On the gentleman's very point, I want to thank our colleague for convening this opportunity to talk about a very important issue. I would like to ask both of the gentlemen, you sat, as I did here, during the State of the Union speech. You…
On the gentleman's very point, I want to thank our colleague for convening this opportunity to talk about a very important issue. I would like to ask both of the gentlemen, you sat, as I did here, during the State of the Union speech. You heard the President, as I did, say that one of the concerns is that Iraq sought to buy uranium in Africa. And that was included in the President's State of the Union speech, one of many compelling reasons why supposedly we had to be alarmed about Iraq and Saddam Hussein. And yet we read in today's Washington Post that the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice conceded that that was an inaccurate claim. And yet here before the entire body of Congress and the American people, we were told that one of the compelling reasons, why do you buy uranium? You buy uranium for nuclear devices. Iraq is something that we need to be concerned about.
And my question to both of my colleagues is, does this not go to the fundamental issue that if the President's preemption doctrine, not that many of us agree with that as a doctrine that should be followed by the United States, but this doctrine of preemption which basically says we cannot wait for the risk to rise to a level that is a threat to the national security of the United States, we have to go in there in any country and preempt that threat, that even if one is to ascribe themselves to that view, that it is based upon the ability of the United States too gather accurate intelligence and make honest assessments? Does that not go to that very purpose of that doctrine?
When we see the revelations that seem to be coming forth like Condoleezza Rice saying, yes, that statement that the President made before Congress and the whole Nation about uranium purchases in Africa being false, that those begin to raise concerns. How do we begin to have any credibility in any such preemption doctrine when the fundamental underpinnings seem to be at question, which is what I think the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) is saying.
Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman's point is well taken. As a matter of fact, one of the things that I was additionally concerned about, and the gentleman did mention the Internet and how anybody who just did a casual search would see that this foreign minister had not been in office in a decade, and yet we rely upon it as fact by which we act and we do not even do a rudimentary study to find out whether that document had legitimacy.
It is interesting to note that one of our allies in this regard seems to have the same problem in this regard. There is an article that appeared in The New York Times that talks about how the top aide to Prime Minister Blair wrote to the head of Britain's Intelligence Service earlier this spring conceding that the government's presentation of a report on Iraqi arms was mishandled. And the report which is entitled, ``Iraq, Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation,'' was used as part of the reason to pursue an invasion of Iraq and Saddam Hussein. And it is now referred to in the British news media as the dodgy dossier because of evidence that part of it was down loaded from the Internet, completed with typographical errors from an American student's thesis that relied on 12-year-old public information. And it is now being reviewed by two parliamentary committees in Great Britain because it raises doubts about its central claim that Iraq's chemical and biological weapons were in such a state of readiness that they could be launched within 45 minutes, within 45 minutes.
That type of information is incredibly frightening when that is the basis under which we would deploy American troops, put at harm American soldiers.
There is no question, I think we would all agree, that Saddam Hussein was a dictator, was a bad actor, happy to see him leave from the world stage; but the question is, what invokes the policy of preemption, the use of U.S. forces and power abroad, under what basis? That is why so many of us who asked questions at the time and say, well, what is the foundation, what is the clear and present danger to the U.S., what is the imminent threat, have real concerns now as I think we see this intelligence information suggesting that there was not necessarily a clear and present danger, any imminent threat to the United States.
I think it puts us in a serious doubt with the international community when the next situation arises. I do not know what my colleague thinks about it.
Mr. Speaker, I think the questioning was a precursor, as mine was, when Secretary Powell appeared before the committee before that, and I asked the Secretary how long, how many lives will we lose, how long will we be there, how much will it cost, and are we nation building?
And I know that my colleagues have listened certainly for the decade that I have been here, listened to our colleagues on the other side of the aisle talk about how they abhorred the concept of nation-building when we were in Bosnia and other places, stopping real atrocities that were taking place, and hearing we are into nation-building.
