Levin's bill, S. 1767, the Auditor Independence and Tax Shelters Act. I am pleased to be an original co-sponsor of that legislation. The Auditor Independence and Tax Shelters Act compliments the legislation that I am introducing today.
Senator Levin's legislation shuts down tax shelter promotion from the audit and financial statement side of the equation. Specifically, S. 1767 would strengthen auditor independence by prohibiting them from providing tax shelter services to their audit clients.
The legislation would also reduce potential auditor conflicts of interest by codifying four auditor independence principles to guide the audit committees of the Board of Directors of a publicly traded company, when that committee is required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to decide whether the company may provide certain non-audit services to the corporation.
Next, the SEC and the new Public Accounting Oversight Board should devote significant resources to considering ways to improve the clarity of the tax footnote in the company's financial statements.
They should also undertake a comprehensive review of financial reporting of income taxation. These agencies should also ensure that they have tax experts to ensure proper oversight investigations and reviews of the financial statement tax disclosures.
The IRS should improve the clarity of the already-required reconciliation between book and tax earnings on the corporate tax return--the Schedule M-1.
And we need to have better communication and coordination between the various federal departments and agencies with oversight over lawyers, accountants and investment bankers. The Department of Treasury, the IRS, the Department of Justice, the SEC, and the Public Accounting Oversight Board should talk to each other and not fall into the ``it's not my job'' mindset.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also empowers the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to describe new non-audit services that public companies could not acquire from their auditors, even if they are not explicitly described in the statute as a prohibited service.
The Accounting Oversight Board should review the record of SEC rulemaking in this area, as well as ongoing business practices, and take action if it is needed to assure the public interest in auditor independence.
Finally, professional firms need to cultivate professional cultures. The Enron scandal should serve as a wake-up call to all of us, but particularly the professionals.
Law firms and accounting firms must be sure that their members and employees understand the nature of corporate representation and who the client is.
Everyone who works at the firm needs to understand that the firm is committed to integrity and quality. And to understand that the firm's leaders will listen and react if legitimate questions arise.
Professionals should resist the tendency to avert their eyes to obvious issues on the grounds that they are technically someone else's responsibility.
In the best traditions of both the accounting and legal professions, the work of the professional must be guided by commitments to professional duty, fair dealing, and honesty.
I hope that the leaders of the accounting and legal professions understand how important this is, and take the actions needed to give new vitality to these great traditions.
Every Spring, Americans sit down at the kitchen table, or at their home computer, and figure out their taxes.
With quiet patriotism, these Americans step up and pay their fair share. They are counting on us to make sure
that sophisticated corporations pay their fair share as well.
I am simply unwilling to tell the school teacher in Montana that he needs to pony up a little more because Congress is unwilling to shut down a loophole that is costing tens of billions every year.
I look forward to continuing to work with the Chairman of the Finance Committee, Senator Grassley, to see the Tax Shelter Transparency and Enforcement Act through to enactment.
I also urge all of my congressional colleagues--in the House and the Senate--to join forces to send tax shelter legislation to the President for his signature.
We need to act to close these tax shelters and restore professional ethics. And we need to act before the next big scandal comes. Congress cannot ignore the problem any longer.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.