And yet as the gentleman was trying to elicit from the witness before our Committee on International Relations, which we both sit on, we have no real planning. There was Jay Gardner, who was designated as the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Here we have the Department of Defense doing nation-building, something that we consistently heard our colleagues on the other side of the aisle rail against, and he in essence was on the job a full 3 weeks, and after all of that preparation that supposedly took place for him to be there, we get rid of him in 3 weeks. He was going to develop a national assembly of Iraqis, and that did not work. And then his State Department successor, Ambassador Bremer, thought that perhaps seven opposition groups might be able to work effectively as an interim government. That was soon abandoned.
Now we are talking about a so-called advisory council of 20 or 25 Iraqis, but this latest plan of an advisory council seems to minimize, not increase, the participation of Iraqis in the process for months, if not longer.
So here we are in this preemption doctrine for which we now have serious questions about the underpinnings under which we committed massive force because it was alleged at the time that there was a clear and present danger to the United States. We are told by the administration, well, you have to have a lot more time; and yet we did not want to give any more time to U.N. weapons inspectors, but we are asked to give enormous amounts of time here. And we have the full roam of the country uninhibited. And then we supposedly were prepared for the post-Saddam era, and we seem not to be able to put that together, or I am not sure what our intent is.
We do not seem to know where Saddam Hussein is. We also do not seem to know where Osama bin Laden is, and that is a whole other issue in terms of Afghanistan and what happened. And so you have the confluence of all of these issues.
The point really is that it is the congressional responsibility for oversight that we have on behalf of all of the American people to raise the questions and get the answers that ultimately lead us to make the right choices in the future, informed choices, based upon real substantive information, not perceived or possibly manipulated information, and to be understanding that we have got to be prepared. We won the war; we salute the men and women who did not ask whether this was the right conflict or not but just responded to the Nation's call. I visited one of our bases and the young men and women there told me, Congressman, we don't ask whether this is right or wrong, we don't pick the time, the place or the conflict, we just respond. We salute them for that. But before we send those young men and women, sons and daughters of Americans of this country, we should know that we are sending them on the right information, that we have a plan not only to win the war but then to achieve the peace and to make sure that the seeds that we seek to sow in terms of democracy take place. Those are some of our concerns I think in this process.
I think there are a variety of things. I am sure some of our colleagues have some ideas as well. But fundamentally you have to get Iraqi civil society back engaged. You have to create the wherewithal to show that not only were we liberators, hopefully, but at the end of the day that we have also come to help really create a better society and to assist Iraqis to be able to do that. That comes with, first of all, at least having the functioning entities of civil society be able to take place, as you suggested, some of those institutions. As our colleagues suggested, to get some of the basic fundamental services that Iraqis would expect from a liberating force to take place and to begin to act. So, clean water, running sewerage systems, the opportunity for electricity to be present, the return to schools of children, the opportunity for hospitals to
be able to take care of the sick. The rudimentary elements of a civil society start there. And then to engage civil society within Iraq to begin to perform some of their own functions and to also ask the beginnings of Iraq's natural resources to go for the purposes of helping Iraq rebuild itself. I think the American people have the right to know how long are we going to continue to be there? How many more lives will we lose? How much will it cost? And, as I always listen to our colleagues here in the House and in committee, what is our exit strategy? What is our exit strategy?
No, we do not hear about exit strategies or nation building anymore.
Very briefly, I appreciate the gentleman's engaging in the dialogue, and I hope we will continue it in the future. I think we owe America's young men and women who went into harm's way, that before we call upon them again for a preemptive strike, that we are doing so based upon sound information, that we are based on intelligence that is honest, truthful and transparent, that we ultimately have a plan not only to win the war but to win the peace, because we are losing soldiers every day. It is not as well publicized, but we are losing soldiers every day. We deserve, before we send the finest to answer the Nation's call, and that is where the congressional responsibility takes place, in asking these questions, in getting answers and being able to prepare for the future.